REVISED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-30513
SIDNEY MARTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PHILLIP HINES, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
July 18, 1997
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WISDOM, KING, GARWOOD, JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM,
DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHÉ, WIENER, BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA,
DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, STEWART, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
We have taken this case en banc to resolve relevant conflicting circuit
precedents, to continue our development of procedures to address and dispose
appropriately of a continually burgeoning prisoner pro se docket, both at the trial
and appellate levels,1 and to note an appropriate awareness of the intervening
1
Including but not limited to procedures established in Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886 (5th
Cir. 1976) (supplementing questionnaire); Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985)
(informal hearing); Graves v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 1993).
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.2
Background
The facts concerning the appeal by Sidney Marts of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint against an assistant district attorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, a
public defender, and a private attorney representing a codefendant in a state court
criminal action, are set forth in the panel opinion.3 Marts’ complaint implicated the
integrity of the state court criminal proceeding, thus requiring the district court to
make a threshold determination whether his action was not frivolous and justified
the retention of federal jurisdiction.4 The trial court dismissed without prejudice
the claim for money damages against the private counsel and public defender
because they were not state actors, and that against the prosecutor on the basis of
absolute immunity. Finding no factual basis for the conspiracy charge it was
dismissed as frivolous, also without prejudice. The panel modified the dismissals
to be with prejudice, except for the conspiracy claim, and affirmed the trial court.
We determined that because of conflicting circuit precedents it was necessary to
revisit this issue en banc.
Analysis
2
Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of
1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
3
68 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 1995), reh’g en banc granted, 79 F.3d 17 (5th Cir. 1996).
4
See Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) (when a section
1983 action might have a disruptive effect upon contemporaneous state criminal
proceedings, the federal district court should stay its hand)).
2
Once again we consider the application of limited judicial resources to an
ever increasing number of prisoner pro se filings. Our task, simply stated, is to
implement procedures which will aid in the separation of the wheat from the chaff
in such filings as early in the judicial process as is possible, in an effort to ensure
that judicial resources will not be wasted and that the meritorious claims may
receive the timely attention and disposition warranted.
The rule that the in limine dismissals of actions by the district court generally
are to be with prejudice5 particularly fits dismissals under the former 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d), now a part of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).6 Dismissals under the in forma
pauperis statute are in a class of their own, acting not as dismissals on the merits
5
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) which provides in pertinent part:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in
this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.
6
Section 1915(e)(2) now reads:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have
been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that
--
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal --
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;
or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
3
but, rather, as denials of in forma pauperis status.7 Typically, but not exclusively,
such dismissals may serve as res judicata for subsequent in forma pauperis filings,
but they effect no prejudice to the subsequent filing of a fee-paid complaint making
the same allegations.8 Exceptions included complaints containing claims which,
on their face, were subject to an obvious meritorious defense,9 or instances in which
the plaintiff was given an opportunity to expound on the factual allegations by a
Watson questionnaire or a Spears hearing and could not assert a claim with an
arguable factual basis,10 or claims without an arguable basis in law.11
On en banc reconsideration, considering the distinct features of such in forma
pauperis proceedings, we now hold that dismissals as frivolous or malicious should
be deemed to be dismissals with prejudice unless the district court specifically
dismisses without prejudice. When the trial court dismisses without prejudice it is
expected that the court will assign reasons so that our appellate review of the trial
court’s exercise of discretion may be performed properly. Unexplained dismissals
without prejudice will necessitate a remand.
We reserve for another day and an appropriate appeal the question of the full
7
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992).
8
Id. The Supreme Court teaches that the dismissal may have a res judicata
effect on frivolousness determinations for future in forma pauperis petitions.
9
One example is a claim subject to a peremptory time bar where no amendment
or subsequent paid filing could overcome the fatal defects. Graves.
10
Id.
11
Id. (noting one likely scenario -- an allegation of infringement of a claimed
legal interest which does not exist).
4
application of this rule to the expanded bases for denial of in forma pauperis status
specified in the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
In reaching today’s decision we have determined and now hold that in cases
involving dismissals as frivolous or malicious under the in forma pauperis statute,
in which the defendant has not been served and was, therefore, not before the trial
court and is not before the appellate court, the appellate court, notwithstanding, has
the authority to change a district court judgment dismissing the claims without
prejudice to one dismissing with prejudice, even though there is no cross-appeal by
the obviously non-present “appellee.” This limited exception is the product of our
effort to make effective the prudential rule announced herein.
Consistent with today’s holding we must now vacate and remand this action
to the district court for entry of an order of dismissal with prejudice except as
relates to the conspiracy claim and for such further proceedings as may be deemed
appropriate.
VACATED and REMANDED.
ENDRECORD
5
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge, with whom KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH,
DUHE’ EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES and DENNIS Circuit Judges, join,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from this Court’s sua sponte action, taken where only
the plaintiff has appealed, changing the district court’s judgment of dismissal
without prejudice to one of dismissal with prejudice. I likewise dissent from the
majority’s conclusory announcement that in all pre-service dismissals without
prejudice of in forma pauperis suits where the plaintiff alone appeals, this Court
will determine whether the dismissal could properly have been with, rather than
without, prejudice and will modify the judgment accordingly.12
The Court provides no explanation, justification, or authority for this action,
and does not even tip its hat to the Federal Rules or the relevant jurisprudence. Its
decision hence appears to be more an exercise of will than of judgment.
Some sixty years ago, just before the Federal Rules went into effect, the
Supreme Court had occasion to review a decision of the Eighth Circuit which had
modified in a manner favorable to the appellee a judgment of the district court,
despite the absence of any cross-appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth
Circuit in a unanimous opinion by Justice Cardozo. Morley Construction Co. v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 57 S.Ct. 325 (1937). The opinion begins by stating the
question before the Supreme Court: “The power of an appellate court to modify a
12
I concur in the balance of the Court’s opinion.
decree in equity for the benefit of an appellee in the absence of a cross-appeal is
here to be admeasured.” Id. at 326 (emphasis added). The Court went on to hold
that the appellate court had no such power, stating:
“Without a cross-appeal, an appellee may ‘urge in support of a decree
any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve
an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon
matter overlooked or ignored by it.’ United States v. American
Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 564, 68 L.Ed.
1087 [1924]. What he may not do in the absence of a cross-appeal is
to ‘attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights
thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he
seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect to
a matter not dealt with below.’ Ibid. The rule is inveterate and
certain.” Id. at 327-28.13
13
Although Morley was decided before the Federal Rules went
into effect, its applicability under the Federal Rules has never
been questioned. See, e.g., Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig,
96 S.Ct. 2158, 2159 (1976) (reversing Court of appeals because its
decision conflicted with “the ‘inveterate and certain’ rule” of
Morley). See also the following decisions of this Court expressly
relying on Morley in support of holdings that the appellee who did
not cross-appeal could not seek to enlarge his rights under the
judgment appealed or diminish those of his adversary, viz: Matter
of Toyota of Jefferson, 14 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994);
Texas Commerce Bank v. National Royalty Corp., 799 F.2d 1081, 1083
(5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Central Gulf Lines, 699 F.2d 243,
248 (5th Cir. 1983); Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1273
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 2239 (1982); North Texas
Producers Ass’n v. Metzger Dairies, 348 F.2d 189, 197 & n.10 (5th
Cir. 1965); Newport Industries v. Crosby Naval Stores, 139 F.2d
611, 612 (5th Cir. 1944); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Leisk, 133 F.2d
79, 81 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1943).
