(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
HOUSE v. BELL, WARDEN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 04–8990. Argued January 11, 2006—Decided June 12, 2006
A Tennessee jury convicted petitioner House of Carolyn Muncey’s mur
der and sentenced him to death. The State’s case included evidence
that FBI testing showing semen consistent (or so it seemed) with
House’s on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing and small bloodstains consistent
with her blood but not House’s on his jeans. In the sentencing phase,
the jury found, inter alia, the aggravating factor that the murder was
committed while House was committing, attempting to commit, or
fleeing from the commission of rape or kidnaping. In affirming, the
State Supreme Court described the evidence as circumstantial but
strong. House was denied state postconviction relief. Subsequently,
the Federal District Court denied habeas relief, deeming House’s
claims procedurally defaulted and granting the State summary
judgment on most of his claims. It also found, after an evidentiary
hearing at which House attacked the blood and semen evidence and
presented other evidence, including a putative confession, suggesting
that Mr. Muncey committed the crime, that House did not fall within
the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default recognized in
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, and Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333.
The Sixth Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held:
1. Because House has made the stringent showing required by the
actual-innocence exception, his federal habeas action may proceed.
Pp. 16–34.
(a) To implement the general principle that “comity and finality
‘must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust in
carceration,’ ” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 495, this Court has
ruled that prisoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted
claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely
2 HOUSE v. BELL
Syllabus
than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup, 513 U. S, at 327. Several fea
tures of Schlup’s standard bear emphasis here. First, while the
gateway claim requires “new reliable evidence . . . not presented at
trial,” id., at 324, the habeas court must assess the likely impact of
“ ‘all the evidence’ ” on reasonable jurors, id., at 329. Second, rather
than requiring absolute certainty about guilt or innocence, a peti
tioner’s burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate that more
likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror
would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, this stan
dard is “by no means equivalent to the standard of Jackson v. Vir
ginia, 443 U. S. 307,” which governs insufficient evidence claims, id.,
at 330. Rather, because a Schlup claim involves evidence the trial
jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the federal court to
assess how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly sup
plemented record. See ibid. Contrary to the State’s arguments, the
standard of review in two provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effec
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U. S. C. §§2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) and
2254(e)(2), is inapplicable here. In addition, because the standard
does not address a “district court’s independent judgment as to
whether reasonable doubt exists,” Schlup, supra, at 329, a ruling in
House’s favor does not require the showing of clear error as to the
District Court’s specific findings. It is with these principles in mind
that the evidence developed in House’s federal habeas proceedings
should be evaluated. Pp. 16–20.
(b) In direct contradiction of evidence presented at trial, DNA
testing has established that semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing came
from her husband, not House. While the State claims that the evi
dence is immaterial since neither sexual contact nor motive were
elements of the offense at the guilt phase, this Court considers the
new disclosure of central importance. This case is about who com
mitted the crime, so motive is key, and the prosecution at the guilt
phase referred to evidence at the scene suggesting that House com
mitted, or attempted to commit, an indignity on Mrs. Muncey. Apart
from proving motive, this was the only forensic evidence at the scene
that would link House to the murder. Law and society demand ac
countability for a sexual offense, so the evidence was also likely a fac
tor in persuading the jury not to let him go free. At sentencing,
moreover, the jury concluded that the murder was committed in the
course of a rape or kidnaping. A jury acting without the assumption
that the semen could have come from House would have found it nec
essary to establish some different motive, or, if the same motive, an
intent far more speculative. Pp. 20–22.
(c) The evidentiary disarray surrounding the other forensic evi
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
dence, the bloodstains on House’s pants, taken together with the tes
timony of an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Ten
nessee, would prevent reasonable jurors from placing significant reli
ance on the blood evidence. The medical examiner who testified
believes the blood on the jeans must have come from the autopsy
samples. In addition, a vial and a quarter of autopsy blood is unac
counted for; the blood was transported to the FBI together with the
pants in conditions that could have caused the vials to spill; some
blood did spill at least once during the blood’s journey from Tennes
see authorities through FBI hands to a defense expert; the pants
were stored in a plastic bag bearing a large bloodstain and a label
from a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation agent; and the box contain
ing the blood samples may have been opened before arriving at the
FBI lab. None of this evidence was presented to the trial jury.
Whereas the bloodstains seemed strong evidence of House’s guilt at
trial, the record now raises substantial questions about the blood’s
origin. Pp. 22–28.
(d) In the post-trial proceedings, House presented troubling evi
dence that Mr. Muncey could have been the murderer. Two wit
nesses described a confession by Mr. Muncey; two others described
suspicious behavior (a fight between the couple and Mr. Muncey’s at
tempt to construct a false alibi) around the time of the crime; and
others described a history of spousal abuse. Considered in isolation,
a reasonable jury might well disregard this evidence, but in combina
tion with the challenges to the blood evidence and lack of motive with
respect to House, evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey likely would rein
force other doubts as to House’s guilt. Pp. 28–33.
(e) The Assistant Chief Medical Examiner further testified that
certain injuries discovered on House after the crime likely did not re
sult from involvement in the murder. Certain other evidence—Mrs.
Muncey’s daughter’s recollection of the night of the murder, and the
District Court’s finding at the habeas proceeding that House was not
a credible witness—may favor the State. Pp. 33–34.
(f) While this is not a case of conclusive exoneration, and the is
sue is close, this is the rare case where—had the jury heard all the
conflicting testimony—it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror viewing the record as a whole would lack reasonable doubt. P.
34.
2. House has not shown freestanding innocence that would render
his imprisonment and planned execution unconstitutional under
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, in which the Court assumed with
out deciding that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration
of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there
4 HOUSE v. BELL
Syllabus
were no state avenue open to process such a claim,” id., at 417. The
threshold showing for such a right would be extraordinarily high, and
House has not satisfied whatever burden a hypothetical freestanding
innocence claim would require. He has cast doubt on his guilt suffi
cient to satisfy Schlup’s gateway standard for obtaining federal re
view, but given the closeness of the Schlup question here, his show
ing falls short of the threshold implied in Herrera. Pp. 34–36.
386 F. 3d 668, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in
which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–8990
_________________
PAUL GREGORY HOUSE, PETITIONER v. RICKY
BELL, WARDEN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 12, 2006]
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some 20 years ago in rural Tennessee, Carolyn Muncey
was murdered. A jury convicted petitioner Paul Gregory
House of the crime and sentenced him to death, but new
revelations cast doubt on the jury’s verdict. House, pro
testing his innocence, seeks access to federal court to
pursue habeas corpus relief based on constitutional claims
that are procedurally barred under state law. Out of
respect for the finality of state-court judgments federal
habeas courts, as a general rule, are closed to claims that
state courts would consider defaulted. In certain excep
tional cases involving a compelling claim of actual inno
cence, however, the state procedural default rule is not a
bar to a federal habeas corpus petition. See Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 319–322 (1995). After careful review
of the full record, we conclude that House has made the
stringent showing required by this exception; and we hold
that his federal habeas action may proceed.
I
We begin with the facts surrounding Mrs. Muncey’s
disappearance, the discovery of her body, and House’s
2 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
arrest. Around 3 p.m. on Sunday, July 14, 1985, two local
residents found her body concealed amid brush and tree
branches on an embankment roughly 100 yards up the
road from her driveway. Mrs. Muncey had been seen last
on the evening before, when, around 8 p.m., she and her
two children—Lora Muncey, age 10, and Matthew
Muncey, age 8—visited their neighbor, Pam Luttrell.
According to Luttrell, Mrs. Muncey mentioned her hus
band, William Hubert Muncey, Jr., known in the commu
nity as “Little Hube” and to his family as “Bubbie.” As
Luttrell recounted Mrs. Muncey’s comment, Mr. Muncey
“had gone to dig a grave, and he hadn’t come back, but
that was all right, because [Mrs. Muncey] was going to
make him take her fishing the next day,” App. 11–12.
Mrs. Muncey returned home, and some time later, before
11:00 p.m. at the latest, Luttrell “heard a car rev its motor
as it went down the road,” something Mr. Muncey custom
arily did when he drove by on his way home. Record,
Addendum 4, 5 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un
ion County, Tenn.) 641–642 (hereinafter Tr.). Luttrell
then went to bed.
Around 1 a.m., Lora and Matthew returned to Luttrell’s
home, this time with their father, Mr. Muncey, who said
his wife was missing. Muncey asked Luttrell to watch the
children while he searched for his wife. After he left,
Luttrell talked with Lora. According to Luttrell:
“[Lora] said she heard a horn blow, she thought she
heard a horn blow, and somebody asked if Bubbie was
home, and her mama, you know, told them—no. And
then she said she didn’t know if she went back to
sleep or not, but then she heard her mama going down
the steps crying and I am not sure if that is when she
told me that she heard her mama say—oh God, no,
not me, or if she told me that the next day, but I do
know that she said she heard her mother going down
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
the steps crying.” App. 14–15.
While Lora was talking, Luttrell recalled, “Matt kept
butting in, you know, on us talking, and he said—sister
they said daddy had a wreck, they said daddy had a
wreck.” Id., at 13.
At House’s trial, Lora repeated her account of the
night’s events, this time referring to the “wreck” her
brother had mentioned. To assist in understanding Lora’s
account, it should be noted that Mrs. Muncey’s father-in
law—Little Hube’s father—was sometimes called “Big
Hube.” Lora and her brother called him “Paw Paw.” We
refer to him as Mr. Muncey, Sr. According to Lora, Mr.
