IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________________
No. 96-31134
(Summary Calendar)
_______________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CRIMINAL SHERIFF, The Parish Of Orleans,
Defendant,
LARRY E. BROOME,
Movant-Appellant.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
90-CV-4930
______________________________________________
June 10, 1997
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Movant-Appellant Larry E. Broome, attorney at law, appeals the
district court’s judgment which disqualifies him from representing
the would-be intervenors in this case and requires him to pay
expenses incurred by Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America as
a result of these proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In 1990, the United States filed suit against, inter alia, the
Parish of Orleans Criminal Sheriff, alleging a “pattern and
practice” of discrimination against women in hiring and in the
conditions of employment. In 1995, Broome filed a motion to
intervene on behalf of approximately one hundred individuals.
Counsel for the United States notified the district court, by
letter of August 1996, of its concern that Broome was (1)
soliciting prospective employment with claimants who had been
recommended for relief by the United States and (2) representing a
non-existent relationship with the Department of Justice.
The magistrate judge granted Broome’s motion to intervene (on
a limited basis) but also set a hearing date, at which time Broome
and any client who stated herself to be represented by Broome were
to appear and be questioned by the court as to the circumstances of
Broome’s representation. The court indicated also that it would
hear allegations against Broome concerning his unprofessional
solicitation of clients.
At the hearing, attorney Milton Osborne represented Broome.
According to the testimony of six female claimants, Broome
approached them (or members of their families) and advised them to
sign retainers so that he could assure them a maximum monetary
recovery in the allegedly impending settlement. Some of the women
testified that Broome claimed to work with or be under contract to
2
work with the Justice Department. Broome did not deny approaching
these people but testified that he represents so many people that
he did not know if they were his clients or not.1
Broome, however, failed to bring any of his alleged clients to
the hearing. Osborne asked for a continuance to give Broome an
opportunity to “bring these people in,” claiming —— somewhat
incredulously —— that neither he nor Broome had noticed that part
of the magistrate’s order. The magistrate judge denied the
request.
The district court found that Broome had solicited five women
to sign a retainer agreement and contingency fee contract in
violation of several of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
Louisiana State Bar Association. The court disqualified Broome
from representing any would-be intervenors in this action and
ordered him to reimburse the United States for expenses incurred in
connection with the hearing. Broome timely appealed pro se,
asserting several errors, none of which concerns his
disqualification from representation of the would-be intervenors.
II.
ANALYSIS
Broome asserts that the magistrate judge (1) failed to inform
him that he was the subject of the scheduled hearing or that he had
1
Broome allegedly represents many or most of the claimants in
another unrelated case against the Sheriff involving overtime.
3
a right to retain counsel of his choice, (2) displayed personal
prejudice against him and should have recused herself from the
hearing, and (3) abused her discretion in denying his request for
a continuance. Broome claims also that his request for a
continuance does not appear in the transcript.
We find no merit in any of Broome’s claims. First, the
magistrate judge clearly and adequately notified Broome of the
nature of the hearing, and Broome never expressed to the magistrate
any dissatisfaction with being represented by Osborne. Second,
Broome’s accusations of prejudice are completely contrived and
unfounded. He bases his claim on the magistrate’s memorandum to
the Chief Judge of the Eastern District which notifies the Chief
Judge of the action taken against Broome and suggests that Broome
had engaged previously in the unlawful solicitation of clients.
This memorandum does nothing more than factually inform the Chief
Judge of the instant matter in a purely objective manner. Third,
the magistrate’s denial of a continuance was properly within her
discretion, as district courts are “vested with the inherent power
‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.’”1 Finally, the transcript of
the hearing accurately reports Broome’s request for a continuance.
In sum, we find Broome’s arguments to be disingenuous and
1
Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406, 1417 (5th Cir.
1995)(quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.
Ct. 1386, 1389 (1962)).
4
approaching frivolousness. We caution Broome that appeals of this
nature are extremely disfavored and that further prosecution of
this or other meritless appellate actions may well subject him to
sanctions by this court.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.
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