Hill v. McDonough

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

HILL v. MCDONOUGH, INTERIM SECRETARY, FLOR
IDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–8794. Argued April 26, 2006—Decided June 12, 2006
Facing execution in Florida, petitioner Hill brought this federal action
under 42 U. S. C. §1983 to enjoin the three-drug lethal injection pro
cedure the State likely would use on him. He alleged the procedure
could cause him severe pain and thereby violate the Eighth Amend
ment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. The District
Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the
§1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a habeas petition. Be
cause Hill had sought federal habeas relief earlier, the court deemed
his petition successive and barred under 28 U. S. C. §2244. The Elev
enth Circuit agreed and affirmed.
Held: Because Hill’s claim is comparable in its essentials to the §1983
action the Court allowed to proceed in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S.
637, it does not have to be brought in habeas, but may proceed under
§1983. Pp. 4–10.
(a) Nelson controls here. Although an inmate’s challenge to the law
fulness of a sentence or confinement is the province of habeas corpus,
e.g., Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 750, the Nelson Court de
clined to deem the instant §1983 Eighth Amendment “challenge seek
ing to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection . . . a challenge to
the fact of the sentence itself,” 541 U. S., at 644. Nelson’s veins were
severely compromised, and Alabama planned to apply an invasive
surgical procedure to enable the injection. However, that procedure
was not mandated by state law, and Nelson appeared willing to con
cede the existence of an acceptable alternative procedure. Absent a
finding that the procedure was necessary to the lethal injection, the
Court concluded, injunctive relief would not prevent the State from
implementing the sentence. Id., at 645–646. Here, as in Nelson,
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Syllabus

Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State
from executing him by lethal injection. He does not challenge his
sentence as a general matter but seeks only to enjoin respondents
from executing him in a manner that allegedly causes a foreseeable
risk of gratuitous and unnecessary pain. He concedes that other le
thal injection methods the State could choose would be constitutional,
and respondents do not contend, at least at this point, that an injunc
tion would leave no other practicable, legal method of lethally inject
ing Hill. Florida law, moreover, does not require the use of the chal
lenged procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive
relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.
The fact that Hill challenges the chemical injection sequence rather
than a preliminary surgical procedure does not change the analysis.
In Nelson, the Court reasoned that “the gravamen of petitioner’s en
tire claim” was that the surgical procedure was “gratuitous,” id., at
645, whereas Hill alleges that the procedure he challenges presents a
risk of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce his
sentence.
The Court rejects two rules proposed by respondents and their
amici to counter the prospect of inmates filing successive §1983 ac
tions challenging one aspect of an execution procedure after another
in order to forestall execution. First, the United States contends that
a capital litigant’s §1983 action can proceed only if, as in Nelson, the
prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution.
Although Nelson’s doing so supported the Court’s conclusion that his
suit need not proceed as a habeas action, that fact was not decisive.
Nelson did not change the traditional pleading requirements for
§1983 actions. Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through
federal courts’ case-by-case determinations. Second, relying on cases
barring §1983 damages actions that, if successful, would imply the
invalidation of an existing sentence or confinement, see, e.g., Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, respondents and the amici States contend
that any challenge that would frustrate an execution as a practical
matter must proceed in habeas. This argument cannot be squared
with Nelson’s observation, 541 U. S., at 646–647, that its criterion—
whether granting relief would necessarily bar the inmate’s execu
tion—is consistent with those cases. Because injunctive relief would
not necessarily foreclose Florida from executing Hill by lethal injec
tion under present law, it could not be said that this suit seeks to es
tablish “unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence
invalid,” Heck, supra, at 486. Pp. 4–9.
(b) Filing a §1983 action does not entitle the complainant to an
automatic stay of execution. Such a stay is an equitable remedy not
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Syllabus

available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the
State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without
undue interference from federal courts. Thus, inmates seeking time
to challenge the manner of their execution must satisfy all of the re
quirements for a stay, including showing a significant possibility of
success on the merits. A court considering a stay must also apply a
strong equitable presumption against granting relief where the claim
could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of
the merits without requiring a stay. Nelson, supra, at 650. After
Nelson federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss
suits they saw as speculative or filed too late. Repetitive or piecemeal
litigation presumably would raise similar concerns. States can and
should be protected from dilatory or speculative suits, but it is not
necessary to reject Nelson to do so. The equities and merits of Hill’s
underlying action are not before this Court. Pp. 9–10.
437 F. 3d 1084, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 05–8794
_________________

CLARENCE E. HILL, PETITIONER v. JAMES R.