Muncey, Sr. had a deep voice, as does petitioner House.
Lora testified that after leaving Luttrell’s house with
her mother, she and her brother “went to bed.” Id., at 18.
Later, she heard someone, or perhaps two different people,
ask for her mother. Lora’s account of the events after she
went to bed was as follows:
“Q Laura [sic], at some point after you got back home
and you went to bed, did anything happen that caused
your mother to be upset or did you hear anything?
“A Well, it sounded like PawPaw said—where’s
daddy at, and she said digging a grave.
“Q Okay. Do you know if it was PawPaw or not, or
did it sound like PawPaw?
“A It just sounded like PawPaw.
“Q And your mother told him what?
“A That he was digging a grave.
“Q Had you ever heard that voice before that said
that?
“A I don’t remember.
“Q After that, at some point later, did you hear any
thing else that caused your mother to be upset?
“A Well, they said that daddy had a wreck down the
road and she started crying—next to the creek.
4 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
“Q Your mother started crying. What was it that
they said?
“A That daddy had a wreck.
“Q Did they say where?
“A Down there next to the creek.” Id., at 18–19.
Lora did not describe hearing any struggle. Some time
later, Lora and her brother left the house to look for their
mother, but no one answered when they knocked at the
Luttrells’ home, and another neighbor, Mike Clinton, said
he had not seen her. After the children returned home,
according to Lora, her father came home and “fixed him a
bologna sandwich and he took a bit of it and he says—
sissy, where is mommy at, and I said—she ain’t been here
for a little while.” Id., at 20. Lora recalled that Mr.
Muncey went outside and, not seeing his wife, returned to
take Lora and Matthew to the Luttrells’ so that he could
look further.
The next afternoon Billy Ray Hensley, the victim’s first
cousin, heard of Mrs. Muncey’s disappearance and went to
look for Mr. Muncey. As he approached the Munceys’
street, Hensley allegedly “saw Mr. House come out from
under a bank, wiping his hands on a black rag.” Id., at 32.
Just when and where Hensley saw House, and how well
he could have observed him, were disputed at House’s
trial. Hensley admitted on cross-examination that he
could not have seen House “walking up or climbing up” the
embankment, id., at 39; rather, he saw House, in “[j]ust a
glance,” id., at 40, “appear out of nowhere,” “next to the
embankment,” id., at 39. On the Munceys’ street, opposite
the area where Hensley said he saw House, a white Ply
mouth was parked near a sawmill. Another witness, Billy
Hankins, whom the defense called, claimed that around
the same time he saw a “boy” walking down the street
away from the parked Plymouth and toward the Munceys’
home. This witness, however, put the “boy” on the side of
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
the street with the parked car and the Munceys’ driveway,
not the side with the embankment.
Hensley, after turning onto the Munceys’ street, contin
ued down the road and turned into their driveway. “I
pulled up in the driveway where I could see up toward
Little Hube’s house,” Hensley testified, “and I seen Little
Hube’s car wasn’t there, and I backed out in the road, and
come back [the other way].” Id., at 32. As he traveled up
the road, Hensley saw House traveling in the opposite
direction in the white Plymouth. House “flagged [Hensley]
down” through his windshield, ibid., and the two cars met
about 300 feet up the road from the Munceys’ driveway.
According to Hensley, House said he had heard Mrs.
Muncey was missing and was looking for her husband.
Id., at 33. Though House had only recently moved to the
area, he was acquainted with the Munceys, had attended a
dance with them, and had visited their home. He later
told law enforcement officials he considered both of the
Munceys his friends. According to Hensley, House said he
had heard that Mrs. Muncey’s husband, who was an alco
holic, was elsewhere “getting drunk.” Ibid.
As Hensley drove off, he “got to thinking to [him]self—
he’s hunting Little Hube, and Little Hube drunk—what
would he be doing off that bank . . . .” Ibid. His suspicion
aroused, Hensley later returned to the Munceys’ street
with a friend named Jack Adkins. The two checked differ
ent spots on the embankment, and though Hensley saw
nothing where he looked, Adkins found Mrs. Muncey. Her
body lay across from the sawmill near the corner where
House’s car had been parked, dumped in the woods a short
way down the bank leading toward a creek.
Around midnight, Dr. Alex Carabia, a practicing pa
thologist and county medical examiner, performed an
autopsy. Dr. Carabia put the time of death between 9 and
11 p.m. Mrs. Muncey had a black eye, both her hands
were bloodstained up to the wrists, and she had bruises on
6 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
her legs and neck. Dr. Carabia described the bruises as
consistent with a “traumatic origin,” i.e., a fight or a fall
on hard objects. 7 id., at 985–986. Based on the neck
bruises and other injuries, he concluded Mrs. Muncey had
been choked, but he ruled this out as the cause of death.
The cause of death, in Dr. Carabia’s view, was a severe
blow to the left forehead that inflicted both a laceration
penetrating to the bone and, inside the skull, a severe
right-side hemorrhage, likely caused by Mrs. Muncey’s
brain slamming into the skull opposite the impact. Dr.
Carabia described this head injury as consistent either
with receiving a blow from a fist or other instrument or
with striking some object.
The county sheriff, informed about Hensley’s earlier
encounter with House, questioned House shortly after the
body was found. That evening, House answered further
questions during a voluntary interview at the local jail.
Special Agent Ray Presnell of the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (TBI) prepared a statement of House’s an
swers, which House signed. Asked to describe his where
abouts on the previous evening, House claimed—falsely,
as it turned out—that he spent the entire evening with his
girlfriend, Donna Turner, at her trailer. Asked whether
he was wearing the same pants he had worn the night
before, House replied—again, falsely—that he was. House
was on probation at the time, having recently been re
leased on parole following a sentence of five years to life
for aggravated sexual assault in Utah. House had
scratches on his arms and hands, and a knuckle on his
right ring finger was bruised. He attributed the scratches
to Turner’s cats and the finger injury to recent construc
tion work tearing down a shed. The next day House gave
a similar statement to a different TBI agent, Charles
Scott.
In fact House had not been at Turner’s home. After
initially supporting House’s alibi, Turner informed au
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
thorities that House left her trailer around 10:30 or 10:45
p.m. to go for a walk. According to Turner’s trial testi
mony, House returned later—she was not sure when—hot
and panting, missing his shirt and his shoes. House,
Turner testified, told her that while he was walking on the
road near her home, a vehicle pulled up beside him, and
somebody inside “called him some names and then they
told him he didn’t belong here anymore.” App. 89. House
said he tried to ignore the taunts and keep walking, but
the vehicle pulled in behind him, and “one of them got out
and grabbed him by the shoulder . . . and [House] swung
around with his right hand” and “hit something.” Ibid.
According to Turner, House said “he took off down the
bank and started running and he said that he—he said it
seemed forever where he was running. And he said they
fired two shots at him while he took off down the bank
. . . .” Ibid. House claimed the assailants “grabbed ahold
of his shirt,” which Turner remembered as “a blue tank
top, trimmed in yellow,” and “they tore it to where it
wouldn’t stay on him and he said—I just throwed it off
when I was running.” Id., at 91. Turner, noticing House’s
bruised knuckle, asked how he hurt it, and House told her
“that’s where he hit.” Id., at 90. Turner testified that she
“thought maybe my ex-husband had something to do with
it.” Ibid.
Although the white Plymouth House drove the next day
belonged to Turner, Turner insisted House had not used
the car that night. No forensic evidence connected the car
to the crime; law enforcement officials inspected a white
towel covering the driver seat and concluded it was clean.
Turner’s trailer was located just under two miles by road,
through hilly terrain, from the Muncey residence.
Law enforcement officers also questioned the victim’s
husband. Though Mrs. Muncey’s comments to Luttrell
gave no indication she knew this, Mr. Muncey had spent
the evening at a weekly dance at a recreation center
8 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
roughly a mile and a half from his home. In his statement
to law enforcement—a statement House’s trial counsel
claims he never saw—Mr. Muncey admitted leaving the
dance early, but said it was only for a brief trip to the
package store to buy beer. He also stated that he and his
wife had had sexual relations Saturday morning.
Late in the evening on Monday, July 15—two days after
the murder—law enforcement officers visited Turner’s
trailer. With Turner’s consent, Agent Scott seized the
pants House was wearing the night Mrs. Muncey disap
peared. The heavily soiled pants were sitting in a laundry
hamper; years later, Agent Scott recalled noticing “reddish
brown stains” he “suspected” were blood. Id., at 274–275.
Around 4 p.m. the next day, two local law enforcement
officers set out for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
Washington, D. C., with House’s pants, blood samples
from the autopsy, and other evidence packed together in a
box. They arrived at 2:00 a.m. the next morning. On July
17, after initial FBI testing revealed human blood on the
pants, House was arrested.
II
The State of Tennessee charged House with capital
murder. At House’s trial, the State presented testimony
by Luttrell, Hensley, Adkins, Lora Muncey, Dr. Carabia,
the sheriff, and other law enforcement officials. Through
TBI Agents Presnell and Scott, the jury learned of House’s
false statements. Central to the State’s case, however,
was what the FBI testing showed—that semen consistent
(or so it seemed) with House’s was present on Mrs.
Muncey’s nightgown and panties, and that small blood
stains consistent with Mrs. Muncey’s blood but not
House’s appeared on the jeans belonging to House.
