FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 28 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER P. JERNIGAN, No. 12-15297
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00104-ECR-
WGC
v.
RENEE BAKER, MEMORANDUM*
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Edward C. Reed, Junior, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 11, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and BEISTLINE, Chief
District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Ralph R. Beistline, Chief United States District Judge
for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
Petitioner-Appellant Christopher Jernigan appeals the denial of a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). Jernigan claims that the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada erred when it agreed with the Nevada
Supreme Court in finding that the State’s prosecutorial misconduct did not present a
substantial and injurious effect or have an influence on the jury’s verdict in Jernigan’s
case.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a writ of habeas corpus.
Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 926-27 (9th Cir. 2007). Once a habeas petitioner has
shown there to be trial error warranting habeas review, the reviewing court has the
responsibility to determine whether the error resulted in actual prejudice. Mancuso
v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 949 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002). Actual prejudice means that “the
error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Although improper, the prosecutor’s elicitation of inadmissible character
testimony and his comments during closing arguments were not prejudicial errors
because the State’s case against Jernigan was overwhelming and because the trial
court took action to cure such improprieties. Thus, the jury’s ability to judge evidence
fairly and the jury’s verdict were not affected. Consequently, the fairness of
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Jernigan’s trial was not disrupted under the Brecht standard. Jernigan also argues that
the trial court wrongly admitted evidence of his prior bad acts. This argument is
virtually identical to his character evidence argument and fails for the same reason.
The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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