MCDONOUGH, INTERIM SECRETARY,

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[June 12, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Clarence E. Hill challenges the constitution
ality of a three-drug sequence the State of Florida likely
would use to execute him by lethal injection. Seeking to
enjoin the procedure, he filed this action in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979,
as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983. The District Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the
action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered
it dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements for
a second and successive petition. The question before us is
whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an action for a
writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that
writ, 28 U. S. C. §2254, or whether it may proceed as an
action for relief under 42 U. S. C. §1983.
This is not the first time we have found it necessary to
discuss which of the two statutes governs an action
brought by a prisoner alleging a constitutional violation.
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Opinion of the Court

See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637 (2004); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S. 475 (1973). Hill’s suit, we now determine, is compara
ble in its essentials to the action the Court allowed to pro
ceed under §1983 in Nelson, supra. In accord with that
precedent we now reverse.
I
In the year 1983, Hill was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death. When his conviction and
sentence became final some five years later, the method of
execution then prescribed by Florida law was electrocu
tion. Fla. Stat. §922.10 (1987). On January 14, 2000—
four days after the conclusion of Hill’s first, unsuccessful
round of federal habeas corpus litigation—Florida
amended the controlling statute to provide: “A death
sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the
person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be exe
cuted by electrocution.” §922.105(1) (2003). The now-
controlling statute, which has not been changed in any
relevant respect, does not specify a particular lethal-
injection procedure. Implementation is the responsibility
of the Florida Department of Corrections. See ibid.; Sims
v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). The
department has not issued rules establishing a specific
lethal-injection protocol, and its implementing policies and
procedures appear exempt from Florida’s Administrative
Procedure Act. See §922.105(7).
After the statute was amended to provide for lethal
injection, the Florida Supreme Court heard a death row
inmate’s claim that the execution procedure violated the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. Sims v. State, supra. In Sims, the com
plainant, who had acquired detailed information about the
procedure from the State, contended the planned three-
drug sequence of injections would cause great pain if the
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Opinion of the Court

drugs were not administered properly. 754 So. 2d, at 666–
668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument
as too speculative. Id., at 668.
On November 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed
Hill’s death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on
January 24, 2006. Hill requested information about the
lethal injection protocol, but the department provided
none. App. 21, n. 3 (Verified Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief ¶15, n. 3 (hereinafter Complaint)). Hill
then challenged, for the first time, the State’s lethal injec
tion procedure. On December 15, 2005, he filed a succes
sive postconviction petition in state court, relying upon the
Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied Hill’s request
for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his claim as
procedurally barred. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
on January 17, 2006. Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, cert.
denied, 546 U. S. ___ (2006).
Three days later—and four days before his scheduled
execution—Hill brought this action in District Court pur
suant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Assuming the State would use
the procedure discussed at length in the Sims decision, see
App. 20–21, and n. 3 (Complaint ¶15, n. 3), Hill alleged
that the first drug injected, sodium pentothal, would not
be a sufficient anesthetic to render painless the admini
stration of the second and third drugs, pancuronium bro
mide and potassium chloride. There was an ensuing risk,
Hill alleged, that he could remain conscious and suffer
severe pain as the pancuronium paralyzed his lungs and
body and the potassium chloride caused muscle cramping
and a fatal heart attack. Id., at 18–21 (Complaint ¶¶9–
16). The complaint sought an injunction “barring defen
dants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they cur
rently intend.” Id., at 22 (Complaint ¶¶19–20).
The District Court found that under controlling Elev
enth Circuit precedent the §1983 claim was the functional
equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., at
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Opinion of the Court

15 (relying on Robinson v. Crosby, 358 F. 3d 1281 (2004)).
Because Hill had sought federal habeas corpus relief in an
earlier action, the District Court deemed his petition
successive and thus barred for failure to obtain leave to
file from the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U. S. C.
§2244(b). On the day of the scheduled execution the Court
of Appeals affirmed. It held that Hill’s action was a suc
cessive petition and that it would deny any application for
leave to file a successive petition because §2244(b)(2)
would not allow his claim to proceed. Hill v. Crosby, 437
F. 3d 1084, 1085 (CA11 2006). After issuing a temporary
stay of execution, this Court granted Hill’s petition for
certiorari and continued the stay pending our resolution of
the case. 546 U. S. ___ (2006).
II
“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on com
plaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas
corpus, 28 U. S. C. §2254, and a complaint under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42
U. S. C. §1983. Challenges to the lawfulness of confinement
or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of
habeas corpus.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam) (citing Preiser, supra, at 500). An
inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confine
ment, however, may be brought under §1983. 540 U. S., at
750.
In Nelson v. Campbell, supra, we addressed whether a
challenge to a lethal injection procedure must proceed as a
habeas corpus action. The complainant had severely
compromised peripheral veins, and Alabama planned to
apply an invasive procedure on his arm or leg to enable
the injection. He sought to enjoin the procedure, alleging
it would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court ob
served that the question whether a general challenge to a
method of execution must proceed under habeas was a
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Opinion of the Court