The Supreme Court has likewise continued to apply the Morley
principles in refusing to consider a contention of a respondent who
did not cross-petition where if the contention were sustained the
judgment of the court of appeals would be modified in a manner
adverse to the petitioner. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Company, 90 S.Ct. 616, 620 n.4 (1970) (citing Morley). See also
Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613, 620 n.14 (1985);
Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2295, 2303
n.11 (1976) (citing Mills); United States v. ITT Continental Baking
Co., 95 S.Ct. 926, 929 n.2 (1975) (citing Morley). Most recently,
in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 114 S.Ct. 855, 862
(1994), the Court wrote: “A cross-petition is required, however,
7
The Supreme Court did not suggest that the Eighth Circuit had abused its
discretion or that the circumstances were not sufficiently exceptional to justify its
action, but rather held that the Eighth Circuit simply did not have the “power” to
do what it did “in the absence of a cross-appeal.”
Yet this Court now, in violation of the “inveterate and certain” rule of
Morley, does just what the Supreme Court held the Eighth Circuit lacked the power
to do.14
I.
Over the years, decisions of the courts of appeals have divided on whether
the Morley rule requiring a cross-appeal in order to modify the judgment to enlarge
the appellee’s rights thereunder, or diminish those of the appellant, is a rule
governing the power or jurisdiction of the appellate court or is rather a rule of
practice as to which exceptions may be made on a case by case basis in highly
when the respondent seeks to alter the judgment below.”
14
It is well-settled that where the plaintiff alone appeals a
dismissal without prejudice, the appellate court may not change the
judgment to one of dismissal with prejudice, as this enlarges the
rights of the defendant-appellee under the judgment, for which a
cross-appeal is required. See, e.g., Transcapital Financial v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 44 F.3d 1023, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Treadway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288, 296 (7th Cir. 1994); New Castle
County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1206 (3d Cir.
1991); Benson v. Armontrout, 767 F.2d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 1985). We
similarly so held in Arvie v. Broussard, 42 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.
1994). In Arvie, we declined to follow earlier decisions in Graves
v. Hampton, 1 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1993), and Ali v. Higgs, 892
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1990), in which this Court had changed dismissal
without prejudice to with prejudice without even commenting on the
absence of a cross-appeal, much less making any attempt to justify
such unusual action. Cf. Penhurst State School v. Halderman, 104
S.Ct. 900, 918 (1984) (decisions assuming jurisdiction sub silentio
are not binding precedent on that issue).
8
unusual and compelling circumstances. A representative sample of cases from
other circuits holding that the cross-appeal requirement is one governing the power
or jurisdiction of the appellate court includes the following: E.F. Operating Corp.
v. American Buildings, 993 F.2d 1046, 1049 & n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
193 (1993); Francis v. Clark Equipment Co., 993 F.2d 545, 552-53 (6th Cir. 1993);
New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1206 (3d Cir.
1991); Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 1990);
Young Radiator Co. v. Celotex Corp., 881 F.2d 1408, 1415-17 (7th Cir. 1989); Broth.
of Maintenance Employees v. St. Johnsburg & Lamoille, 806 F.2d 14, 15-16 (2d Cir.
1986) (at least where no cross-appeal by any party); Benson v. Armontrout, 767 F.2d
454, 455 (8th Cir. 1985); Savage v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass’n, 737 F.2d 887, 888-89
(10th Cir. 1984); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413,
415 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Morley); Martin v. Hamil, 608 F.2d 725, 730-31 (7th Cir.
1979) (citing Morley); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 725-26 (2d Cir.
1978); Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 414 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Whitehead v.
American Security and Trust Company, 285 F.2d 282, 285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Some of the cases from other circuits which treat the absence of a cross-appeal as
rule of practice which can be dispensed with in certain rare circumstances include
the following. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 342-45 (3d
Cir. 1991); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 32-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 508, 509 (1990); Lafaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 n.9 (4th Cir.
1987); Bryant v. Technical Research Company, 654 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir.
9
1981); Hysell v. Iowa Public Service Co., 559 F.2d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 1977). See
also Transcapital Financial v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 44 F.3d 1023, 1026 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (declining relief to appellee for want of a cross-appeal notice, but stating
“we will not waive this requirement in these circumstances”); Freeman v. B&B
Associates, 790 F.2d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (failure to file notice of cross-appeal
is not jurisdictional, and can be waived “but only in cases involving exceptional
circumstances”; applying rule that where no cross-appeal “‘we may not and should
not consider’” an argument that would enlarge appellee’s rights under judgment).
Still other cases have denied an appellee relief because of the lack of a cross-
appeal, but have not indicated whether this is on a jurisdictional basis or simply as
a matter of practice. See, e.g., Tredway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288, 296 (7th Cir. 1994);
Turpen v. City of Corvallis, 26 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 426
(1994); U.S. v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 917 F.2d 654, 662 (1st Cir. 1990).
Likewise in this Court there are decisions viewing the question as one of
power or jurisdiction, and others which treat it as a rule of practice or as at least
subject to exception in particularly unusual circumstances. Among our decisions
treating the lack of a cross-appeal as limitation on the appellate court’s jurisdiction
or power are the following: Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Because Kelly did not file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal, however, we lack
jurisdiction to alter the district court’s judgment in her favor”); Memorial Hosp.
System v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236, 239 N.2 (5th Cir. 1990) (declining
to consider appellee’s request for relief because they did not cross-appeal and “we
10
have held that ‘the filing of a notice of appeal is a “mandatory precondition” to our
exercise of jurisdiction’”); Ayers v. United States, 750 F.2d 499, 457 (5th Cir. 1985)
(appellee “Ayers’ challenge to the set-off against the damage award clearly
attempts to enlarge his rights under the district court’s judgment. As such, a cross-
appeal is necessary to pursue the challenge and Ayers’ failure to file a cross-appeal
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) precludes consideration of his claim”); Shipp v.
