In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 08-4159
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOEL T URNER, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 3:05-cr-50082-11—Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 24, 2009—D ECIDED A PRIL 30, 2010
Before P OSNER, M ANION, and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
T INDER, Circuit Judge. Joel Turner, Jr. was convicted of
a drug conspiracy and firearms offense and was sen-
tenced to 300 months in prison. He challenges the
evidence upon which the district court relied in finding
that he was a member of the conspiracy in January 2005
and in making its drug quantity finding. He also argues
that the court erred in not considering unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities among his codefendants and ignored
2 No. 08-4159
sentencing factors, which resulted in an unreasonable
sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Background
The government indicted sixteen defendants, including
Joel Turner, Jr., on multiple counts of drug and gun
crimes. Turner pled guilty to Counts One and Two of
the second superseding indictment. The former count
charged him with a criminal drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, and the latter count charged him with possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a criminal drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Turner was sentenced to
240 months on Count One and 60 months on Count Two,
to be served consecutively. We already have decided the
appeals of several of Turner’s codefendants. See United
States v. Easter, 553 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied
sub nom. McKay v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1281 (Jan. 25,
2010) (No. 08-10584).
Turner admitted the following facts, among others,
which are taken from his written plea agreement: From
at least August 10, 2005, and continuing through at least
August 22, 2005, Turner was a member of the Titanic
Stones street gang and agreed with Darrell “Duck”
Davis and others to sell controlled substances, primarily
consisting of heroin. In August 2005, Turner sold heroin
out of a drug house operated by the organization at
1023 Kishwaukee in Rockford, Illinois. The organiza-
tion of which Turner was a part operated the drug
house at 1023 Kishwaukee between August 9, 2005 and
September 13, 2005. Davis supplied several members of
No. 08-4159 3
the organization with packs of heroin and crack cocaine
(cocaine base) to sell from the house during that
time period. On August 10, 2005, Turner sold several
individually wrapped packets of heroin to customers
out of the Kishwaukee house. Each packet weighed
approximately .2 grams and was sold for $20. While the
organization ran the drug house at 1023 Kishwaukee,
the doors of the house were fortified to prevent the
police and rivals from getting in, and many members of
the organization, including Turner, possessed firearms
to protect the organization’s drugs and drug proceeds.
On August 10, 2005, in furtherance of the conspiracy
charged in Count One and his heroin sales at the
Kishwaukee drug house, Turner possessed a firearm
for the purpose of protecting himself, the heroin, and the
proceeds from the heroin sale.
In addition, Turner admitted that he was guilty as
charged in Counts One and Two of the second super-
seding indictment. The district court accepted his guilty
pleas, found a factual basis for the pleas, and adjudged
him guilty.
The probation office prepared a presentence investiga-
tion report (“PSR”) on Turner. The PSR attributed one
to three kilograms of heroin and at least fifty grams of
cocaine base to Turner, and accordingly found a base
offense level of 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(4).
However, the PSR also found that he was a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). As a result, Turner’s
criminal history category was VI. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Based
on his career offender status and the fact that he was
4 No. 08-4159
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and another offense,
the PSR found that the applicable Guideline range was
the greater of (A) 211 to 248 months (the range deter-
mined by adding the mandatory minimum of 60 con-
secutive months to the range of 151 to 188 months deter-
mined on Count One) and (B) 262 to 327 months (the
range determined using the table in § 4B1.1(c)(3)
because Turner received a three-level reduction for ac-
ceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1). See
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(c)(2). Turner filed an objection to the
PSR and a sentencing memorandum.
At Turner’s sentencing hearing, the court found that
the residence at 821 Buckbee was a drug house from
which the conspirators sold heroin between 2002 and
2005 (the conspirators operated several different drug
houses), that Turner was arrested in the Buckbee house
on January 18, 2005, and that Turner sold heroin from
the Buckbee house. The court also considered that
Turner was incarcerated from January 26 until his
release on July 27, 2005, and that shortly after his
release from custody, he became involved in the con-
spiracy at the drug house at 1023 Kishwaukee. From all
the evidence, the court found that Turner was involved
in the conspiracy at least as of January 18, 2005, and
again became involved in the conspiracy upon his
release from custody in late July that same year. (The
court said that Turner never really left the conspiracy;
he just was not an active member while incarcerated.)
