IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-50131
Summary Calendar
Delia Ramirez,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
State of Texas,
Dept. of Mental Health &
Mental Retardation, and
San Antonio State School
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-95-CV-1029)
September 4, 1997
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Delia Ramirez appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment for the Appellees. We affirm.
I.
Appellees moved for summary judgment in accordance with Rule
56(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Attached to the Appellees’ summary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
judgment motion were affidavits and documents showing that they had
a non-discriminatory reason for dismissing Ms. Ramirez. The
Appellees’ motion and supporting materials complied with Rule
56(e), including the documents from Ms. Ramirez’s personnel file
which the records custodian at the San Antonio State School
certified as business records. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); See Fed. R.
Evid. 803(6). Contrary to Ms. Ramirez’s assertions, there is no
question about the admissibility of Appellees’ supporting
materials.
After Appellees filed their motion for summary judgment with
supporting affidavits, Ms. Ramirez’s job was to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(e). In completing this task, Ms. Ramirez could not
simply restate the allegations in her pleadings. Rather, she was
required to respond with affidavits and other materials which
evidenced a triable issue of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Topalian v. Ehrman,
954 F.2d 1125, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 961 F.2d 215
(5th Cir. 1992), and cert. denied 506 U.S. 825 (1992).
Ms. Ramirez did not do so. In response to Appellees’ motion,
Ms. Ramirez only offered her subjective opinion that she was
subjected to increased scrutiny at work and eventual termination
because of her engagement in protected activities. She offered no
evidence of any kind which provided a factual basis for her belief.
On the other hand, Appellees presented a great deal of evidence
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which indicated that the reason for the close supervision and
eventual termination of Ms. Ramirez was her continually poor work
performance. “It is more than well-settled that an employee’s
subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as
a result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive
a summary judgment motion, in the face of proof showing an adequate
non-discriminatory reason.” Douglass v. United Services Automobile
Ass’n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). Ms. Ramirez’s
challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment against
her must fail since she failed to come forward with any evidence
establishing an essential element of a Title VII claim for unlawful
retaliation viz., a causal link between her filing discrimination
complaints against her employers and the termination of her
employment. Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
1996).
II.
Ms. Ramirez also complains that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment because pending at the time of entry of
the summary judgment order was her motion to compel production of
discovery requests. She claims that the records she sought from
Appellees at this time were “tremendously relevant to the [sic] her
obtaining evidence concerning Defendants’ retaliatory actions.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 22.) We find her challenge to the district
court’s judgment on this ground to be frivolous. If Ms. Ramirez
needed more discovery to defeat summary judgment, then it was up to
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her to move for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(f); Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 887 (5th
Cir. 1996). “Because she did not, she is now foreclosed from
arguing that she did not have adequate time for discovery.”
Potter, 98 F.3d at 887.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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