IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-60317
Summary Calendar
JAMES M. LYLE, IV,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAGNOLIA STATE ENTERPRISE, INC.;
AVERY WOODS, CEO, of Magnolia State
Enterprises; LOUIS VAUGHN, Supervisor;
LARRY HOLLEY, Supervisor,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(4:94-CV-326-B-A)
_________________________________________________________________
December 12, 1996
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, James M. Lyle IV,
an inmate in the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) at
Parchman, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Magnolia State Enterprises (MSE) and three of its
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
employees. Lyle now appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). We affirm
in part and vacate and remand in part.
I. BACKGROUND
MSE is a private corporation that operates facilities at
Parchman under contract with MDOC. In his complaint, Lyle
asserts four distinct causes of action under the umbrella of
§ 1983. First, Lyle claims that all inmates who work for MSE are
employees and as such have a constitutional right to earn at
least minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).
Second, Lyle claims that MSE’s failure to provide workers’
compensation for inmate employees violates state and federal law.
Third, Lyle asserts that MSE subjects its inmate employees to
unsafe and unhealthy working conditions in violation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), which in turn
constitutes a violation of the inmates’ constitutional right to
equal protection. Finally, Lyle alleges that two MSE supervisors
verbally threatened him, ultimately causing him to resign his
job.
The magistrate judge conducted a Spears1 hearing on
September 27, 1995, and subsequently issued his report and
recommendation that Lyle’s suit be dismissed as frivolous under
1
See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985).
2
§ 1915(d). Lyle sought and was granted an extension of time to
file his objections to the magistrate judge’s report. Lyle did
not file his objections within the extended period, and the
district court entered final judgment adopting the findings and
conclusions of the magistrate judge and dismissing the case.
Lyle subsequently filed his objections. The district court
construed these objections as a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court denied the motion, and Lyle timely
filed a notice of appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 1915(d) authorizes a district court to dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint “if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d). A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in
law if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,”
such as where defendants are clearly immune from suit or where
the complaint alleges infringement of a legal interest that
clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. We review a § 1915(d)
dismissal for abuse of discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
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A. Fair Labor Standards Act
Lyle argues that the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing his FLSA claim2 as being without an arguable basis in
fact or law. Lyle contends that the district court improperly
based its decision on the misconception that Lyle’s work for MSE
was part of his prison sentence, and he cites Watson v. Graves,
909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that inmates
who work for a private business are employees within the meaning
of the FLSA.
Watson involved two prisoners in Louisiana who had not been
sentenced to hard labor, but who, under a work-release program,
were contracted out by a sheriff for trusty labor at a flat rate
of $20 per day. Id. at 1551. The court explained that
determination of “employee” status for purposes of the FLSA
focuses on “economic reality and economic dependence.” Id. at
1553. The “economic reality” test includes inquiry into:
‘whether the alleged employer (1) has the power to hire
and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment,
(3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4)
maintained employment records.’
Id. (quoting Carter v. Dutchess Community College, 735 F.2d 8, 12
(2d Cir. 1984)). The court stated that an inmate’s employee
2
Although Lyle brought this claim under § 1983, he has not
alleged violation of a specific constitutional right nor has he
alleged that MSE is a state actor for § 1983 purposes. The
district court did not dismiss the action on this basis, but
apparently construed the claim liberally as one brought under the
FLSA.
4
status should be assessed by applying the above factors to the
facts of the case in light of the FLSA policies “to improve
living conditions, bargaining strength vis-a-vis employers, and
the general well-being of the American worker, [and] also to
eliminate unfair competition among employers competing for
business in the market and among workers looking for jobs.” Id.
at 1554.
The court distinguished between situations in which a
private, for-profit firm conducts operations on prison grounds,
typically utilizing prisoners who have been sentenced to hard
labor, and those in which inmates work outside the prison for and
under the supervision of private contractors. Id. at 1553. The
court stated that in most of the former situations, the economic
reality test has led courts to conclude that inmates were not
entitled to FLSA protection because “primary control over the
inmates, and determination of the hours to be worked and the
nature of the work to be performed rested with the prison.” Id.