General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 428 (5th Cir. 1985) (declining to consider
appellee Shipp’s request for relief because his notice of cross-appeal was late; “As
the filing of a notice of appeal is a ‘mandatory precondition’ to our exercise of
jurisdiction [citations], we must decline to entertain Shipp’s belated cross-points”);
Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263, 1272-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
2239 (1982) (“Appellees contend that the district court erred in denying them
attorney’s fees . . . We cannot consider this contention. Appellees filed no cross-
appeal . . . In the absence of a cross-appeal, an appellee cannot ‘attack the [district
court’s] decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of
lessening the rights of his adversary,’” quoting Morley at 328); Duriso v. K-Mart,
559 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Our consideration of this issue is precluded
by [appellee] Duriso’s failure to file a timely notice of cross-appeal. Rule 4(a),
F.R.A.P.”); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1026 n.34 (5th Cir. 1977) (refusing to
consider appellee’s claim that erroneous charge entitled it to new trial on liability
as well as damages “[b]ecause the appellee did not cross-appeal” such relief “may
occur only on cross-appeal”); North Texas Producers Ass’n v. Metzger Dairies, Inc.,
11
348 F.2d 189, 197 (5th Cir. 1965) (declining relief on appellee’s contention fee
award below was inadequate because “in the absence of a cross-appeal, this Court
cannot enlarge the rights of the appellee,” citing Morley); Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v.
Leisk, 133 F.2d 79, 81 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1943) (rehearing granted to eliminate
modification of judgment below which increased award to appellee, because
appellee did not cross-appeal; noting that although on appeal this Court had
jurisdiction to revise the judgment appealed, nevertheless “the jurisdiction thus
conferred must be invoked before it may be exercised” and without a cross-appeal
“appellee may not attempt either to enlarge his rights under the judgment appealed
from or to lessen the rights of his adversary,” citing Morley). See also Richardson
v. Byrd, 709 F.2d 1016, 1024 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Absent a timely cross-appeal,
[appellee] Gassner’s request for additional relief is not before us”); Likens v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1934) (question of whether
trial court correctly allowed an offset to defendants-appellants “is not before us as
the plaintiff has not [cross] appealed”).
In other cases, though we have not expressly spoken in terms of the appellate
court’s jurisdiction or power we have denied relief to an appellee simply on the
basis that without a cross-appeal an appellee may not seek to enlarge its rights (or
diminish its adversary’s) under the judgment appealed, generally citing Morley,
which, as previously noted, spoke to the “power” of the appellate court. See, e.g.,
Matter of Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 14 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.1 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Morley); Speaks v. Trikora Lloyd P.T., 838 F.2d 1436, 1439 (5th Cir. 1988); Texas
12
Commerce Bank v. Nat. Royalty Corp., 799 F.2d 1081, 1083 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing
Morley); United States v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 699 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citing Morley); United States v. Yorfino, 412 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1969) (“In the
absence of a cross-appeal, as was the case, defendants-appellees are without
standing to contest the judgment entered by the district court”); Abel v. Brayton
Flying Service, 248 F.2d 713, 717 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1957); Newport Industries v.
Crosby Naval Stores, 139 F.2d 611, 612 (5th Cir. 1944) (citing Morley). In none of
these cases did we suggest that this was a rule of practice the invocation of which
was discretionary with the appellate court or discuss whether the circumstances
were exceptional or the like. We simply applied a fixed rule, generally relying on
Morley.
On the other hand, there are a few decisions of this Court which have treated
the cross-appeal requirement as a rule of practice subject to exceptions in rare
particular cases. We took that approach in Calhoun County v. Roberts, 137 F.2d
130, 132 (5th Cir. 1943), and again in United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332, 337-
38 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969), and United States v. United States Steel Corporation, 520
F.2d 1043, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 61 (1976). So far as I can
determine, we have not since 1975 expressly invoked the rule of practice theory to
modify a district court judgment in a manner favorable to an appellee who has not
filed a cross-appeal. However, in Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, 616 F.2d 734, 742-
44 (5th Cir. 1980), we did hold that an appeal by a third party defendant, whose
liability was derivative of the defendant’s, successfully challenging an instruction
13
relating to the defendant’s liability, “operates” as an appeal by the defendant,
resulting in a new trial as to both the defendant and third party defendant. 15
On one occasion, we opined in dicta that an appellate court does have
authority to grant relief to appellees who have not appealed, but declined to grant
such relief, noting that it is available only in a very limited set of defined
circumstances. In Anthony v. Petroleum Helicopter, 693 F.2d 495, 497-98 (5th Cir.
1982), PHI, owner of a helicopter which crashed, was sued by an injured passenger,
15
We stated that “we have held . . . that the third party
defendant . . . has appealed on behalf of defendant,” id. at 743,
and
“[b]ecause the third-party defendant’s liability is
derivative of defendant’s liability, and because the
reversal of the judgment against the third-party
defendant is based solely on an error in the main case,
i.e., plaintiff’s case against defendant, we hold that
third-party defendant has appealed and asserted this
error not only on its own behalf but also on behalf of
defendant. Thus the third-party defendant’s appeal
operates, in this limited circumstance, as an appeal of
the judgment of defendant as well as the judgment of
third-party defendant.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
We were careful to note the limited nature of our holding,
observing that the D.C. Circuit’s Whitehead case was
distinguishable because “[t]he plaintiff in Whitehead could not be
said to have appealed on behalf of the defendant,” id. at 743; and
we likewise reserved judgment on cases from other circuits which
had allowed a successful appeal by one party to operate in favor of
a nonappealing party whose interests were parallel to, though not
derivative of, those of the appellant. Id. at 743 & n.14.
I note in passing our decision in French v. Estelle, 696 F.2d
318 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2108 (1983), in which
we affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief, albeit on
a different ground than that relied on by the district court even
though the prisoner had not cross-appealed. Although such an
affirmance may have had adverse collateral consequences to the
state, we noted that despite his failure to cross-appeal “the
petitioner may urge the appellate court to affirm the district
court’s decision on any ground raised below.” Id. at 320.
14
who also sued the manufacturer, MBB, the distributor, Boeing, and Texaco; PHI
brought claims for contribution and for loss of the helicopter against MBB and
Boeing; and MBB and Boeing sought contribution against Texaco. The trial court
granted summary judgment exonerating MBB, Boeing, and Texaco from all
liability. The surviving passenger appealed the judgment exonerating MBB,
Boeing, and Texaco, but then settled. PHI appealed the judgment but only insofar
as it exonerated MBB and Boeing. We reversed, holding that summary judgment
for MBB and Boeing was improper, as there were genuine issues of fact. We
refused to consider the request of appellees MBB and Boeing, who had not cross-
appealed, to also set aside the summary judgment in favor of Texaco, stating
“[since] neither party [MBB and Boeing] filed a protective appeal against Texaco
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3), we dismiss the appeal with respect to Texaco.”
