IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-31074
Summary Calendar
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CLIFFORD EUGENE DAVIS, JR. and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,
JOHNNIE A. JONES,
Movant-Appellant,
versus
EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH
SCHOOL BOARD, a Corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Louisiana
(56-CV-1662)
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September 10, 1997
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Johnnie Jones appeals an order denying his request for over
$1.2 million in attorney’s fees for his work in this decades-old
desegregation suit, over which the district court has retained
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
jurisdiction. We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine, see Walker v. U.S. Dept. of
Housing and Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1996), and
affirm.
In 1981 Jones filed a similar request for fees. The
district court denied the motion, reasoning that Jones had not
complied with the requirements of Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), and related cases.
Jones appealed the order and we affirmed in an unpublished
opinion. Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., No. 81-
3287 (5th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983). We agreed with the district court
that his fee application was “totally inadequate” under Johnson.
Davis, supra, at 3.
In 1996 Jones filed a motion for attorney’s fees which is
the subject of the present appeal. The district court properly
denied the motion, since both the district court and this court
are bound by the prior appellate decision under the law of the
case doctrine. That doctrine “precludes reexamination of issues
decided on appeal, either by the district court on remand or by
the appellate court itself upon a subsequent appeal.” Quest
Medical, Inc. v. Apprill, 90 F.3d 1080, 1094 (5th Cir. 1996).
Recognized exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are
that “evidence in the subsequent trial is substantially
different, the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
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work manifest injustice, or controlling authority has in the
interim made a contrary rule of law applicable.” Id. The only
conceivable exception which might apply here is that Jones has
somehow augmented his fee request with additional evidence.
The renewed fee request, however, remains totally inadequate
to support an award. We noted in the prior appeal that Jones
“does not even list his clients, although they are the ‘parties’
who must recover attorneys’ fees.” Davis, supra, at 3. In his
renewed motion for fees, Jones again fails to list which
plaintiffs he represented, fails to move for fees on their
behalf, and instead requests fees as “movant in proper person.”
The fee request fails to delineate, among other Johnson factors,
the novelty and difficulty of the questions presented in the
case, whether the fee agreement with the clients was fixed or
contingent, or the results obtained. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at
718.
While, unlike the first fee request, Jones breaks down his
work into various dated entries in an affidavit, those entries
are implausible on their face. Many of the entries indicate that
Jones worked more than 24 hours in a single day. By way of
example, Jones claims he spent 157.5 hours on July 23, 1970 (at a
requested rate of $250 an hour) on a “memorandum opinion and
order.” Further, the only work Jones claims to have done after
April 16, 1981, the date of his first fee motion, involved his
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unsuccessful quest for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, we follow
our prior decision.
AFFIRMED.
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