IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-40999
Summary Calendar
BROOKS ROWE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DAVID WHITE; RON SCOTT; D. BALLARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:96-CV-209
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May 29, 1997
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Brooks Rowe, Arkansas inmate #159100, moves for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA). The PLRA requires a
prisoner appealing IFP in a civil action to pay the full amount
of the filing fee, $105. As Rowe does not have funds for
immediate payment of this fee, he is assessed an initial partial
filing fee of $.07, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
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Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, funds shall
be deducted from Rowe’s prisoner account until the full filing
fee is paid. See § 1915(b)(2).
IT IS ORDERED that Rowe pay the appropriate initial filing
fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Texas. Rowe shall authorize the appropriate prison
authorities to withdraw this fee from his trust fund account in
accordance with their policy and local procedures and to forward
the fee to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having
custody of Rowe’s inmate account shall collect the remainder of
the $105 filing fee and forward for payment, in accordance with
§ 1915(b)(2), to the Clerk of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas each time the amount in Rowe’s account exceeds
$10, until the appellate filing fee is paid.
Rowe challenges the district court’s dismissal of his civil
rights complaint as frivolous. He argues the following: 1) the
investigation leading to his placement in ad seg and the
disciplinary case resulting in a loss of privileges violated his
constitutional rights and the district court erred in dismissing
the claim; 2) the district court overlooked Rowe’s supplemental
pleading, which Rowe asserts clarifies the viability of his
liberty-interest claim arising from the disciplinary-case claim;
3) the district court failed to consider Rowe’s banishment from
the law library -- for unauthorized taking of a law book --
No. 96-40999
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before entering final judgment, which Rowe contends amounts to
denial of access to the courts; and 4) the district court erred
in dismissing his conditions-of-confinement claim, a claim which
Rowe asserts is viable in light of his asthma condition, a
condition which Rowe alleges for the first time on appeal.
We have carefully reviewed the arguments and the appellate
record. For essentially the same reasons upon which the district
court relied by adopting the magistrate judge’s report, see Rowe
v. White, No. 5:96cv209 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1996), we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the complaint as frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). This appeal is without arguable merit
and thus is frivolous. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. It is DISMISSED.
Rowe moves for injunctive and protective relief. The motion
is DENIED.
APPEAL DISMISSED. IFP GRANTED. FILING FEE ASSESSED. OTHER
MOTION DENIED.