UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
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No. 96-10222
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RIFER JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, ET AL.,
Defendants,
JIM BOWLES, ADRIAN COLLYNS, and BARBARA STACY,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
Dallas Division
(3:92-CV-1121-P)
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March 20, 1997
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:1
Rifer Johnson, plaintiff-appellee, who was a convicted felon
and an inmate in the Dallas County Jail, filed this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 suit against Jim Bowles, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas,
Barbra Stacy, head of nursing for the jail, and Dr. Adrian Collyns,
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Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
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a physician on the jail medical staff alleging that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of his constitutional rights. The three defendants filed
motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal based on qualified
immunity which the district court denied. We REVERSE and RENDER.
I.
Assessing the defense of qualified immunity is a two-step
process. First, we must determine whether Johnson has alleged
the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. If
Johnson has alleged such a violation, we then decide if the
defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable. Even if an
official’s conduct violates a constitutional right, he is
entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively
reasonable. Nerren v. Livingston Police Dept., 86 F.3d 469, 473
(5th Cir. 1996); Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1993).
Assessing Johnson’s allegations in the light most favorable
to him, Johnson has failed to state a claim for violation of a
constitutional right. In order to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
for denial of medical care in violation of the Eight Amendment,
Johnson was required to allege facts demonstrating that these
defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of
serious harm to Johnson but responded with deliberate
indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ---, 114 S.Ct. 1970,
128 L.Ed.2d 811, 832 (1984); Hare v. City of Cornith, 74 F.3d
633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
As to defendants Sheriff Bowles and Nurse Stacy, Johnson
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simply failed to produce any summary judgment evidence indicating
that Sheriff Bowles or Nurse Stacy had any personal knowledge of
Johnson’s gastrointestinal difficulties which serve as the basis
of this suit. He also failed to produce summary judgment
evidence tending to establish that Sheriff Bowles and Nurse Stacy
had actual knowledge of a longstanding, pervasive or well
documented pattern of inadequate treatment given by the prison
medical staff to prisoners with emergency medical needs. Under
Farmer, Johnson thus fails to allege that these defendants
violated his rights under the Eight Amendment for denial of
medical care and both Sheriff Bowles and Nurse Stacy are entitled
to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Nerren, 86 F.3d
at 473.
As to Dr. Collyns, Johnson’s affidavit states that at
approximately 10:00 a.m. on March 18, 1990, he was brought to Dr.
Collyns for examination. Johnson’s affidavit further states that
Dr. Collyns did not carefully examine him despite Johnson’s
recitation of severe abdominal pain, vomiting blood and other
symptoms. Assuming these allegations as true, Johnson
nonetheless fails to present a genuine issue of material fact
tending to show that Dr. Collyns reacted with deliberate
indifference to these complaints. The objective summary judgment
evidence in the record conclusively establishes that Johnson was
admitted to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital in Dallas at
12:20 p.m. on March 18, 1990, or approximately two hours after
Dr. Collyns allegedly examined Johnson. Given the promptness
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with which Johnson was transferred to Parkland Hospital, Johnson
has not demonstrated that Dr. Collyns’ responded with deliberate
indifference to Johnson’s serious medical needs. See Farmer, 128
L.Ed.2d at 830. Dr. Collyns is therefore entitled to qualified
immunity. Nerren, 86 F.3d at 473.
The judgment of the district court denying summary judgment
to appellants is therefore reversed and judgment is rendered in
appellants favor recognizing their qualified immunity defense.
REVERSED and RENDERED.
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