UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-6165
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHONE EDWARD WILKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-6166
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHONE EDWARD WILKES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:01-cr-00031-FDW-8)
Submitted: April 29, 2010 Decided: May 4, 2010
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Shone Edward Wilkes, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina;
Gretchen C. F. Shappert, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, DC, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Shone Edward Wilkes seeks to appeal two of the
district court’s December 22, 2009, text orders: (1) denying his
motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 to correct “clerical error in
the written judgment” and (2) his “motion asserting his actual
innocence . . . contest[ing] his prior convictions which
factored into his sentence.” The district court denied the
first motion noting that “the Court finds no clerical error in
the written judgment.” We note that Rule 36 motions apply only
to clerical errors and are not the proper vehicle for
challenging the substance of the information in a presentence
report (“PSR”). Rather, any challenges to a PSR should be filed
within fourteen days of receiving the document. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32(f).
The district court denied relief in the second motion
noting the “late date” of the motion occurring “years after his
plea, sentencing, and appeal.” We note that, to the extent
Wilkes seeks to challenge his conviction and sentence, he must
first obtain authorization from this court to file a successive
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009) motion. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
2255(h). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s text orders. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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