IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-50238
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RAED FAKHRI ABDEL-HADI
ZAYED, also known as
Raed Fakhri Abdel-Ha
Zayed,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-96-CR-84
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November 3, 1997
Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Raed Fakhri Abdel-Hadi Zayed argues that the district court
erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because
the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
possessed a firearm with knowledge that the weapon’s serial
number had been obliterated or removed.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 97-50238
-2-
The jury’s determination that Zayed had knowledge that the
serial number on the pistol that he sold to the undercover agent
was removed or obliterated was a credibility determination
entitled to great deference on appeal. United States v. Harris,
25 F.3d 1275, 1279 (5th Cir. 1994). This determination was
supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict. Id. The district court did not err in denying
Zayed’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
Zayed also argues that the district court abused its
discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence that he had previously
sold a shotgun that was stolen and possessed an obliterated
serial number. The evidence admitted was intrinsic evidence
because it showed that the instant offense was one of a series of
sales by Zayed of stolen weapons containing obliterated serial
numbers. The introduction of the evidence was also necessary to
complete the story of the crime at trial. The admission of the
evidence was not erroneous. See United States v. Morgan, 117
F.3d 849, 861 (5th Cir. 1997).
Even assuming that the evidence was not intrinsic in nature,
it was admissible extrinsic evidence because it was relevant to
Zayed’s knowledge and intent at the time that he possessed the
Colt .45 pistol. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911
(5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Any prejudice arising from the
admission of the evidence was limited by the district court’s
instruction to the jury during and after the trial that the
No. 97-50238
-3-
evidence was to be considered for limited purposes only. See
United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 831 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1340 (1996).
Zayed argues that the district court clearly erred in
increasing his offense level for the obstruction of justice based
on Zayed’s presenting perjured testimony at trial. Zayed argues
that he was entitled to exercise his constitutional right to
present his version of the events surrounding the transaction.
The district court determined that Zayed’s testimony
constituted an egregious case of perjury. Based on the
incredulous nature of Zayed’s testimony at trial, this
determination was not clearly erroneous. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
comment. (n.3(b)); United States v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182,
186 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court properly imposed the
enhancement for the obstruction of justice.
AFFIRMED.