Id. at 498. We also observed that “MBB and Boeing do not fall within any of the
exceptional circumstances in which the appellate courts have exercised their
discretionary powers.” Id. We had earlier described these circumstances as
follows:
“Although appellate courts have ‘discretionary power to retain all
parties in the lawsuit [on] remand . . . to insure an equitable resolution
at trial,’ Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th
Cir. 1981), this discretion has been exercised only in narrowly defined
situations: when the reversal ‘wipes out all basis for recovery against
the nonappealing, as well as against the appealing defendant,’ Daniels
v. Gilbreath, 668 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1982); Kicklighter v. Nails by
Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 742-45 (5th Cir. 1980); when the failure to
reverse with respect to the nonappealing party will frustrate the
execution of the judgment in favor of the successful appellant, In re
Barnett, 124 F.2d 105, 1008-12 (2d Cir. 1942); or when the appealed
decision could reasonably be read as not being adverse to the
15
nonappealing party. Bryant, 654 F.2d at 1342-43.” Id. at 497-98.
The last three times we have expressly addressed the “rule of practice”
argument we have declined to either adopt or reject it, but have denied relief to the
appellee due to the failure to cross-appeal. In Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material, Inc.,
697 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1983), the defendant appealed an award to the plaintiffs-
employees (welders), and, because they had not cross-appealed, we refused to
consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the judgment erroneously failed to include
liquidated damages, quoting the rule as stated in Morley and also citing, inter alia,
Alford and Dupuy. Robicheaux at 668. We noted that “plaintiff welders argue that
this rule is not jurisdictionally mandated and may be judicially waived.” Id.
However, we did not expressly accept or reject this argument, but simply held that
the liquidated damages issue was “not properly before us,” noting that “no more
reason is shown for our exercising any power we might have under Fed. R. App.
P. 2 to suspend the requirement for a timely cross-appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3),
than in other such instances.” Id. In both Stockstill v. Petty Ray Geophysical, 888
F.2d 1493 (5th Cir. 1989), and Crist v. Dickson Welding, Inc., 957 F.2d 1281 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 187 (1992), we declined to consider requests for relief
by those who had not cross-appealed. In each case we noted the Anthony dicta
suggesting that “an initial notice of appeal is jurisdictional but a protective or cross-
appeal is permissive and courts of appeal may retain all parties in order to do
justice.” Stockstill at 1496; Crist at 1289 (same). Each opinion further notes “[t]he
continued viability of the principle recognized in Anthony is questionable, however,
16
in view of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101
L.Ed.2d 285 (1988).” Crist at 1289; Stockstill at 1496 (same). In Stockstill we
quoted from the Seventh Circuit’s thorough discussion of this issue in Young
Radiator Co., which explained that Torres made clear that the requirements of Fed.
R. App. P. 3 and 4 must be satisfied as to each party and that a notice of appeal
which was adequate as to some plaintiffs was nevertheless inadequate to confer
appellate jurisdiction as to a plaintiff unnamed therein. Stockstill at 1496-97.
Stockstill goes on to observe “[u]nder Torres, therefore, it is doubtful we have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal of BMF.” 888 F.2d at 1497. In
both Crist and Stockstill, we refrained from ultimately resolving this question as we
concluded that even if the Anthony dicta were viable, nevertheless none of the three
narrow circumstances in which Anthony indicated the absence of a cross-appeal
could be dispensed with were present, and so we granted the motions to dismiss
these contentions by the parties who had not filed protective appeals. Crist at 1289-
90; Stockstill at 1497.
For a better understanding of whether the Morley limitations relate to the
power or jurisdiction of the court of appeals or merely state a rule of practice from
which the court can depart in its discretion, some review of the development of the
relevant Federal Rules is helpful. Morley was handed down in early 1937. In
December 1937, the Supreme Court adopted what are now the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 73 governed the mechanics of taking an appeal, including
the form of notice of appeal, but did not initially provide any time limits for
17
appealing, which were covered by statute. In 1946, Rule 73(a) was amended by,
inter alia, prescribing a thirty-day period (sixty days if the United States were a
party) in which an appeal could be taken (this operated to shorten the time allowed,
which had generally been three months). 9 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.), ¶¶
203.22, 203.24[1], [2], 203.25[1].16 In 1966, Rule 73(a) was again amended to
provide, for the first time, an additional period for an appeal taken after an appeal
by another party. Id. ¶ 203.24[2].17 As amended in 1966, and as in effect when
replaced by the new Rules of Appellate Procedure in 1968, the first sentence of
Rule 73(a) provided:
“(a) HOW AND WHEN TAKEN. An appeal permitted by law from
a district court to a court of appeals shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the district court within 30 days from the entry of the
judgment appealed from, except that: (1) in any action in which the
United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party, the notice of
appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days from such entry; (2)
upon a showing of excusable neglect the district court in any action
may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal not exceeding 30
days from the expiration of the original time herein prescribed; (3) if
a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file
a notice of appeal within 14 days of the date on which the first notice
of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise herein prescribed,
whichever period last expires; (4) an appeal by permission of a court
of appeals obtained under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1292(b) shall be taken in
accordance with the rules of the Court of Appeals.”
16
This amendment also allowed the district court to extend the
time for an additional thirty days “upon a showing of excusable
neglect based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of the
judgment.” Id. ¶ 203.24[2].
17
The 1966 amendment also expanded the excusable neglect for
which the district court could extend the appeal period for an
additional thirty days from that based solely on failure to learn
of the entry of the judgment (see note 5 above) to any form of
excusable neglect. Id.
18
The first sentence of the second paragraph of Rule 73(a) provided (as does now the
third sentence of Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)) that “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of
the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems
appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.”
When the Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted, former Rule 73 was
abrogated, and its provisions concerning the time in which a notice of appeal must
be filed were placed in Fed. R. App. P. 4, while those dealing with other aspects of
the notice of appeal, including the necessity for it and its contents, were placed in
Fed. R. App. P. 3. The first three sentences of Rule 3 now provide:
“(a) Filing the Notice of Appeal. An appeal permitted by law
as of right from a district court to a court of appeals must be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. At the time of filing, the appellant must
furnish the clerk with sufficient copies of the notice of appeal to
enable the clerk to comply promptly with the requirements of
subdivision (d) of this Rule 3. Failure of an appellant to take any step
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the court
of appeals deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the
appeal.”
Except for the 1994 addition of the second sentence (and its change of the “shall”
to “must” in the first sentence), this language is unchanged from the originally
promulgated Rule 3. The relevant portions of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) now provide as
follows:
“(a) Appeal in a Civil Case——
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(4) of this
Rule, in a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by
law as of right from a district court to a court of
appeals the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be
19
filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from; but if the United States or an officer or agency
thereof is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by
any party within 60 days after such entry. . . .
(2) [premature notice of appeal] . . .
(3) If one party timely files a notice of appeal,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14
days after the date when the first notice was filed, or
within the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 4(a),
whichever period last expires.
(4) If any party files a timely motion of a type
specified immediately below, the time for appeal for all
parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
last such motion outstanding. . . .
(5) The district court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule
4(a). . . . No such extension shall exceed 30 days past
such prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of
the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(6) [allowing 14-day reopening of appeal period
where party does not receive notice within 21 days after
entry of judgment, provided motion made within 180 days
of entry or 7 days of notice, whichever first] . . .
(7) [entry of judgment defined] . . .”
