United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-40240.
Nesbitt Edwin MADISON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lt. R. PARKER, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Jan. 31, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Nesbitt Edwin Madison, an inmate currently confined in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, filed
a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of
his constitutional rights during his confinement in the state
penitentiary. A hearing was held by Magistrate Judge Judith K.
Guthrie of the Eastern District of Texas after which she held,
inter alia, that a prisoner has no liberty interest in his good
conduct credit time and dismissed Madison's claim. Upon reviewing
the facts in the record along with the laws of Texas we vacate the
lower court's decision and remand for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
Madison is incarcerated at the Beto I Unit in Tennessee
Colony, Texas. On May 18, 1995, Madison was in his prison cell
when his cellmate, Garcia, was severely injured. A security
officer on duty that evening, Officer Goodwin, was conducting a
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security check when he saw Garcia standing by the bars with blood
on his face and clothes. Goodwin called for Lieutenant R. Parker,
a correctional officer at the Beto I Unit. When Parker arrived at
the scene he was told by both inmates that Garcia had fallen out of
his bunk. Despite Garcia's and Madison's statements, Lt. Parker
concluded that the numerous facial injuries sustained by Garcia
indicated that he had been assaulted. Madison was removed from the
cell and placed in prehearing detention.
A disciplinary hearing was held on May 23, 1995. Parker
testified that, although he did not witness the alleged fight,
Madison continually tried to assault Garcia after he arrived.
Madison tried to rebut Parker's testimony by attempting to
introduce his medical records of that evening to show that he had
not been injured. He also tried to introduce a witness statement
from Officer Goodwin stating that Garcia had told him that he had
injured himself by falling from his bunkbed. However, Captain
Emerson, the officer presiding over the hearings, denied both of
these requests. Madison was ultimately found guilty and punished
to 30 days of commissary restriction, 30 days of cell restriction,
and 30 days loss of good time already accumulated.
Madison filed suit contending his civil rights were violated
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and requested, as relief, that the
disciplinary case be expunged from his record and that he be
awarded $8,000 from Lt. Parker and $3,000 from Capt. Emerson.
Madison and the defendants consented to have this case heard by a
magistrate judge. A hearing in accordance with Spears v. McCotter,
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766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.1985), was held on February 20, 1996. Upon
reviewing the case, the lower court dismissed Madison's complaint
as frivolous on the grounds that the punishment Madison received
was not sufficient to trigger due process.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review a judgment rendered by a magistrate judge just as
we do a judgment rendered by a district judge. 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(3). The identification of the liberty interests that are
protected by the Due Process Clause is a question of federal
constitutional law that we review de novo. See Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 56
L.Ed.2d 30 (1978).
II. Due Process
Madison complains that he was denied due process at his
disciplinary hearing in that he was refused the opportunity to
present witnesses and offer documentary evidence. In evaluating
Madison's claim, we must first address the issue of whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to this
situation.
Although lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal of many privileges and rights, prisoners do not shed all
their rights at the prison gate. In fact, the Supreme Court has
recently reiterated and clarified which rights receive
constitutional protection in Sandin v. Conner, --- U.S. ----, 115
S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). The Court continued to follow
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its prior decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct.
2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), in holding that states may, under
certain circumstances, create liberty interests which are protected
by the Due Process Clause. However, it held that these interests
are generally limited to state created regulations or statutes
which affect the quantity of time rather than the quality of time
served by a prisoner. In coming to this conclusion, the Court
first laid down the principle that the Due Process Clause does not
protect every change in the conditions of confinement which has a
substantial adverse effect upon a prisoner. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct.
at 2297 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532,
2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976)).
We agree that Madison's 30 day commissary and cell
restrictions as punishment are in fact merely changes in the
conditions of his confinement and do not implicate due process
concerns. They are penalties which do not represent the type of
atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a
liberty interest. However, his loss of 30 days good time credit
calls for a more careful analysis.
The Constitution does not guarantee good time credit for
satisfactory behavior while in prison. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974).
However, some states create such a right. When a state creates a
right to good time credit and recognizes that its revocation is an
authorized sanction for misconduct, a prisoner's interest therein
is embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" concerns so
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as to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the due process clause to insure that
this state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935
(1974). In Texas, a prisoner may be awarded good conduct time
based on his or her specific behavior in various vocations.
TEX.GOV.CODE ANN. § 498.003(a) (Vernon 1996). If an inmate commits
an offense or violates an institutional rule during the course of
his confinement, the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice—Institutional Division ("TDCJ-ID") is empowered to forfeit
all or any part of the inmate's accrued good time. TEX.GOV.CODE ANN.
