IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-21130
_____________________
GEORGE WEBSTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER
RETIREMENT PLAN; WILLIAM BIDWILL;
THOMAS CONDON; GENE UPSHAW;
TAYLOR SMITH; LEONARD TEEUWS;
JEFF VAN NOTE; EDDIE JONES; JAMES
KENSIL; DANIEL JIGGETTS; EDWARD
GARVEY; SARAH E. GUANT, formerly
known as Sarah E. Meizlik,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
(H-95-CV-3826)
_________________________________________________________________
September 22, 1997
Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
George Webster appeals the district court’s order dismissing
on summary judgment his claim that the Retirement Board arbitrarily
and capriciously denied him past and future retirement and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
disability benefits under the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan
(the “Plan”). Finding no abuse of discretion, the district court
affirmed the Retirement Board’s determination that Webster was
totally disabled as a result of nonfootball related injuries and
that, under the Plan, participants are entitled to “football”
benefits only when the cause of total disability is such that, if
the football related injury did not exist, the participant would
not be totally disabled. We review de novo the district court’s
holding whether the Retirement Board abused its discretion, but
will set aside factual findings underlying the district court’s
review of the Board’s determination only if clearly erroneous. See
Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 601 (5th Cir.
1994).
As the district court’s well-reasoned opinion properly
concludes, the Retirement Board did not abuse its discretion in
denying Webster football benefits. Webster’s medical records
contain ample evidence that he first became totally disabled as a
result of throat cancer, as well as other nonfootball related
injuries, and that they continued to plague him throughout the time
he sought football benefits under the Plan. Despite Webster’s
assertions to the contrary, the medical reports issued in 1992 and
1993 do not establish that he was totally disabled solely as a
result of football related injuries. Rather, the reports reveal
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that, while the effects of Webster’s football related injuries were
enough to leave him totally disabled, the disabling effects of his
nonfootball related injuries persisted. Thus, the Retirement Board
did not abuse its discretion in finding that the initial and
continuing cause of Webster’s total disability was unrelated to
football.
The district court also correctly determined that the
Retirement Board’s interpretation of the Plan did not constitute an
abuse of discretion. Under the Plan, Webster was entitled to
football benefits if his total disability “result[ed] from a
football injury.” The Board interpreted this provision to permit
football benefits only if total disability would not exist but for
the presence of football related injuries. This interpretation is
entirely consistent with a fair and reasonable reading of the Plan
and, therefore, not an abuse of discretion. See Pickrom v. Belger
Cartage Serv., Inc., 57 F.3d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1995). As the
district court concluded, because substantial evidence indicated
that Webster’s nonfootball related injuries were totally disabling,
he was not entitled to football benefits under the Board’s
reasonable interpretation of the Plan. Consequently, the judgment
of the district court is, for the reasons assigned by that court,
A F F I R M E D.
3