IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-50206
(Summary Calendar)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GREGORY LEON PALMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(USDC No. MO-96-CR-86)
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January 6, 1998
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gregory Leon Palmer appeals his conviction and sentence for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack”) in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Palmer argues that the
district court committed reversible error by failing to instruct
the jury on the defense of entrapment as requested. Palmer failed
to make a prima facie showing that “the government’s conduct
created a substantial risk that an offense would be committed by a
person other than one ready to commit it,” and thus was not
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
entitled to an entrapment instruction. See United States v.
Bradfield, 113 F.3d 515, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1997).
Palmer next argues that district court erred by failing to
depart downwardly from the sentencing guidelines for sentencing
entrapment. We lack jurisdiction to review a defendant's challenge
to his sentence for mere dissatisfaction with the court’s refusal
to grant a downward departure. United States v. Palmer, 122 F.2d
215, 222 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. DiMarco, 46 F.3d 476,
477 (5th Cir. 1995).
Palmer also argues that the district court clearly erred in
finding that he indirectly threatened or intimidated witnesses and,
as a result, increasing his base offense level for obstruction of
justice. The government demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that Palmer indirectly threatened and intimidated witness
Sarah Baldwin. Despite Palmer’s assertions to the contrary, the
record reflects that Baldwin identified who made the threat,
disclosed the substance of the threat, and directly linked Palmer
to the threat. As the district court’s finding was not clearly
erroneous, that court did not err by applying the obstruction of
justice increase. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, comment. (n.3(a)); United
States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
2
United States v. Palmer
Combined Opinion