As can be seen, current Rule 4(a)(3) is virtually identical to
clause (3) of former Rule 73(a) as amended in 1966. The Committee
Note respecting the 1966 amendment adding clause (3) to Rule 73(a)
explains:
“The exception number (3) in the first sentence
affords additional time for appeal to all parties other
than an initial appellant whenever the first appeal taken
from a judgment is taken within the 14 days preceding
expiration of the time for appeal. . . . The added time
which may be made available by the operation of the
provision is not restricted to cross appeals in the
technical sense, i.e., to appeals by parties made
appellees by the nature of the initial appeal. The
20
exception permits any party to the action who is entitled
to appeal within the time ordinarily prescribed to appeal
within such added time as the sentence affords. Bertman
v. J.A. Kirch Co., 377 U.S. 995 (1964), Schildhaus v.
Moe, 335 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1964) and Whitehead v.
American Security and Trust Co., 285 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.
1960) are illustrative of the desirability of a change in
the present rule.”18
As explained in Moore’s, the purpose of the 1966 addition of
clause (3) to the first sentence of former Rule 73(a) was
“. . . simply to permit each party to a judgment to
decide upon the advisability of an appeal with full
knowledge of the intentions of all other parties with
respect to an appeal. It not infrequently happens that
a party is satisfied with a judgment only if it is to be
the final result; that is, if no other party intends to
appeal from it. Before the addition of [the predecessor
to] Rule 4(a)(3), a party so situated had no certain way
of knowing whether any other party intended to appeal.
All parties were required to appeal within the time
regularly fixed for taking an appeal. A party who
desired to appeal only if some other party took an appeal
either had to forego that desire and file a notice of
appeal, thereby possibly provoking other appeals that
might not have been taken, or keep watch at the clerk’s
office during the final days of the time for appeal in
order to be sure that he would learn of the fact of the
appeal in time to take his own.” Id. ¶ 204.11[1] at 4-18
(footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
By the time that clause (3) was added to the first sentence of
former Rule 73(a), it was already clear that the time limits for
filing a notice of appeal were “mandatory and jurisdictional.”
United States v. Robinson, 80 S.Ct. 282, 288 (1960). This is also
reflected in the provision of the second paragraph of former Rule
73(a) that “failure of an appellant to take any step other than the
18
Quoted in Moore’s ¶ 203.25[3]. The cases cited in the last
sentence are ones in which the initial appeal was filed on or about
the last day, and the other party’s notice of appeal was
consequently a day or two late, resulting in its dismissal by the
court of appeals.
21
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of
the appeal” (emphasis added), and in the provision of former Rule
6(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that courts “may not extend
the time for taking any action under rules 25, 50(b), (d), and (e),
60(b), and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent and under the
conditions stated in them.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.) ¶
6.01[16].19
As previously observed, these provisions have all been carried
forward into the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
Committee Note to Rule 3 made at the time the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure were adopted states:
“Rule 3 and Rule 4 combine to require that a notice of
appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court
within the time prescribed for taking an appeal. Because
the timely filing of a notice of appeal is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional,’ United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,
224 (1960), compliance with the provisions of those rules
is of the utmost importance.” 9 Moore’s Federal Practice
(2d ed.) ¶ 203.01[2].
Since then, the Supreme Court has time and again reiterated that
the filing of a timely notice of appeal is “mandatory and
19
The quoted provision of the second paragraph of Rule 73(a)
has been contained in Fed. R. App. P. 3(a) since its adoption. The
portion of Rule 6(b) quoted in the text was carried forward as to
notices of appeal in Fed. R. App. P. 26(b) (as to the other filings
it remains in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)) by the provision contained in
Rule 26(b) since its adoption that “the court may not enlarge the
time for filing a notice of appeal.” See 9 Moore’s Federal
Practice ¶¶ 226.01, 226.02. Moreover, Fed. R. App. P. 2 has, since
its original adoption with the other Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, provided that “a court of appeals may, except as
otherwise provided in Rule 26(b), suspend the requirements or
provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on
application of a party or on its own motion and may order
proceedings in accordance with its direction.” (Emphasis added).
22
jurisdictional.” See, e.g., Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 108
S.Ct. 2405, 2409 (1988) (“. . . a court of appeals . . . may not
waive the jurisdictional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, even for
‘good cause shown’ under Rule 2"); Budinich v. Becton Dickinson And
Co., 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1722 (1988) (“the taking of an appeal within
the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional”); Griggs v.
Provident Consumer Discount Co., 103 S.Ct. 400, 403 (1982) (“It is
well settled that the requirement of a timely notice of appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional” [internal quotations marks omitted]);
Browder v. Director, 98 S.Ct. 556, 561 (1978) (“‘mandatory and
jurisdictional,’” citing Robinson).
Similarly, it is plain from both the wording and history of
former Rule 73(a)——particularly its first sentence——that the filing
within the time there specified of a notice of appeal by one party
after another party had timely filed a notice of appeal was as much
a necessary precondition to the appellate court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over the former’s appeal as compliance with any of the
other time periods specified in the rule’s first sentence was a
prerequisite to exercise of jurisdiction over the appeals to which
such other periods related. As the Supreme Court observed in
Torres respecting the above quoted Committee Note to Rule 3: “This
admonition by the Advisory Committee makes no distinction among the
various requirements of Rule 3 and Rule 4; rather it treats the
requirements of the two Rules as a single jurisdictional
threshold.” Torres at 2408. Clause (3) of the first sentence of
former Rule 73(a) merely extends the otherwise applicable and
23
jurisdictional thirty-day period provided in the initial clause of
the sentence by up to fourteen days, just as clause (1) employs a
sixty-day period for cases in which the United States is a party.
There is simply nothing in the wording or structure of the first
sentence of former Rule 73(a) to suggest that the time limit of its
clause (3) was any less mandatory and jurisdictional than any of
the other time limits specified in that sentence. Indeed, the
history of the adoption of clause (3) of former Rule 73(a) clearly
reflects that it was intended to allow the fourteen additional days
following timely appeal by another party in order to avoid the
jurisdictional dismissal which otherwise ensued when an appellee
waited to see if another party would appeal, but the other party
did not do so until the last day, so the appellee was only able to
file his notice of cross-appeal after the thirty days had expired.
It might be argued that the “cross-appeal” provision——clause
(3) of the first sentence of former Rule 73(a) and its successor,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3)——merely affords a “safe harbor,” so that a
party who complies therewith, after another party has timely
appealed, has the right to seek a modification in his favor of the
judgment below without being subject to any “rule of practice”
limitation on that right. Such an argument, however, illogically
treats this “cross-appeal” time limit differently from the other
notice of appeal time limits specified in the same rule. Moreover,
it ignores the provisions of the second paragraph of former Rule
73(a)——now carried forward as the third sentence of Fed. R. App. P.
