UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-60423
Summary Calendar
BRYAN HOLLAND HASTINGS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
THE MS PAROLE BOARD; RUTH S. MOSLEY, Chairman, MS Parole Board;
HARRY F. BRYANT, III, MS Parole Board Member; CORNELIA MASON,
MS Parole Board Member
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(4:97-CV-54-D-B)
November 26, 1997
Before WISDOM, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bryan Holland Hastings, a Mississippi prisoner, filed this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
against the Mississippi Parole Board and several of its members, challenging the methods employed
to determine his eligibility for parole. The district court granted Hastings’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis (IFP) and assessed a filing fee under the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1996 (PLRA). The district court dismissed the Hastings complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915. Hastings appeals.
First, Hastings argues that the district court erred in assessing a filing fee because he was
granted IFP status. We find that the district court correctly followed the terms of the PLRA which
call for an IFP plaintiff in a civil action to pay a partial initial filing fee when the suit is filed or an
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published
and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
appeal is taken and to pay that filing fee in full over a period of time.2 No error was committed.
Hastings also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 complaint as
frivolous. A district court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in fact or
in law.3 A civil rights complaint that fails to allege the deprivation of either a constitutional or federal
right is frivolous.4 We review the district court’s dismissal for abuse of discretion.5
The district court found that Hastings failed to present a constitutional claim. We agree.
Hastings’s allegations that the defendants violated his rights under the equal protection clause and
the due process clause are without merit.
To establish a violation of the equal protection clause, the plaintiff must show an attempt to
classify or to distinguish two or more relevant groups.6 Hastings alleges that he was denied equal
protection because other murderers have been granted parole but his request was denied. This
allegation does not suggest that Hastings is a member of any identifiable group that has been
wronged. Hastings has not alleged an arguable equal protection violation.
In this case, to state a claim under the due process clause, Hastings must show that the parole
board is denying him a constitutionally protected liberty interest.7 The Mississippi statutes vest the
parole board with complete discretion to determine whether to release an eligible prisoner on parole.8
The statutes do not confer a liberty interest upon prisoners.9 Hastings does not have a cognizable
2
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b).
3
Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993).
4
See Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1995).
5
Booker, 2 F.3d at 115.
6
Vera v. Tue, 73 F.3d 604, 610 (5th Cir. 1996).
7
See Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-2 (5th Cir. 1995).
8
Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1217-8 (5th Cir. 1984).
9
Id.
2
due process claim based upon the denial of his parole or the factors considered by the board to reach
its decision.
We find that Hastings’s complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact or in law. The district court
did not abuse its discretion. This appeal is DISMISSED.
3