IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-20496
_____________________
MITZIE L. CRADDOCK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS and CRAIG HUGHES,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(CA-H-94-3709)
_________________________________________________________________
March 28, 1997
Before REAVLEY, KING and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Mitzie L. Craddock appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to defendants Deputy Constable Craig A.
Hughes and Harris County on her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and the
court’s granting of summary judgment to Hughes on Mrs. Craddock’s
various state law claims. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Background
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
As this is a review of a summary judgment, we will state the
relevant facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. Craddock, the
nonmovant.
On October 19, 1991, Harris County Deputy Constable Hughes
responded to a complaint about a loud party at the Craddocks’
home in a residential area of Kingwood. Hughes observed a number
of youths in and around the Craddocks’ residence1 and several
cars parked along the street. Mrs. Craddock and her husband were
preparing to go to bed when one of the youths informed them that
a policeman was outside preparing to tow cars. Mrs. Craddock
went outside to investigate. She saw Hughes standing by his
patrol car apparently ticketing one of the youths. Mrs. Craddock
asked Hughes why he was planning to tow the cars. After some
discussion, Hughes asked Mrs. Craddock for identification. She
replied that she did not have any. Hughes then told Mrs.
Craddock to place her hands on his car. She did so, but Hughes
apparently did not like the way she placed them and he physically
repositioned her hands. Mrs. Craddock, believing Hughes was
about to frisk her, told him that he had no right to do so and
that she would not allow it. At that point, Mrs. Craddock’s
teenage son, Patrick, confronted Hughes about Hughes’s treatment
of Mrs. Craddock. After several verbal exchanges, Hughes chased
Patrick up the driveway. During the chase Mrs. Craddock went
back into her house.
1
Hughes reported that there were approximately 200 youths,
while witnesses for the Craddocks provide varying numbers as low
as 20.
2
A short time later, other deputy constables, including
Hughes’s supervisor, arrived at the Craddocks’ residence. The
supervisor told Mr. Craddock that he wanted to get Mrs.
Craddock’s and Patrick’s versions of the evening’s events. Mr.
Craddock did not want his wife and son to leave the house to
speak with the constables. The supervisor assured the Craddocks
that he only wanted to talk and did not plan to arrest anyone.
The Craddocks then relayed their versions of what happened.
Hughes promised to get a warrant and to return to arrest Mrs.
Craddock. After conducting a search of the exterior of the
Craddocks’ residence, the constables left.
Hughes and two other deputy constables returned to the
Craddocks’ residence on October 21 near midnight. They served a
warrant for Mrs. Craddock’s arrest for the offense of evading
arrest. She was taken to the Harris County jail and booked at
approximately 2:00 a.m. Mrs. Craddock was released on bond at
11:30 a.m.
Mrs. Craddock was tried for evading arrest in a Harris
County Criminal Court-at-Law on February 19, 1992. The trial
judge granted an instructed verdict of not guilty at the close of
evidence.
Mrs. Craddock filed a state court civil action against
Hughes and Harris County on July 23, 1993. She alleged state
law claims for false arrest, invasion of privacy, negligence,
conspiracy to falsely obtain an arrest warrant, and malicious
prosecution. On October 14, 1994, the court granted summary
3
judgment in favor of Harris County on all pending claims, but
allowed the claims asserted against Hughes to continue. On
October 17, 1994, Mrs. Craddock amended her petition to allege
federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Harris
County and Hughes.2 Relying on this newly-presented federal
question, defendants removed this lawsuit to federal district
court on October 31, 1994.
The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor
of both defendants on April 23, 1996. The summary judgment in
favor of Harris County on the § 1983 claim against the County was
based on Mrs. Craddock’s failure to allege facts or submit proof
indicating that her alleged deprivation of constitutionally
protected rights was a result of a Harris County policy or
custom. Summary judgment in favor of Hughes was granted based on
qualified immunity and disposed of all pending claims, which
consisted of the § 1983 claims as well as the various state law
claims.
Mrs. Craddock timely filed a notice of appeal. On appeal,
Mrs. Craddock argues that several fact issues are present,
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Mrs. Craddock
alleges that the October 21 arrest was illegal and
unconstitutional because it was based on an invalid warrant. She
relies on events from the October 19 incident to attempt to
2
Harris County and Hughes argue that Mrs. Craddock’s § 1983
claims do not relate back to the date the original petition was
filed and, therefore, are barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. Due to our disposition of other issues on this
appeal, we do not reach this question.
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establish the illegality of the arrest warrant and as evidence of
an official Harris County policy or custom that led to a
constitutional deprivation.