These findings were based on all the evidence, including
that part of the trial testimony of codefendant Ambrose
Jones (who had testified at the trial of three of Turner’s
No. 08-4159 5
codefendants) which the court found sufficiently reliable,
as well as on information in Turner’s PSR about his
January 18, 2005 arrest at the Buckbee house.
The sentencing court assessed the drug amount even
though that issue was trumped by Turner’s status as a
career offender. In making the drug quantity finding,
the court reviewed the transcripts of the sentencing
hearings of codefendants Darrell Davis and Jamaul
McKay and considered its finding that Turner was in-
volved in the conspiracy during the operation of the
drug house at 1023 Kishwaukee for a thirty-day period.
The court also relied on its previous finding that
slightly over one-half of one kilogram of heroin was
sold out of the Kishwaukee house during that thirty-
day period. The court determined that Turner was re-
sponsible for all the quantities sold out of the
Kishwaukee house during that thirty-day period.
The sentencing court also considered whether Turner
was responsible for a quantity of drugs sold at any other
time period. The court noted its finding that Turner
was involved in the conspiracy at the Buckbee house
and, based on testimony from McKay’s sentencing
hearing, found “that there were quantities sold at that
house” and that “almost another half kilo was sold.” In
addition, the court relied on the credible trial “testimony
as to approximately what was sold out of each drug
house,” which included the testimony of codefendants
Bobby Harris and Dupree Turner, who gave informa-
tion about the organization’s operations. The sentencing
court found Turner responsible for a total quantity of
6 No. 08-4159
700 grams to one kilogram of heroin, resulting in a base
offense level of 30 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5). Turner
was sentenced to 240 months on Count One and a con-
secutive 60 months on Count Two.
II. Discussion
Turner argues that the district court’s finding that he
was involved in the conspiracy in January 2005 and its
drug quantity finding were not based on a preponderance
of the evidence. He also argues that the court erred in
believing that it could not consider sentencing disparities
among codefendants. And he argues that his sentence
is substantively unreasonable when weighed against
the sentencing factors.
We review de novo whether the district court followed
proper sentencing procedures and we review factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Pulley, No. 08-3363,
2010 WL 537574, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 2010). We defer
to a district court’s credibility finding, “which can
virtually never be clear error.” Id. (citing United States
v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 584 (7th Cir. 2008)). The substan-
tive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, and we presume that a properly
calculated, within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. Id.
A. Findings Regarding Turner’s Involvement
in the Conspiracy and Drug Quantity
Turner contends that the sentencing court’s finding
that he was involved in the conspiracy on January 18, 2005,
No. 08-4159 7
and its resulting drug quantity finding were not sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence. He main-
tains that these erroneous findings made his career of-
fender range seem closer to the advisory Guideline
range than it was, and the sentencing court could have
considered the difference in deciding whether his
career offender status overstated his criminal history.
The government must establish the drug quantity by a
preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Cox, 536
F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 770 (2008).
A sentencing court may “rely on information that has
‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
accuracy.’ ” Pulley, 2010 WL 537574, at *3 (quoting United
States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2008)). When
a court relies on information contained in a presentence
report, “the defendant bears the burden of showing
that the presentence report is inaccurate or unreliable.”
United States v. Heckel, 570 F.3d 791, 795 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quotation omitted). A defendant’s bare denial of infor-
mation in a presentence report is insufficient to chal-
lenge its accuracy and reliability. Id.