Regarding the semen, FBI Special Agent Paul Bigbee, a
serologist, testified that the source was a “secretor,” mean
ing someone who “secrete[s] the ABO blood group sub
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
stances in other body fluids, such as semen and saliva”—a
characteristic shared by 80 percent of the population,
including House. Id., at 55. Agent Bigbee further testified
that the source of semen on the gown was blood-type A,
House’s own blood type. As to the semen on the panties,
Agent Bigbee found only the H blood-group substance,
which A and B blood-type secretors secrete along with
substances A and B, and which O-type secretors secrete
exclusively. Agent Bigbee explained, however—using
science an amicus here sharply disputes, see Brief for
Innocence Project, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 24–26—that
House’s A antigens could have “degraded” into H, App. 57–
58. Agent Bigbee thus concluded that both semen deposits
could have come from House, though he acknowledged
that that the H antigen could have come from Mrs.
Muncey herself if she was a secretor—something he “was
not able to determine,” id., at 58—and that, while Mr.
Muncey was himself blood-type A (as was his wife), Agent
Bigbee was again “not able to determine his secretor
status,” id., at 57. Agent Bigbee acknowledged on cross-
examination that “a saliva sample” would have sufficed to
determine whether Mr. Muncey was a secretor; the State
did not provide such a sample, though it did provide sam
ples of Mr. Muncey’s blood. Id., at 62.
As for the blood, Agent Bigbee explained that “spots of
blood” appeared “on the left outside leg, the right bottom
cuff, on the left thigh and in the right inside pocket and on
the lower pocket on the outside.” Id., at 48. Agent Bigbee
determined that the blood’s source was type A (the type
shared by House, the victim, and Mr. Muncey). He also
successfully tested for the enzyme phosphoglucomutase
and the blood serum haptoglobin, both of which “are found
in all humans” and carry “slight chemical differences” that
vary genetically and “can be grouped to differentiate
between two individuals if those types are different.” Id.,
at 49–50. Based on these chemical traces and on the A
10 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
blood type, Agent Bigbee determined that only some 6.75
percent of the population carry similar blood, that the
blood was “consistent” with Mrs. Muncey’s (as determined
by testing autopsy samples), and that it was “impossible”
that the blood came from House. Id., at 48–52.
A different FBI expert, Special Agent Chester Blythe,
testified about fiber analysis performed on Mrs. Muncey’s
clothes and on House’s pants. Although Agent Blythe
found blue jean fibers on Mrs. Muncey’s nightgown, brass
ier, housecoat, and panties, and in fingernail scrapings
taken from her body (scrapings that also contained trace,
unidentifiable amounts of blood), he acknowledged that, as
the prosecutor put it in questioning the witness, “blue jean
material is common material,” so “this doesn’t mean that
the fibers that were all over the victim’s clothing were
necessarily from [House’s] pair of blue jeans.” 6 Tr. 864–865.
On House’s pants, though cotton garments both transfer
and retain fibers readily, Agent Blythe found neither hair
nor fiber consistent with the victim’s hair or clothing.
In the defense case House called Hankins, Clinton, and
Turner, as well as House’s mother, who testified that
House had talked to her by telephone around 9:30 p.m. on
the night of the murder and that he had not used her car
that evening. House also called the victim’s brother, Ricky
Green, as a witness. Green testified that on July 2, roughly
two weeks before the murder, Mrs. Muncey called him and
“said her and Little Hube had been into it and she said she
was wanting to leave Little Hube, she said she was want
ing to get out—out of it, and she was scared.” 7 id., at
1088. Green recalled that at Christmastime in 1982 he
had seen Mr. Muncey strike Mrs. Muncey after returning
home drunk.
As Turner informed the jury, House’s shoes were found
several months after the crime in a field near her home.
Turner delivered them to authorities. Though the jury did
not learn of this fact (and House’s counsel claims he did
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
not either), the State tested the shoes for blood and found
none. House’s shirt was not found.
The State’s closing argument suggested that on the
night of her murder, Mrs. Muncey “was deceived . . . . She
had been told [her husband] had had an accident.” 9 id.,
at 1226. The prosecutor emphasized the FBI’s blood
analysis, noting that “after running many, many, many
tests,” Agent Bigbee:
“was able to tell you that the blood on the defendant’s
blue jeans was not his own blood, could not be his own
blood. He told you that the blood on the blue jeans
was consistent with every characteristic in every re
spect of the deceased’s, Carolyn Muncey’s, and that
ninety-three (93%) percent of the white population
would not have that blood type. . . . He can’t tell you
one hundred (100%) percent for certain that it was her
blood. But folks, he can sure give you a pretty good—
a pretty good indication.” Id., at 1235–1236.
In the State’s rebuttal, after defense counsel questioned
House’s motive “to go over and kill a woman that he barely
knew[,] [w]ho was still dressed, still clad in her clothes,”
Id., at 1274, the prosecutor referred obliquely to the semen
stains. While explaining that legally “it does not make
any difference under God’s heaven, what the motive was,”
App. 106, the prosecutor told the jury, “you may have an
idea why he did it,” ibid.:
“The evidence at the scene which seemed to suggest
that he was subjecting this lady to some kind of in
dignity, why would you get a lady out of her house,
late at night, in her night clothes, under the trick that
her husband has had a wreck down by the creek? . . .
Well, it is because either you don’t want her to tell
what indignities you have subjected her to, or she is
unwilling and fights against you, against being sub
jected to those indignities. In other words, it is either
12 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
to keep her from telling what you have done to her, or
it is that you are trying to get her to do something
that she nor any mother on that road would want to
do with Mr. House, under those conditions, and you
kill her because of her resistance. That is what the
evidence at the scene suggests about motive.” Id., at
106–107.
In addition the government suggested the black rag
Hensley said he saw in House’s hands was in fact the
missing blue tank top, retrieved by House from the crime
scene. And the prosecution reiterated the importance of
the blood. “[D]efense counsel,” he said, “does not start out
discussing the fact that his client had blood on his jeans on
the night that Carolyn Muncey was killed. . . . He doesn’t
start with the fact that nothing that the defense has in
troduced in this case explains what blood is doing on his
jeans, all over his jeans, that is scientifically, completely
different from his blood.” Id., at 104–105. The jury found
House guilty of murder in the first degree.
The trial advanced to the sentencing phase. As aggra
vating factors to support a capital sentence, the State
sought to prove: (1) that House had previously been con
victed of a felony involving the use or threat of violence;
(2) that the homicide was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind; and
(3) that the murder was committed while House was
committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing from the
commission of, rape or kidnaping. See Tenn. Code Ann.
§§39–2–203(i)(2), (5), (7) (1982) (repealed 1989); compare
§§39–13–204(i)(2), (5), (7) (2003). After presenting evi
dence of House’s parole status and aggravated sexual
assault conviction, the State rested. As mitigation, the
defense offered testimony from House’s father and mother,
as well as evidence, presented through House’s mother,
that House attempted suicide after the guilt-phase verdict.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
Opinion of the Court
Before the attempt House wrote his mother a letter pro
fessing his innocence.
In closing the State urged the jury to find all three
aggravating factors and impose death. As to the kidnap
ing or rape factor, the prosecution suggested Mrs. Muncey
was “decoy[ed] or entic[ed] . . . away from her family, and
confin[ed] her against her will because you know that as
she was being beaten to death.” 10 Tr. 1410. “We also
think,” the prosecutor added, “the proof shows strong
evidence of attempted sexual molestation of the victim to
accompany the taking away and murdering her.” Id., at
1410–1411. Later the prosecutor argued, “I think the
proof shows in the record that it is more likely than not
that having been through the process before and having
been convicted of a crime involving the threat of violence,
or violence to another person, aggravated sexual assault,
that the defendant cannot benefit from the type of reha
bilitation that correction departments can provide.” Id., at
1413. The jury unanimously found all three aggravating
factors and concluded “there are no mitigating circum
stances sufficiently substantial to outweigh the statutory
aggravating circumstance or circumstances.” Id., at1454.
The jury recommended a death sentence, which the trial
judge imposed.
III
The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed House’s convic
tion and sentence, describing the evidence against House
as “circumstantial” but “quite strong.” State v. House, 743
S. W. 2d 141, 143, 144 (1987). Two months later, in a state
trial court, House filed a pro se petition for postconviction
relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel
at trial. The court appointed counsel, who amended the
petition to raise other issues, including a challenge to
certain jury instructions. At a hearing before the same
judge who conducted the trial, House’s counsel offered no
14 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
proof beyond the trial transcript. The trial court dis
missed the petition, deeming House’s trial counsel ade
quate and overruling House’s other objections. On appeal
House’s attorney renewed only the jury-instructions ar
gument. In an unpublished opinion the Tennessee Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and both the Tennessee
Supreme Court and this Court, House v. Tennessee, 498
U. S. 912 (1990), denied review.
House filed a second postconviction petition in state court
reasserting his ineffective-assistance claim and seeking
investigative and/or expert assistance. After extensive
litigation regarding whether House’s claims were proce
durally defaulted the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
House’s claims were barred under a state statute provid
ing that claims not raised in prior postconviction proceed
ings are presumptively waived, Tenn. Code Ann. §40–30–
112 (1990) (repealed 1995), and that courts may not con
sider grounds for relief “which the court finds should be
excluded because they have been waived or previously
determined,” §40–30–111 (repealed 1995). See House v.
State, 911 S. W. 2d 705 (Tenn. 1995). This Court denied
certiorari. House v. Tennessee, 517 U. S. 1193 (1996).
