IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEBRA PUGH, AARON BOWMAN and
FLOANN BAUTISTA on their own No. 68651-8-1
behalf and on behalf of all persons
similarly situated, DIVISION ONE
Respondents, PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
cr. o
EVERGREEN HOSPITAL MEDICAL CD
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CENTER a/k/a KING COUNTY PUBLIC o
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HOSPITAL DISTRICT NO. 2, rv?
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Appellant, 3T
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WASHINGTON STATE NURSES CO
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ASSOCIATION, FILED: October 28, 2013
Appellant.
Grosse, J - A union has standing to sue in its associational capacity for injunctive
relief and back pay for missed rest breaks incurred by its members when, as here,
damages can be established without requiring the participation of the individual union
members. Thus, the trial court erred by invalidating a settlement agreement between
the union and the employer based on the union's lack of standing. Accordingly, we
reverse.
FACTS
The Washington State Nurses Association (WSNA) appeals from the same trial
court orders addressed in the linked appeal brought by Evergreen Hospital.1 Thus, the
procedural and substantive facts are identical to those set forth in the opinion for the
1 Puqh v. Evergreen Hospital and Wash. State Nurses Ass'n, No. 68550-3-I (Wash. Ct.
App. October 28, 2013).
No. 68651-8-1/2
Evergreen appeal. Accordingly, for efficiency for they will not be repeated here but will
be incorporated by reference as they are necessary to the analysis.
ANALYSIS
WSNA contends that the trial court erred by concluding that WSNA lacked
standing to sue Evergreen and invalidating the settlement agreement on that basis.
We agree. An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members when the
following criteria are satisfied: (1) the members of the organization would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests that the organization seeks to
protect are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither claim requires the participation of the
organization's individual members.2
Unlike a suit for injunctive relief which generally benefits every member of an
employee association equally, a suit for monetary relief may involve varying amounts of
damages among employee members.3 Thus, in a suit for money damages, the third
requirement has been interpreted to permit associational standing when "an individual
association member's participation is not necessary to prove the damages that are
asserted on behalf of the members by the association."4 This is established when the
record shows that the amount of monetary relief requested on behalf of each employee
is certain, easily ascertainable, and within the defendant's knowledge.5
2 International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d 207,
213-14, 45 P.3d 186(2002).
3 Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d at 214.
4 Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d at 216.
5 Spokane Airports, 146 Wn.2d at 216.
2
No. 68651-8-1/3
In Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Department of Corrections (DOC),6 we held
that a union representing prison emergency response team members had associational
standing to sue DOC for recovery of wages for time spent on call while off duty. We
concluded that the amount of wages sought was both easily ascertainable and within
the employer's knowledge because the employees carried pagers when off duty and
wages could be calculated by subtracting time for regular shifts, overtime, on leave, or
official standby. More importantly, we concluded that standing is not defeated simply
because individual association members may be called as witnesses:
[The employer] confuses participation as witnesses with participation as
necessary parties to ascertain damages. The employees are not
necessary parties; neither are they indispensable parties. Here, the
calculation of damages does not require individual determination and the
liability issues, though of a factual nature, are common to all. We refuse
to adopt [the employer's] position that participation of an individual
member as a witness abrogates the Union's standing to prosecute the
employees wage claims.171
Here, the trial court concluded that WSNA lacked standing because the third
requirement was not met:
Spokane Airports holds that the union's standing to sue on an
associational basis violates the third requirement unless "the amount of
monetary damages sought on behalf of those members is certain, easily
ascertainable, and within the knowledge of the defendant." 146 Wn.2d at
215-16. In Spokane Airports, the amounts due were withholdings for
Social Security and employer matched funds, which were calculated
exactly and were clearly known to the Spokane airport. [146 Wn.2d] at
217. In a similar case involving Special Emergency Response Team
(SERT) employees at a prison seeking compensation for their on-call time,
the Court of Appeals found standing for the union where calculating
possible damages, "will then be nothing more than a mathematical
exercise." Teamsters Local Union No. 117, 145 Wn. App. at 513.
6
145 Wn. App. 507,187 P.3d 754 (2008).
7 Teamsters Local Union No. 117, 145 Wn. App. at 513-14 (footnote and citation
omitted).
3
No. 68651-8-1/4
No such easily ascertainable amount of damages can be found
here. The parties disagree vehemently as to even the possible amount of
damages in this case. Plaintiffs assert that WSNA previously calculated
the amount owed to the nurse was over $1 million dollars, and that
Evergreen estimated the amount due as approximately $600,000,
although Evergreen contests the basis and accuracy of this amount.
Further, all parties agree that nurses in different sections of the hospital
missed breaks at various rates. Unlike Spokane Airports and Teamsters
Local Union No. 117, all parties agree there are no records from which
Evergreen can precisely determine the amount owed. Under these
circumstances, it is clear that WSNA would require the participation of at
least some of the registered nurses who work at Evergreen Hospital.
We disagree with the trial court. First, the fact that the parties disagree about the
amount of damages does not mean that there is no ascertainable amount of damages
and WSNA is thereby prevented from establishing damages for purposes of standing.
Rather, WSNA need only show that it was prepared to establish damages that did not
require participation of the individual members. Indeed, WSNA and Evergreen
considered various damages calculations and in fact determined damages owed to the
nurses for the settlement agreement without requiring the participation of the individual
nurses.8
Nor is the absence of records fatal to establishing WSNA's standing. Our courts
have recognized that in wage and hour cases where employers have failed to keep
adequate records, damages may be established by "just and reasonable inference."
Such inferences can be established by "representative testimony," as in McLaughlin v.
8 Eg^, they used the number of hours worked per week over the alleged time period, the
hourly rate, and the number of breaks to which they were entitled.
9 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687, 66 S. Ct. 1187, 90 L. Ed.
1515(1946).
4
No. 68651-8-1/5
Ho Fat Seto,10 where the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's inference of a violation
involving 28 employees based on the testimony of five witnesses. Similarly here,
representative testimony from each department could serve as proof of the damages.
As in Teamsters Local Union No. 117, the participation of some nurses to establish
damages does not abrogate the union's standing to prosecute such cases.11
Additionally, the trial court's ruling disregards the fact that WSNA's lawsuit also
sought injunctive relief, which does not require proof of individual damages. As WSNA
correctly notes, the trial court's assertion that "Washington law is clear that a union may
only represent its membership on a claim for damages and not for injunctive relief," is in
error. As discussed above, our courts have recognized that associational standing to
sue for injunctive relief is more easily established than standing to sue for monetary
damages because it generally benefits members of an employee association equally.
Because WSNA had standing to sue, the trial court's ruling invalidating the settlement
agreement for WSNA's lack of standing is without basis. Accordingly, we reverse.
WSNA also contends, as does Evergreen, that the trial court erred by invalidating
the settlement agreement on the basis that the settlement was not court approved
under CR 23(e), and by invalidating the individual settlements and releases entered into
by WSNA members. As we conclude in our opinion in Evergreen's appeal, these
arguments have merit and the trial court erred by invalidating the settlements on these
10 850 F.2d 586, 589 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 488 U.S. 1040, 109 S. Ct. 864, 102 L.
Ed. 2d 988 (1989).
11 See 145 Wn. App. at 513-14.
12 See Spokane Airports. 146 Wn.2d at 214.
No. 68651-8-1/6
bases.13 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary judgment for
Pugh and remand for reinstatement of the settlement agreement.
We reverse and remand.
WE CONCUR:
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13 See Evergreen, No. 68550-3-I, slip op. at 12.
6