In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, a
defendant may be held accountable for “ ‘all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’ ” United States
v. Soto-Piedra, 525 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). Thus, in a drug con-
spiracy, “each conspirator is responsible not only for
drug quantities directly attributable to him but also for
amounts involved in transactions by coconspirators
8 No. 08-4159
that were reasonably foreseeable to him.” Acosta, 534
F.3d at 585 (quoting United States v. McLee, 436 F.3d
751, 765 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Turner asserts that the government acknowledged in
its brief that it offered only two facts to support a
finding that he had joined the conspiracy on January 18,
2005: Jones’s trial testimony that Turner sold heroin at
the Buckbee house in January 2005 and information
in Turner’s PSR related to his January 18 arrest at the
Buckbee house. Turner argues that neither fact supports
a finding by a preponderance that he was involved in
the conspiracy since at least January 18, 2005. Although
Jones could not testify as to the specific dates or the
quantity of drugs that was sold, the district court credited
Jones’s trial testimony about the various houses from
which the organization sold drugs and the estimate of
dates. Specifically, Jones testified that the organization
sold heroin out of the Buckbee house at some point be-
tween 2002 and 2005. He also testified that he saw Turner
sell heroin from the Buckbee house. This testimony sup-
ports the district court’s finding that Turner was part of
the conspiracy on January 18, 2005.
Turner acknowledges that his arrest record supports
a finding that he was present at the Buckbee house on
January 18, 2005, but claims that the record contradicts
Jones’s testimony. The arrest record noted that Turner
denied that the heroin was his and that his cousin
claimed the drugs. The district court was capable of
weighing these claims against the other evidence, in-
cluding the evidence that a confidential informant made
No. 08-4159 9
a controlled buy of heroin from someone at the Buckbee
house and that officers executing a search warrant at
the house entered and discovered Turner, who attempted
to thwart their entry and resisted arrest. Officers ob-
served a plastic bag sticking out of Turner’s mouth; he
later spit out twenty-five plastic baggies containing
heroin. Codefendant McKay also was in the house and
the front door was fortified. Other evidence, including
Turner’s own admissions, established that he was a
member of the conspiracy in August 2005 and sold
heroin at that time.
Although Turner argues that the sentencing court
refused to rely on the police report and gave assurances
that it would not rely on offenses not resulting in con-
victions, he takes the court’s comments out of context.
Turner had objected to the inclusion in the PSR’s criminal
history section of information regarding arrests for
cases that were either dismissed or never initiated. The
court’s remark that it would not consider mere
arrests that did not result in convictions was made in
addressing that objection. In effect, the court was indi-
cating that it would not rely on such arrests in deter-
mining Turner’s criminal history score. (The PSR didn’t
count those arrests in computing Turner’s criminal history
score either.) The court did not disclaim all reliance on
the information underlying such arrests, however.
Together, Jones’s testimony and the arrest report allow
a reasonable inference that Turner was involved in the
conspiracy since at least January 18, 2005, and sold
heroin from the Buckbee house. And that’s not all. Turner
10 No. 08-4159
admitted that he was a member of the conspiracy from
at least August 10, 2005; that he agreed with Davis and
others to sell controlled substances, primarily heroin;
and that he sold heroin out of another drug house
operated by the organization in August 2005. The
evidence of Turner’s involvement in the conspiracy
following his release from custody in late July 2005 sup-
ported the inference that he was involved in the con-
spiracy at the time of his arrest back in January 2005.
Turner has not denied that he was arrested at the
Buckbee house on January 18, 2005, or that he was in
possession of heroin at the time of his arrest.
Turner also challenges the basis for the sentencing
court’s drug quantity findings from the Buckbee house.
In prior sentencings, the court found that Davis bought
in one kilogram quantities, assumed that one house
operated at a time, and inferred that the organization
sold approximately one-half kilogram quantities a
month from January to the beginning of September 2005.
In addition, there was evidence from Turner’s arrest
record that a confidential informant bought heroin at the
Buckbee house and that Turner was found in the house
with plastic baggies of heroin, indicative of selling. The
evidence of the drug quantity from the Kishwaukee
house in August and September 2005 and the ongoing
nature of the organization’s drug dealing support a
reasonable inference of the quantities sold in the earlier
part of the year. Thus, reasonable inferences supported
the sentencing court’s finding that one-half kilogram of
heroin was sold from the Buckbee house in January 2005.