difficult one. The claim was not easily described as a
challenge to the fact or duration of a sentence; yet in a
State where the legislature has established lethal injection
as the method of execution, “a constitutional challenge
seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection
may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence
itself.” Id., at 644.
Nelson did not decide this question. The lawsuit at
issue, as the Court understood the case, did not require an
injunction that would challenge the sentence itself. The
invasive procedure in Nelson was not mandated by law,
and the inmate appeared willing to concede the existence
of an acceptable alternative procedure. Id., at 645–646.
Absent a finding that the challenged procedure was neces
sary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, injunctive
relief would not prevent the State from implementing the
sentence. Consequently, the suit as presented would not
be deemed a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself.
See ibid.
The decision in Nelson also observed that its holding
was congruent with the Court’s precedents addressing
civil rights suits for damages that implicate habeas relief.
Those cases provide that prisoners’ suits for damages can
be barred from proceeding under §1983 when a judgment
in the prisoner’s favor necessarily implies the invalidity of
the prisoner’s sentence. See, e.g., Heck, 512 U. S., at 487;
Close, supra, at 751. The action in Nelson, however, was
not analogous to a damages suit filed to circumvent the
limits imposed by the habeas statute. The suit did not
challenge an execution procedure required by law, so
granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness of the
lethal injection sentence. See 541 U. S., at 647.
In the case before us we conclude that Hill’s §1983
action is controlled by the holding in Nelson. Here, as in
Nelson, Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily
prevent the State from executing him by lethal injection.
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Opinion of the Court

The complaint does not challenge the lethal injection
sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to
enjoin the respondents “from executing [Hill] in the man
ner they currently intend.” App. 22 (Complaint ¶20). The
specific objection is that the anticipated protocol allegedly
causes “a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unneces
sary” pain. Id., at 46 (Application for Stay of Execution
and for Expedited Appeal). Hill concedes that “other
methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to
use would be constitutional,” Brief for Petitioner 17, and
respondents do not contend, at least to this point in the
litigation, that granting Hill’s injunction would leave the
State without any other practicable, legal method of exe
cuting Hill by lethal injection. Florida law, moreover, does
not require the Department of Corrections to use the
challenged procedure. See Fla. Stat. §§922.105(1), (7)
(prescribing lethal injection and leaving implementation to
the Department of Corrections). Hill’s challenge appears
to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection
procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunc
tive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of
Hill’s sentence.
One difference between the present case and Nelson, of
course, is that Hill challenges the chemical injection se
quence rather than a surgical procedure preliminary to
the lethal injection. In Nelson, however, the State argued
that the invasive procedure was not a medical operation
separable from the lethal injection but rather a “necessary
prerequisite to, and thus an indispensable part of, any
lethal injection procedure.” 541 U. S., at 645. The Court
reasoned that although venous access was necessary for
lethal injection, it did not follow that the State’s chosen
means of access were necessary; “the gravamen of peti
tioner’s entire claim” was that the procedure was “gratui
tous.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). The same is true here.
Although the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious
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Opinion of the Court

necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the chal
lenged procedure presents a risk of pain the State can
avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence order
ing a lethal injection.
One concern is that the foregoing analysis may be more
theoretical than real based on the practicalities of the
case. A procedure that avoids the harms Hill alleges, for
instance, may be susceptible to attack for other purported
risks of its own. Respondents and their supporting amici
thus contend that the legal distinction between habeas
corpus and §1983 actions must account for the practical
reality of capital litigation tactics: Inmates file these
actions intending to forestall execution, and Nelson’s
emphasis on whether a suit challenges something “neces
sary” to the execution provides no endpoint to piecemeal
litigation aimed at delaying the execution. Viewed in
isolation, no single component of a given execution proce
dure may be strictly necessary, the argument goes, and a
capital litigant may put off execution by challenging one
aspect of a procedure after another. The amici States
point to Nelson’s aftermath as a cautionary example,
contending that on remand the District Court allowed
Nelson to amend his complaint and that litigation over the
constitutionality of Alabama’s adopted alternative—one
that Nelson had previously proposed—continues to this
day. See Brief for the State of Alabama et al. 7–14.
Respondents and their supporting amici conclude that
two different rules should follow from these practical
considerations. The United States as amicus curiae con
tends that a capital litigant’s §1983 action can proceed if,
as in Nelson, supra, at 646, the prisoner identifies an
alternative, authorized method of execution. A suit like
Hill’s that fails to do so, the United States maintains, is
more like a claim challenging the imposition of any
method of execution—which is to say, the execution it
self—because it shows the complainant is unable or un
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Opinion of the Court

