UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 97-10873
Summary Calendar
RONALD BLANKENSHIP,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
ATCHISON, TOPEKA, & SANTA FE
RAILROAD COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
Fort Worth Division
(4:97-CV-124-Y)
March 18, 1998
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:^
This case comes from a decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth
Division, the Honorable Terry R. Means, presiding. The district
court dismissed the case against the Defendant-Appellee, the
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad Company (“the Railroad”).
The Plaintiff-Appellant, Ronald Blankenship (“Blankenship”),
timely appealed, and the matter now lies before this circuit.
^
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Background
Blankenship worked for the Railroad for twenty-five years,
and he lives in Barstow, California. Blankenship is a Diesel
Locomotive Machinist and a member of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“the Union”).
The terms of Blankenship’s employment are governed by a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between the Railroad and
the Union.
As part of his job, Blankenship is occasionally asked to
move locomotives in and out of the building in which the
locomotives are repaired, a practice known as “hostling.” As a
hostler, Blankenship was covered under the Hours of Service Act
(“the Service Act”), 45 U.S.C. §61-64(b), which requires the
random drug testing of covered employees. If Blankenship was
required to hostle a locomotive on a given day, his name would be
shown on a specific “Hours of Service Report” at the locomotive
terminal. Even if he was not listed for hostling on a given day,
his name was in the database of workers subject to the Service
Act, and hence, drug testing, under the requirements of the
Railroad’s drug and alcohol policy.
On January 9, 1995, Blankenship reported for work. His name
was not included on any report showing him to have hostling
duties that day. Nevertheless, Blankenship’s supervisor informed
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him that he was subject to a random drug test, and he would be
required to produce a urine sample. Blankenship assented to this
and presented himself for testing. Blankenship, despite having
ingested a quantity of liquids, was unable to produce a sample.
The next day, as instructed by the Railroad, Blankenship reported
to a doctor chosen by the Railroad, in order to determine whether
Blankenship’s inability to produce a sample was medically
justified, or constituted a refusal to test. Blankenship refused
this exam, stating that he did not know this physician, and he
would be willing to have a medical exam performed by his own
physician. The Railroad declined this offer. Incidentally, a
subsequent drug test, performed by Blankenship’s physician,
showed no evidence of illegal drugs in his system.
The Railroad proceeded with an investigation of Blankenship
(as provided for and required by the CBA), and dismissed
Blankenship for alleged violations of the Railroad’s drug and
alcohol policy. Blankenship contended that his selection for
drug testing and his subsequent firing was improper, and he
appealed his dismissal to a Public Law Board. Approximately two
years later, Blankenship prevailed in the decision of Public Law
Board No. 5816, and he was awarded his net lost wages.
On January 9, 1997, Blankenship filed suit against the
Railroad in the District Court of Tarrant County, Texas (the site
of the Railroad’s headquarters), seeking damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The Railroad moved for removal
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to federal court, and removal was granted. The Railroad then
filed a motion to dismiss, and Judge Means granted the motion on
the grounds that the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. §151,
et seq., preempted the state law claims, and on the alternative
grounds that the elements for the state law claims were not met.
Blankenship timely appealed, and we affirm the decision of the
district court on the grounds that preemption was appropriate.1
Standard of Review
Preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo. Reece v.
Houston Lighting & Power Company, 79 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 171 (1996). This circuit reviews
de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Dao
v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 1996).
Analysis
This case turns on the preemption issue. The question of
jurisdiction, while argued separately by the Plaintiff-Appellant,
is intertwined with the preemption issue, because if preemption
is proper, then jurisdiction is proper as well. If the state law
1
We do not pass on whether dismissal was appropriate on the
grounds that the elements of the state law claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress were not met. This case should
not be cited for the proposition that we passed on that issue, one
way or another.
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claim was completely preempted by the RLA, then federal question
jurisdiction exists, and this case was properly removed to
federal court. Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590,
594 (5th Cir. 1993).
There are two categories of disputes under the RLA, major
and minor. Minor disputes are those which arise from disputes
from grievances or from the interpretation or application of
agreements regarding pay, working conditions, or work rules. Id.
at 594. The RLA’s arbitral remedy is mandatory and exclusive for
minor disputes, and state law claims that involve these disputes
are preempted. Id.; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 303-304 (1989)
(“Conrail”); Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 253-256
(1994). “The distinguishing characteristic of a minor dispute is
that it ‘may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the
existing [collective bargaining] agreement.’” Anderson, 2 F.3d
at 595 (citing Conrail, 491 U.S. at 305).
The Supreme Court has stated that the determination of
whether a dispute is a minor one, and hence, whether its
resolution by an RLA system board preempts an alternative cause
of action, is to be determined using the same analysis employed
in determining whether a cause of action is preempted by Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§158. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 263. Under Section 301,
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the key in determining whether a claim is preempted is whether
that claim depends on an interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 262-263; see also Lingle v. Norge
Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-406 (1987).
In the instant case, any analysis of whether the Railroad’s
actions were improper must depend upon an interpretation of the
CBA. The questions of whether the drug testing and dismissal
were proper can only be answered by consultation with and
interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, the claims are preempted
by the RLA, under the precedent cited. Further, we find no error
in the district court’s decision that the Railroad met its burden
in persuading the district court that its drug testing policy and
subsequent actions were justified by the terms of the CBA.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we find no reversible error in the
decision of the district court, which dismissed the case against
the Defendant-Appellee. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.
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