3(a)——that “failure of an appellant to take any step other than the
24
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of
the appeal” (emphasis added), and it likewise ignores both the
provision of Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)——carrying forward the similar
provision of former Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)——that “the court may not
enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal” and the related
provision of Fed. R. App. P. 2 allowing the courts of appeal to
suspend the requirements of the rules in particular cases “except
as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b).” (Emphasis added). See note
8, supra, and accompanying text. It makes no sense to say that the
cross-appeal requirement is merely a rule of practice which does
not limit the jurisdiction or power of the court of appeals, but
that nevertheless the court of appeals is powerless to extend the
time allowed therefor provided in Rule 4(a)(3) (and its predecessor
former Rule 73(a)) despite being empowered to suspend all the
other time limits provided in the appellate rules.
Finally, Morley stood and stands as a clear statement of the
Supreme Court respecting the appellate court’s lack of “power,” in
the absence of a cross-appeal, to change a trial court judgment so
as to enlarge an appellee’s rights, or diminish those of the
appellant, thereunder.
The inevitable conclusion is that without a timely cross-
appeal the appellate court lacks jurisdiction or power to modify
the lower court’s judgment adversely to the appellant.
The notion that the requirement of a cross-appeal in order to
modify the judgment in a manner favorable to the appellee is merely
a “rule of practice” which the appellate court may disregard at its
25
discretion is founded on essentially three propositions. I
consider these seriatim.
First, reliance is placed on Langnes v. Green, 51 S.Ct. 243
(1931), which does indeed contain “rule of practice” language. Id.
at 245-246. However, Langnes cannot sustain the weight thus sought
to be placed on it. In the first place, Langnes predates Morley,
and Morley expressly speaks to the “power” of the appellate court.
The Supreme Court has never retreated from Morley. See note 2,
supra. If Langnes and Morley conflict, the latter clearly
controls. Second, the “rule of practice” language in Langnes is
dicta, as Langnes expressly held that the respondent there, who had
not cross-petitioned, sought “not to overthrow the [court of
appeals] decree, but to sustain it” and hence was within that prong
of the rule of United States v. American Railway Express Co., 44
S.Ct. 560, 564 (1924),20 allowing an appellee who has not cross-
appealed to “‘urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in
the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the
reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matters
overlooked or ignored by it.’” Langnes at 246. While we relied on
Langnes in Calhoun County, we recognized that the rule of practice
language in Langnes was only “considered dictum.” Calhoun County,
137 F.2d at 132.21 Even the Langnes dicta stresses the admiralty
20
Both prongs of the rule were later quoted in Morley and there
described as “inveterate and certain” and as measuring “[t]he power
of an appellate court.”
21
It is to be noted that Calhoun County was decided before any
time limits were contained in former Rule 73(a); also, Calhoun
26
nature of the proceedings there in which appellate review was de
novo and under a separate statutory system; moreover, the language
is directed to Supreme Court certiorari review. Id. at 245-246.22
County was an admiralty case, decided at a time when admiralty
appeals were governed by separate statutory provisions and review
was de novo. Id. at 132.
22
It is to be doubted that the Langnes dicta is any longer
followed so as to allow a respondent who has not cross-petitioned
for certiorari to seek to modify in his favor the decree of the
court of appeals. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent,
114 S.Ct. 855, 862 (1994). See also note 2, supra. In Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Thornton, 105 S.Ct. 613 (1985), the court of
appeals held that petitioner TWA was liable in damages to the
plaintiffs-respondents for violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA); and it also held that the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA) had violated the ADEA, but that the plaintiffs
could not recover damages from the ALPA because the ADEA did not
permit monetary recovery from unions. TWA petitioned for
certiorari, but the plaintiffs-respondents did not cross-petition.
The Supreme Court held it “was without jurisdiction” to consider
the correctness of the court of appeals’ ruling as to the ALPA’s
lack of liability for damages, which plaintiffs-respondents (as
well as TWA) urged it to reverse. Id., 105 S.Ct. at 620 n.14. The
Court stated:
“In its petition for a writ of certiorari, TWA
raised the issue of a union’s liability for damages under
the ADEA. Although we granted the petition in full, we
now conclude that the Court is without jurisdiction to
consider this question. TWA was not the proper party to
present this question. The airline cannot assert the
right of others to recover damages against the Union.
Both the individual respondents and the EEOC argue
that the issue of union liability is properly before the
Court. But the respondents failed to file a cross-
petition raising this question. A prevailing party may
advance any ground in support of a judgment in his favor.
[citation] An argument that would modify the judgment,
however, cannot be presented unless a cross-petition has
been filed. [citation] In this case, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals would be modified by the arguments
advanced by the EEOC and the individual plaintiffs, as
they are contending that the Union should be liable to
them for monetary damages.” Id. (emphasis added).
So far as the “rule of practice” approach is followed by the
27
The next argument in favor of the “rule of practice” approach
is founded on Fed. R. App. P. 2 (allowing courts of appeals to
suspend the rules in particular cases) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (rules
“shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action”). See, e.g., Robicheaux
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 697 F.2d at 628 (declining to exercise
“any power we might have under Fed. R. App. P. 2 to suspend the
requirement for a timely cross-appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3)”).
Of course, as previously noted, Fed. R. App. P. 2 is expressly made
subject to Fed. R. App. P. 26(b), which provides that a court of
Supreme Court on certiorari, it seems to be only to limit the
rights of a respondent who has not cross-petitioned to seek to
sustain the judgment of the court of appeals on a different basis
than that relied on by the court of appeals. See, e.g., United
States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 95 S.Ct. 926, 929 n.2 (1975):
“Respondent recognizes that, not having cross-
petitioned, it cannot attack the judgment insofar as it
sustained the findings of violations and imposed
penalties for such violations. United States v. American
Railway Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560,
563, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924). Cf. Morley Construction Co.
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U.S. 185, 57 S.Ct. 325, 81
L.Ed. 593 (1937). Respondent argues that it may
nevertheless seek to sustain the Court of Appeals’
limitation on the penalties on the theory that no penalty
should have been awarded at all. Ordinarily, however, as
a matter of practice and control of our docket, if not of
our power, we do not entertain a challenge to a decision
on the merits where the only petition for certiorari
presents solely a question as to the remedy granted for
a liability found to exist, even if the respondent is willing to
accept whatever judgment has already been entered against him.”
This contrasts with the absolute duty of the court of appeals
to rule on issues properly presented by appellee and preserved
below which would result in affirmance of the district court’s
judgment, albeit on a different ground and even though no cross-
appeal has been taken. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 96
S.Ct. 2158, 2159 (1976).
28
appeals “may not enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal.”
As to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, the Rules of Civil Procedure have long
been inapplicable to giving notice of appeal, and when they were
applicable former Rule 6(b) prohibited notice of appeal time
enlargements not provided for in former Rule 73(a). See note 8,
supra, and accompanying text. In related contexts, the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected these or similar arguments. See
Torres at 2407-08; Budinich at 1722; Griggs at 403.
