UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4636
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CRAIG TADLOCK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:08-cr-00176-TLW-4)
Submitted: April 7, 2010 Decided: May 4, 2010
Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kathy Price Elmore, ORR ELMORE & ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Harold Craig Tadlock pled guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute OxyCodone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006). He was sentenced to forty-one months in
prison. Tadlock now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Tadlock was
advised of his right to file a pro se brief but has not filed
such a brief. We affirm.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Tadlock
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and that there
was a factual basis for the plea. Further, the transcript of
the plea colloquy discloses that the district court
substantially complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. Although the
district court did not advise Tadlock of the court’s obligation
to impose a special assessment, see Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1)(L), Tadlock’s plea agreement made clear that Tadlock
was subject to such an assessment. Tadlock acknowledged at the
Rule 11 hearing that he had read and understood the entire plea
agreement. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court’s omission did not constitute plain error
affecting Tadlock’s substantial rights. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating standard of
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review). The district court otherwise complied with the
requirements of Rule 11.
Tadlock’s total offense level was 23, his criminal
history category was II, and his advisory Guidelines range was
51-63 months. At sentencing, after hearing from counsel and
Tadlock, the court recognized this range and considered the
factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). The court took
note of Tadlock’s past criminal conduct and his persistence in
involving himself in drug activity. However, the court
announced that it would impose a variant sentence based on
Tadlock’s having cooperated with the Government by participating
in controlled drug buys and on Tadlock’s ill health. The court
determined that a two-level reduction in his offense level, and
a resulting Guidelines range of 41-51 months, was appropriate.
The court sentenced him to forty-one months in prison.
We conclude that the sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). In this regard, the court properly calculated
Tadlock’s advisory Guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a)
factors, and sufficiently explained the variant sentence. See
id.; United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008).
After reviewing the entire record in accordance with
Anders, we find that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
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We therefore affirm Tadlock’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel=s motion must state that a
copy of the motion was served on her client. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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