In a footnote, the court made an explicit distinction between
prisoners who are sentenced to labor as part of their sentences
and those who are not. In the former case, “[the prisoner’s]
labor belongs to the prison and is at the disposal of the prison
officials.” Id. at 1553 n.7. However, “[i]n the latter case,
there is no bar to a FLSA claim because the prisoner’s work
belongs to him and not to the prison.” Id.
The district court based its conclusion that Lyle was not an
5
employee of MSE for FLSA purposes on a determination that Lyle
was required to work as part of his sentence. This determination
rested on a provision in the Mississippi Code which states that
“[a]ll inmates, unless physically unable, shall be required to
perform such work as may be set out in the policy-making board of
the institution.” Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-126 (1981).
It is not apparent from this record whether Lyle’s work for
MSE is required by § 47-5-126. The statute expressly
incorporates the policies of the institution, but the record
discloses no factual allegations concerning such policies.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that this claim is frivolous on
the ground that the work at issue is required as part of Lyle’s
sentence.
The magistrate judge also stated in his report that our
decision in Alexander v. Sara, Inc., 721 F.2d 149 (5th Cir.
1983), mandates the conclusion that Lyle is not an “employee”
under the FLSA. While we recognize many factual similarities
between this case and Alexander, our subsequent decision in
Watson establishes that the inquiry into employee status is more
complex than may have been suggested by Alexander.
We intimate no view as to the ultimate merits of this claim.
We hold merely that on the record before us we cannot conclude
that this claim has no “arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
B. Workers’ Compensation
6
In disposing of Lyle’s workers’ compensation claim, the
district court concluded that the claim lacked a basis in law
because the Mississippi workers’ compensation statute
specifically excludes inmates from coverage. See Miss. Code Ann.
§ 47-5-567. Lyle argues that this statute does not apply to a
private, for-profit corporation such as MSE. Lyle makes no
attempt, however, to reconcile his position with express language
in § 47-5-567 to the contrary:
No inmate shall be eligible for unemployment
compensation or workmen’s compensation whether employed
by the corporation or by any other private enterprise
operating on the grounds of a correctional institution
or elsewhere where such employment shall be part of a
correctional work program or work release program of
either the corporation or the department.
Id. (emphasis added). Further, Lyle does not assert that he has
suffered any injury that would entitle him to compensation, nor
does he advance any argument in support of a violation of federal
law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing this claim as legally frivolous.
C. OSHA
The district court concluded that Lyle’s OSHA claim was
frivolous because OSHA does not establish a constitutional
standard and Lyle did not allege facts either in his complaint or
at the Spears hearing which would constitute “deliberate
indifference” under the Eighth Amendment. On appeal, Lyle argues
that he could make a specific showing of deliberate indifference
7
due to OSHA violations. Lyle does not argue that he in fact made
such a showing to the district court. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim as
frivolous.3
D. Verbal threats
Lyle asserts that the district court abused its discretion
in dismissing his § 1983 claim against two MSE supervisors, Louis
Vaughn and Larry Holley. Lyle alleged that Vaughn and Holley
verbally threatened him during his month of employment with MSE.
Even assuming that the supervisors are state actors for purposes
of § 1983, mere allegations of verbal abuse and threats do not
state a claim under § 1983. McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 998 (1983).
Lyle argues that the alleged threats constitute violations
of various state statutes. Lyle did not, however, make any such
claims in his complaint. Even assuming that Lyle made this
argument below and that the behavior in question does violate
state law, a violation of state law does not automatically give
rise to a claim of constitutional significance under § 1983.
Moreover, if construed purely as claims pursuant to state law,
3
The district court analyzed this claim as a potential
constitutional violation under § 1983. We note that this claim
would have been properly dismissed if construed as a direct
challenge under OSHA, because OSHA does not give rise to a
private cause of action. See Barrera v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
and Co., Inc., 653 F.2d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 1981).
8
pendent jurisdiction does not attach because these claims do not
arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as Lyle’s federal
causes of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing this claim as frivolous.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of this action as to Lyle’s workers’ compensation,
OSHA, and verbal threat claims, and VACATE the order of dismissal
and REMAND for further proceedings as to Lyle’s FLSA claim.
9