UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-10477
(Summary Calendar)
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VIVIAN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DALLAS COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT AND
THE BILL J PRIEST INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:95-CV-2798-X)
January 3, 1997
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Vivian Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
Dallas County Community College District (“DCCCD”).2 We affirm.
I
Vivian Williams filed suit against the DCCCD alleging
discrimination based on race and retaliation in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, Ms. Williams alleges that she was
terminated from her job as an “Executive Secretary I” at the Bill
J. Priest Institute for Economic Development because she is
African-American and because she allegedly filed an Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) grievance against her supervisor.
The DCCCD brought a motion for summary judgment to which Ms.
Williams did not file a response. In support of its motion, the
DCCCD presented evidence that Ms. Williams was terminated because
she had falsified her employment application by indicating that she
possessed a college degree, when in fact she did not. The DCCCD
also demonstrated that it filled Ms. Williams’ position with other
African-American females after Ms. Williams’ termination, and that
Ms. Williams was not qualified for the position because she did not
possess a college degree.
The district court granted the DCCCD’s motion for summary
2
Though named as a defendant in this suit, the Bill J.
Priest Institute for Economic Development is a part of the DCCCD.
As the district court noted, the Institute was never served with
process. Thus, the district court dismissed Ms. Williams’ claims
against the Institute for want of prosecution. Ms. Williams does
not challenge this dismissal on appeal.
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judgment. Ms. Williams appeals.
II
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. Rizzo
v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 761 (5th
Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation
of Title VII,3 a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a
member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified to perform
the job; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that she was replaced
by a person outside the protected class. Normand v. Research Inst.
of Am., Inc., 927 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1991).
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
3
Ms. Williams alleges violations of both Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981. However, as the district court correctly noted, the
elements of the two claims are identical. Anderson v. Douglas &
Lomason Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1099, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1066 (1995); see
also Flanagan v. A.E. Henry Community Health Servs. Ctr., 876 F.2d
1231, 1233-34 (5th Cir. 1989) (“When 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII
are alleged as parallel bases of relief, the same elements of proof
are required for both actions.”). Thus, we employ only one
analysis in evaluating Ms. Williams’ Title VII and § 1981 claims.
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506-07, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993). If the
defendant provides such a reason, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at
507-08, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
Ms. Williams did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination in violation of Title VII or § 1981 because she was
replaced by two persons within her protected class. Moreover, the
DCCCD presented evidence that Ms. Williams was not qualified for
the position from which she was terminated because she did not have
a college degree and the posted Notice of Vacancy for the position
included the educational requirement of “Associate Degree in
secretarial science or equivalent.” Therefore, Ms. Williams failed
to make a prima facie case, and the district court properly granted
summary judgment.
Also, in failing to respond to the DCCCD’s summary judgment
motion, Ms. Williams failed to present any evidence, even outside
the prima facie case framework, indicating that racial
discrimination motivated her termination. See Jatoi v. Hurst-
Euless-Bedford Hosp. Auth., 807 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“If a plaintiff cannot establish some or all of the [elements of
the prima facie case], the district court must examine all the
evidence that has been adduced for other indicia of racial
discrimination relating to [the plaintiff’s] discharge and
determine whether it is more likely than not that the employer’s
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actions were based on illegal discriminatory criteria.”), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 108 S. Ct. 709, 98 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1988).
Furthermore, had Ms. Williams established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the DCCCD presented evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Williams’ termination))that she
falsified her employment application to indicate that she possessed
a college degree that she did not indeed possess. Ms. Williams
offered no evidence demonstrating that the DCCCD’s proffered
nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Ms. Williams’ discrimination
claims. See also Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 657 (5th
Cir. 1996) (“Because plaintiffs filed no timely response [to the
defendant’s summary judgment motion], they did not meet their
burden to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. Therefore, the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Conoco was entirely appropriate.”)
(quotations and citations omitted).
Ms. Williams also alleges that she was terminated in
retaliation for her alleged filing of a grievance against her
supervisor. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under
Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she engaged in
activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment
action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal connection between
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the participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision. Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 724
(5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 107 S. Ct. 952, 93 L.
Ed. 2d 1001 (1987).
Ms. Williams did not establish a prima facie case of
retaliation. Specifically, she provided no evidence other than the
allegations in her complaint that she filed an EEO grievance
against her supervisor.4 Furthermore, she presented no evidence
demonstrating that a causal connection existed between the alleged
EEO grievance and her termination. As a result, we also affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the DCCCD on
Ms. Williams’ retaliation claim.5
4
On appeal, Ms. Williams presents what appears to be a
handwritten letter from herself to Elizabeth Klimback regarding the
alleged filing of a grievance. This document does not appear in
the district court record, and therefore cannot be considered on
appeal. See Stults, 76 F.3d at 657 (“Although on summary judgment
the record is reviewed de novo, this court for obvious reasons,
will not consider evidence or arguments that were not presented to
the district court for its consideration in ruling on the motion.”)
(citation omitted).
5
The DCCCD also argues that Ms. Williams’ claims were
time-barred by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The date of
receipt of a right-to-sue letter triggers the commencement of the
statutory time period for filing suit. Espinoza v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985) (“We believe that
ordinarily the purposes of the Act will be served by commencement
of the ninety-day period on the date that notice is received at the
address supplied to the EEOC by the claimant.”). “[C]ommencing an
action within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter is
not a jurisdictional prerequisite; rather, the ninety-day
requirement is akin to a statute of limitations.” Id. at 1248 n.1.
The parties in this case apparently contest the date on which
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AFFIRMED.
Ms. Williams received her right-to-sue letter. See Appellee’s
Brief at 7 (“Ms. Williams . . . alleges that she did not receive
[right-to-sue] notice until August 28, 1995. . . . DCCCD asserts
that Ms. Williams received notice prior to August 26, 1995, thus
making the filing of her suit untimely and barred as a matter of
law.”). However, because we find that summary judgment in favor of
the DCCCD is appropriate on the merits of Ms. Williams’ claims, we
need not reach the DCCCD’s statute of limitations argument or
attempt to resolve the dispute regarding Ms. Williams’ receipt of
the right-to-sue letter.
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