REVISED
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 97-40663
Summary Calendar.
CALHOUN COUNTY, TEXAS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
Jan. 22, 1998.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, STEWART and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves Calhoun County's action to quiet title to
certain lands claimed by the United States. The district court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the district court's order.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Federal land on Matagorda Island
Matagorda Island is a 57,000 acre barrier island located in
Calhoun County, Texas, with a long history of litigation in federal
court. In the early 1940's, the federal government condemned 41
parcels of land constituting almost 19,000 acres of privately owned
land on the eastern half of the northern portion of the island.
See United States v. 35,220 Acres of Land, C.A. No. 22
1
(S.D.Tex.1940). The government's First Amended Petition for
Condemnation named the Calhoun County tax assessor as a defendant,
and its Third Amended Petition in Condemnation listed Calhoun
County as a defendant.
The court issued a Final Judgment on the Declaration of
Taking, which allowed the United States to take possession of the
condemned lands, and a Judgment on the Declaration of Taking, which
specified the lands condemned and that the United States took full
and complete possession of those lands in fee simple. The United
States War Department, and later the Air Force, used the federal
lands as a bombing and gunnery range until 1971, when it allowed
the Department of the Interior ("DOI") to manage the lands for use
as a wildlife refuge. In 1982, the Air Force transferred
jurisdiction over the federal lands to the DOI.
B. State land on Matagorda Island
From October 8, 1942 until 1971, the federal government
condemned for a term of years nearly 17,000 acres of state-owned
land making up the northern half of the western portion of
Matagorda Island. See United States v. 16,579.70 Acres of Land,
C.A. No. 41 (S.D.Tex.1942); United States v. Certain Public Roads
and Highways on Matagorda Island, C.A. No. 165 (S.D.Tex.1951);
United States v. 16,579.70 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in
Calhoun County, C.A. No. 336 (S.D.Tex.1957); United States v.
16,579.70 Acres of Land, C.A. No.487-488 (S.D.Tex.1966); United
States v. 17,499.11 Acres of Land in Calhoun County, C.A. No. 70-V-
14 (S.D.Tex.1970). Each of these actions involved essentially the
2
same acreage, which the State of Texas owned.
On October 8, 1942, the United States filed Cause of Action
Number 41, and successfully condemned the 17,000 acres for a term
of years, subject to existing easements for public roads, highways,
utilities, railroads, and pipelines. The 1942 petition recognized
that Calhoun County may have had some interest in part of the
condemned land, but did not specify any particular parcel as
belonging to the county. On May 29, 1951, in Cause of Action
Number 165, a related action, the United States successfully
petitioned to condemn the public roads and highways on Matagorda
Island over which the state had reserved easements pursuant to the
government's initial condemnation action.
In its third and fourth condemnation actions, Civil Action
Number 336 and Civil Actions Number 487-488, the United States
again condemned the same land, public roads, and highways which it
had condemned in 1941 and 1951 because the term of years under each
of the first two actions had expired. Calhoun County participated
in the stipulated final judgment in Civil Actions Number 487-488,
which recited Calhoun County's stipulation that it had waived "all
claims for remuneration of damages for the limited takings of its
public roads, highways and easements on and across said 16,579.70
acres...." In exchange, Calhoun County reserved a right to request
administrative action to set aside a National Historical Shrine,
with connecting causeway and highway easements to Port O'Connor,
Texas.
On June 23, 1970, the United States filed its fifth and final
3
condemnation action regarding the Matagorda Island properties,
Civil Action Number 70-V-14, resulting in condemnation of the same
approximately 17,000 acres for a term of years which the United
States could extend until June 30, 1977. On December 2, 1970,
Calhoun County filed a "Disclaimer and Reservation" in the case,
providing that Calhoun County:
has no claim to an interest in the compensation to be awarded
in this proceeding, and in waiving all claims for remuneration
of damages for the limited taking, if any, of its public
roads, highways and easements on and across said 17,499.11
acres of land, reserves in lieu thereof the election to
request administrative action to set aside a National
Historical Shrine....
The district judge dismissed Calhoun County from the suit.
C. Management of State and Federal land on Matagorda Island
In November, 1971, the Air Force and the DOI entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (the "1971 MOU"), pursuant to which the
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") began using the leasehold lands
as part of the National Wildlife Refuge System. In September 1975,
the Air Force declared the federally owned lands to be in excess of
its needs and terminated its leasehold interest in the adjacent
acreage. The DOI applied to the General Services Administration
("GSA") for a transfer of the approximately 19,000 federally owned
acres to the FWS, and the State of Texas applied to the GSA for a
transfer of the adjacent leasehold lands to the State of Texas for
use as a state park.
