UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 96-40421
Summary Calendar
__________________
FREDA YOKUM MONROE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BEAUMONT REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas
(1:95-CV-851)
______________________________________________
December 24, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*
Freda Yokum Monroe (“Monroe”) appeals from a summary judgment
granted in favor of Beaumont Regional Medical Center on her claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
We review the district court’s grant of a summary judgment de
novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Hanks v.
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.
1992). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). We have
reviewed the briefs, the pleadings, and the summary judgment
evidence and agree that no genuine issue of material fact precludes
summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm for essentially the
reasons stated by the district court in its order.
Monroe also contends that the district court abused its
discretion by failing to allow her additional time to conduct
discovery before rendering summary judgment. We find this
contention to be without merit. Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure gives the district court discretion to allow
additional time for discovery before the court rules on a pending
motion for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f). We have
held that to obtain a Rule 56(f) continuance, “a party must
specifically explain both why it is currently unable to present
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact and how a
continuance would enable the party to present such evidence.”
Liquid Drill, Inc. v. U.S. Turnkey Exploration, Inc., 48 F.3d 927,
2
930 (5th Cir. 1995). In her response to Beaumont Regional Medical
Center’s motion for summary judgment, Monroe reiterated her belief
that she had been given insufficient time for discovery, but failed
to point out what evidence she expected to garner from further
discovery. Similarly, Monroe on appeal makes no attempt to
demonstrate that additional discovery would have allowed her to
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Stults v. Conoco,
Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996). At the time Monroe filed
her response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the
district court had already granted Monroe three extensions of time
within which to respond. The district court in this case acted
well within its discretion by refusing to further postpone ruling
on defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
3