United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-50100.
TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee-Cross-
Appellant,
v.
RYLANDER INVESTMENT CO., INC., Defendant-Counter Claimant-
Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
March 25, 1997.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
While the parties to this case have presented us with several
questions to resolve in this appeal, only one merits extended
discussion: Does Texas law require an entity which brokers real
estate on behalf of a governmental body to obtain a real estate
license. We answer this question in the negative.
This case concerns a contract ("the Agreement") between Travis
County, Texas ("County") and Hill Rylander ("Rylander") for the
construction and operation of a farmers market ("the Market") in
Austin for a 20-year term. Rylander agreed to exercise his best
efforts and professional skill in managing the Market so as to
provide the County with an economic return and to "provide a
quality service at an affordable price for the public in the
marketing of produce by local growers and producers, and an
agricultural exhibit center, with related operations being a magnet
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to attract citizens and tourists on a year-round basis." One of
his chief tasks involved leasing space at the Market to the vendors
who are, ultimately, the Market's raisons d'être. Rylander's
compensation was tied to the Market's performance which, in turn,
depended upon there being vendors at the Market whose wares were
desired by the shopping public in Travis County. These lease
agreements were not final, however, until the County gave its
approval to them.
For a variety of reasons, the parties' relationship soured to
the point of litigation. The County sued Rylander Investment
Company ("RIC"), which had been assigned all of Rylander's rights
and obligations under the Agreement, in state court in July 1994
alleging a number of claims and sought damages as well as
rescission of the contract. It based its rescission argument on a
claim that RIC failed to obtain a real estate license required
under both state law and the Agreement. Its failure to obtain this
license, the County asserted, resulted in RIC's breach of certain
fiduciary obligations it owed the County. RIC removed the case to
federal court1 and counter-claimed for damages it alleged to have
suffered from, inter alia, the County's refusal to approve
negotiated leases. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge and a two-week bench trial commenced.
The magistrate judge entered an opinion and order on December
1
Subject-matter jurisdiction was premised on an Americans with
Disabilities Act claim brought by Travis County. The court
dismissed this claim before trial but, "[d]ue to the advanced
posture of the case," elected to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining claims.
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13, 1995. With respect to the issue of the real estate license,
the magistrate determined, after hearing the testimony of an
attorney with the Texas Real Estate Commission, that RIC was
required to be licensed under state law. He excused RIC's
noncompliance with the Act, however, finding that its use of its
lawyer2 demonstrated good-faith compliance with the Act. Yet he
also determined that the Agreement required that RIC itself become
licensed and so ordered it to obtain this license. At the same
time he forgave the County's refusal to approve leases because of
RIC's lack of a license. Both parties appeal.
The issue of real estate licensure requires us to engage in an
interpretation of the Texas Real Estate License Act (RELA), Tex.
Rev. Civil Stat. Ann. art. 6573a. The County asserts that both the
Agreement and the RELA required RIC to obtain a real estate license
in connection with its duties in leasing space at the Market. It
is undisputed that RIC did not possess a license. Rylander
obtained one after the Agreement was signed but it subsequently
lapsed; he took the test again in 1993 but failed and currently
does not have one. RIC asserts that the RELA does not require
licensure because all of its real estate brokering was done on
behalf of Travis County, a local governmental body. The County
disputes this reading of the RELA, but argues that even if RIC was
not required by Texas law to become licensed, the Agreement itself
requires a license. We review de novo both the lower court's
2
Lawyers are not required to become licensed real estate
brokers under Texas law.
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interpretation of the Agreement and its conclusions as to the
requirements of state law.
RIC first states that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that the Agreement required anything above and beyond compliance
with state law. The magistrate judge's opinion does not indicate
upon which section of the Agreement he relied in making this
determination. The only section we find that might bear upon this
situation is § 7(d), which requires RIC
[t]o comply with all licensing requirements in order to allow
[RIC] to serve in the capacity provided herein, and to comply
with all building codes, zoning, and licensing requirements,
and other requirements of federal, state, county, or municipal
authorities having jurisdiction over the Premises, with the
exception that [RIC] will not have to comply with any
requirements which are not applicable to the Owner.
We find that this section does no more than require adherence to
applicable law. In light of this finding, we must now determine
what the applicable law—the RELA—requires.
The RELA was enacted in an attempt to eliminate or reduce
fraud on the public caused by unlicensed, unqualified, or
unscrupulous persons dealing in real estate. See Henry S. Miller
Co. v. Treo Enters., 585 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Tex.1979). Among its
provisions is a requirement that certain individuals or entities
obtain a license from the Texas Real Estate Commission before
engaging in real estate transactions. It requires licensure for "a
person, who for another person and for a fee, commission, or other
valuable consideration, or with the intention or in the expectation
or on the promise of receiving or collecting a fee, commission, or
other valuable consideration from another person " sells, leases,
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purchases, rents, leases real estate, or negotiates such
activities, and other related activities. RELA § 2(2) (emphasis
added). The RELA defines a "person" as "an individual, a limited
liability company, or a corporation, foreign or domestic." RELA §
2(5). RIC concedes that it is a "person," but argues that the
County is not a "person," thereby exempting it from the license
requirements of the RELA.
