Stephens v. Polvadore

                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


                         _______________________

                               No. 95-10978
                             Summary Calendar
                         _______________________


                              BILL STEPHENS,

                                                      Plaintiff-Appellant,


                                   versus

           LAQUITTA POLVADORE; SCOTT MORRISON; JOHN LESLY;
             TOM LESLY; GERALD MCDOUGALL; RANDY SHERROD;
          DEBBIE ZVOLAR; MIKE MILLER, Sargent; TRACY HALL,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.


_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Northern District of Texas
                           (2:94-CV-175)
_________________________________________________________________


                                May 12, 1997

Before JOLLY, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.


PER CURIAM:*

            Appellant Stephens complains of the district court’s

dismissal of his section 1983 complaint for failure to comply with

     *
        Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
a June 1994 court order requiring him (1) to submit additional

copies of his complaint for service on the nine named defendants

and (2) to file a complete and correct IFP application or pay the

court filing fee.     Stephens said he complied with the first

requirement; the magistrate judge and district court believed he

did not.    Stephens’s attempt to re-file his IFP request again

yielded an incomplete application.

           After attempting to comply with the magistrate judge’s

order in July, 1994, Stephens did nothing on the case for seven

months, when he wrote an inquiry about its status to the court.   In

June, 1995, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(b) for Stephens’s failure to comply with the

court’s order of June 24, 1994.   Stephens filed objections to the

recommendation on the basis that he had submitted extra copies of

the complaint. Stephens made no mention of the still-erroneous IFP

application.   The district court overruled Stephens’s objections

and adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge,

dismissing the complaint.

           Although Stephens argues that the district court abused

its discretion by dismissing his complaint for failure to comply

with the June 1994 order, he nowhere addresses the fact that he has

not yet provided a properly completed application for IFP status.

Rule 41(b) allows the court sua sponte to dismiss an action with

prejudice for failure to prosecute or to comply with any court

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order.    We review such a dismissal for an abuse of discretion.

Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1992).

We find no abuse of discretion here.    The magistrate judge’s June

1994 order painstakingly explained what it required of Stephens.

Even if there is a dispute whether he submitted the correct number

of copies of his complaint to the court, he has never provided any

explanation for his still-deficient IFP application.       Stephens

could have complied with the court’s order easily.        Moreover,

because he had another lawsuit pending in the court at the time, we

assume he had some familiarity with court procedures.     Under the

circumstances, Stephen’s continued ignoring of the court’s order

means that no lesser sanction than dismissal would have been

appropriate.   Stephens’s failure to comply with the court’s order

and delay in pursuing the matter justified the court’s employment

of the “extreme sanction” of dismissal.    Berry, 975 F.2d at 1191.

           Under the facts above stated, this case is similar to our

recent decision in Dorsey v. Scottwetzel Services, Inc., 84 F.3d

170 (5th Cir. 1996), where we also affirmed a Rule 41(b) dismissal

for a plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with court scheduling

orders.   This court concluded that “there were no lesser sanctions

available to the trial court that would have served the best

interests of justice.”   Id. at 171.   Even though the trial court

did not expressly so conclude, it is true in this case that lesser



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sanctions   would   not   have   been       appropriate   against   Stephens’s

stubborn refusal to follow the court’s orders.

            AFFIRMED.




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