IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-30494
Summary Calendar
ELLIS GUILLOT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ED DAY, ET AL
Defendants
ED DAY, Warden; M. R. WINSTEAD,
JR., LYN H. PIGOTT,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 94-CV-1832-A
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March 12, 1998
Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendants Ed Day, Sgt. M.R. Winstead, Jr., and Lyn H.
Pigott appeal the magistrate judge’s decision denying in part
their summary judgment motion based upon qualified immunity. A
lower court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment asserting
qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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collateral-order doctrine to the extent review is sought of an
issue of law and not of the lower court’s determination that
sufficient evidence existed to create a question of fact or
support the claim. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995);
Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 471-72 (5th Cir.
1996). This court reviews the magistrate judge’s denial of a
summary-judgment motion de novo. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161,
1164 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 800 (1996).
“Movants may prevail only if they have demonstrated that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
The magistrate judge understood Guillot’s claims to be two-
fold: (1) falsification of records by Winstead, which Guillot
wished to complain of to Winstead’s superiors and ultimately to
litigate in court, and (2) retaliation by Winstead and Pigott
because Guillot had grieved Winstead’s actions.
Denial of access to the courts
It is not clear that the magistrate judge treated the first
claim as a “denial-of-access-to-the-courts” claim, per se, as the
parties argue on appeal. The magistrate judge cited no case law
in her order related to such a claim; she instead explicitly
relied upon case law espousing the scope of retaliation claims.
The magistrate judge also stated only “that the retaliation
claims would go to trial.”
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To the extent that Guillot seeks relief for denial of access
to the courts, as we have previously held, Guillot has not
alleged specific facts showing that his access to the courts has
been denied or that his legal position has been prejudiced or
that he suffered an actual injury. See Guillot v. Day, No. 95-
31235 (5th Cir. Aug. 6, 1996); Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174,
2179-80 (1996); Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.
1992) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) dismissal). Although Guillot amended
his complaint on remand, he again failed to alleged that his
legal position had been prejudiced or that he had suffered an
actual injury. Accordingly, Guillot has failed to state a claim
for denial of access to the courts.
Retaliation
The elements of a retaliation claim are (1) the invocation
of a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to
retaliate against the plaintiff for exercising that right, (3) a
retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation. Clarke v. Stalder,
121 F.3d 222, 231 (5th Cir. 1997). Prisoners enjoy a
constitutional right to be free from harassment or retaliation
for complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s misconduct.
Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164; see also Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040,
1046 (5th Cir. 1986) (a guard “may not harass an inmate in
retaliation for the inmate complaining to supervisors about the
guard’s conduct”); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1154 (5th
Cir.) (holding that prison officials were prohibited from
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“retaliati[ng] against inmates who complain of prison conditions
or official misconduct”), opinion amended in part and vacated in
part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982). The inmate must produce
direct evidence of the defendants’ motivation, or “allege a
chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be
inferred.” Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). With respect to causation, Guillot must show
“direct evidence of motivation or allege a chronology of events
from which retaliation may be plausibly inferred.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation omitted). “An action motivated by
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right is actionable, even if the act, when taken for a different
reason, might have been legitimate.” Id. at 1165.
Winstead
We previously held that Guillot’s pleadings contained
specific allegations of a chronology of events regarding actions
taken by Winstead from which it may be inferred that Winstead
retaliated against Guillot for filing a grievance against him.
Guillot, No. 95-31225, slip op. at 7. Accordingly, the
magistrate judge did not err in denying summary judgment as to
Winstead on the retaliation claim.
Pigott
Although this court previously held that Guillot had failed
to allege sufficient facts of retaliation against Pigott, see
id., the magistrate judge allowed Guillot to amend his complaint.
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Guillot alleged that Pigott had retaliated against him when she
rejected his grievances filed under the Administrative Remedy
Procedure (ARP) and filed a disciplinary report against him for
allegedly abusing the ARP procedure; he further alleged, based on
“information and belief,” that Pigott had complained that Guillot
had “filed too many ARPs, causing more work for her” and that she
had denied the ARP to punish him.
Guillot enjoys a constitutional right to be free from
harassment or retaliation for complaining to a supervisor about a
guard’s misconduct. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1164. Guillot alleges
that Pigott complained about Guillot having filed too many ARPs,
and he relies on a letter from an attorney for the Secretary of
Safety and Corrections to show Pigott’s retaliatory intent.
Whether Pigott’s denial of Guillot’s ARPs is objectively
reasonable is in dispute. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did
not err in denying summary judgment as to Guillot’s alleged claim
of retaliation against Pigott.
Finally, the appellants argue that the magistrate judge
erred when she failed to dismiss Warden Day as a defendant in his
individual capacity because Guillot had failed to plead actions
attributable to Day which articulate the violation of a clearly
established federally protected right. Supervisory officials
like Warden Day are not liable for the actions of subordinates on
a theory of vicarious liability. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d
298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987). A supervisor will have personal
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liability only if he is personally involved in the constitutional
deprivation, or if there is a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor's conduct and the violation. Id. at 304.
Guillot has not stated a valid claim of denial of access to the
courts against Day, nor has he alleged that Day retaliated
against him. Accordingly, the magistrate judge erred in failing
to dismiss Day in his individual capacity.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion, including dismissal of
Warden Day in his individual capacity.