There exists no reported decision of a Texas court
interpreting the RELA with respect to this question. There do
exist, however, numerous decisions which set forth the rules of
statutory construction in Texas as well as decisions interpreting
the term "corporation" in other contexts. It is based upon these
precedents and our own reading of the RELA that we conclude that
RIC is exempt from its licensing requirement.
The RELA applies only to a person who represents another
person. If the County is not included within RELA's definition of
"person," RIC is not required to become licensed. This follows
from a general rule of statutory construction, followed in Texas,
that presumes that every word in a statute is used for a purpose
and every word excluded is excluded for a purpose. Cameron v.
Terrell & Garrett, 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex.1981). The plain
language of RELA's definition of person does not seem to permit the
inclusion of a local government body like Travis County. The
County is obviously not an individual or a limited liability
company and our reading of Texas case law leads us to conclude that
it cannot be considered a corporation.
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Texas courts have held in other contexts that the term
"corporation" does not include governmental bodies. See State v.
Central Power & Light Co., 139 Tex. 51, 161 S.W.2d 766, 768 (1942)
(antitrust case holding that "as a general rule the word
"corporation' is construed to apply only to private corporations
and does not include municipal corporations, unless the statute
expressly so provides"); Harris Mun. Util. Dist. v. Mitchell, 915
S.W.2d 859, 866 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied)
(for purposes of attorney's fees statute, governmental unit not a
"corporation"); Base-Seal, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 901 S.W.2d
783, 787 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, writ denied) (same); Lake LBJ
Mun. Util. Dist. v. Coulson, 839 S.W.2d 880, 892-93
(Tex.App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (same); Kerrville HRH v. City of
Kerrville, 803 S.W.2d 377, 381-82 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, writ
denied) (holding that definition of "person" in Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, defined as "an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other group, however organized," does not include
local governmental bodies). We defer to this interpretation and
hold that the County was not a "person" for purposes of RELA.
Accordingly, § 2(2) does not require RIC to obtain a real estate
license.
In response, the County first argues that, notwithstanding the
foregoing discussion of § 2, § 4 of the RELA mandates licensure for
RIC. Section 4 provides as follows:
A person who, directly or indirectly for another, with the
intention or on the promise of receiving any valuable
consideration, offers, attempts, or agrees to perform, or
performs, a single act defined in Subdivisions 2 and 3,
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Section 2 of this Act, whether as a part of a transaction, or
as an entire transaction, is deemed to be acting as a real
estate broker or salesman within the meaning of this Act. The
commission of a single such act by a person required to be
licensed under this Act and not so licensed shall constitute
a violation of this Act.
RELA § 4. As RIC correctly argues, this section does not impose a
duty upon one who is already disqualified under the terms of §§
2(2) and 2(3). As discussed above, § 2(2) does not pick up RIC and
neither does § 2(3). Accordingly, § 4 does not require a license.
The County also argues that there is already a specific
exception in the RELA for public officials (§ 3(3)), which
exception RIC cannot utilize. While an accurate reading of the
statute, this does nothing to change our interpretation. The fact
that there is already a government-related exception from the
license requirement does not require an interpretation of the RELA
which pretends to ignore the language in § 2(2).
The remaining issues raised by the parties do not merit
extended discussion. Our review of the record satisfies us that
the magistrate judge did not err in finding that the County
fulfilled its obligations under the contract with respect to the
initial construction upgrades, but not because it spent what it was
required to spend. We agree with the magistrate judge's
conclusions that income received by RIC from the farmers' stall
fees constitutes "gross rental income," that RIC is not entitled to
damages from the County's interference with the Pumpkin Festival,
that the Agreement requires RIC to obtain fire and liability
insurance, that the amendment to the Agreement is supported by
consideration, and that RIC has no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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We find no abuse of discretion in the magistrate judge's refusal to
designate RIC as the prevailing party for purposes of an award of
attorney's fees. We find that RIC did not breach any fiduciary
duty it may have owed to the County and refuse to order rescission
of the Agreement. We agree with the magistrate judge that the
Agreement does not prevent RIC from conducting festivals at the
Market for profit.
We reverse the magistrate judge's order requiring RIC to
obtain a real estate license. As a consequence, we also reverse
that part of its order denying RIC's claim relating to the County's
refusal to approve leases submitted to it. The magistrate judge
found the County's refusal to approve did not amount to a breach of
the Agreement because it found that the County acted upon "a
reasonable (and ultimately justified) belief that RIC needed to
obtain a real estate license." Because we have found the County's
position with respect to the requirement of licensure to be
erroneous under both the Agreement and state law, we remand the
case for reconsideration of this aspect of RIC's breach of contract
claim.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with
instructions.
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