House next sought federal habeas relief, asserting nu
merous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and
prosecutorial misconduct. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, though deem
ing House’s claims procedurally defaulted and granting
summary judgment to the State on the majority of House’s
claims, held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
House fell within the “actual innocence” exception to
procedural default that this Court recognized as to sub
stantive offenses in Schlup and as to death sentences in
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992). Presenting evi
dence we describe in greater detail below, House attacked
the semen and blood evidence used at his trial and pre
sented other evidence, including a putative confession,
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
Opinion of the Court
suggesting that Mr. Muncey, not House, committed the
murder. The District Court nevertheless denied relief,
holding that House had neither demonstrated actual
innocence of the murder under Schlup nor established
that he was ineligible for the death penalty under Sawyer.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a
certificate of appealability under 28 U. S. C. §2253(c) as to
all claims in the habeas petition. On the merits a divided
panel affirmed, but its opinion was withdrawn and the
case taken en banc. A divided en banc court certified
state-law questions to the Tennessee Supreme Court.
House v. Bell, 311 F. 3d 767 (CA6 2002). Concluding that
House had made a compelling showing of actual inno
cence, and recognizing that in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S.
390 (1993), this Court assumed without deciding that “in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual
innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim,” id., at 417, the six-judge majority certified ques
tions to the State Supreme Court, 311 F. 3d, at 777–778.
The questions sought “to ascertain whether there remains
a ‘state avenue open to process such a claim’ in this case.”
Id., at 768. Four dissenting judges argued the court
should have reached the merits, rather than certifying
questions to the state court; these judges asserted that
House could not obtain relief under Schlup, let alone
Sawyer and Herrera. 311 F. 3d, at 780–781 (Boggs, J., dis
senting). A fifth dissenter explained that while he agreed
with the majority that House “presents a strong claim for
habeas relief, at least at the sentencing phase of the case,”
he objected to the certification of questions to the Tennes
see high court. Id., at 787 (opinion of Gilman, J.). This
Court denied certiorari. Bell v. House, 539 U. S. 937
(2003).
The State urged the Tennessee Supreme Court not to
16 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
answer the Court of Appeals’ certified questions, and the
state court did not do so. The case returned to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. This time
an eight-judge majority affirmed the District Court’s
denial of habeas relief. 386 F. 3d 668 (2004). Six dissent
ers argued that House not only had met the actual inno
cence standard for overcoming procedural default but also
was entitled to immediate release under Herrera. 386
F. 3d, at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting). A seventh dissenter
(the same judge who wrote separately in the previous en
banc decision) described the case as “a real-life murder
mystery, an authentic ‘who-done-it’ where the wrong man
may be executed.” Id., at 709 (opinion of Gilman, J.). He
concluded such grave uncertainty necessitated relief in the
form of a new trial for House. Id., at 710.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), and now
reverse.
IV
As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may
support federal habeas relief only if the prisoner demon
strates cause for the default and prejudice from the as
serted error. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 485
(1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 129 (1982); Wain
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 87 (1977). The rule is based
on the comity and respect that must be accorded to state-
court judgments. See, e.g., Engle, supra, at 126–129;
Wainwright, supra, at 89–90. The bar is not, however,
unqualified. In an effort to “balance the societal interests
in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial
resources with the individual interest in justice that arises
in the extraordinary case,” Schlup, 513 U. S., at 324, the
Court has recognized a miscarriage-of-justice exception.
“ ‘[I]n appropriate cases,’ ” the Court has said, “the princi
ples of comity and finality that inform the concepts of
cause and prejudice ‘must yield to the imperative of cor
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17
Opinion of the Court
recting a fundamentally unjust incarceration,’ ” Carrier,
supra, at 495 (quoting Engle, supra, at 135).
In Schlup, the Court adopted a specific rule to imple
ment this general principle. It held that prisoners assert
ing innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must
establish that, in light of new evidence, “it is more likely
than not that no reasonable juror would have found peti
tioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 513 U. S., at
327. This formulation, Schlup explains, “ensures that
petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary,’ while still provid
ing petitioner a meaningful avenue by which to avoid a
manifest injustice.” Ibid. (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U. S. 467, 494 (1991)). In the usual case the presumed
guilt of a prisoner convicted in state court counsels against
federal review of defaulted claims. Yet a petition sup
ported by a convincing Schlup gateway showing “raise[s]
sufficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine
confidence in the result of the trial without the assurance
that that trial was untainted by constitutional error”;
hence, “a review of the merits of the constitutional claims”
is justified. 513 U. S., at 317.
For purposes of this case several features of the Schlup
standard bear emphasis. First, although “[t]o be credible”
a gateway claim requires “new reliable evidence—whether
it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewit
ness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not
presented at trial,” id., at 324, the habeas court’s analysis
is not limited to such evidence. There is no dispute in this
case that House has presented some new reliable evidence;
the State has conceded as much, see infra, at 20–21. In
addition, because the District Court held an evidentiary
hearing in this case, and because the State does not chal
lenge the court’s decision to do so, we have no occasion to
elaborate on Schlup’s observation that when considering
an actual-innocence claim in the context of a request for
an evidentiary hearing, the District Court need not “test
18 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
the new evidence by a standard appropriate for deciding a
motion for summary judgment,” but rather may “consider
how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility
of the affiants bear on the probable reliability of that
evidence.” 513 U. S., at 331–332. Our review in this case
addresses the merits of the Schlup inquiry, based on a
fully developed record, and with respect to that inquiry
Schlup makes plain that the habeas court must consider
“ ‘all the evidence,’ ” old and new, incriminating and excul
patory, without regard to whether it would necessarily be
admitted under “rules of admissibility that would govern
at trial.” See id., at 327–328 (quoting Friendly, Is Inno
cence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 160 (1970)). Based on this
total record, the court must make “a probabilistic deter
mination about what reasonable, properly instructed
jurors would do.” 513 U. S., at 329. The court’s function is
not to make an independent factual determination about
what likely occurred, but rather to assess the likely impact
of the evidence on reasonable jurors. Ibid.
Second, it bears repeating that the Schlup standard is
demanding and permits review only in the “ ‘extraordi
nary’ ” case. Id., at 327 (quoting Zant, supra, at 494); see
also 513 U. S., at 324 (emphasizing that “in the vast ma
jority of cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely suc
cessful”). At the same time, though, the Schlup standard
does not require absolute certainty about the petitioner’s
guilt or innocence. A petitioner’s burden at the gateway
stage is to demonstrate that more likely than not, in light
of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—or, to remove the dou
ble negative, that more likely than not any reasonable
juror would have reasonable doubt.
Finally, as the Schlup decision explains, the gateway
actual-innocence standard is “by no means equivalent to
the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979),”
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 19
Opinion of the Court
which governs claims of insufficient evidence. Id., at 330.
When confronted with a challenge based on trial evidence,
courts presume the jury resolved evidentiary disputes
reasonably so long as sufficient evidence supports the
verdict. Because a Schlup claim involves evidence the
trial jury did not have before it, the inquiry requires the
federal court to assess how reasonable jurors would react
to the overall, newly supplemented record. See ibid. If
new evidence so requires, this may include consideration
of “the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial.”
Ibid.; see also ibid. (noting that “[i]n such a case,
the habeas court may have to make some credibility
assessments”).
As an initial matter, the State argues that the Antiter
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
110 Stat. 1214, has replaced the Schlup standard with a
stricter test based on Sawyer, which permits consideration
of successive, abusive, or defaulted sentencing-related
claims only if the petitioner “show[s] by clear and convinc
ing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reason
able juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty under the applicable state law,” 505 U. S., at
336. One AEDPA provision establishes a similar standard
for second or successive petitions involving no retroactively
applicable new law, 28 U. S. C. §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); another
sets it as a threshold for obtaining an evidentiary hearing
on claims the petitioner failed to develop in state court,
§2254(e)(2). Neither provision addresses the type of peti
tion at issue here—a first federal habeas petition seeking
consideration of defaulted claims based on a showing of
actual innocence. Thus, the standard of review in these
provisions is inapplicable. Cf. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517
U. S. 314, 324 (1996) (“[D]ismissal of a first federal habeas
petition is a particularly serious matter”).
The State also argues that the District Court’s findings
in this case tie our hands, precluding a ruling in House’s
20 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
favor absent a showing of clear error as to the District
Court’s specific determinations. This view overstates the
effect of the District Court’s ruling. Deference is given to a
trial court’s assessment of evidence presented to it in the
first instance. Yet the Schlup inquiry, we repeat, requires
a holistic judgment about “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” 513 U. S., at
328 (quoting Friendly, supra, at 160), and its likely effect
on reasonable jurors applying the reasonable-doubt stan
dard. As a general rule, the inquiry does not turn on
discrete findings regarding disputed points of fact, and
“[i]t is not the district court’s independent judgment as to
whether reasonable doubt exists that the standard ad
dresses,” 513 U. S., at 329. Here, although the District
Court attentively managed complex proceedings, carefully
reviewed the extensive record, and drew certain conclu
sions about the evidence, the court did not clearly apply
Schlup’s predictive standard regarding whether reason
able jurors would have reasonable doubt. As we shall
explain, moreover, we are uncertain about the basis for
some of the District Court’s conclusions—a consideration
that weakens our reliance on its determinations.
With this background in mind we turn to the evidence
developed in House’s federal habeas proceedings.
DNA Evidence
First, in direct contradiction of evidence presented at
trial, DNA testing has established that the semen on Mrs.