In October, 1982, the FWS and the GSA published an
environmental impact statement ("EIS") proposing the termination of
the 1971 MOU between the Air Force and the DOI and the transfer of
4
jurisdiction over the federally owned land to the FWS to manage as
a unit of the National Wildlife Refuge System. In addition, the
FWS proposed to exchange easements with the Texas General Lands
Office, thereby allowing the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
to operate the 19,000 acres of federal land as a state park and
providing the FWS with a conservation easement on the adjacent
state-owned land. The EIS included a provision that would have
prohibited any entity other than the FWS or the State of Texas from
having access to publicly owned parts of Matagorda Island. The EIS
did not indicate that Calhoun County had any rights in or on
Matagorda Island. As required by federal law, the Federal Register
contained a notice regarding the preparation of the EIS. Notice,
47 Fed.Reg. 5048 (1982). In addition, the FWS hosted public
meetings to discuss the EIS, which a local newspaper mentioned.
In October, 1982, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department
published its own "conceptual plan" for Matagorda Island. This
plan would have left only two miles of managed beach available for
public use with limitations on the types of activities allowed
there. The conceptual plan did not refer to Calhoun County as
having any ownership interest on the Island.
On December 8, 1982, the FWS and the Governor of Texas entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement (the "1982 MOA") implementing the
proposals presented in the EIS. The 1982 MOA provides for
integrated management of all publicly owned land on Matagorda
Island by the United States and the State of Texas. The 1982 MOA
further provides that the State of Texas may not authorize any use
5
affecting either the federal lands or the federal conservation
easement unless the FWS determines the use to be compatible with
the purposes of the National Wildlife Refuge System. The 1982 MOA
also limits vehicular access to Matagorda Island to those vehicles
authorized to manage, enforce, or maintain the Wildlife Management
Area. The 1982 MOA does not provide any role for Calhoun County in
managing Matagorda Island.
On December 9, 1982, the State of Texas and the United States
recorded the conservation easements in the Calhoun County Clerk's
Office. On August 4, 1983, over considerable public controversy,
Congress passed a bill enacting the 1982 MOA into law.
D. This litigation
On November 8, 1995, Calhoun County filed a petition for a
declaratory judgment that it has valid title to real property on
Matagorda Island claimed by the United States. Calhoun County's
petition did not specify which areas of land it claimed to own, but
did claim rights to "use, maintain and enjoy all of the public
roads, beaches, historic sites and shrines, cemeteries and other
real estate interests that [Calhoun County] still has and maintains
on Matagorda Island." Calhoun County's petition argued that the
initial 1940 taking was void because the United States failed to
identify and serve Calhoun County as a defendant in that action.
Calhoun County also argued that the expiration of the United States
leasehold interests in the state-owned land, which the United
States had condemned for successive terms of years, caused title to
that land to revert to Calhoun County.
6
The United States moved to dismiss or alternatively for
summary judgment. The United States argued that the 1940
condemnation action extinguished any property interests that
Calhoun County may have had in the federally owned acreage on
Matagorda Island and that Calhoun County's failure to file suit
within twelve years from the time it received actual or
constructive notice of the federal claims to that land barred any
claims that Calhoun County may have had to that land. The district
court concluded that Calhoun County could not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the Quiet Title Act ("QTA"), 28
U.S.C. § 2409a (1997), because the QTA's twelve year statute of
limitations had expired prior to Calhoun County's commencement of
suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) through (j) (limitations periods
for actions under QTA).
II. Discussion
Calhoun County appeals the district court's dismissal of its
complaint for failing to meet the jurisdictional requirements of
the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1997). This Court reviews
a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Hebert v. United
States, 53 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1995). The district court's
thorough order discussed several alternative bases for its
dismissal, none of which are in error. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's dismissal of Calhoun County's complaint.
A. The QTA's twelve year limitations period applies to Calhoun
County's claim.
The district court properly applied a twelve year statute of
7
limitations to Calhoun County's claim. Section 2409a(g) provides:
Any civil action under this section, except for an action
brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced
within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such
action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the
plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have
known of the claim of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Calhoun County is not a state; therefore,
it is subject to this twelve year limitations period. As the
district court noted, however, even if Calhoun County, a
subdivision of the State of Texas, was a state for purposes of the
QTA, the applicable limitations period in this case would still be
twelve years. Section 2409a(i) provides:
Any civil action brought by a State under this section with
respect to lands, other than tide or submerged lands, on which
the United States or its lessee or right-of-way or easement
grantee has made substantial improvements or substantial
investments or on which the United States has conducted
substantial activities pursuant to a management plan such as
... wildlife habitat improvement, or other similar activities,
shall be barred unless the action is commenced within twelve
years after the date the State received notice of the Federal
claims to the lands.