II. Standard of Review
This court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same criteria used by the district court in the
first instance. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th
Cir. 1994). First, the court consults the applicable law to
ascertain the material factual issues. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d
653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992). The court then reviews the evidence
bearing on those issues, viewing the facts and inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th
Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
III. Claims Against Hughes
A. Section 1983 Claims
Hughes obtained an arrest warrant before arresting Mrs.
Craddock. Therefore, in order to recover from Hughes under
§ 1983 for any damages arising from the arrest, Mrs. Craddock
must make a showing that Hughes, in his arrest warrant affidavit,
intentionally misrepresented material facts, stated material
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facts in reckless disregard for the truth, or omitted material
facts. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, we find that no issue of material fact exists as to
whether Hughes violated the Franks v. Delaware standard.
Undoubtedly, there is substantial disagreement as to what
actually happened between Mrs. Craddock and Hughes on the night
of the party. However, Mrs. Craddock’s version of the events
simply does not call into question whether Hughes intentionally
or recklessly included or omitted false information in the
affidavit.3
Mrs. Craddock attempts to attack Hughes’s affidavit by
questioning the evidentiary support for several representations
contained therein. Most notably, she disputes whether minors
were drinking alcohol, whether alcohol was provided, whether
Hughes was attempting to arrest her, and whether she knew Hughes
3
Hughes’s affidavit stated in full as follows:
Affiant, C.A. Hughes, is a credible and reliable person
who is reputably employed as a peace officer with
Harris County Constable’s Office. Affiant believes and
has reason to believe that Defendant, Mitzie Craddock,
committed the offense of evading arrest on October 19,
1991, in Harris County, Texas. Affiant spoke with the
Defendant regarding a party at her house where people
under the age of 21 were drinking alcoholic beverages.
The Defendant stated that it was under her residence.
Affiant learned from her son, who is 18 YOA that he was
having a party. Affiant saw that alcoholic beverages
were provided. Affiant, who was in uniform, attempted
to arrest the Defendant when she turned away from him
and ran into her residence evading arrest. The
Defendant knew the Affiant was a police officer and
knew that Affiant was attempting to arrest her.
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was attempting to arrest her when she fled into the house. Under
the undisputed facts, there were minors at the party, there was
alcohol at the party, and Hughes, even from Mrs. Craddock’s point
of view, was attempting to detain her when Patrick interfered
with Hughes’s actions and Mrs. Craddock went back into her house.
We note that the offense with which Mrs. Craddock was charged
actually encompassed evading arrest or evading detention. See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04 (Vernon 1994). That Hughes stated in his
affidavit he was attempting to “arrest” Mrs. Craddock and also
stated that Mrs. Craddock knew she was being “arrested” when she
fled into her house, rather than using the word “detained”, does
not cause Hughes’s arrest warrant affidavit to fail the Franks v.
Delaware standard. We do not require law enforcement officers to
be grammarians. Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1273 (5th Cir.
1982).4
B. State Law Claims
The district court found that Hughes was protected by
qualified immunity from further litigation of Mrs. Craddock’s
state law claims. Texas allows qualified immunity as an
affirmative defense by a governmental employee if three tests are
met: (1) the employee was performing discretionary duties, (2)
4
The district court granted summary judgment on Mrs.
Craddock’s § 1983 claims against Hughes based on Hughes’s
qualified immunity. However, we find that the summary judgment
evidence raised no issue of material fact as to whether Hughes
violated Mrs. Craddock’s constitutional rights. Qualified
immunity need not be inquired into, as no constitutional right
has been violated. Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1981).
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the employee was acting in good faith, and (3) the employee was
acting within the scope of his authority. Wyse v. Department of
Pub. Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. App.--Waco 1986, writ
ref’d).
The only element that seems to be in dispute in this case is
whether Hughes was acting in good faith. The Texas standard for
determining whether a law enforcement officer acted in good
faith, which is derived from the federal standard for § 1983
actions, measures whether a reasonably prudent law enforcement
officer could have believed that the defendant officer’s acts
were justified under the same or similar circumstances. See City
of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.
1994)(establishing the good faith standard for pursuit cases).
Mrs. Craddock has not raised a fact issue as to whether
Hughes’s actions on the night of the party and his actions in
executing the warrant meet the Texas standard for qualified
immunity. The district court correctly concluded that Hughes was
entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity
on all of Mrs. Craddock’s state law claims.
IV. Harris County
In order to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal policy or custom
caused a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. New York City
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978); Rhyne v.
Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). Although
Mrs. Craddock has attempted to raise several “customs or
8
policies” of Harris County, we find that she has not raised a
material fact issue as to whether any Harris County custom or
policy actually caused any injuries she may have suffered.
AFFIRMED.
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