UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-20567
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
ALBERTO TOMAS YOUNGBLOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(CR-H-95-250-ALL)
May 29, 1997
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Alberto Youngblood (“Youngblood”) appeals his arson
conviction, complaining of various points of error, among them that
the district court’s admission of evidence that he took a polygraph
test was reversible error. For the following reasons, we affirm
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Youngblood’s conviction and sentence.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In April 1995, an early morning fire destroyed an
establishment, Willy’s Pub, located in the student center at Rice
University. Other businesses in the student center were also
damaged. It was determined quite quickly that the cause of the
fire was arson.
In August 1995, investigators received a tip that indicated
that they should speak with Youngblood and an appointment was
scheduled with Youngblood, a Rice student, for late September 1995,
after the start of Rice’s fall semester.
During the course of that interview appointment, Youngblood
agreed to take a polygraph exam. It took one hour for the
polygraph examiner to arrive at the Houston Arson Bureau offices
and the polygraph test took from two to two and a half hours to
complete.
At some point after the polygraph test was administered,
Youngblood admitted that he started the fire at Willy’s Pub. He
wrote a confession and attached a diagram showing his entry into
the student center and path to Willy’s Pub. The appointment began
at 10:00 a.m. that day and it was 5:00 p.m. when Youngblood signed
his confession and the investigators subsequently drove him back to
the university.
Youngblood was charged in a one-count indictment with
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violating the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), and was
convicted following a trial. The district court sentenced
Youngblood to 78 months in prison and three years of supervised
release. Youngblood was also ordered to pay restitution in the
amount of $2,402,265.10.
Youngblood now appeals to this court, arguing, inter alia,
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the fact
that Youngblood took a polygraph test.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Youngblood contends that it was reversible error for the
district court to admit evidence that he took a polygraph test
during the time that he was at the Houston Arson Bureau.
The Government argues that our prerequisites for the admission
of polygraph evidence are not applicable here because the polygraph
test results were not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating the
test’s results, but for the purpose of showing that Youngblood’s
confession was not coerced, as he asserted in his defense. The
Government was attempting to rebut the defense’s focus on the
amount of time spent in the interview in its coercion argument by
pointing out that three to three and a half hours were consumed by
a polygraph test.
The district court allowed the admission of the fact that a
polygraph test was administered merely to introduce the fact that
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a polygraph took up to three and a half hours of the time that
Youngblood spent at the Houston Arson Bureau offices. The district
court did not allow the Government to introduce the results of the
polygraph, nor did the district court admit any evidence showing
the questions asked or the answers given in the polygraph
examination.
Our concern centers on whether the Government abused the
process in this case by seizing upon the defense’s focus on the
amount of time that Youngblood was in the company of investigators
as a back-door means of conveying to the jury not only that
Youngblood took a polygraph test but, by linking in time
Youngblood’s confession with the conclusion of the polygraph
examination, also that he gave answers that the polygraph examiner
considered to be inconsistent with the truth. The sequence of
events that transpired after the administration of the test made it
apparent to the jury that Youngblood had failed the test.
We have carefully reviewed the record and have concluded that
the district court adequately protected the defendant’s rights and
that Youngblood suffered no prejudice from the procedure utilized
in this case. The circumstance presented here is essentially
indistinguishable from other instances in which district courts
have permitted the introduction of polygraph evidence for a
circumscribed purpose. See Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883
F.2d 400, 405 & n. 10 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that polygraph
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results have been allowed at trial where testimony regarding the
exam carefully limited) (citing cases); United States v. Thevis,
665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) (polygraph admissible not for its
truth but to demonstrate that defendant knew another person was
cooperating with the Government); United States v. Hall, 805 F.2d
1410, 1416-17 (10th Cir. 1986) (detective’s testimony regarding
defendant’s failure of polygraph admissible for limited purpose of
explaining detective’s failure to conduct more complete
investigation); United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th
Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that had the defendant urged the argument
that his confession was involuntary, the admission of the fact that
the defendant failed his polygraph would have been admissible to
demonstrate the voluntariness of the confession).
B. Youngblood’s Other Points of Error
We have carefully reviewed the record and considered the
parties’ arguments regarding Youngblood’s other claims. We find
his arguments to be without merit and affirm the district court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Youngblood’s conviction
and sentence.
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