willing to concede acceptable alternatives “[e]xcept in the
abstract.” Brief for United States 14.
Although we agree courts should not tolerate abusive
litigation tactics, see Part III, infra, even if the United
States’ proposed limitation were likely to be effective we
could not accept it. It is true that the Nelson plaintiff’s
affirmative identification of an acceptable alternative
supported our conclusion that the suit need not proceed as
a habeas action. 541 U. S., at 646 (citing the inmate’s
complaint and affidavits). That fact, however, was not
decisive. Nelson did not change the traditional pleading
requirements for §1983 actions. If the relief sought would
foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an
action for habeas corpus might be proper. See id., at 644,
646. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. ___ (2005). Imposi
tion of heightened pleading requirements, however, is
quite a different matter. Specific pleading requirements
are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determina
tions of the federal courts. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 and
9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 512–514
(2002).
Respondents and the States as amici frame their argu
ment differently. While not asking the Court in explicit
terms to overrule Nelson, they contend a challenge to a
procedure implicating the direct administration of an
execution must proceed as a habeas action. Brief for
Respondents 30–31; Brief for the State of Alabama et al.
16–18. They rely on cases barring §1983 damages actions
that, if successful, would imply the invalidation of an
existing sentence or confinement. See, e.g., Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997); Heck, 512 U. S. 477. Those
cases, they contend, demonstrate that the test of whether
an action would undermine a sentence must “be applied
functionally.” Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as
Amici Curiae 16. By the same logic, it is said, a suit
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Opinion of the Court

should be brought in habeas if it would frustrate the exe
cution as a practical matter.
This argument cannot be squared with Nelson’s obser
vation that its criterion—whether a grant of relief to the
inmate would necessarily bar the execution—is consistent
with Heck’s and Balisok’s approach to damages actions
that implicate habeas relief. Nelson, supra, at 646–647.
In those cases the question is whether “the nature of the
challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to
imply the invalidity” of the confinement or sentence.
Balisok, supra, at 645. As discussed above, and at this
stage of the litigation, the injunction Hill seeks would not
necessarily foreclose the State from implementing the
lethal injection sentence under present law, and thus it
could not be said that the suit seeks to establish “unlaw
fulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence inva
lid.” Heck, supra, at 486. Any incidental delay caused by
allowing Hill to file suit does not cast on his sentence the
kind of negative legal implication that would require him
to proceed in a habeas action.
III
Filing an action that can proceed under §1983 does not
entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution
as a matter of course. Both the State and the victims of
crime have an important interest in the timely enforce
ment of a sentence. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538,
556 (1998). Our conclusions today do not diminish that
interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the means to
protect it.
We state again, as we did in Nelson, that a stay of exe
cution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a
matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s
strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without
undue interference from the federal courts. 541 U. S., at
649–650. See In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 236, 239–240 (1992)
10 HILL v. MCDONOUGH

Opinion of the Court

(per curiam); Delo v. Stokes, 495 U. S. 320, 323 (1990) (per
curiam) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Thus, like other stay
applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in
which the State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the
requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant
possibility of success on the merits. See Barefoot v. Estelle,
463 U. S. 880, 895–896 (1983). See also Mazurek v. Arm
strong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (preliminary
injunction not granted unless the movant, by a clear show
ing, carries the burden of persuasion).
A court considering a stay must also apply “a strong equi
table presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim
could have been brought at such a time as to allow consid
eration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.”
Nelson, supra, at 650. See also Gomez v. United States Dist.
Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992)
(per curiam) (noting that the “last-minute nature of an
application” or an applicant’s “attempt at manipulation” of
the judicial process may be grounds for denial of a stay).
After Nelson a number of federal courts have invoked their
equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or
filed too late in the day. See, e.g., Hicks v. Taft, 431 F. 3d
916 (CA6 2005); White v. Johnson, 429 F. 3d 572 (CA5 2005);
Boyd v. Beck, 404 F. Supp. 2d 879 (EDNC 2005). Although
the particular determinations made in those cases are not
before us, we recognize that the problem they address is
significant. Repetitive or piecemeal litigation presumably
would raise similar concerns. The federal courts can and
should protect States from dilatory or speculative suits, but
it is not necessary to reject Nelson to do so.
The equities and the merits of Hill’s underlying action are
also not before us. We reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consis
tent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.