IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________________________
No. 96-50461
(Summary Calender)
______________________________
CATARINA GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS YOUTH COMMISSION;
WEST TEXAS STATE SCHOOL,
Defendants,
STEVE ROBINSON, Individually
and as Executive Director of
Texas Youth Commission;
JOHNNY WILLIAM, Individually
and as Superintendent of West
Texas State School; KAY
DOEBBELING, Individually
and as Acting Superintendent
of West Texas State School,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________________________
Appeal From the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. 95-CV-75
____________________________________________
May 23, 1997
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Plaintiff-Appellant Catarina Garcia appeals from the district
court’s partial grant of summary judgment on her workers’
compensation retaliation claims against Defendants-Appellees Steven
Robinson, Johnny Williams and Kay Doebbeling (“defendants”). The
district court dismissed the defendants in their official
capacities, holding that (1) the Texas legislature has not waived
sovereign immunity from workers’ compensation retaliation claims
for the State of Texas and state agencies, and (2) the defendants,
acting in their official capacities, are cloaked with the same
immunity from suit.
In conducting our de novo review, we have carefully evaluated
the record on appeal, the arguments of counsel for both parties as
set forth in their respective briefs to this court, and the
applicable law. Our review convinces us that the district court
correctly analyzed the issue, applied the appropriate law, and
reached the correct result. Garcia’s singular reliance on City of
LaPorte v. Barfield1 in support of her contention that sovereign
immunity has been waived by the Texas legislature in workers’
compensation retaliation cases is misplaced. In Barfield, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas legislature has granted a
limited waiver of sovereign immunity from workers’ compensation
retaliation claims for political subdivisions of the State of
Texas, such as cities and local school districts, but not for the
1
898 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1995).
2
State of Texas itself or its agencies.2 Moreover, another Texas
appellate decision has recently confirmed that a Texas state agency
and its officials acting in their official capacity are entitled to
sovereign immunity from claims of workers’ compensation
retaliation.3 Accordingly, the district court properly granted
summary judgment to defendants in their capacities as officials of
either the Texas Youth Commission, a state agency, or its wholly
owned entity, the West Texas State School.
In any event, the district court did not grant summary
judgment on Garcia’s retaliation claims against the defendants in
their individual capacities, so Garcia was able to present these
claims to a jury and did so. The jury found, however, that the
defendants had not discharged Garcia for her good faith filing of
a workers’ compensation claim, and thus had not discriminated
against her for filing that claim. Consequently, Garcia would be
collaterally estopped from re-litigating the same workers’
compensation retaliation claim in another trial against the
defendants in their official capacities that she had actually
2
Id. at 297-299.
3
919 S.W.2d 185, 187-188 (Tex. App. - Eastland 1996) (writ
denied). See also Bagg v. University of Texas Medical Branch at
Galveston, 726 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.]
1987) (writ ref’d n.r.e.) (officials enjoy same governmental
immunity as state entity to the extent they act in their official
capacity when they discharge an employee).
3
litigated against the defendants in their individual capacities.4
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Robinson, Williams and Doebbeling, dismissing them as
defendants in their official capacities.
AFFIRMED.
4
“Collateral estoppel depends on three elements: (1) the
issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior
action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the
prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior
action must have a necessary part of the judgment in that earlier
action.” RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1290 (5th
Cir. 1995). In this case, all three elements are clearly present.
4