[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13485 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 28, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
Agency No. A079-516-484
AGRON NEZIRI,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(April 28, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Agron Neziri, an ethnic Albanian who is a native and citizen of Macedonia,
petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals that
affirmed an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application for asylum, 8 U.S.C. §§
1158, 1231; withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and relief under the
United Nations Convention Against Torture.1 He contends that the Board erred in
finding that he failed to demonstrate either past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution.
I.
“When the BIA issues a decision, we review the BIA’s decision, except to
the extent that the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision.” Niftaliev v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 504 F.3d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“To the extent that the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we review the IJ’s decision
as well.” Mehmeti v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2009).
Because the Board adopted the Immigration Judge’s reasoning, we will review
both decisions. “We review de novo the conclusions of law by the Board and
Immigration Judge, but we review findings of fact for substantial evidence to
support them.” Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (11th
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Neziri did not challenge the denial of his request for withholding of removal and CAT
relief before the BIA and does not challenge them before us. Those claims are abandoned. See
Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that an
appellant’s failure to offer argument on an issue constitutes abandonment of that issue).
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Cir. 2009).
“Our review for substantial evidence is highly deferential.” Id. at 1351. We
view the evidence in the record “in the light most favorable to the agency’s
decision and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Id. We may
not “re-weigh the evidence from scratch” and must affirm the agency’s decision if
“it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
“Under this highly deferential standard of review, the [agency’s] decision can be
reversed only if the evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to find otherwise.”
Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The mere fact that the record may support a contrary
conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.”
Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1351.
The Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security has discretion to
grant asylum to any alien determined to be a “refugee,” as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A). See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is defined as:
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . .
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish
that [he] is a refugee.” Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1351 (internal quotation marks
omitted). An applicant establishes asylum based on past persecution by proving
“(1) that [he] was persecuted, and (2) that the persecution was on account of a
protected ground.” Silva v. United States Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th
Cir. 2006). An applicant who establishes past persecution is presumed to have a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1351.
“That presumption may be rebutted if an asylum officer or immigration judge
makes either of two findings: (1) that ‘[t]here has been a fundamental change in
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of
persecution’; or (2) ‘[t]he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to
another part of the applicant’s country of nationality . . . and under all the
circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.’ ” Id. at
1351–52 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) & (B)). The government has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, either changed
circumstances or the ability to avoid persecution by relocating. See id. at 1352.
“If an applicant fails to demonstrate past persecution, an applicant may still
establish asylum based upon proof of a well-founded fear of future persecution.”
De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2008). The
applicant must show “(1) a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear of
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persecution that is (2) on account of a protected ground.” Id. “The subjective
component is generally satisfied by the applicant’s credible testimony that he or
she genuinely feared persecution.” Mehmeti, 572 F.3d at 1200. The objective
component is satisfied either by showing past persecution or that the applicant has
a good reason to fear future persecution. See id. The applicant must establish a
nexus between the statutorily protected ground and the feared persecution. Id. The
applicant can do this by presenting “specific, detailed facts showing a good reason
to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on account of” the
protected ground. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the applicant
does not have to prove that he would be singled out if he can show a pattern or
practice of persecution of a group of which he is a member. Id.
II.
Neziri contends that the Board erred in concluding that he failed to
demonstrate past persecution based on his race and membership in the Democratic
Party. We do not need to decide that issue because the record supports the Board’s
determination that due to changed country conditions Neziri did not have an
objectively reasonable well-founded fear of future persecution. The 2007 Country
Report indicated that “[i]ndividuals could criticize the government publicly or
privately without reprisal, and the government did not attempt to impede
criticism.” The report also stated that “[r]elations between the ethnic Macedonian
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majority and the ethnic Albanian population continues to decrease” and that ethnic
Albanians made up 17 percent of Macedonia’s police force. Although Neziri
contends that the Immigration Judge erred in relying exclusively on the 2007
Country Report to conclude that country conditions in Macedonia had changed, his
reliance on that report was proper. See Djonda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 514 F.3d 1168,
1175 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the BIA may rely heavily on country reports
because the State Department is the most appropriate resource on foreign nations’
political conditions). In any event, the substantial evidence test precludes us from
reweighing from scratch the importance attributed to a particular report. See id.
Accordingly, we deny his petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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