§ 498.004(a) (Vernon 1996). Once an inmate acquires good time, the
only way it can be revoked is if he or she commits an offense or
violates an institutional rule. The question here is whether Texas
has created a liberty interest in disseminating good conduct
credit, thereby invoking the due process requirements under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
There are two ways in which a prisoner becomes eligible for
release under Texas law. The first is by parole and the second is
under a mandatory supervised release program. "Parole" means the
discretionary and conditional release of an eligible prisoner
sentenced to the institutional division so that the prisoner may
serve the remainder of his sentence under the supervision and
control of the pardons and paroles division. TEX.CODE CRIM.P.ANN.
art. 42.18 § 2(1) (Vernon 1996). "Mandatory supervision" means the
release of an eligible prisoner sentenced to the institutional
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division so that the prisoner may serve the remainder of his
sentence not on parole, but under the supervision and control of
the pardons and paroles division. TEX.CODE CRIM.P.ANN. art. 42.18 §
2(2) (Vernon 1996).
In Texas, it is entirely speculative whether an inmate will
actually obtain parole, inasmuch as there is no right to be
released on parole. TEX.CODE CRIM.P.ANN. art. 42.18 § 8(a) (Vernon
1996); Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir.1995). In fact, we
have expressly held that there is no constitutional expectancy of
parole in Texas. Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1991).
However, we have not yet addressed the issue of whether there is a
constitutional expectancy of early release under mandatory
supervision when an inmate has acquired good time credits.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.18 § 8(c) provides
that "a prisoner who is not on parole shall be released to
mandatory supervision" when his calender time plus his accrued
good-conduct time equals the maximum term to which he was
sentenced. Furthermore, "a prisoner released to mandatory
supervision shall, upon release, be deemed as if released on
parole." TEX.CODE CRIM.P.ANN. art. 42.18 § 8(c) (Vernon 1996).
According to the Supreme Court in Wolff, a Nebraska statutory
provision that bestowed mandatory sentence reductions for good
behavior created a liberty interest for prisoners. This interest
in a shortened prison sentence resulted from good time credits,
credits which were revocable only if the prisoner was guilty of
serious misconduct. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975.
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Texas law parallels the Nebraska law interpreted by the Court
in Wolff in two ways. First, both states have statutes which
bestow mandatory sentence reductions for good behavior. Second,
both states have statutes which allow for a revocation of good
conduct credit for misbehavior. However, we note that under the
Texas statute, certain inmates are not eligible for release to
mandatory supervision. A prisoner is not eligible for release to
mandatory supervision if he has been convicted of certain crimes
listed under art. 42.18 § 8(c).
The lower court relies heavily on Sandin in its decision. In
Sandin, a Hawaii prison inmate was charged with "high misconduct"
for using physical interference to impair a correctional function,
and "low moderate misconduct" for using abusive or obscene language
and harassing employees. He appeared before an adjustment
committee at a disciplinary hearing, but was not permitted to call
witnesses. He was convicted of the charges and sentenced to 30
days of disciplinary segregation on the high misconduct charge and
four hours of segregation for each of the other two charges. In
its decision, the Court re-evaluated the circumstances under which
state prison regulations afford inmates a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause and determined, as it did in
Meachum, that the punishment received did not trigger the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Wolff is distinguishable from Sandin in one very important
facet. In Wolff, the Court based its analysis on the freedom from
restraint, while in Sandin it grounds its opinion on the type of
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restraint. It is a matter of kind rather than degree.
Furthermore, the Court in Sandin clearly left intact its holding in
Wolff, namely, that the loss of good time credits under a state
statute that bestowed mandatory sentence reductions for good
behavior must be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards in
order to satisfy due process. In Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541,
543 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994), we noted in dictum that such punishment
(loss of good time credit as the result of a disciplinary charge)
would trigger the higher standard of due process enunciated in
Wolff.
Unfortunately, the record lacks significant information as to
whether Madison was eligible for mandatory supervised release.
Therefore, we cannot determine whether he was entitled to due
process until sufficient facts have been revealed. Accordingly, we
vacate the judgment of the district court and remand this case for
further proceedings. In the event the lower court finds that
Madison is not eligible for mandatory release under 42.18 § 8(c),
the dismissal of Madison's complaint may be reinstated. In the
event the lower court finds that Madison is eligible for mandatory
release, the lower court should call for briefing from both the
State and Madison as to (1) whether the statutes regarding
mandatory release create a liberty interest requiring a higher
level of due process; and if so, (2) whether the disciplinary
hearing in this case satisfied the higher levels of due process
contemplated by the Supreme Court in Wolff.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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