IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-50818
JERRY R. WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STEPHEN MARK, Doctor;
RUSSELL HUNT, Esq.,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
June 5, 1997
BEFORE WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges, and LITTLE, District
Judge.*
B Y T H E C O U R T :
ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant, Jerry R. Williamson, a federal
prisoner, filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in the
above captioned appeal. This court, by order of January 21, 1997,
instructed Williamson to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PLRA), either by paying our appellate filing fee of
$105 or by filing an affidavit and certified statement of his trust
*
District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana,
sitting by designation.
fund account. Williamson complied by submitting such an affidavit
and statement.
Before an initial partial filing fee was assessed for
Williamson and payment of the balance of the filing fee ordered as
required by the PLRA, however, we decided Morgan v. Haro.2 In that
case we held that (1) a prisoner who seeks to proceed IFP on appeal
must obtain leave to do so even if he has proceeded IFP in the
district court, and (2) the financial screening and assessment
procedures of the PLRA regarding appellate filing fees are
nevertheless to be conducted by the district court.
IT IS ORDERED, therefore, that this appeal be held in
abeyance and that only the preliminary issue of Williamson’s
request to proceed IFP in this court be remanded to the district
court to permit it to rule on Williamson’s appellate IFP
application and, if granted, to order payment of the proper
appellate filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b); this panel
retaining jurisdiction of Williamson’s appeal for all other
purposes. After such a determination is made by the district
court, it shall return the case to this court for further
proceedings by this panel.
In the event that (1) further proceedings should
eventuate, (2) this panel should ultimately determine that we have
jurisdiction over Williamson’s appeal, and (3) we should find merit
in the sole matter of substance in that appeal, i.e., Williamson’s
2
F.3d , 1997 W.L. 211799, 1997, Slip Op. 3159 (5th
Cir. March 31, 1997).
2
contention that the district court’s calculation of the initial
district court filing fee payable under the PLRA upon the filing of
his original complaint was erroneous, we shall continue to retain
appellate jurisdiction but order another limited remand to the
district court for the purpose of (1) affording the district court
the opportunity to re-assess the correct district court filing fees
due from Williamson under the PLRA, and (2) allowing Williamson to
continue prosecuting his complaint, assuming that he is still
inclined to do so and that he timely remits the appropriate new
district court filing fee assessment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Williamson thus proceeds in
district court but is ultimately dissatisfied with the final ruling
or rulings of that court and desires to prosecute his appeal
therefrom in this court, he will be permitted to do so upon his
timely filing a new notice of appeal under the same appellate
docket number as this one and without being required to remit a
second appellate filing fee.
REMANDED with instructions, and with appellate jurisdiction
retained by this panel.
3