28 U.S.C. § 2409a(i) (emphasis added). As the district court
pointed out, Calhoun County agrees that the United States and the
State of Texas have conducted activities to improve the wildlife
habitat on Matagorda Island since 1982. As such, even under the
limitations provisions applicable to states, a twelve year period
would apply to this case.
B. The QTA's statute of limitations bars Calhoun County's claim
because the cause of action accrued more than twelve years
before commencement of suit.
The district court correctly found that Calhoun County had
failed to comply with the QTA's twelve year statute of limitations.
8
The district court properly found that Calhoun County had actual
and constructive notice of the United States' claim to the land on
Matagorda Island by virtue of the 1982 MOA and the recording of the
conservation easements with the Calhoun County Clerk's Office, thus
beginning the limitations period more than twelve years before
commencement of suit. See California v. Yuba Goldfields, Inc., 752
F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir.) (holding that recording of deed naming
United States as grantee constituted actual notice of United States
interest in property for QTA limitations purposes), cert. denied
sub nom., California State Lands Comm'n v. United States, 474 U.S.
1005, 106 S.Ct. 526, 88 L.Ed.2d 458 (1985); Lee v. United States,
629 F.Supp. 721 (D.Alaska 1985) (holding that QTA limitations
period began to run upon publication of notice of federal claims in
Federal Register). The 1982 MOA, which Congress ratified,
essentially enacted the proposals set forth in the EIS published in
the Federal Register earlier that year. In addition, the United
States had been landing planes and dropping bombs on the island
from the 1940's until the 1970's, which is openly and notoriously
inconsistent with any claims Calhoun County may have had to that
land. Even under the QTA's notice provisions applicable to states,
these circumstances constitute sufficient notice for purposes of
accrual of an action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(k) (providing that
public communication reasonably calculated to put the claimant on
notice of federal claim or open and notorious use, occupancy, or
improvement constitutes notice for purposes of accrual of an action
brought by a state).
9
C. Equitable tolling does not apply to the facts of this case.
In Hart v. United States, this Court rejected the proposition
that equitable considerations might justify tolling the QTA's
twelve year statute of limitations. 585 F.2d 1280, 1284-85 (5th
Cir.1978) ("Whether the equitable considerations advanced by
plaintiffs would be persuasive under other facts is wholly beside
the point."), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99 S.Ct. 2882, 61 L.Ed.2d
310 (1979). In so construing the QTA, Hart noted that "[w]e have
before us an Act of Congress that is understandable both in
language and intent," 585 F.2d at 1285, and relied upon the well
established proposition that statutes waiving immunity of the
United States are subject to strict construction in favor of the
United States. Id.
Since Hart, the Supreme Court has confirmed the applicability
of equitable tolling against the United States. See Irwin v. Dep't
of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457, 112
L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (establishing a general rule that "the same
rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits
against private defendants should also apply to suits against the
United States."). Although Irwin involved Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act rather than the QTA, the Supreme Court's holding in
Irwin does relax the maxim that courts must strictly construe
waivers of sovereign immunity in favor of the sovereign, which the
Hart panel interpreted as barring consideration of equitable
tolling under the QTA. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94, 95, 111 S.Ct. at
457, 458. Irwin qualified that maxim by stating that "[o]nce
10
Congress has made such a waiver, we think that making the rule of
equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in
the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to
little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver." Id. Irwin
thus reinterpreted the intent behind congressional waivers of
sovereign immunity, but did not necessarily alter the nature of
conditions on that waiver, such as a statute of limitations.1
Since Irwin, the Fourth Circuit has continued to construe the
QTA's statute of limitations as jurisdictional in nature.
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945
F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir.1991) ("Because the limitations period
represents a condition on the waiver of federal sovereign immunity,
it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and is to be construed
narrowly in favor of the government."), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984,
112 S.Ct. 1667, 118 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992); see also, e.g., Vintilla
v. United States, 931 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir.1991) (adhering to
1
In Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75
L.Ed.2d 840 (1983), the Supreme Court held that if a suit under the
QTA is time-barred by the statute of limitations, then federal
courts have "no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits." 461 U.S.
at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 1822. When the United States consents to be
sued, "the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define the
extent of the court's jurisdiction." United States v. Mottaz, 476
U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 2229, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986). Under
this line of cases, a statute of limitations constitutes a
condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus, defines
jurisdiction. Id. The Supreme Court has not overruled these
decisions, but did, in Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.
