IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30050
(Summary Calendar)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM SCOTT, JR.,
a/k/a Animal,
Defendant-Appellant.
.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(95-CR-101-G)
July 31, 1997
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Scott, Jr., has appealed the life sentence which he received, as an armed career
criminal, upon his guilty plea of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Scott contends that the
district court erred by departing upward to a life sentence and by ordering his sentence to run
consecutively to several concurrent state sentences which he received. Having carefully reviewed the
briefs and all the arguments, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
We review a district court’s decision to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of
discretion. Koon v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996). A district court’s decision to depart
is due substantial deference, “for it embodies the traditional exercise of discret ion by a sentencing
court.” United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1997).
Here, the district court departed upwardly six levels to level 37. The court found that
departure was appropriate because Scott’s criminal history was underrepresented by criminal history
category (CHC) VI, and because many of his prior offenses were “of an extremely violent nature.”
Scott argues that the district court “did not take into consideration the serious mitigating factor of
[his] history of mental illness.” We disagree. The district court did not abuse its discretion by
departing upward because the Sentencing Commission has expressly encouraged departures if the
defendant’s criminal history is underrepresented by CHC VI and he is likely to recidivate. See
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. Further, the record shows that the district court was well informed
concerning Scott’s mental history and condition, so that its failure to specifically advert to this as a
mitigating factor was not error. We therefore reject this argument.
Next, Scott asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the decision to run his federal sentence
consecutive to his state sentences violates the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.
After sentencing, Scott’s defense counsel made only a general objection to the court’s decision to
make the sentences run consecutively; he did not state any basis for his objection. Accordingly, we
review arguments not raised in the district court for plain error only. Douglass v. United Serv. Auto.
Assn., 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Scott has shown no plain error regarding this
argument. Specifically, Scott has cited no authority to support his argument that his consecutive
sentence violates his Eighth Amendment rights. Furthermore, the district court was authorized by law
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to impose upon Scott a concurrent, partially concurrent, or consecutive sentence “to the prior
undischarged term o f imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a); United States v. Gonzalez, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 1036
(1997). Thus, we hold that Scott’s claim is without merit.
Having found no abuse of discretion by the district court, we AFFIRM.
AFFIRMED.
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