The final and most frequently invoked justification for the
“rule of practice” approach to cross-appeals is that the initial
appellant’s notice of appeal gives the court of appeals
jurisdiction over the whole case, so notice of appeal by any other
party is not a necessary precondition to exercise appellate power
or jurisdiction to modify the judgment in a manner adverse to the
appellant.23 However, as pointed out above, this approach ignores
the reason for the 1966 addition of the extra fourteen days for
cross-appeal by clause (3) of former Rule 73(a) and is likewise
inconsistent with the treatment in former Rule 73(a), and now in
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), of the “cross appeal” time limits in the very
same way as the initial appeal time limits, except for the extra
fourteen days allowed for the “cross-appeal.” Nor does this
approach account for the provision in the second paragraph of
23
See, e.g., Hysell, 559 F.2d at 476 (“once a timely notice of
appeal has been filed from a judgment it gives us jurisdiction to
review the entire judgment; rules requiring separate appeals by
other parties are rules of practice, which may be waived . . .,”
citing Langnes).
29
former Rule 73(a), now in Fed. R. App. P. 3(a), that “failure of an
appellant to take any steps other than the timely filing of a
notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal”
(emphasis added). This provision was plainly as applicable to
appeals under clause (3) of the first sentence of former Rule 73(a)
as to appeals under the other provisions of that sentence, just as
it is now as applicable to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3) as to Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1).24 Further, the rule of practice approach cannot
reasonably account for the provisions of Fed. R. App. P.
26(b)——formerly contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)——prohibiting
enlargement of the fourteen-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(3) (and previously in former Rule 73(a)) or the fact that the
flexibility authorized to the courts of appeal by Fed. R. App. P.
2 is expressly made subject to this restriction.
Finally, the theory that the initial appeal fulfills all
jurisdictional prerequisites so as to empower the appellate court
to dispose of all aspects of the entire case appears to be
necessarily inconsistent with Torres. The Seventh and Third
Circuits have expressly so recognized. See Young Radiator, 881
24
I note that there is no basis for concluding that a party who
files a notice of appeal after another party has done so is not an
“appellant.” No distinction is made in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3)——or
in its predecessor former Rule 73(a)(3)——between those parties who
are adverse or potentially adverse to the party first appealing and
those who are not. This is also reflected in the above-cited
Committee Notes to the 1966 amendment to former Rule 73(a), which
state that the new clause (3) “is not restricted to cross appeals
in the technical sense, i.e. to appeals by parties made appellees
by the nature of the initial appeal.” See text accompanying note
7, supra.
30
F.2d at 1416; E.F. Operating Corp., 993 F.2d at 1029 & n.1.25 We,
too, have twice recognized the strength of the Young Radiator
analysis of Torres in this connection, although not ultimately
resolving the matter. See Crist at 1289; Stockstill at 1296-97.
In Torres, notice of appeal was timely filed naming as appellants
fifteen of the sixteen plaintiffs, but the name of the sixteenth
plaintiff, Jose Torres, was inadvertently left off the notice of
appeal. The Supreme Court held that because Torres’ name was left
off the notice of appeal, the court of appeals never acquired
jurisdiction on appeal over the case as to Torres. Obviously, had
the notice of appeal of the other plaintiffs——which was indisputably
timely and adequate——sufficed to bring up the whole case or the
entire judgment, then this would not have been so. Torres thus
necessarily rejects the notion that a valid notice of appeal by one
party suffices to vest the court of appeals with jurisdiction over
the entire judgment of the district court, even as to parties not
giving notice of appeal. As the Young Radiator Court stated:
“. . . it could have been argued in Torres that the
notice of appeal naming fifteen of the sixteen plaintiffs
invoked the jurisdiction of the court over the whole
case, so that a separate appeal by the sixteenth
plaintiff would not be jurisdictionally required. Yet
the Court’s holding made clear that the requirements of
Rules 3 and 4 must be satisfied as to each party, and
precludes the argument in this case that Celotex’s
25
Another panel of the Third Circuit, however, rejected this
reading of Torres. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.,
943 F.3d 335, 343-344 (3d Cir. 1991). Tabor Court is itself
apparently contrary to the Third Circuit’s New Castle County, 933
F.2d 1162, 1206 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Absent a cross-appeal, however,
the Carrier Appellees may not obtain more extensive relief on
appeal than they received in the district court”; emphasis added).
31
noncompliance with Rule 4(a)(3) can be waived.” Id., 881
F.2d at 1416.
The theory that an initial appeal by one party brings up the entire
judgment so as to render appeals by other parties irrelevant for
purposes of the jurisdiction or power of the court of appeals is
likewise rejected, at least implicitly, by Osterneck v. Ernst &
Whinney, 109 S.Ct. 987 (1989).26
26
There, the plaintiffs Osterneck, stockholders in a
corporation which merged into Barwick Industries, sued defendants
Barwick Industries, its officers, E.T. Barwick, Keller, and Talley,
and its accountants, Ernest & Whinney (E&W), claiming that the
merger was induced by fraud. On January 30, 1985, judgment was
entered on the jury verdict awarding the Osternecks damages against
Barwick Industries, Keller, and Talley, but exonerating E.T.
Barwick and E&W. Within ten days, the Osternecks filed a motion
for prejudgment interest. While this motion was pending, on March
1, 1985, the Osternecks filed a notice of appeal naming all
defendants, and on the same day Talley and Keller filed notices of
appeal. On July 9, 1985, the district court entered an amended
judgment, granting the Osternecks some but not all the prejudgment
interest they had requested (but otherwise not changing the January
30 judgment). Within thirty days thereafter, Keller and Talley
filed notices of appeal, as did the Osternecks on July 31. The
Osternecks’ July 31 notice of appeal named all the defendants
except E&W. Before the court of appeals the Osternecks claimed
that the judgment erroneously exonerated E&W and E.T. Barwick, and
also that the award of prejudgment interest was inadequate; Keller
and Talley argued, inter alia, that the Osternecks’ claims against
them were barred by limitations and that the evidence was
insufficient. The court of appeals held it had jurisdiction over
the July 1985 appeals of Keller and Talley, but found that the
issues raised by those defendants were without substantive merit.
Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 1521 (11th
Cir. 1987). The court likewise concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the Osternecks’ July 31, 1985, notice of appeal, but that this
notice of appeal did not suffice to bring forward the Osternecks’
claims against E&W, as E&W was not named therein. Id. at 1528-
1529. See, also, e.g., Capitol Parks v. Southeastern Advertising,
30 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1994); Pope v. MCI, 937 F.2d 258, 266
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1956 (1992). The court of
appeals further held that the Osternecks’ March 1, 1985, notice of
appeal (and that of Keller and Talley filed the same day) was
rendered ineffective by the then provisions of Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4) because it was filed while the motion for prejudgment
32
In summary, the language and history of Fed. R. App. P. 3,
4(a), and 26 (b), and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Morley and
Torres, compel the conclusion that a court of appeals, despite a
timely and proper appeal from a district court judgment by one
party, lacks power or jurisdiction to modify that judgment so as to
make it either more favorable to another party who has not timely
appealed it or less favorable to the only party who has appealed
it. The majority errs in its implicit holding to the contrary.
