UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 97-40474
Summary Calendar
_______________________
MARY LOU KING DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER OF EAST TEXAS; POLK COUNTY MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL; POLK COUNTY LAKE LIVINGSTON MEDICAL CENTER;
LIVINGSTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; POLK COUNTY HOSPITAL;
ANNE GOODWIN; DARLENE WILLIAMS; THE DIRECTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
OF POLK COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, their assignees & successors;
THE DIRECTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS OF POLK COUNTY LAKE LIVINGSTON
MEDICAL CENTER, their assignees & successors; JAY DICKERSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(9:96-CV-459)
_________________________________________________________________
October 7, 1997
Before JONES, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant May Lou King Davis appeals the judgment of the
district court pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6) dismissing her
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (“Title VII”), and the Age
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(“ADEA”), on the pleadings for failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. We affirm.
Davis filed a complaint in the district court apparently
attempting to charge the appellees with discrimination based on
sex, race, and/or age. The appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss and
for a More Definite Statement. While denying the Motion to
Dismiss, the court granted the appellees’ Motion for a More
Definite Statement, requesting that Davis replead her complaint to
include “the specific acts and/or omissions of each and every
defendant named in Plaintiff’s complaint.” She was warned that
failure to do so could result in dismissal of her case.
Davis filed an amended complaint. Shortly thereafter and
upon motion of the appellees, the court dismissed Davis’s claims,
stating that, although the court does not hold a pro se plaintiff
to the same standard expected of practicing attorneys, Davis had
failed to supply any specific allegations of wrongdoing against any
specific defendant. Davis timely appealed.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal
of a plaintiff’s case on the pleadings pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6). See Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 601 (5th Cir. 1996).
“Dismissal is not proper unless it appears, based solely on the
pleadings, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief.” Id.
2
Davis, appearing pro se in both the district court and before
this court, attempted to plead claims under Title VII for sex and
race discrimination and under the ADEA for age discrimination.1 In
order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title
VII, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish that (1)
she is a member of a class protected under Title VII; (2) she was
qualified for the position that she held; (3) she was discharged;
and (4) after being discharged, her employer replaced her with a
person not a member of a protected class. See Meinecke v. H & R
Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995). If an employer
discharges the plaintiff and does not replace her, the plaintiff
must establish as the fourth element of her prima facie claim that,
after being discharged, others who are not members of the protected
class remained in similar positions. See id. Similarly,
[t]he first three elements of a prima facie case of age
discrimination under the ADEA are identical to the first
three elements of a Title VII prima facie case. The
fourth element is similar, although we have worded it
somewhat differently: The plaintiff must show that “[s]he
was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected
class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise
discharged because of [her] age.”
Id. (internal citations omitted; quoting Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993)).
1
Because the requirements for establishing a claim under
either of these statutes is similar, we will analyze them together.
See Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir.
1995).
3
We have reviewed the pleadings and agree with the
district court that Davis has failed to plead facts in support of
her claims which would entitle her to relief. Although she claims
in her pleadings to be a black, female who was “illegally
terminated” for “improperly changed medical records,” Davis does
not claim that after being discharged, her employer replaced her
with a person who is not a member of a class protected by Title VII
or that others who are not members of a protected class remained in
similar positions. Neither does she claim that she was replaced by
someone younger or otherwise discharged because of her age. Even
after being instructed by the court to do so, she has failed to
include in her complaint any specific allegations of wrongdoing
against any specific defendant.
Davis has not pleaded facts -- even when read liberally
-- which would entitle her to relief under Title VII or ADEA.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
4