IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-60209
(Summary Calendar)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EUGENE ERVIN; ERIC JEROME ERVIN,
also known as Sealed Defendant 2,
Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:96-CR-61-BN-ALL
__________________________________________
December 19, 1997
Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Eugene Ervin and Eric Jerome Ervin appeal their convictions for jury tampering pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1503. Both defendant s argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that they
endeavored to influence a juror. The juror need not actually have been influenced. United States v.
Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 981 (5th Cir. 1989). The Ervins need not have explicitly threatened Caston
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is
not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
or have told Caston that he should acquit Culley. See United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1113-
14 (5th Cir. 1980). The evidence was sufficient.
Eugene Ervin argues that the district court committed reversible error in not granting his
motion for new trial. The district court’s holding that the alleged newly discovered evidence would
be cumulative of that presented at trial and would not change the outcom e of the trial was not an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993).
Eric Ervin argues that the district court committed reversible error in failing to sustain his
objection to the admission of certain testimony by Vedale Williams as more prejudicial than probative
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403. From the context of Williams’ testimony, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in allowing the quesitons as probative of Williams’ credibility. The court
determined that the probative value of the elicited testimony would not be substantially outweighed
by any possible speculative prejudicial effect. United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir.
1993).
AFFIRMED.
2