UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
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No. 96-30874
Summary Calendar
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LARRY W. MOORE and NAOMI S. MOORE
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(90-2073)
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March 13, 1997
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellants challenge the inadequacy of the district court's
award of attorney's fees in this case. We vacate and remand.
Plaintiffs filed this suit against the Farmer's Home
Administration on grounds that their application to participate in
the agency's farm credit program was denied because of their race.
The district court initially dismissed the case for prematurity and
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
lack of standing. We reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. Moore v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 993 F.2d 1222
(5th Cir. 1993). Following remand, the district court conducted a
bench trial and then dismissed plaintiffs' case on grounds of
sovereign immunity. An appeal was taken by the Moores and this
court reversed and remanded for a trial on damages. Moore v. U.S.
Dept. of Agriculture, 55 F.3d 991 (5th Cir. 1995). On remand, the
district court held a bench trial and rendered judgment in favor of
the Moores in the amount of $25,000. The court also directed
counsel to submit their claim and supporting documentation for
attorney's fees. The district court made a thorough analysis of
the fees requested by the three counsel involved in the case.
Affidavits from the Alexandria-Monroe area suggested a range of
appropriate hourly rates running from $100 to $250. The court set
the lodestar hourly rate for attorneys McPherson and Ellis at $100
and the rate for Mr. Deaton at $50 and hour. The court also
established a rate of $40 per hour for paralegal work and
determined that travel hours should be billed at $30 an hour.
Based on these rates and the hours the court determined were
reasonably expended on this case amounted to $35,505. This was
calculated as the lodestar fee.
The district court then reduced the total fee from $35,505 to
$7,500. The only significant reason given by the district court
for this reduction is that plaintiffs' efforts "at the second trial
can hardly be considered a 'success' as they recovered only l0% of
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what was sought." The court went on to say that "it is difficult
to agree that the second trial was even justified in this manner."
The assigned reasons do not support the reduction. We find no
indication from the record that the plaintiffs had any choice but
to try the case on damages. No judgment in any amount would have
been rendered unless plaintiffs tried the issue of damages and
obtained a resolution of this issue.
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Riverside v. Rivera,
477 U.S. 561 (1986), supports our conclusion that the fee reduction
was inappropriate. In Riverside, the district court assessed an
award of $245,000 in attorney's fees against defendants where the
prevailing plaintiffs recovered only $33,350 in damages. The
Supreme Court affirmed in a plurality opinion and rejected a rule
of proportionality for attorney's fees under § 1988.
The Fifth Circuit applied Riverside in Cobb v. Miller, 818
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1987), in which a magistrate reduced attorney's
fees by two-thirds where the plaintiff had recovered comparatively
nominal damages. This Court reversed, noting that while Riverside
indicates that the amount of damages a plaintiff recovers is
relevant to the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, that
factor, alone, is not decisive. Id. at 1234. The Cobb court
explained:
In the absence of other [relevant] factors justifying a
reduction in a fee award, a district court should not
reduce the fee award solely because of a low damages
award. Such an approach would lead to a proportionality
requirement between the amount of attorney's fees and the
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amount of damages and was explicitly rejected by the
Court in Riverside.
Id. at 1235. Courts have applied the Riverside reasoning in
contexts other than § 1988 fee awards. See, e.g., R.M. Perez &
Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
proportionality rule in RICO action). Its application here is
equally valid.
Defendant's reliance on EEOC v. Clear Lake Dodge, 60 F.3d 1146
(5th Cir. 1995), is misplaced. In Clear Lake, we reduced
plaintiff's attorney's fees where the plaintiff who prevailed on
her Title VII claims was represented by both the EEOC and a private
attorney. Id. at 1154. The Court reasoned that "because there is
no suggestion of possible conflict between the interests of the
EEOC and those of the plaintiff, nor any suggestion that the EEOC
was lax in pursuing the Title VII claims, there is little
justification on any basis for additional attorneys." Id. In the
case at hand, however, the district court made no finding that the
attorneys' efforts were duplicative.
Because the record reveals no legally justifiable reason for
reducing the lodestar fee in this case, we vacate the fee award and
remand this case for entry of judgment for attorney's fees in favor
of plaintiffs in the amount of the lodestar as calculated by the
district court in its July 10, 1996 ruling ($35,505) together with
costs originally awarded. The district court shall also add
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$2,000 to the fee award due plaintiffs for attorney's fees expended
in prosecuting this appeal.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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