No. 08-4159 11
Turner contests the sentencing court’s reliance on
testimony at the sentencing hearings of Anthony K. Glover,
Montrell McSwain, and Davis as support for its drug
quantity findings. Turner first asserts that the court
concluded at Glover’s and McSwain’s sentencings that
the government could not establish when they sold
heroin, for how long, or how much heroin was sold at the
Buckbee house. At Glover’s sentencing, the government
sought to hold Glover accountable for a drug quantity of
ten to thirty kilograms—a drug quantity much greater
than that asserted in Turner’s case. Although the court
questioned whether the government could prove that
quantity, Glover stipulated that the government could
prove that the drug quantity was at least three kilograms
but no more than ten kilograms. Thus, the court did not
find that the government’s evidence of drug quantity
was unreliable, as Turner suggests.
Similarly, the government attempted to prove that
McSwain was accountable for ten to thirty kilograms of
heroin, again a quantity substantially greater than
that for which the government sought to hold Turner ac-
countable. But the court found McSwain responsible only
for more than one kilogram of heroin sold at the
Kishwaukee house and the Third Street house (another
drug house run by the conspirators) in 2005. The court
said that it could not accurately find what the quantities
were for the period from roughly the end of 2002 through
2005; instead, it had to resort to estimating the drug
quantities, which it was permitted to do. See Easter, 553
F.3d at 524. The court based its estimation on Jones’s
testimony, which it credited, that there was an ongoing
12 No. 08-4159
conspiracy to sell during that time period (2002 through
2005) and the quantities that were found in various
drug raids. The court found that this evidence sup-
ported a drug quantity of over one kilogram and prob-
ably “near three to ten kilos, but I can’t tell exactly.” The
court therefore found McSwain responsible for at least
one kilogram but less than 3 kilograms of heroin.
Turner argues that Jones could not identify which
houses operated on which dates or how much was sold
out of any house, including the Buckbee house. But the
court did not have to rely on Jones’s testimony to
establish the specific dates on which the organization
sold heroin out of the Buckbee house. The court could
draw reasonable inferences from information provided
in Turner’s PSR—he was arrested at the Buckbee house
on January 18, 2005, and he had twenty-five baggies of
heroin in his mouth at the time. These facts along with
other reliable evidence in the record, including
Turner’s admission that he was part of the conspiracy
in August 2005 and the testimony about the organiza-
tion’s extensive drug distribution and use of other
drug houses permit the reasonable inference that the
organization was selling heroin from the Buckbee house
in January 2005.
And Turner challenges the sentencing court’s reliance
on its findings at McKay’s sentencing to support its
conclusion that “almost another half kilo” of heroin
was sold at the Buckbee house. Turner claims there was
no evidence that McKay sold heroin at the Buckbee
house: McKay’s drug quantity calculation was based on
No. 08-4159 13
drug (crack) quantities sold at the Underwood and
Kishwaukee drug houses. These criticisms are well-
taken. McKay stipulated to the quantity of heroin (960
grams) sold from the Underwood and Kishwaukee drug
houses when he was involved with those houses. It
does not appear that McKay was involved at the
Buckbee house. However, in finding the drug quantity
sold from the Buckbee house, the court relied not only
on its findings at McKay’s sentencing, but also on “testi-
mony as to approximately what was sold out of each
drug house during the period of time.” And the court
earlier had referred to the transcript from Davis’s sen-
tencing as the basis for finding reliable evidence as to
drug quantity. At Davis’s sentencing, the court found
that the organization sold about one-half kilogram per
month from January through the beginning of Septem-
ber 2005. This finding was based on trial testimony of
codefendants Jones, Dupree Turner, and Bobby Harris;
the many arrests of conspirators and discovery of drugs
from 2002 through 2005; evidence from garbage pulls
from two of the drug houses; testimony from persons
who had made several purchases of heroin from mem-
bers of the conspiracy; and a surveillance tape covering
an eight-day period of time of the traffic at the
Kishwaukee house.
Turner further complains that the court held him ac-
countable for a full month’s distribution of heroin even
though the government can point to only a single day
in January 2005 that he was allegedly involved in the
conspiracy. The court did say that it would not hold
Turner accountable for the heroin sold while he was in
14 No. 08-4159
custody between January and July 2005. (Of course, as
we noted at oral argument, nothing prevented the court
from holding him accountable for all the heroin sold
during this period. Though Turner may not have been an
active member of the conspiracy while in custody, there
is no evidence that he withdrew from the conspiracy.
