UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-50910
Summary Calendar
In the Matter of DAVID MARVIN SWIFT, doing business
as State Farm Insurance,
Debtor.
MARTIN W. SEIDLER,
Defendant-Appellant,
VERSUS
DAVID M. SWIFT,
Plaintiff-Debtor-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(SA-96-CV-918)
May 1, 1997
Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Martin W. Seidler (“Seidler”) comes to this court complaining
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
of the legal judgment made by the bankruptcy and district courts
regarding the status of the debtor David M. Swift’s (“Swift”) legal
malpractice claim against Seidler at the time of the filing of the
bankruptcy case. Swift brought the malpractice claim against
Seidler in state court after the commencement of the bankruptcy
case. The two lower courts both found that under Texas law, the
claim had not yet accrued as of the time of the petition’s filing,
and thus was not property of the estate. They also found that
Swift’s interest in his unaccrued malpractice cause of action was
not a property interest recognized by Texas law.
Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the property
of the bankruptcy estate as “...all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11
U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). A cause of action belonging to a debtor as of
a petition’s filing becomes property of the estate. La. World
Exposition v. Federal Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 245 (5th Cir. 1988);
see also In re Wischan, 77 F.3d 875, 877 (5th Cir. 1996).
We agree with the two lower courts’ well-reasoned opinions
that under Texas law, Swift’s malpractice claim had not yet accrued
at the time of the petition’s filing. We also agree that the
debtor’s interest in the unaccrued cause of action at the time of
the petition’s filing was not a contingent property interest under
Texas law, and thus was not property of the bankruptcy estate under
Seidler’s alternative theory of a contingent or inchoate interest.
2
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the bankruptcy and district
courts.
3