UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-50118
JIM AND LAVERNE TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
VERSUS
REPUBLIC BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(W-93-CV-378)
February 19, 1998
Before KING, JOLLY, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Neither party has questioned the jurisdiction of the district
court (indeed, the parties stipulated to jurisdiction), but “it is
the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction of the
[district court], which is defined and limited by statute, is not
exceeded.” Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149,
152 (1908) (quoted in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511
(1973)). Section 1132 of ERISA extends federal jurisdiction to
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
enforce benefits due participants or beneficiaries of a federally
regulated “employee welfare benefit plan.” In removing the case to
federal court, the appellee alleged that the Taylors’ state law
claims were governed by ERISA because the 1991 Republic policy at
issue in this case was used to fund employee health benefits for
eligible employees of Family Finance, including the Taylors.
Because the subject policy lists only the Taylors as insureds, and
because no “employees” (as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3) appear
to be covered by the policy, a question has arisen as to whether
this insurance policy qualifies as an “employee welfare benefit
plan” under ERISA. See, e.g., Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d
352 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the contours of employee welfare
benefit plans covered under ERISA). Furthermore, the record is
unclear whether any other Republic (or other) insurance policy or
policies existed that would qualify as an ERISA plan and what
relationship such policies might have with the subject policy. In
short, we have a serious question whether the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
Moreover, Section 1132 of ERISA grants standing only to plan
“participants” or “beneficiaries” to bring a civil suit to recover
benefits. If, but only if, a viable ERISA plan exists in this
case, the question whether the Taylors have standing to bring suit
under ERISA must be considered. Compare Kwatcher v. Massachusetts
Employees Welfare Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989); Madonia v.
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 511 U.S. 1019 (1994); Robinson v. Linomaz, 58 F.3d 365 (8th
Cir. 1995).
Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the district court and
remand this case for the limited purpose of obtaining further
findings of fact and conclusions of law on these jurisdictional
issues. On remand, the district court has the discretion to devise
a method for resolving these issues concerning the existence of an
ERISA plan and the appellants’ standing to sue. To that end, the
court may consider affidavits, allow further discovery and briefing
by the parties, and conduct an evidentiary hearing. If the court
chooses to allow additional discovery, it should be limited to only
that which is necessary to determine the jurisdictional issues.
If the district court finds that no ERISA plan exists so that
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, or that an ERISA plan
exists but the Taylors do not have standing, the court is ordered
to remand the case to Texas state court where the suit was
originally filed. If, on the other hand, the district court finds
that an ERISA plan exists and that the Taylors have standing, then
the court shall reinstate its judgment and supplement the record on
appeal with the evidence presented on remand and the court’s
findings and conclusions.
Although a new notice of appeal must be filed if any party
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wishes to appeal the district court’s new judgment, and the parties
may brief the district court’s jurisdictional conclusions, the
parties need not submit additional briefs on the merits. The court
will use the briefs from this appeal for any further appeal on the
merits issues. Any new appeal shall be sent to this panel.
VACATED AND REMANDED with instructions.
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