Muncey’s nightgown and panties came from her husband,
Mr. Muncey, not from House. The State, though conced
ing this point, insists this new evidence is immaterial. At
the guilt phase at least, neither sexual contact nor motive
were elements of the offense, so in the State’s view the
evidence, or lack of evidence, of sexual assault or sexual
advance is of no consequence. We disagree. In fact we
consider the new disclosure of central importance.
From beginning to end the case is about who committed
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 21
Opinion of the Court
the crime. When identity is in question, motive is key.
The point, indeed, was not lost on the prosecution, for it
introduced the evidence and relied on it in the final guilt-
phase closing argument. Referring to “evidence at the
scene,” the prosecutor suggested that House committed, or
attempted to commit, some “indignity” on Mrs. Muncey
that neither she “nor any mother on that road would want
to do with Mr. House.” 9 Tr. 1302–1303. Particularly in a
case like this where the proof was, as the State Supreme
Court observed, circumstantial, State v. House, 743 S. W.
2d, at 143, 144, we think a jury would have given this
evidence great weight. Quite apart from providing proof of
motive, it was the only forensic evidence at the scene that
would link House to the murder.
Law and society, as they ought to do, demand account
ability when a sexual offense has been committed, so not
only did this evidence link House to the crime; it likely
was a factor in persuading the jury not to let him go free.
At sentencing, moreover, the jury came to the unanimous
conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder
was committed in the course of a rape or kidnaping. The
alleged sexual motivation relates to both those determina
tions. This is particularly so given that, at the sentencing
phase, the jury was advised that House had a previous
conviction for sexual assault.
A jury informed that fluids on Mrs. Muncey’s garments
could have come from House might have found that House
trekked the nearly two miles to the victim’s home and
lured her away in order to commit a sexual offense. By
contrast a jury acting without the assumption that the
semen could have come from House would have found it
necessary to establish some different motive, or, if the
same motive, an intent far more speculative. When the
only direct evidence of sexual assault drops out of the case,
so, too, does a central theme in the State’s narrative link
ing House to the crime. In that light, furthermore,
22 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
House’s odd evening walk and his false statements to
authorities, while still potentially incriminating, might
appear less suspicious.
Bloodstains
The other relevant forensic evidence is the blood on
House’s pants, which appears in small, even minute,
stains in scattered places. As the prosecutor told the jury,
they were stains that, due to their small size, “you or I
might not detect[,] [m]ight not see, but which the FBI lab
was able to find on [House’s] jeans.” App. 11. The stains
appear inside the right pocket, outside that pocket, near
the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on the
seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, including
inside the pants. Due to testing by the FBI, cuttings now
appear on the pants in several places where stains evi
dently were found. (The cuttings were destroyed in the
testing process, and defense experts were unable to repli
cate the tests.) At trial, the government argued “nothing
that the defense has introduced in this case explains what
blood is doing on his jeans, all over [House’s] jeans, that is
scientifically, completely different from his blood.” Id., at
105. House, though not disputing at this point that the
blood is Mrs. Muncey’s, now presents an alternative ex
planation that, if credited, would undermine the probative
value of the blood evidence.
During House’s habeas proceedings, Dr. Cleland Blake,
an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State of
Tennessee and a consultant in forensic pathology to the
TBI for 22 years, testified that the blood on House’s pants
was chemically too degraded, and too similar to blood
collected during the autopsy, to have come from Mrs.
Muncey’s body on the night of the crime. The blood sam
ples collected during the autopsy were placed in test tubes
without preservative. Under such conditions, according to
Dr. Blake, “you will have enzyme degradation. You will
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 23
Opinion of the Court
have different blood group degradation, blood marker deg
radation.” Record, Doc. 275, p. 80 (hereinafter R275:80).
The problem of decay, moreover, would have been com
pounded by the body’s long exposure to the elements,
sitting outside for the better part of a summer day. In
contrast, if blood is preserved on cloth, “it will stay there
for years,” ibid.; indeed, Dr. Blake said he deliberately
places blood drops on gauze during autopsies to preserve it
for later testing. The blood on House’s pants, judging by
Agent Bigbee’s tests, showed “similar deterioration,
breakdown of certain of the named numbered enzymes” as
in the autopsy samples. Id., at 110. “[I]f the victim’s blood
had spilled on the jeans while the victim was alive and
this blood had dried,” Dr. Blake stated, “the deterioration
would not have occurred,” ibid., and “you would expect
[the blood on the jeans] to be different than what was in
the tube,” id., at 113. Dr. Blake thus concluded the blood
on the jeans came from the autopsy samples, not from
Mrs. Muncey’s live (or recently killed) body.
Other evidence confirms that blood did in fact spill from
the vials. It appears the vials passed from Dr. Carabia,
who performed the autopsy, into the hands of two local
law enforcement officers, who transported it to the FBI,
where Agent Bigbee performed the enzyme tests. The
blood was contained in four vials, evidently with neither
preservative nor a proper seal. The vials, in turn, were
stored in a styrofoam box, but nothing indicates the box
was kept cool. Rather, in what an evidence protocol expert
at the habeas hearing described as a violation of proper
procedure, the styrofoam box was packed in the same
cardboard box as other evidence including House’s pants
(apparently in a paper bag) and other clothing (in separate
bags). The cardboard box was then carried in the officers’
car while they made the 10-hour journey from Tennessee
to the FBI lab. Dr. Blake stated that blood vials in hot
conditions (such as a car trunk in the summer) could blow
24 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
open; and in fact, by the time the blood reached the FBI it
had hemolyzed, or spoiled, due to heat exposure. By the
time the blood passed from the FBI to a defense expert,
roughly a vial and a half were empty, though Agent Big-
bee testified he used at most a quarter of one vial. Blood,
moreover, had seeped onto one corner of the styrofoam box
and onto packing gauze inside the box below the vials.
In addition, although the pants apparently were pack
aged initially in a paper bag and FBI records suggest they
arrived at the FBI in one, the record does not contain the
paper bag but does contain a plastic bag with a label
listing the pants and Agent Scott’s name—and the plastic
bag has blood on it. The blood appears in a forked streak
roughly five inches long and two inches wide running
down the bag’s outside front. Though testing by House’s
expert confirmed the stain was blood, the expert could not
determine the blood’s source. Speculations about when
and how the blood got there add to the confusion regarding
the origins of the stains on House’s pants.
Faced with these indications of, at best, poor evidence
control, the State attempted to establish at the habeas
hearing that all blood spillage occurred after Agent Bigbee
examined the pants. Were that the case, of course, then
blood would have been detected on the pants before any
spill—which would tend to undermine Dr. Blake’s analysis
and support using the bloodstains to infer House’s guilt.
In support of this theory the State put on testimony by a
blood spatter expert who believed the “majority” of the
stains were “transfer stains,” that is, stains resulting from
“wip[ing] across the surface of the pants” rather than
seeping or spillage. App. 293–294. Regarding the spillage
in the styrofoam box, the expert noted that yellow “Tennes
see Crime Laboratory” tape running around the box and
down all four sides did not line up when the bloodstains on
the box’s corner were aligned. The inference was that the
FBI received the box from Tennessee authorities, opened it,
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 25
Opinion of the Court
and resealed it before the spillage occurred. Reinforcing
this theory, Agent Bigbee testified that he observed no
blood spillage in the styrofoam box and that had he de
tected such signs of evidence contamination, FBI policy
would have required immediate return of the evidence.
In response House argued that even assuming the tape
alignment showed spillage occurring after FBI testing,
spillage on one or more earlier occasions was likely. In
fact even the State’s spatter expert declined to suggest the
blood in the box and on the packing gauze accounted for
the full vial and a quarter missing. And when the defense
expert opened the box and discovered the spills, the bulk
of the blood-caked gauze was located around and under
neath the half-full vial, which was also located near the
stained corner. No gauze immediately surrounding the
completely empty vial was stained. The tape, moreover,
circled the box in two layers, one underneath the other,
and in one spot the underlying layer stops cleanly at the
lid’s edge, as if cut with a razor, and does not continue
onto the body of the box below. In House’s view this clean
cut suggests the double layers could not have resulted
simply from wrapping the tape around twice, as the spat
ter expert claimed; rather, someone possessing Tennessee
Crime Lab tape—perhaps the officers transporting the
blood and pants—must have cut the box open and resealed
it, possibly creating an opportunity for spillage. Support
ing the same inference, a label on the box’s lid lists both
blood and vaginal secretions as the box’s contents, though
Agent Bigbee’s records show the vaginal fluids arrived at
the FBI in a separate envelope. Finally, cross-
examination revealed that Agent Bigbee’s practice did not
always match the letter of FBI policy. Although Mrs.
Muncey’s bra and housecoat were packed together in a
single bag, creating, according to Agent Bigbee, a risk of
“cross contamination,” id., at 286, he did not return them;
nor did he note the discrepancy between the “[b]lood and
26 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
[v]aginal secretions” label and the styrofoam box’s actual
contents, though he insisted his customary practice was to
match labels with contents immediately upon opening an
evidence box. Id., at 287.
The State challenged Dr. Blake’s scientific conclusions,
and to do so it called Agent Bigbee as a witness. Agent
Bigbee defended the testimony he had given at the trial.
