UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-40949
Summary Calendar
LEONARD REED,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Warden, Warden II, Coffield Unit; BERNIE L. BUSH, Captain,
Coffield Unit; WAYNE ASBERRY, Lieutenant, Coffield Unit; LISA MARTIN, Co. II, Coffield Unit;
RONNIE GOFF, Co. II, Coffield Unit,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(6:96-CV-366)
October 20, 1997
Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
On April 26, 1996, Leonard Reed, a Texas prisoner, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging
that his constitutional rights were violated by prison officials during three separate disciplinary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
hearings. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge as authorized by 28 U.S.C. §
636(c). The magistrate held a hearing on July 24, 1996 to develop the facts underlying Reed’s
complaint. On September 13, 1996, the magistrate judge dismissed this suit as frivolous under 28
U.S.C. §1915. Reed appeals.
This court reviews a judgment rendered by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) using
the same standards applied to final decisions by a district court judge.2 Accordingly, the magistrate
judge’s decision to dismiss this suit as frivolous is reviewed for abuse of discretion.3 We have
examined Reed’s arguments and the record. We find that the magistrate judge did not abuse her
discretion.
Reed’s first two claims stem from disciplinary hearings held in November of 1993 and on
March 12, 1994. The magistrate judge found these claims barred by the statute of limitations. We
agree. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is borrowed from the forum state’s general
personal injury limitations period.4 In Texas, the forum state of this suit, the period is two years.5
The injuries Reed allegedly suffered in the November 1993 and March 1994 hearings occurred more
than two years before this § 1983 action was commenced on April 26, 1996. As a result, both of these
claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
Reed also alleges that prison officials violated his rights in a third disciplinary hearing held on
October 27, 1994. At the hearing, Reed was found guilty of sexual misconduct. He lost 14 days of
2
James v. Hyatt Corp., 981 F.2d 810, 812 (5th Cir. 1993).
3
Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).
4
Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).
5
Id. at 419.
2
good time credit, had his status reduced from “SAT-4" to “line class 2", and was placed into solitary
confinement for 15 days. First, Reed maintains that prison officials violated his right to privacy by
punishing him for acts performed in the privacy of his own cell. There is no merit to this contention.
“[M]asturbation does not qualify as a basic human need or a fundamental right protected under the
penumbral right to privacy.”6
Reed also argues that prison officials violated his procedural due process rights during the
third disciplinary hearing because a portion of the hearing was conducted outside of his presence and
because he was denied the testimony of a key witness, Officer Hart.7 We disagree. Reed has
provided no factual basis to support these contentions. He has offered no theory to show that Officer
Hart possessed evidence that would help his cause. Nor has he shown that prison officials presented
any evidence outside of his presence. As a result, we find Reed’s procedural due process claim
meritless.
Finally, Reed maintains that his rights were violated by the filing of a false disciplinary report
against him. To succeed on this claim, Reed must show that the disciplinary proceedings terminated
in his favor.8 They did not, and Reed’s argument must fail.
Reed’s appeal is DISMISSED.
6
Ordaz v. Martin, No. 93-4170 at 11 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
7
In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Supreme Court found that prisoners are entitled to notice,
a hearing, and an opportunity to present witnesses before prison officials take away good time credits
or impose a sentence of solitary confinement upon the prisoner. 418 U.S. 539, 563-6 (1974). That
right to call witnesses is not absolute Members of the disciplinary committee may refuse to allow
a witness to testify if that testimony would be irrelevant, unnecessary, or hazardous to institutional
safety and correctional goals. Id. at 566-7.
8
Ordaz v. Martin, No. 93-4170 at 12 (5th Cir., Sept. 15, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
3