IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-20966
(Summary Calendar)
DORIS JACKSON; Lewis Jackson,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, SYSTEM; PRAIRIE VIEW A&M
UNIVERSITY; HAROLD NMI BONNER, Individually and as Vice
President for Finance and Administration of Prairie View A&M
University; WILLIE TEMPTON, Individually and as Assistant Vice
President of Physical Plant & Department of Public Safety;
LORENZO TRAMBLE, Individually and as former employee with
Prairie View A&M University; ALBERT GEE, Individually and as
Director of Personnel Services of Prairie View A&M University,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(95-CV-1072)
May 19, 1997
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Doris Jackson (“Jackson”) and husband Lewis Jackson appeal the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Jackson sued defendants claiming, inter alia, violations of Title VII of the Civil
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined t hat this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Rights Act of 1964 based on a hostile work environment. The claims stem from false rumors that
were circulated about Jackson and a supervisor having an adulterous affair, which caused dissension
between Jackson and her co-workers. Jackson, and her co-workers, all secretaries, were later
transferred to different departments but without any loss in pay or benefits. Jackson claims that the
rumors and her transfer were the result of a hostile work environment based on her sex. She also
claims that the hostile environment resulted in the intentional infliction of mental distress.
The district court tentatively dismissed Jackson’s claims, but reserved final determination
until Jackson submitted additional evidence and it heard arguments in support of Jackson’s position.
After considering the additional evidence and oral arguments the court rendered a final decision and
entered an order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. After carefully reviewing the
briefs and the record, we affirm for the same reasons set forth in the district court’s Memorandum
and Order. See Jackson v. Texas A&M, et al., No. H-95-1072 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1 1996).
Specifically, the district court determined that Jackson did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because she has proffered no evidence of discrimination on the basis of her sex. See
LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996). Jackson has not alleged any facts
sufficient to establish that the false rumors were circulated in an effort to discriminate against her on
the basis of sex. Nor has she proven that the rumors or insults were so perverse as to al ter a
condition of her employment. Finally, defendants had an articulated nondiscriminatory reason for
transferring Jackson that was neither rebutted by Jackson, nor did she raise a genuine issue of material
fact. Thus, Jackson has also failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action by
defendants on the basis of her sex. DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591,
593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 473 (1995).
2
Accordingly, we are satisfied that the district court adequately considered Jackson’s
arguments and rendered a proper decision, thus, we AFFIRM.
3