IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-50392
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ARTURO SOLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-95-CR-111 (1)
August 8, 1997
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Arturo Solis, TDCJ # 514142, appeals his conviction for
possession of an unregistered destructive device, possession of an
unidentifiable destructive device, and possession of a firearm by
a felon. A jury found that Solis, who was incarcerated in the
administrative segregation division of a Texas maximum security
prison, injured a fellow inmate by giving him a package that
exploded when he tried to open it. We find no reversible error.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Many of Solis’s claimed errors require us to apply the abuse-
of-discretion standard. The trial court did not depart from its
wide discretion in handling trial matters. The amount of time
provided to Solis for inspecting photographs of his cell and items
seized from the cell was within the boundaries of discretion and in
any event did not prejudice Solis. See United States v. Deisch, 20
F.3d 139, 154 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court’s decision not
to subpoena defense witnesses was a legitimate exercise of
discretion in light of Solis’s failure to explain how those
witnesses were necessary to his defense. See United States
Butler, 988 F.2d 537, 540 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 956,
114 S. Ct. 413, 126 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1993). The court used its sound
discretion to limit Solis’s cross-examination of prosecution
witnesses on the issue of whether the device could be characterized
as a “firecracker.” See Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008, 1013
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 829, 113 S. Ct. 91, 121
L. Ed. 2d 53 (1992). And the admission of evidence of Solis’s gang
activity was within the court’s discretion because it had a bearing
on Solis’s motive for the attack. See United States v. Leahy, 82
F.3d 624, 636 (5th Cir. 1996).
Because Solis did not raise certain objections at trial, we
must review portions of his appeal for plain error under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 52(b). Before trial, Solis moved for appointment of a
handwriting expert in an effort to show that the signature of the
foreman of the grand jury was a forgery. The district court denied
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the motion, and Solis did not raise 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) or
otherwise object. He complains that a long list of prosecutorial
remarks were beyond the pale, but he did not raise those complaints
with the trial court. He also mounts a due process challenge to
his conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) on the theory that his
incarceration made it impossible to comply with the statute’s
registration requirements. We have held that the impossibility of
compliance does not render a registration requirement
unconstitutional. United States v. Ridlehuber, 11 F.3d 516, 526-27
(5th Cir. 1993). We have also rejected Solis’s argument that
§ 5861(d) is beyond Congress’s constitutional powers; the statute
is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, so infirmities in the
commerce power are beside the point. Id. at 526. Finally, Solis
contends that the jury instructions were erroneous because they did
not require a finding of knowledge that the device was unregistered
and because they went beyond the indictment. The National Firearms
Act does not require the mens rea that Solis suggests, United
States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
and we cannot find any basis for the claim that the jury charge
went beyond the indictment. None of these points of error rises to
the level of plain error, and in any event none seriously affected
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37, 113 S. Ct. 1770,
123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160,
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162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1196, 115
S. Ct. 1266, 131 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1995).
We cannot review Solis’s claim that the district court
improperly restricted his opening and closing arguments because he
failed to include the relevant portions of the trial transcript in
the record. See United States v. Narvaez, 38 F.3d 162, 167 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1087, 115 S. Ct. 1803, 131
L. Ed. 2d 729 (1995).
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
state, we cannot say that the convictions rest on insufficient
evidence. The jury could conclude from the prosecution’s case that
the package was a “destructive device” within the meaning of 26
U.S.C. § 5845, that Solis possessed it, that it was not registered
and did not have the required serial number, and that parts of the
device moved in interstate commerce. See United States v. Price,
877 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dickey, 102
F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 1996).
Because the prosecution introduced the victim’s medical report
at trial, it did not suppress the report under Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1050
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1008, 115 S. Ct. 530, 130
L. Ed. 2d 433 (1994), and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1179, 115 S. Ct.
1165, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1120 (1995). Furthermore, Solis has not
established that any tardy disclosure caused him prejudice. See
id.
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The multiple punishments under 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and
5861(i) do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each
violation involves an element that the other does not. See
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76
L. Ed. 306 (1932).
Finally, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) does not require the
district court to make specific findings on each contested matter
at sentencing. It was proper for the court simply to reject
Solis’s objections and to adopt the factual findings in the pre-
sentence report. United States v. Nnanna, 7 F.3d 420, 421 (5th
Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
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