II.
Finally, even if we were dealing with a rule of practice which
the Court might waive in a particular case, cf. Fed. R. App. P. 2,
I would still dissent from the majority’s modification of the
judgment, which only the plaintiff has appealed, from one of
dismissal without prejudice to one of dismissal with prejudice, and
from its apparent announcement of a new rule of practice that in
interest, which the court concluded was a Rule 59(e) motion, was
pending. Osterneck, 825 F.2d at 1525-1529. The Osternecks
petitioned for certiorari complaining of the dismissal of their
appeal as to E&W. The Supreme Court granted the writ and affirmed.
It noted that “[t]he Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners’ appeal
as to Ernest & Whinney for lack of jurisdiction.” Osterneck, 108
S.Ct. at 989. It agreed with the court of appeals that the
Osternecks’ motion for prejudgment interest was a Rule 59(e)
motion, and since it was pending when the March 1 notice of appeal
was filed that notice of appeal was nugatory under the then
provisions of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Id. at 990-992. The Court
declined to make any equitable exception to this ruling. Id. at
992-93. The Osternecks did not contend in the Supreme Court that
their July 31, 1985, notice of appeal was effective as to E&W. Id.
at 990 n.1. Of course, had the July 1985 notices of appeal by
Keller and Talley——which were properly before the court of
appeals——brought the whole July 9, 1985, judgment into the court of
appeals for jurisdictional purposes, then the court of appeals
would have had jurisdiction over the Osternecks’ complaints of that
judgment’s denial to them of recovery against E&W.
33
all pre-service dismissals without prejudice of in forma pauperis
suits where only the plaintiff appeals this Court will sua sponte
determine whether the dismissal of any claim could properly have
been with, rather than without, prejudice, and will modify the
judgment accordingly.
Courts that have espoused the rule of practice approach have
almost always emphasized that waiver or excuse of the failure to
file a protective or cross-appeal was available only in most
narrowly defined circumstances. Those circumstances we listed in
Anthony, 693 F.2d at 497-98, and there refused to go beyond them,
as we similarly so refused in Robicheaux, Stockstill, and Crist.27
Other courts that have assumed arguendo that a rule of practice
“waiver” might theoretically be available in some cases have
refused to invoke it in similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 917 F.2d at 662-663. Where “rule of
practice” waiver of failure to appeal has been invoked it has
almost always been in highly unusual cases involving three or more
parties where the rights of the parties are interdependent and on
the appeal by one party the appellate court changes the judgment in
27
Anthony states:
“. . . this discretion has been exercised only in
narrowly defined situations: when the reversal ‘wipes
out all basis for recovery against the nonappealing, as
well as against the appealing defendant” [citations,]
when the failure to reverse with respect to the
nonappealing party will frustrate the execution of the
judgment in favor of the successful appellant,
[citation,] or when the appealed decision could
reasonably be read as not being adverse to the
nonappealing party.” Id. at 497-98.
34
a way that adversely affects the rights of one nonappealing party
as against another or eliminates the basis of the judgment against
a nonappealing party. Thus, 15A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure, (2d ed.) § 3904 at 219, states “[t]he cases
that have excused separate appeal requirements virtually all
involved circumstances in which appeals were taken by one or more
defendants or third party defendants, but not by others. The
decision on appeal was inconsistent with the judgment against those
who did not appeal.” See also 9 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed.)
¶ 204.11[5] (“In some cases, however, the rights of the parties are
tied together so closely that the court of appeals can render no
judgment that would be just without affecting the rights of the
parties who did not file a notice of appeal.”).
No cases have been found granting a “rule of practice” waiver
of the failure to file a cross-appeal or protective appeal in a
situation, such as the present, where absent such a waiver the only
result would have been a simple affirmance of the judgment below.
The waiver is granted only where on the appeal timely taken the
appellate court properly grants relief to the appellant and
accordingly changes the judgment below in some respect; because of
that appellate change, nonappealing parties are sometimes, in
certain narrow and extreme cases, allowed to request other or
further changes in the judgment below under the “rule of practice”
theory notwithstanding their failure to appeal, because the
appellate change in the judgment affects their rights against some
other nonappealing party or eliminates the basis of the judgment
35
against them. The Court’s decision in the instant case represents
a sharp break with this rationale, and in effect simply creates a
wholly new rule of practice.
Moreover, our departure from the “inveterate and certain” rule
of Morley gains us next to nothing in judicial efficiency. Any
gain in judicial efficiency presupposes both that if we had merely
affirmed the dismissal without prejudice the appellant would in
fact have timely filed another suit on the same claim against the
same defendant, and that because we have changed the dismissal so
that it is with prejudice, he will not actually do so. This is a
lot of assuming. But, to promote the efficiency of this Court——and
I believe the district courts generally can pretty well take care
of their own efficiency concerns——we must also further assume that
when the district court disposes of the second suit, which will
again doubtless be by dismissal, the plaintiff will again appeal to
us, but would not have done so had we on the first appeal changed
the district court’s original dismissal to be with prejudice.28 Nor
are these hypothetical efficiency gains without costs (apart from
the systemic costs of casually departing from established legal
rules), for we must now not only determine whether the dismissal
without prejudice violated the appellant’s rights, but we must also
28
Experience has shown few, if any, occasions where we have
faced appeals by plaintiffs in second suits following our
affirmance of a section 1915(d) dismissal without prejudice of the
first suit on the same claim, particularly not where the initial
dismissal was on grounds which likely would have warranted
dismissal with prejudice; nor is there any reason to believe that
we would not have faced the second appeal had we, on the first
appeal, changed the dismissal to “with prejudice.”
36
sua sponte determine the sometimes rather close question of whether
the dismissal should instead have been made with prejudice. In
this case, for example, we hold that the dismissal should have been
with prejudice as to three of the claims, but was properly without
prejudice as to the fourth.
III.
The plaintiff alone has appealed the judgment dismissing all
his claims without prejudice. Instead of entering the obviously
merited simple affirmance, we have undertaken to change the
judgment to one of dismissal with prejudice as to three of the four
claims. That change exceeds our power and jurisdiction. Even were
we to follow the theory that the failure to take a protective or
cross-appeal may in certain rare instances be waived by a court of
appeals, this simple case——where absent the waiver there would be
only a plain vanilla affirmance——is totally beyond the universe of
cases in which that approach has been followed and is wholly
unsupported by their rationale.
From one point of view, this is certainly a “nothing” case.
But as a court of appeals it is vitally important that we
understand and observe the rules which govern our jurisdiction,
power, and proceedings. We should not so casually depart from such
inveterate and certain rules.
37