UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4598
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARY ALICE ANDERSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00025-GRA-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2010 Decided: May 5, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, 1 and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Maxwell B. Cauthen,
III, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
1
Judge Michael was a member of the original panel but did
not participate in this decision. This opinion is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Mary Alice Anderson pled guilty without a plea
agreement to four counts of fraudulently using social security
numbers, 42 U.S.C.A. § 408(a)(7)(B) (West Supp. 2009), and one
count of aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028A(a)(1)
(West Supp. 2009). She was sentenced to one day, concurrent, on
the fraudulent use charges, and two years, consecutive, for
identity theft. She now appeals. Her attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether Anderson’s sentence is reasonable but
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
Anderson was notified of her right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but has not filed such a brief. We affirm.
Our review of the transcript of the plea colloquy
discloses full compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Furthermore, the record reveals that Anderson entered her plea
voluntarily and knowingly and that there was a factual basis for
the plea. We have identified no meritorious appellate issues
related to the convictions.
Turning to Anderson’s sentence, our review is for
reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The one-day
sentence on the fraudulent use counts falls within Anderson’s
advisory Guidelines range of 0-6 months; we afford a presumption
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of reasonableness to this within-Guidelines sentence. See
United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, the consecutive, two-year sentence for identity
theft was statutorily mandated. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028A(a)(1),
(b)(2) (West Supp. 2009). “A statutorily required sentence . .
. is per se reasonable.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d
210, 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 743 (2008).
In sentencing Anderson, the district court did not
apply the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors or
explain the sentence, as Gall requires. See Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. Although the court did not “place on the record an
individualized assessment based on the particular facts before
it,” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2009), the parties did not object to this error in the district
court. 2 Anderson was not eligible for a sentence of probation.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028A(b)(1) (West Supp. 2009). Further, she
received a sentence at the lowest end of her advisory Guidelines
range for the fraudulent use offenses, and received the
statutorily required consecutive sentence for identify theft.
Accordingly, the error did not affect Anderson’s substantial
2
At sentencing, Anderson requested a within-Guidelines
sentence--specifically, a sentence of one day--on the fraudulent
use counts, to be followed by a two-year sentence for identity
theft.
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rights, and we decline to recognize it. See United States v.
Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating plain error
standard of review), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009).
In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly reviewed
the record for any meritorious issues and have found none. We
therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel inform his
client, in writing, of her right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, counsel may move this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy of the motion was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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