89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) relax the underlying
maxim that courts must strictly construe waivers of sovereign
immunity in favor of the government. As such, the Court did allow
for the possibility that courts may equitably toll limitations
periods in actions against the government, but did not specifically
discuss the QTA or the jurisdictional nature of its statute of
limitations. Id. at 95-96, 111 S.Ct. at 457-458.
11
pre-Irwin mode of analysis and ruling that tax code limitations
period may not be equitably tolled because timely filing of a
refund claim is jurisdictional prerequisite to suit); Knapp v.
United States, 636 F.2d 279, 282 (10th Cir.1980) (holding,
pre-Irwin, that "timeliness ... is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suit under section 2409a."); Dillard v. Runyon, 928 F.Supp. 1316,
1323-24 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (arguing that Irwin does not extinguish
jurisdictional nature of time limits on claims against federal
government, and noting that "the Supreme Court in Irwin affirmed
both lower courts' dismissals for lack of jurisdiction."), aff'd,
108 F.3d 1369 (2d Cir.1997).
We note, however, that other courts, including the Ninth
Circuit, have held that Irwin eliminated the jurisdictional nature
of statutes of limitation under statutes waiving sovereign
immunity, apparently based on the rationale that equitable
principles cannot expand a court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fadem
v. United States, 52 F.3d 202 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that statute
of limitations under QTA is not jurisdictional), vacated, --- U.S.
----, 117 S.Ct. 1103, 137 L.Ed.2d 306, orig. opinion reinstated,
113 F.3d 167 (9th Cir.1997); see also Krueger v. Saiki, 19 F.3d
1285, 1286 (8th Cir.) ("Because suits against the government are
subject to equitable tolling, compliance with [Federal Tort Claims
Act] limitations period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to
suing the government."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 905, 115 S.Ct. 269,
130 L.Ed.2d 187 (1994); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639,
640 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that, as a result of Irwin, statutes of
12
limitations in actions against the government are affirmative
defenses rather than jurisdictional bars).
We conclude below that the district court did not err in
finding that the evidence showed Calhoun County's failure to
satisfy the statute of limitations, regardless of equitable
tolling. As such, this case does not require us to decide whether
Irwin extinguished the jurisdictional nature of the QTA's statute
of limitations, and we decline to do so.
After the district court ordered dismissal of Calhoun
County's claim, a divided panel of this Court handed down a
decision in Beggerly v. United States, 114 F.3d 484 (5th Cir.1997),
cert. petition filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3324 (Oct. 27, 1997). In
Beggerly, the Court explicitly applied the doctrine of equitable
tolling to a QTA claim, noting that "[e]quitable tolling applies
principally where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant
about the cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way
from asserting his rights." 114 F.3d at 489 (quoting Rashidi v.
American President Lines, 96 F.3d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1996)). In so
holding, the Court cited the Supreme Court's Irwin decision for the
proposition that "[e]quitable tolling may be applied against the
United States." Id. at 489 n. 19. Intervening Supreme Court
precedent had changed the law that Hart relied upon in refusing to
consider the doctrine of equitable tolling in the context of a QTA
claim; therefore, the Court in Beggerly was not bound by Hart and
neither are we.
Although prior to this Court's decision in Beggerly, the
13
district court in this case correctly noted that Calhoun County
could not rely on equitable tolling, even if the doctrine did
apply. As such, the district court's analysis would stand
regardless of the Beggerly panel's decision, which applied the
doctrine of equitable tolling against the United States. 114 F.3d
at 489. In Beggerly, the United States had, in a previous quiet
title action, ostensibly conducted a thorough search of the public
land records and formerly represented to the plaintiffs and the
district court that the United States had never granted any part of
the land in question to a private landowner and, therefore, that
the United States was the title owner of that land. Id. at 486.
That representation later turned out to be false. Id.
In contrast, in this case, the evidence showed that Calhoun
County had notice of the United States' claim in 1982 at the
latest, when the FWS and the GSA published the EIS in the Federal
Register. As a result, the statute of limitations began to run in
1982 and expired before Calhoun County commenced this action,
unless the statute was equitably tolled. The evidence before the
district court did not include any evidence of active
misrepresentation or extraordinary prevention by the United States
that would justify the application of equitable tolling under
Beggerly; therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal.
AFFIRMED.
14