REVISED, MARCH 13, 1998
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-60751
JOHNNIE GOODEN,
Petitioner,
versus
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER’S COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; ITO
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
Appeal from a Decision of the
Benefits Review Board
March 12, 1998
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Gooden (Gooden) was a longshoreman employed by ITO
Corporation (ITO) as a forklift operator. On November 13, 1990,
Gooden suffered a heart attack that necessitated a triple coronary
bypass surgery three days later. Unable to work after the surgery,
Gooden sought benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et seq. (LHWCA).
The claim was referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in
Metairie, Louisiana, who dismissed the claim on the grounds that
there was no relationship between Gooden’s employment and his
underlying cardiac disease. This dismissal was subsequently
affirmed without review by the Benefits Review Board, pursuant to
Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub.L. No. 104-134 § 101, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1321-218,
219.1 Gooden, raising several points of error, now appeals.
Facts and Proceedings Below
It is undisputed that Gooden had preexisting heart disease
dating back to 1987. In that year, he underwent a balloon dilation
of a coronary artery and a coronary angiography, which revealed the
coronary artery disease, but the disease was not severe enough to
warrant surgery. He returned to work and did not suffer any
symptoms for the next three years.
On October 31, 1990, Gooden was working for ITO as a forklift
operator and experienced chest pains while physically lifting bags
of rice that had fallen from the pallets, which he was moving
around with his forklift. Gooden continued to work and went to a
hospital after work. He was given medication and released from the
hospital. The doctor recommended that Gooden undergo an
angiography, but the procedure was delayed by Gooden, who said he
needed to work.
On November 13, 1990, Gooden again experienced chest pains
1
Under the Appropriations Act, appeals from ALJ decisions under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901, et
seq. that had been pending before the Benefits Review Board (BRB)
for more than one year before September 12, 1996, such as Gooden’s,
were to be considered affirmed by the BRB and final for purposes of
appeal as of that date.
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while lifting heavy bags that had fallen from their pallets. It is
unclear when the chest pains actually started. The hospital
records list the “onset of injury” as having occurred at two
o’clock in the morning while Gooden was at home. The isoenzyme
analysis, however, reveals a pattern of enzyme levels that indicate
that Gooden suffered a myocardial infarction “several hours” before
the initial blood specimen taken at 3:45 p.m. on November 13.
Gooden testified he felt the pains at work. He subsequently
took his medication and the pains subsided for a while. In the
afternoon, when the pains returned, he reported them to his foreman
and his doctor. At his doctor’s recommendation, Gooden admitted
himself to the hospital.
At the hospital, he was diagnosed with an acute myocardial
infarction. An angiography was performed, and subsequently he
underwent a triple bypass surgery. He did not return to his job as
a forklift operator and has not worked since.
Gooden sought compensation for his injury under the LHWCA, but
the claim was denied by the ALJ for lack of causation. The ALJ
found that Gooden had met his initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case of causation under section 920(a), but he also
found that the employer met its burden of rebutting the presumption
with substantial evidence that showed the injury did not “arise”
out of the employment.
Specifically, the ALJ relied on the testimony of two
cardiovascular physicians who testified that the symptoms may have
been caused or unmasked by Gooden’s work, but that the work did not
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cause or aggravate the cardiovascular disease. He discounted
testimony to the contrary by a third doctor, who specialized in
internal medicine but was not a cardiovascular specialist.
Discussion
I. Due Process
Gooden contends that automatic affirmance under the
Appropriations Act violates his due process rights by retroactively
depriving him of a level of review by the BRB. In Shell Offshore,
Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 122
F.3d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) we specifically rejected this
argument and held that this provision of the Appropriations Act is
constitutional. In light of Shell, we hold that this provision
does not violate Gooden’s due process rights.
