UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-11021
Summary Calendar
RITA RENEE JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MARVIN T. RUNYON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:93-CV-1511-R)
March 25, 1997
Before WISDOM, KING, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Rita Renee Jones appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgement for her employer, the United States Postal
Service. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined t hat this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
court’s order in part, VACATE in part, and REMAND the case for
trial.
Summary judgement is appropriate only where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgement as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). All
reasonable doubts and inferences must be decided in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Thornbrough v.
Columbus and Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640 (5th Cir.
1985). As long as there appears to be some evidentiary support
for the disputed allegations, the motion must be denied.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
The only issue on appeal concerns whether the plaintiff
raised any genuine issue of material fact as to her claim of
retaliatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must show: (1) that she was
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an
adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment decision. Jones v. Flagship Intern., 793 F.2d 714,
724 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987). In its July
16, 1996 order, the court stated that it “previously found that
Plaintiff raised a fact issue regarding the element of causal
connection. Specifically, Plaintiff provided evidence that
Johnson [Jones’s supervisor] knew about her prior EEO activity
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and this knowledge led to her eventual termination, thus
demonstrating a causal connection.” The court then found that
Johnson’s affidavit amounted to “uncontroverted evidence that he
[Johnson] did not learn of her prior EEO activity until after her
termination”, and that therefore the plaintiff could not
establish any causal connection. We disagree.
The court had before it an affidavit submitted to the EEO
investigator by Johnson. The affidavit stated in relevant part:
Q: Prior to the notice of said removal, being issued,
did you have knowledge of this complainant filing EEO
complaints? If yes, was reprisal a factor in the
notice of removal being issued?
A: Yes, 10/10/91. Reprisal was not a factor.
Record p. 65. Although the date given is after Jones’s removal,
the answer to the question “Did you have prior knowledge” is
clearly in the affirmative. This answer is cast in a somewhat
different light in Mr. Johnson’s affidavit given in support of
the defendant’s motion for summary judgement. There, Mr. Johnson
states that he “was aware of Ms. Jones’ prior EEO activity as of
October 10, 1991". This conflicts his prior statement. As a
result, whether Mr. Johnson knew of the plaintiff’s prior EEO
activity remains at issue. We find this to be a genuine issue of
material fact within Rule 56 (c).
Because Jones raises only her retaliation claim on appeal,
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the portion of the district courts order dismissing her gender
discrimination claim is AFFIRMED. The courts grant of summary
judgment as to the retaliation claim is VACATED and the case is
REMANDED to the district court for trial on the that issue. It
is so ORDERED.
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