FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 05 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-50454
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00513-PA-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
SEYED MAHMOOD MOUSAVI, AKA
Seyyed Mahmood Mousavi, AKA Seyed
Mahmoud Mousawi,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 1, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE, ** District Judge.
The government presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mousavi “[w]illfully ma[de] and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Lloyd D. George, United States District Judge for the
District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
subscribe[d]” to a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).
Specifically, the government presented evidence that Mousavi made large
understatements of categories of income in successive years, and had motivation to
conceal such income in order to avoid government notice of unlawful dealings with
Iran. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954); United States v.
George, 420 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, although the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury as to “willfulness” under this count, see United
States v. Brooksby, 668 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1982), we hold there was no
plain error. Given the strength of the evidence that Mousavi knew his conduct was
illegal, the omission of a proper willfulness instruction did not affect the outcome
of the district-court proceeding; nor did the error seriously affect “the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Puckett v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 734 (1993)). We thus affirm Mousavi’s conviction under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1).
We likewise affirm Mousavi’s conviction for corrupt or forcible interference
with the tax laws under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). An act is “corrupt” within the
meaning of § 7212(a) if it is “performed with the intention to secure an unlawful
benefit for oneself or for another.” United States v. Hanson, 2 F.3d 942, 946 (9th
2
Cir. 1993). Mousavi substantially underreported income in 2002 and 2003,
resulting in the avoidance of taxes and allegedly unwarranted claimed refunds of
several thousand dollars. Additionally, because some of the income Mousavi
failed to report was generated through illegal activity, a reasonable juror could
infer that Mousavi sought to avoid government inquiry into his illegal activity.
This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that Mousavi acted
with “the intention to secure an unlawful benefit,” namely, to avoid taxes and
discovery of his regulatory violations. Id.
For the reasons explained in the concurrently filed opinion, we hold that the
evidence was sufficient to support Mousavi’s conviction under 50 U.S.C. § 1705.
We reject Mousavi’s contention that the jury instruction given on this charge
constituted plain error; the instruction incorporated a correct statement of the
standard for “willfulness” in this circuit. See United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga,
541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976).
We reverse Mousavi’s convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). Although,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable
juror could conclude that Mousavi made misrepresentations regarding
organizational memberships or affiliations with the Iranian military, the evidence
was insufficient for any reasonable juror to conclude that these omissions or
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misrepresentations were “material.” In support of the charge that Mousavi
fraudulently procured naturalization, the government offered no evidence
indicating that Mousavi’s former memberships or military service gave rise to a
fair inference of ineligibility for naturalization. United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d
1297, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, Special Agents Hunt and Lyons repeatedly
disclaimed any assertion that the facts concealed by Mousavi were disqualifying,
maintaining only that they would warrant “further review.” Such testimony is
insufficient to establish materiality under our precedents. See id. at 1303; United
States v. Alferahin, 433 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly,
evidence was insufficient to support Mousavi’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1425.
Similarly, the government offered no testimony indicating that Mousavi’s
misrepresentations regarding Iranian military service to Special Agents
Thomserson and Caruth had any potential or actual effect on agency action or on
the Agents’ behavior. United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1072 (9th Cir.
2008). The Agents provided no testimony about the scope of their investigations
into Mousavi or the relevance of his statements to that investigation; the jury thus
had no evidence regarding “what decision . . . the agency [was] trying to make.”
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Because of this failure to present evidence on the element of materiality,
we likewise reverse Mousavi’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
We affirm the district court’s denial of Mousavi’s motion to suppress.
Mousavi has not identified a single document found on his computer that exceeded
the scope of the warrant, nor provided any evidence of procedural violations of the
warrant’s computer-related terms. The government’s one-day delay in returning
such computers, on defense counsel’s request, is not a basis for the exclusion of
documents. See Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009). The
testimony of Agents O’Brien and Adib indicate full compliance with the warrant’s
terms regarding Farsi and Arabic documents, and each of the documents Mousavi
specifically challenges falls within provisions ff, hh, ii or jj of the warrant.
Because Exhibit 48 contains six letters or other documents plainly within the
warrant’s scope, and it was found as a bound volume, the government was
permitted to seize it in its entirety. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th
Cir. 1979).
Mousavi’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not adequately
factually developed for direct review. United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149,
1155–56 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reyes-Platero, 224 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th
Cir. 2000). The record is “devoid of facts concerning the motives of . . . trial
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counsel,” Reyes Platero, 224 F.3d at 1116, and without such a record this court
cannot determine whether trial counsel in this case acted strategically or
ineffectively, United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1349–50 (9th Cir.
1995). We thus may not reach these claims.
This memorandum disposition is filed concurrently with an opinion
addressing Mousavi’s challenges to his conviction under 50 U.S.C. § 1705, which
for the reasons stated therein we affirm. Each side shall bear its own costs on
appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART & REVERSED IN PART.
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