UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-10588
Janet Glaser,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
William C. Isbell,
Appellant,
VERSUS
Just Brakes Corporation, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
Jenkens & Gilchrist, et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:92-CV-2470-P)
March 27, 1997
Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
1
PER CURIAM:1
Appellants challenge three orders of the district court: (1)
an order of October 24, 1994, denying the plaintiff’s motion to
enforce a settlement agreement and sanction the defendants and
their lawyers under Rule 11, and awarding opposing counsel, Robert
Sheeder, Brian Easley, and Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C. (“attorneys”),
the costs incurred in responding to the motion; (2) an order of
January 23, 1995, denying the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the
prior order; and, (3) an order of April 16, 1996, which specified
the amount owed in attorney’s fees. Appellants filed their notice
of appeal on May 16, 1996.
Although an order awarding attorney’s fees is not final (and
therefore not appealable) until an amount is specified, this
tolling does not affect the finality of the remainder of a court’s
order. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196
(1988). With regard to the 1994 and 1995 orders, appellants did
not file their notice of appeal until well after the 30-day period
mandated by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), and therefore
this court is without jurisdiction to review the district court’s
decisions relating to the enforcement of the parties’ settlement
agreement. Funderburk v. Wainwright, 484 F.2d 681, 681 (5th Cir.
1973).
1
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
2
However, the portion of the 1994 order granting the attorneys
their fees did not become final until April 16, 1996, and thus the
notice of appeal was timely as to that issue. See Hay v. City of
Irving, 893 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1990). We review all aspects
of a Rule 11 determination for an abuse of discretion. Krim v.
BancTexas Group, Inc., 99 F.3d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1996)(citing
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)).
After denying a Rule 11 motion, a district court “may” award
the other party “the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees
incurred in . . . opposing the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(1)(A). Having reviewed the briefs and the relevant portions
of the record, we cannot say that the order directing the
plaintiff’s counsel to pay $2,000 in attorney’s fees was an abuse
of the court’s discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order awarding
attorney’s fees incurred in responding to the plaintiff’s motion is
AFFIRMED.
3