IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-60542
(Summary Calendar)
BOB LAMB,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JIM EDWARDS; HENRY POTTS;
PAUL KING SHANNON; BUDDY TWITTY;
LEROY MCMILLEN; THE NEW ALBANY
MUNICIPAL AIRPORT BOARD; NEW
ALBANY, MISSISSIPPI; UNION COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(3:94-CV-160-S-D)
February 21, 1997
( , 1997)
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In the instant appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Bob Lamb asks us to
reverse the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees to
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Defendants-Appellees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, resulting from
the Defendants return to district court following our 1995
affirmance of that court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the Defendants, rejecting all of Lamb’s claims.1 Lamb argues that
(1) the Defendants-Appellees should not have been awarded fees for
independent counsel when a legal defense was provided by their
liability insurance carrier, (2) Defendants-Appellees’ motion for
attorney’s fees was untimely under the Local Rules and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and (3) Lamb’s claims were not frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation, pretermitting Defendants-
Appellees’ entitlement to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Concluding that Lamb’s contentions not only lack merit but approach
legal frivolousness, we affirm the district court’s award of costs,
including attorney’s fees, and remand the case to the district
court to augment its award with additional reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs incurred by the Defendants-Appellees from the end of
the period for which fees were previously awarded through the
instant appeal.
We have familiarized ourselves with the underlying
litigation,2 reviewed the record in the instant case, read the
district court’s Memorandum Opinion Granting Defendants’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees, and considered the arguments of counsel as fully
set forth in their respective appellate briefs. As a result, we
1
Lamb v. Edwards, et al., No. 94-60414, February 8, 1995
(unpublished).
2
Id.
2
are firmly convinced that the rendition of the facts and law
contained in Lamb’s appellate brief mischaracterizes the situation
to such an extent that Lamb’s appeal closely approaches legal
frivolousness and thus sanctionability under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38. In contrast, the arguments and authorities
set forth in the appellate brief of Defendants-Appellees and, more
importantly, the well-crafted opinion of the district court,
accurately and completely portraying the issues involved in the
attorney’s phase of this litigation and support in full both the
propriety of awarding attorney’s fees and other direct costs, and
the quantum of the fees and costs awarded. Moreover, the
methodology employed by the district court faithfully follows the
guidance of this court regarding attorney’s fees litigation,
particularly that embodied in the opinion of our seminal case of
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,3 and its progeny.
We would, therefore, merely waste judicial resources (as well
as paper) if we were to write separately on the merits of this
appeal; instead, we adopt in toto the opinion of the district court
and append a copy hereto. Our adoption of that opinion includes,
inter alia, approval of the court’s determination of frivolousness
which underpins its award of attorney’s fees, its determination of
the lodestar amount, and its identification of those legal services
that should either be allowed or disallowed in calculating the
quantum of its award; and affirmance of the separate judgment of
the district court, in its entirety.
3
488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
3
We nevertheless remand this case once more to the district
court for the limited purpose of augmenting its attorney’s fees
judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees to compensate them for
the additional expenses of attorney’s fees and out-of-pocket costs
incurred in obtaining the attorney’s fees judgment in the district
court and defending that judgment in the instant appeal. The
district court need not “reinvent the wheel” by gain determining
the lodestar amount, modifications thereto, if any, or other such
matters preliminary to calculation, but need only multiply the
hourly rate already determined by the number of hours appropriately
expended by counsel for Defendants-Appellees in obtaining the
attorney’s fees award and defending that award in the instant
appeal. In closing we caution counsel for Lamb against further
prolongation of the instant litigation: We shall cast a jaundiced
eye on further filings, including, without limitation, a petition
for rehearing of this appeal and opposition to or appeals from the
award of supplemental attorney’s fees and costs by the district
court on remand.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED for award of supplemental attorney’s fees and
costs.
4