See United States v. Julian, 427 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005)
(stating that in order to withdraw from a conspiracy,
a defendant must take some affirmative act; “[s]imply
ceasing to participate even for extended periods of
time is not sufficient to show withdrawal” (quotation
omitted)). Thus, he could have been held accountable
for heroin sold while he was incarcerated. Turner can
hardly complain that he was held responsible for one-
half of January’s heroin sales from the Buckbee house
when he could have been held accountable for a much
greater quantity.) The fact that Turner was only found
at the Buckbee house on one day does not negate the
reasonable inference drawn by the sentencing court that
his participation extended beyond (and prior to) that
date. A defendant’s presence at a drug house is not the
determinative factor in assessing accountability for drug
quantity. Where, as here, the offense is a conspiracy, the
drug quantity for which a defendant may be held ac-
countable is based on “‘all reasonably foreseeable acts
and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly under-
taken criminal activity.’ ” Soto-Piedra, 525 F.3d at 531
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)).
Nor are we persuaded by Turner’s argument that his
career offender status substantially over-represents the
seriousness of his criminal history, justifying a reduced
No. 08-4159 15
sentence. Turner cites United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d
877 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 (2009),
where we said that “there is no statutory provision in-
structing courts to sentence a career offender at or near
the statutory maximum.” Id. at 884 (quoting United
States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 663 (2d Cir. 2008)). That is
certainly correct. And we recently ruled that sen-
tencing courts are free to disagree with the career
offender Guideline. United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411,
415-16 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The sentencing court’s
comments show that it understood that the career
offender Guideline was advisory. And the court care-
fully considered Turner’s assertion that application
of the career offender Guideline greatly exaggerated
his criminal history. But the court ultimately concluded
that Turner’s criminal history did not justify a variance
below the Guideline. We see no reason to disagree
with that reasoned determination.
B. Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants
The argument that the district court erred in failing to
consider unwarranted sentencing disparities is also
unavailing. Section “3553(a)(6) does not allow unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities between codefendants,”
Pulley, 2010 WL 537574, at *6 (citing United States v.
Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 908, 909 (7th Cir. 2009)), but “war-
ranted disparities are allowed,” id. A court that sen-
tences within a properly calculated Guidelines range
“necessarily gives weight and consideration to avoiding
16 No. 08-4159
unwarranted disparities.” Id. (citing Bartlett, 567 F.3d
at 908).
The court identified several justifications for the sen-
tencing disparities between Turner and his codefendants.
First, Turner was sentenced as a career offender; none
of Turner’s codefendants were sentenced as career of-
fenders. The career offender Guideline was intended
to punish career offenders more severely than other of-
fenders. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, cmt.
(background). Second, some of the codefendants re-
ceived reductions for cooperation; Turner did not cooper-
ate with the government.1 A difference justified by the
fact that a codefendant assisted the government, whereas
the defendant did not is not “unwarranted.” Bartlett,
567 F.3d at 908. In addition, Turner was facing a first-
degree murder charge; there is no indication that any of
his codefendants were also charged with murder. The
judge also noted that “[t]hey were different defendants”
and he stated that he did not view the codefendants’
sentences to be particularly out of line with Turner’s
sentence. The judge emphasized that “[e]ach must be
judged on an individual basis.”
As the court’s explanation for the disparities between
Turner’s sentence and those of his codefendants reveals,
the judge appears to have been merely making a prelimi-
nary remark when he stated that there were “unwar-
1
Turner argues he was unable to cooperate because he was
in state custody. Nothing in the record suggests that he
offered to cooperate with the government.
No. 08-4159 17
ranted” disparities. The court’s detailed explanation of
the variances in the sentences which followed that initial
comment shows that it believed the disparities were
warranted. And the court explicitly stated that it had
“considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records.”