To begin with, he suggested Dr. Blake had misconstrued
the term “inc” in Agent Bigbee’s trial report, interpreting
it to mean “incomplete” when it in fact meant “inconclu
sive.” Id., at 254–256, 282. Dr. Blake, however, replied
“[s]ame difference” when asked whether his opinion would
change if “inc” meant “inconclusive.” Id., at 256; see also
6 Tr. 906 (Bigbee trial testimony) (“You will notice I have
INC written under the transparent, that is the symbol
that I use to mean the test was incomplete”). Agent Big-
bee further asserted that, whereas Dr. Blake (in Bigbee’s
view) construed the results to mean the enzyme was not
present at all, in fact the results indicated only that Big-
bee could not identify the marker type on whatever en
zymes were present. App. 282. Yet the State did not
cross-examine Dr. Blake on this point, nor did the District
Court resolve the dispute one way or the other, so on this
record it seems possible that Dr. Blake meant only to
suggest the blood was too degraded to permit conclusive
typing. The State, moreover, does not ask us to question
Dr. Blake’s basic premise about the durability of blood
chemicals deposited on cotton—a premise Agent Bigbee
appeared to accept as a general matter. Given the record
as it stands, then, we cannot say Dr. Blake’s conclusions
have been discredited; if other objections might be ad
duced, they must await further proceedings. At the least,
the record before us contains credible testimony suggest
ing that the missing enzyme markers are generally better
preserved on cloth than in poorly kept test tubes, and that
principle could support House’s spillage theory for the
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 27
Opinion of the Court
blood’s origin.
In this Court, as a further attack on House’s showing,
the State suggests that, given the spatter expert’s testi
mony, House’s theory would require a jury to surmise that
Tennessee officials donned the pants and deliberately
spread blood over them. We disagree. This should be a
matter for the trier of fact to consider in the first instance,
but we can note a line of argument that could refute the
State’s position. It is correct that the State’s spatter ex
pert opined that the stains resulted from wiping or smear
ing rather than direct spillage; and she further stated that
the distribution of stains in some spots suggests the pants
were “folded in some manner or creased in some manner”
when the transfers occurred, id., at 296. While the expert
described this pattern, at least with respect to stains on
the lap of the pants, as “consistent” with the pants being
worn at the time of the staining, ibid., her testimony, as
we understand it, does not refute the hypothesis that the
packaging of the pants for transport was what caused
them to be folded or creased. It seems permissible, more
over, to conclude that the small size and wide distribution
of stains—inside the right pocket, outside that pocket,
near the inside button, on the left thigh and outside leg, on
the seat of the pants, and on the right bottom cuff, includ
ing inside the pants—fits as well with spillage in transport
as with wiping and smearing from bloody objects at the
crime scene, as the State proposes. (As has been noted, no
blood was found on House’s shoes.)
The District Court discounted Dr. Blake’s opinion, not
on account of Blake’s substantive approach, but based on
testimony from Agent Scott indicating he saw, as the
District Court put it, “what appeared to be bloodstains on
Mr. House’s blue jeans when the jeans were removed from
the laundry hamper at Ms. Turner’s trailer.” Id., at 348.
This inference seems at least open to question, however.
Agent Scott stated only that he “saw reddish brownish
28 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
stains [he] suspected to be blood”; he admitted that he
“didn’t thoroughly examine the blue jeans at that time.”
R276:113–114. The pants were in fact extensively soiled
with mud and reddish stains, only small portions of which
are blood.
In sum, considering “ ‘all the evidence,’ ” Schlup, 513
U. S., at 328 (quoting Friendly, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 160),
on this issue, we think the evidentiary disarray surround
ing the blood, taken together with Dr. Blake’s testimony
and the limited rebuttal of it in the present record, would
prevent reasonable jurors from placing significant reliance
on the blood evidence. We now know, though the trial jury
did not, that an Assistant Chief Medical Examiner be
lieves the blood on House’s jeans must have come from
autopsy samples; that a vial and a quarter of autopsy
blood is unaccounted for; that the blood was transported to
the FBI together with the pants in conditions that could
have caused vials to spill; that the blood did indeed spill at
least once during its journey from Tennessee authorities
through FBI hands to a defense expert; that the pants
were stored in a plastic bag bearing both a large blood
stain and a label with TBI Agent Scott’s name; and that
the styrofoam box containing the blood samples may well
have been opened before it arrived at the FBI lab. Thus,
whereas the bloodstains, emphasized by the prosecution,
seemed strong evidence of House’s guilt at trial, the record
now raises substantial questions about the blood’s origin.
A Different Suspect
Were House’s challenge to the State’s case limited to the
questions he has raised about the blood and semen, the
other evidence favoring the prosecution might well suffice
to bar relief. There is, however, more; for in the post-trial
proceedings House presented troubling evidence that Mr.
Muncey, the victim’s husband, himself could have been the
murderer.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 29
Opinion of the Court
At trial, as has been noted, the jury heard that roughly
two weeks before the murder Mrs. Muncey’s brother re
ceived a frightened phone call from his sister indicating
that she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she was
scared, and that she wanted to leave him. The jury also
learned that the brother once saw Mr. Muncey “smac[k]”
the victim. 7 Tr. 1087–1088. House now has produced
evidence from multiple sources suggesting that Mr. Muncey
regularly abused his wife. For example, one witness—
Kathy Parker, a lifelong area resident who denied any
animosity towards Mr. Muncey—recalled that Mrs. Muncey
“was constantly with black eyes and busted mouth.” App.
235. In addition Hazel Miller, who is Kathy Parker’s
mother and a lifelong acquaintance of Mr. Muncey, testi
fied at the habeas hearing that two or three months before
the victim’s death Mr. Muncey came to Miller’s home and
“tried to get my daughter [Parker] to go out with him,”
R274:47. (Parker had dated Mr. Muncey at age 14.) Ac
cording to Miller, Muncey said “[h]e was upset with his
wife, that they had had an argument and he said he was
going to get rid of that woman one way or the other.” App.
236.
Another witness—Mary Atkins, also an area native who
“grew up” with Mr. Muncey and professed no hard feel
ings, R274:10, 16—claims she saw Mr. Muncey “back
han[d]” Mrs. Muncey on the very night of the murder.
App. 226, 228. Atkins recalled that during a break in the
recreation center dance, she saw Mr. Muncey and his wife
arguing in the parking lot. Mr. Muncey “grabbed her and
he just backhanded her.” Id., at 228. After that, Mrs.
Muncey “left walking.” Id., at 229. There was also testi
mony from Atkins’ mother, named Artie Lawson. A self-
described “good friend” of Mr. Muncey, id., at 231, Lawson
said Mr. Muncey visited her the morning after the mur
der, before the body was found. According to Lawson, Mr.
Muncey asked her to tell anyone who inquired not only
30 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
that she had been at the dance the evening before and had
seen him, but also that he had breakfasted at her home at
6 o’clock that morning. Lawson had not in fact been at the
dance, nor had Mr. Muncey been with her so early.
Of most importance is the testimony of Kathy Parker
and her sister Penny Letner. They testified at the habeas
hearing that, around the time of House’s trial, Mr. Muncey
had confessed to the crime. Parker recalled that she and
“some family members and some friends [were] sitting
around drinking” at Parker’s trailer when Mr. Muncey
“just walked in and sit down.” R274:37. Muncey, who had
evidently been drinking heavily, began “rambling off . . .
[t]alking about what happened to his wife and how it
happened and he didn’t mean to do it.” Ibid. According to
Parker, Mr. Muncey “said they had been into [an] argu
ment and he slapped her and she fell and hit her head and
it killed her and he didn’t mean for it to happen.” Id., at
38. Parker said she “freaked out and run him off.” Ibid.
Letner similarly recalled that at some point either “dur
ing [House’s] trial or just before,” id., at 30, Mr. Muncey
intruded on a gathering at Parker’s home. Appearing
“pretty well blistered,” Muncey “went to crying and was
talking about his wife and her death and he was saying
that he didn’t mean to do it.” App. 232. “[D]idn’t mean to
do what[?],” Letner asked, R274:33, at which point Mr.
Muncey explained:
“[S]he was ‘bitching him out’ because he didn’t take
her fishing that night, that he went to the dance in
stead. He said when he come home that she was still
on him pretty heavily ‘bitching him out’ again and
that he smacked her and that she fell and hit her
head. He said I didn’t mean to do it, but I had to get
rid of her, because I didn’t want to be charged with
murder.” App. 232–233.
Letner, who was then 19 years old with a small child,
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 31
Opinion of the Court
said Mr. Muncey’s statement “scared [her] quite badly,” so
she “got out of there immediately.” Id., at 233. Asked
whether she reported the incident to the authorities,
Letner stated, “I was frightened, you know. . . . I figured
me being 19 year old they wouldn’t listen to anything I
had to say.” R274:31. Parker, on the other hand, claimed
she (Parker) in fact went to the Sherriff’s Department, but
no one would listen:
“I tried to speak to the Sheriff but he was real busy.
He sent me to a deputy. The deputy told me to go up
stairs to the courtroom and talk to this guy, I can’t
remember his name. I never did really get to talk to
anybody.” App. 234.
Parker said she did not discuss the matter further because
“[t]hey had it all signed, sealed and delivered. We didn’t
know anything to do until we heard that they reopened
[House’s] trial.” R274:45. Parker’s mother, Hazel Miller,
confirmed she had driven Parker to the courthouse, where
Parker “went to talk to some of the people about this case.”
App. 237.
Other testimony suggests Mr. Muncey had the opportu
nity to commit the crime. According to Dennis Wallace, a
local law enforcement official who provided security at the
dance on the night of the murder, Mr. Muncey left the
dance “around 10:00, 10:30, 9:30 to 10:30.” R274:56–57.
