IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-11427
Summary Calendar
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SARAH L. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN J. CALLAHAN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:95-CV-205-C
_________________________________________________________________
August 7, 1997
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sarah L. Wilson appeals the district court’s grant of the
Social Security Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment,
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of supplemental security
benefits to Wilson. Wilson argues that the Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) erred in his determination that she was not disabled
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
because she was able to perform the duties of her past relevant
work. Wilson contends that, by statutory definition, she did not
engage in past relevant work and, therefore, the ALJ’s decision did
not comport with relevant legal standards. Wilson argues further
that the ALJ failed to compare Wilson’s residual functional
capacity with the actual demands of her previous work and that the
ALJ erred by failing to apply the correct standards for evaluating
pain by failing to develop evidence on the possibility that her
mental impairment would cause her pain.
Wilson failed to raise these issues in her appeal to the
Appeals Council. This court has jurisdiction to review the
Commissioner’s final decision only when a claimant has exhausted
her administrative remedies. Paul v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 208, 210
(5th Cir. 1994). Wilson’s failure to raise these issues before the
Appeals Council deprives this court of jurisdiction to review them.
See id. These claims are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
Wilson argues that the ALJ’s finding at Step Three that she
did “not have an impairment listed in or medically equal to one
listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4,” was not
supported by adequately articulated findings. Because the ALJ
proceeded to Step Four, although he determined that Wilson did not
have an impairment at Step Three, this court must infer that a
severe impairment was found at Step Three. See Reves v. Sullivan,
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915 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d
1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (“If the ALJ proceeds past the
impairment step in the sequential evaluation process the court must
infer that a severe impairment was found.”). Therefore, Wilson’s
contentions that the ALJ committed error in his findings at Step
Three have no basis and are without merit.
Wilson also contends that the district court erred by denying
her motion to remand for consideration of new and material
evidence. The district court did not err by denying Wilson’s
motion to remand because she presented no new and material evidence
and did not show good cause for her failure to submit the evidence
earlier. See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995).
The district court’s denial of the motion is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
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