II. Presumption
Gooden contends that the ALJ misapplied the section 920(a)
presumption, 33 U.S.C. § 920(a). Section 920(a) establishes that
once a claimant puts forth a prima facie case, the claim is
presumed to come within the LHWCA; this presumption can be rebutted
by “substantial evidence to the contrary.” 33 U.S.C. § 920(a).
A claimant, such as Gooden, bears the initial burden of
establishing that (1) he suffered an injury and (2) the accident
occurred in the course of employment or conditions existed at work
that could have caused the harm. See Kelaita v. Triple A Machine
Shop, 13 BRBS 326, 331 (1981). Once the claimant has established
his prima facie case, a presumption is created which can be
rebutted by the employer through substantial evidence establishing
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the absence of a connection between the injury and the employment.
See Kier v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 16 BRBS 128, 129 (1984); Parsons
Corp. of California v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs, 619 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1980). If the employer rebuts the
presumption, then the issue of causation must be decided by looking
at all the evidence of record. See Stevens v. Tacoma Boatbuilding
Co., 23 BRBS 191, 192 (1990).
In this case, the ALJ found that Gooden established his prima
facie case, and, thus, the burden shifted to ITO to bring forth
substantial evidence to rebut the presumption. Instead of
following a formal three-step analysis, the ALJ blended the second
and third steps into one step. In so doing, the ALJ considered all
the evidence presented by both parties, rather than first
considering ITO’s evidence alone and then considering both parties’
evidence together only if ITO’s evidence had rebutted the initial
presumption.
While the ALJ’s analysis of the issue may have strayed from
the formal three-step process, we conclude that this departure was
not error. To hold otherwise would elevate form over substance.
If the judge found that the evidence defeated the claim, then
surely he found it sufficient to rebut the initial section 920(a)
presumption. The initial presumption is either rebutted or it is
not rebutted; which party’s evidence produces the rebuttal is
essentially irrelevant.
III. Proper Focus
Gooden contends that the ALJ erroneously focused on the
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origins of his underlying heart condition, rather than on the
ultimate heart attack. We agree.
An LHWCA employer generally takes his employee as he finds
him. See Pacific Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Pillsbury, 61 F.2d 101, 103
(9th Cir. 1932) (“The employer accepts the employee subject to
physical disabilities, which may make the latter more susceptible
to injury than would be a stronger or more robust person . . . .”).
Thus, the focus should be on the ultimate injury, not Gooden’s
preexisting condition. In this case, the injury for which recovery
is sought is the heart attack, not the underlying heart disease.
It is well settled that a heart attack suffered in the course
and scope of employment is compensable even though the employee may
have suffered from a related preexisting heart condition. In Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Donovan, 300 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1962) and
Southern Stevedoring Co. v. Henderson, 175 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.
1949), for example, the court awarded LHWCA benefits to workers who
had suffered heart attacks while at work, despite their pre-
existing heart conditions. The Henderson court stated:
“The Act gives compensation for accidental injury or
death arising out of and in the course of employment; it
does not say caused by the employment. There is no
standard or normal man who alone is entitled to workmen's
compensation. Whatever the state of health of the
employee may be, if the conditions of his employment
constitute the precipitating cause of his death, such
death is compensable as having resulted from an
accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his
employment. If the workman overstrains his powers,
slight though they be, or if something goes wrong within
the human frame, such as the straining of a muscle or the
rupture of a blood vessel, an accident arises out of the
employment when the required exertion producing the
injury is too great for the man undertaking the work; and
the source of the force producing the injury need not be
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external.” Henderson, 175 F.2d at 866, quoted with
approval in Donovan, 300 F.2d at 745.
Conclusion
Since the ALJ erroneously focused his analysis and findings on
the underlying disease, his decision is vacated and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings, with instructions that the
findings must address the heart attack itself, consistent with our
Henderson and Donovan opinions. Whether a dismissal of Gooden’s
claim under an appropriate analysis is supportable is a matter we
leave in the first instance to the ALJ on remand, subject to review
by the BRB and this Court.
VACATED and REMANDED
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