Although Mr. Muncey told law enforcement officials just
after the murder that he left the dance only briefly and
returned, Wallace could not recall seeing him back there
again. Later that evening, Wallace responded to Mr.
Muncey’s report that his wife was missing. Muncey de
nied he and his wife had been “a fussing or a fighting”; he
claimed his wife had been “kidnapped.” Id., at 58. Wal
lace did not recall seeing any blood, disarray, or knocked-
over furniture, although he admitted he “didn’t pay too
much attention” to whether the floor appeared especially
32 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
clean. According to Wallace, Mr. Muncey said “let’s search
for her” and then led Wallace out to search “in the weeds”
around the home and the driveway (not out on the road
where the body was found). Id., at 58, 60, 63.
In the habeas proceedings, then, two different witnesses
(Parker and Letner) described a confession by Mr.
Muncey; two more (Atkins and Lawson) described suspi
cious behavior (a fight and an attempt to construct a false
alibi) around the time of the crime; and still other wit
nesses described a history of abuse.
As to Parker and Letner, the District Court noted that it
was “not impressed with the allegations of individuals who
wait over ten years to come forward with their evidence,”
especially considering that “there was no physical evi
dence in the Munceys’ kitchen to corroborate [Mr.
Muncey’s] alleged confession that he killed [his wife]
there.” App. 348. Parker and Letner, however, did at
tempt to explain their delay coming forward, and the
record indicates no reason why these two women, both
lifelong acquaintances of Mr. Muncey, would have wanted
either to frame him or to help House. Furthermore, the
record includes at least some independent support for the
statements Parker and Letner attributed to Mr. Muncey.
The supposed explanation for the fatal fight—that his wife
was complaining about going fishing—fits with Mrs.
Muncey’s statement to Luttrell earlier that evening that
her husband’s absence was “all right, because she was
going to make him take her fishing the next day,” id., at
11–12. And Dr. Blake testified, in only partial contradic
tion of Dr. Carabia, that Mrs. Muncey’s head injury re
sulted from “a surface with an edge” or “a hard surface
with a corner,” not from a fist. R275:72. (Dr. Carabia had
said either a fist or some other object could have been the
cause.)
Mr. Muncey testified at the habeas hearing, and the
District Court did not question his credibility. Though Mr.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 33
Opinion of the Court
Muncey said he seemed to remember visiting Lawson the
day after the murder, he denied either killing his wife or
confessing to doing so. Yet Mr. Muncey also claimed,
contrary to Constable Wallace’s testimony and to his own
prior statement, that he left the dance on the night of the
crime only when it ended at midnight. Mr. Muncey, more
over, denied ever hitting Mrs. Muncey; the State itself had
to impeach him with a prior statement on this point.
It bears emphasis, finally, that Parker’s and Letner’s
testimony is not comparable to the sort of eleventh-hour
affidavit vouching for a defendant and incriminating a
conveniently absent suspect that Justice O’Connor de
scribed in her concurring opinion in Herrera as “unfortu
nate” and “not uncommon” in capital cases, 506 U. S., at
423; nor was the confession Parker and Letner described
induced under pressure of interrogation. The confession
evidence here involves an alleged spontaneous statement
recounted by two eyewitnesses with no evident motive to
lie. For this reason it has more probative value than, for
example, incriminating testimony from inmates, suspects,
or friends or relations of the accused.
The evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey is by no means
conclusive. If considered in isolation, a reasonable jury
might well disregard it. In combination, however, with the
challenges to the blood evidence and the lack of motive with
respect to House, the evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey
likely would reinforce other doubts as to House’s guilt.
Other Evidence
Certain other details were presented at the habeas
hearing. First, Dr. Blake, in addition to testifying about
the blood evidence and the victim’s head injury, examined
photographs of House’s bruises and scratches and con
cluded, based on 35 years’ experience monitoring the
development and healing of bruises, that they were too old
to have resulted from the crime. In addition Dr. Blake
34 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
claimed that the injury on House’s right knuckle was
indicative of “[g]etting mashed”; it was not consistent with
striking someone. R275:63. (That of course would also
eliminate the explanation that the injury came from the
blow House supposedly told Turner he gave to his uniden
tified assailant.)
The victim’s daughter, Lora Muncey (now Lora Tharp),
also testified at the habeas hearing. She repeated her
recollection of hearing a man with a deep voice like her
grandfather’s and a statement that her father had had a
wreck down by the creek. She also denied seeing any
signs of struggle or hearing a fight between her parents,
though she also said she could not recall her parents ever
fighting physically. The District Court found her credible,
and this testimony certainly cuts in favor of the State.
Finally, House himself testified at the habeas proceed
ings. He essentially repeated the story he allegedly told
Turner about getting attacked on the road. The District
Court found, however, based on House’s demeanor, that he
“was not a credible witness.” App. 329.
Conclusion
This is not a case of conclusive exoneration. Some as
pects of the State’s evidence—Lora Muncey’s memory of a
deep voice, House’s bizarre evening walk, his lie to law
enforcement, his appearance near the body, and the blood
on his pants—still support an inference of guilt. Yet the
central forensic proof connecting House to the crime—the
blood and the semen—has been called into question, and
House has put forward substantial evidence pointing to a
different suspect. Accordingly, and although the issue is
close, we conclude that this is the rare case where—had
the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror viewing the record
as a whole would lack reasonable doubt.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006)
35
Opinion of the Court
V
In addition to his gateway claim under Schlup, House
argues that he has shown freestanding innocence and that
as a result his imprisonment and planned execution are
unconstitutional. In Herrera, decided three years before
Schlup, the Court assumed without deciding that “in a
capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual
innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas
relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim.” 506 U. S., at 417; see also id., at 419 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal
principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with
the Constitution”). “[T]he threshold showing for such an
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high,”
the Court explained, and petitioner’s evidence there fell
“far short of that which would have to be made in order to
trigger the sort of constitutional claim which we have
assumed, arguendo, to exist.” Id., at 417, 418–419; see
also id., at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
because “[p]etitioner has failed to make a persuasive
showing of actual innocence,” “the Court has no reason to
pass on, and appropriately reserves, the question whether
federal courts may entertain convincing claims of actual
innocence”). House urges the Court to answer the ques
tion left open in Herrera and hold not only that freestand
ing innocence claims are possible but also that he has
established one.
We decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here,
much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical
freestanding innocence claim would require, this peti
tioner has not satisfied it. To be sure, House has cast
considerable doubt on his guilt—doubt sufficient to satisfy
Schlup’s gateway standard for obtaining federal review
despite a state procedural default. In Herrera, however,
the Court described the threshold for any hypothetical
36 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of the Court
freestanding innocence claim as “extraordinarily high.”
506 U. S., at 417. The sequence of the Court’s decisions in
Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved the status of
freestanding claims and then establishing the gateway
standard—implies at the least that Herrera requires more
convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It follows,
given the closeness of the Schlup question here, that
House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in
Herrera.
* * *
House has satisfied the gateway standard set forth in
Schlup and may proceed on remand with procedurally
defaulted constitutional claims. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–8990
_________________
PAUL GREGORY HOUSE, PETITIONER v. RICKY
BELL, WARDEN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[June 12, 2006]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA
and JUSTICE THOMAS join, concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part.
To overcome the procedural hurdle that Paul House
created by failing to properly present his constitutional
claims to a Tennessee court, he must demonstrate that the
constitutional violations he alleges “ha[ve] probably re
sulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,”
such that a federal court’s refusal to hear the defaulted
claims would be a “miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo,
513 U. S. 298, 326, 327 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To make the requisite showing of actual inno
cence, House must produce “new reliable evidence” and
“must show that it is more likely than not that no reason
able juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence.” Id., at 324, 327 (emphasis added). The question
is not whether House was prejudiced at his trial because the
jurors were not aware of the new evidence, but whether all
the evidence, considered together, proves that House was
actually innocent, so that no reasonable juror would vote to
convict him. Considering all the evidence, and giving due
regard to the District Court’s findings on whether House’s
new evidence was reliable, I do not find it probable that no
reasonable juror would vote to convict him, and accordingly
I dissent.
2 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
Because I do not think that House has satisfied the actual
innocence standard set forth in Schlup, I do not believe that
he has met the higher threshold for a freestanding inno
cence claim, assuming such a claim exists. See Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 417 (1993). I therefore concur in the
judgment with respect to the Court’s disposition of that
separate claim.
I
In Schlup, we stated that a habeas petitioner attempt
ing to present a defaulted claim to a federal court must
present “new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or
critical physical evidence—that was not presented at
trial.” 513 U. S., at 324 (emphasis added). Implicit in the
requirement that a habeas petitioner present reliable
evidence is the expectation that a factfinder will assess
reliability. The new evidence at issue in Schlup had not
been subjected to such an assessment—the claim in
Schlup was for an evidentiary hearing—and this Court
specifically recognized that the “new statements may, of
course, be unreliable.” Id., at 331. The Court stated that
the District Court, as the “reviewing tribunal,” was tasked
with assessing the “probative force” of the petitioner’s new
evidence of innocence, and “may have to make some credi
bility assessments.” Id., at 327–328, 330. Indeed, the
Supreme Court took the unusual step of remanding the
case to the Court of Appeals “with instructions to remand
to the District Court,” so that the District Court could
consider how the “likely credibility of the affiants” bears
upon the “probable reliability” of the new evidence. Id., at
332. In short, the new evidence is not simply taken at face
value; its reliability has to be tested.