Even if the judge was under the mistaken impression
that “a sentencing disparity is problematic only if it is
between the defendant’s sentence and the sentences
imposed on other similarly situated defendants nation-
wide,” Statham, 581 F.3d at 556 (explaining that Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) foreclosed such a rule), the
sentencing transcript shows that the judge did, in fact,
consider the sentencing disparities with Turner’s
codefendants. He simply concluded that the differences
were warranted. We find no error in the court’s consider-
ation of the sentencing disparities.
C. Substantive Reasonableness of Turner’s Sentence
Turner contends that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable and that the district court inadequately
weighed the sentencing factors. A court must give mean-
ingful consideration to the sentencing factors, but need
not address every argument that a defendant makes at
sentencing. United States v. Carrillo-Esparza, 590 F.3d
538, 540 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Pulley,
2010 WL 537574, at *5 (“The court is not required to
consider every ‘stock’ argument, but it must address the
defendant’s principal arguments.”). “An adequate state-
ment of reasons why its sentence is appropriate and
18 No. 08-4159
consistent with § 3553(a) will suffice.” Carrillo-Esparza,
590 F.3d at 540 (citing United States v. Alden, 527 F.3d
653, 662 (7th Cir. 2008)).
In arguing that his sentence is substantively unreason-
able, Turner specifically cites the following: his desire to
rehabilitate and avoid recidivism; his upbringing with a
drug-using mother and drug-using and abusive father;
his prior offenses occurred at a young age; his assertion
that many of his offenses were “relatively minor in
nature”; and the effect his incarceration has on his
family, especially his minor children. Turner also claims
that the court failed to consider the nature and circum-
stances of his offense, its seriousness, and the appro-
priate Guidelines range—in essence restating his earlier
challenges to the court’s factual findings. We have ad-
dressed these challenges above.
Regarding Turner’s other claims, the record establishes
that the sentencing court did consider Turner’s argu-
ments for leniency. The judge said that he considered the
statement Turner made at the sentencing, the lawyers’
arguments, the parties’ sentencing memoranda, the PSR,
and the transcripts of the trial, guilty pleas, and sen-
tencings as related to Turner’s codefendants. In par-
ticular, the judge noted that Turner claimed to have had
some positive life changes, but found that Turner was
at a high risk for recidivism. This risk was supported
by the two jail violations Turner incurred while in
custody based on the charges against him in this case.
The sentencing judge also examined the effect on
Turner’s family as well as his disadvantaged upbringing,
No. 08-4159 19
noting that these circumstances were no different than
the average case and were “all too frequent.” He consid-
ered Turner’s age, twenty-six years at sentencing, and
lack of parental direction, noting that he had been
involved in criminal conduct since the age of fifteen. The
judge also noted Turner’s history of alcohol and drug
abuse and behavioral problems and then described
Turner’s background as “all too typical.” Furthermore, the
judge took into account the fact that Turner had been
given probation and other forms of leniency as a
juvenile and adult, but persisted in his criminal ways.
This history suggested to the judge that a longer sen-
tence was necessary to serve the goals of just punishment
and deterrence. And the judge found that the need to
protect the public also weighed in favor of a within-
Guidelines sentence.
As for Turner’s prior offenses, the judge weighed his
two prior convictions for selling controlled substances
and the fact that he was a career offender. The judge
said that Turner’s traffic offenses were not minor traffic
violations; Turner had been driving with a suspended
license, which demonstrated to the court a disregard
for the law and that Turner was not deterred by punish-
ment. And the court noted that Turner always gave a
false name when stopped for a traffic offense. The
court considered that the conviction in this case, which
was Turner’s third for selling drugs, also involved guns
and violence. The judge therefore concluded that Turner’s
background did not justify a variance from a career
offender Guideline. And in doing so, the judge gave
appropriate consideration to the seriousness of the
20 No. 08-4159
offense and the fact that Turner has persisted in his
criminal conduct.
In the sentencing judge’s view, none of the § 3553(a)
factors weighed in Turner’s favor and none justified a
sentence reduction. We find no abuse of discretion here.
The judge thoroughly considered the sentencing factors
and more than adequately explained why the chosen
sentence was appropriate. Turner has not rebutted the
presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence was
reasonable. See Carrillo-Esparza, 590 F.3d at 540.
III. Conclusion
The sentence and judgment are A FFIRMED.
4-30-10