Critical to the Court’s conclusion here that House has
sufficiently demonstrated his innocence are three pieces of
new evidence presented to the District Court: DNA evi
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
dence showing that the semen on Carolyn Muncey’s cloth
ing was from her husband, Hubert Muncey, not from
House; testimony from new witnesses implicating Mr.
Muncey in the murder; and evidence indicating that Mrs.
Muncey’s blood spilled from test tubes containing autopsy
samples in an evidence container. To determine whether
it should open its door to House’s defaulted constitutional
claims, the District Court considered this evidence in a
comprehensive evidentiary hearing. As House presented
his new evidence, and as the State rebutted it, the District
Court observed the witnesses’ demeanor, examined physi
cal evidence, and made findings about whether House’s
new evidence was in fact reliable. This factfinding role is
familiar to a district court. “The trial judge’s major role is
the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling
that role comes expertise.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U. S. 564, 574 (1985).
The State did not contest House’s new DNA evidence
excluding him as the source of the semen on Mrs.
Muncey’s clothing, but it strongly contested the new tes
timony implicating Mr. Muncey, and it insisted that the
blood spillage occurred after the FBI tested House’s jeans
and determined that they were stained with Mrs.
Muncey’s blood.
At the evidentiary hearing, sisters Kathy Parker and
Penny Letner testified that 14 years earlier, either during
or around the time of House’s trial, they heard Mr.
Muncey drunkenly confess to having accidentally killed
his wife when he struck her in their home during an ar
gument, causing her to fall and hit her head. Record, Doc.
274, pp. 28–29, 30, 37–38. Schlup provided guidance on
how a district court should assess this type of new evi
dence: The court “may consider how the timing of the
submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear
on the probable reliability of that evidence,” and it “must
assess the probative force of the newly presented evidence
4 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
in connection with the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.”
513 U. S., at 332. Consistent with this guidance, the
District Court concluded that the sisters’ testimony was
not credible. The court noted that it was “not impressed
with the allegations of individuals who wait over ten years
to come forward.” App. 348. It also considered how the
new testimony fit within the larger web of evidence, ob
serving that Mr. Muncey’s alleged confession contradicted
the testimony of the Munceys’ “very credible” daughter,
Lora Tharp, who consistently testified that she did not
hear a fight in the house that night, but instead heard a
man with a deep voice who lured her mother from the
house by saying that Mr. Muncey had been in a wreck
near the creek. Id., at 323, 348.
The District Court engaged in a similar reliability in
quiry with regard to House’s new evidence of blood spill
age. At the evidentiary hearing, House conceded that FBI
testing showed that his jeans were stained with Mrs.
Muncey’s blood, but he set out to prove that the blood
spilled from test tubes containing autopsy samples, and
that it did so before the jeans were tested by the FBI. The
District Court summarized the testimony of the various
witnesses who handled the evidence and their recollec
tions about bloodstains and spillage; it acknowledged that
House’s expert, Dr. Cleland Blake, disagreed with FBI
Agent Paul Bigbee about how to interpret the results of
Agent Bigbee’s genetic marker analysis summary; and it
summarized the testimony of the State’s blood spatter
expert, Paulette Sutton. Id., at 339–347. After reviewing
all the evidence, the District Court stated: “Based upon
the evidence introduced during the evidentiary hearing . . .
the court concludes that the spillage occurred after the
FBI crime laboratory received and tested the evidence.”
Id., at 348 (emphasis added).
Normally, an appellate court reviews a district court’s
factual findings only for clear error. See Fed. Rule Civ.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
Proc. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportu
nity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses”); Bessemer City, supra, at 574 (clearly erroneous
standard applies “even when the district court’s findings do
not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead
on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from
other facts”). The Sixth Circuit deferred to the District
Court’s factual findings, 386 F. 3d 668, 684 (2004), and
Schlup did not purport to alter—but instead reaffirmed
and highlighted—the district court’s critical role as fact-
finder. Yet the majority asserts that the clear error stan
dard “overstates the effect of the District Court’s ruling,”
and then dismisses the District Court’s reliability findings
because it is “uncertain about” them, while stopping short
of identifying clear error. Ante, at 20. This is a sharp
departure from the guidance in Schlup.
In Schlup, we contrasted a district court’s role in assess
ing the reliability of new evidence of innocence with a
district court’s role in deciding a summary judgment
motion. 513 U. S., at 332. We explained that, in the latter
situation, the district court does not assess credibility or
weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there
is a genuine factual issue for trial. Ibid. Assessing the
reliability of new evidence, on the other hand, is a typical
factfinding role, requiring credibility determinations and a
weighing of the “probative force” of the new evidence in
light of “the evidence of guilt adduced at trial.” Ibid. We
found it “obviou[s]” that a habeas court conducting an
actual innocence inquiry must do more than simply check
whether there are genuine factual issues for trial. Ibid.
The point of the actual innocence inquiry is for the federal
habeas court to satisfy itself that it should suspend the
normal procedural default rule, disregard the important
judicial interests of finality and comity, and allow a state
6 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
prisoner to present his defaulted constitutional claims to a
federal court. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 490–
491 (1991).
The majority surprisingly states that this guidance is
inapplicable here because this case involves a “fully devel
oped record,” while the district court in Schlup had de
clined to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Ante, at 17–18.
But the guidance is clearly applicable: The point in Schlup
was not simply that a hearing was required, but why—
because the district court had to assess the probative force
of the petitioner’s newly presented evidence, by engaging
in factfinding rather than performing a summary judg
ment-type inquiry. 513 U. S., at 331–332. That is pre
cisely what the District Court did here. In addition to a
“fully developed record,” we have the District Court’s
factual findings about the reliability of the new evidence
in that record, factual findings which the majority disre
gards without finding clear error.
The majority essentially disregards the District Court’s
role in assessing the reliability of House’s new evidence.
With regard to the sisters’ testimony, the majority casts
aside the District Court’s determination that their state
ments came too late and were too inconsistent with credi
ble record evidence to be reliable, instead observing that
the women had no obvious reason to lie, that a few aspects
of their testimony have record support, and that they
recounted an uncoerced confession. Ante, at 32–33. As for
the District Court’s express finding that the autopsy blood
spilled after the FBI tested House’s jeans, the majority
points to Dr. Blake’s testimony that blood enzymes “are
generally better preserved on cloth,” and even conjures up
its own theory in an attempt to refute Ms. Sutton’s expert
testimony that the pattern of some bloodstains was consis
tent with blood being transferred while the pants were
being worn. Ante, at 27 (“This should be a matter for the
trier of fact to consider in the first instance, but we can
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
note a line of argument that could refute the State’s posi
tion . . . [Ms. Sutton’s] testimony . . . does not refute the
hypothesis that the packaging of the pants for transport
was what caused them to be folded or creased”); see App.
296.
The majority’s assessment of House’s new evidence is
precisely the summary judgment-type inquiry Schlup said
was inappropriate. 513 U. S., at 332. By casting aside the
District Court’s factual determinations made after a com
prehensive evidentiary hearing, the majority has done
little more than reiterate the factual disputes presented
below. Witnesses do not testify in our courtroom, and it is
not our role to make credibility findings and construct
theories of the possible ways in which Mrs. Muncey’s blood
could have been spattered and wiped on House’s jeans.
The District Court did not painstakingly conduct an evi
dentiary hearing to compile a record for us to sort through
transcript by transcript and photograph by photograph,
assessing for ourselves the reliability of what we see.
Schlup made abundantly clear that reliability determina
tions were essential, but were for the district court to
make. 513 U. S., at 331–332. We are to defer to the better
situated District Court on reliability, unless we determine
that its findings are clearly erroneous. We are not con
cerned with “the district court’s independent judgment as
to whether reasonable doubt exists,” id., at 329, but the
District Court here made basic factual findings about the
reliability of House’s new evidence; it did not offer its
personal opinion about whether it doubted House’s guilt.
Schlup makes clear that those findings are controlling
unless clearly erroneous.
I have found no clear error in the District Court’s reli
ability findings. Not having observed Ms. Parker and Ms.
Letner testify, I would defer to the District Court’s deter
mination that they are not credible, and the evidence in
the record undermining the tale of an accidental killing
8 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
during a fight in the Muncey home convinces me that this
credibility finding is not clearly erroneous. Dr. Alex Cara
bia, who performed the autopsy, testified to injuries far
more severe than a bump on the head: Mrs. Muncey had
bruises on the front and back of her neck, on both thighs,
on her lower right leg and left knee, and her hands were
bloodstained up to the wrists; her injuries were consistent
with a struggle and traumatic strangulation. Record,
Addendum 4, 7 Tr. of Evidence in No. 378 (Crim. Ct. Un
ion County, Tenn.) 984–987 (hereinafter Tr.) And, of
course, Lora Tharp has consistently recalled a deep-voiced
visitor arriving late at night to tell Mrs. Muncey that her
husband was in a wreck near the creek. App. 19, 270.
I also find abundant evidence in the record to support
the District Court’s finding that blood spilled within the
evidence container after the FBI received and tested
House’s jeans. Agent Bigbee testified that there was no
leakage in the items submitted to him for testing. Id., at
277. The majority’s entire analysis on this point assumes
the agent flatly lied, though there was no attack on his
credibility below. Moreover, Ms. Sutton determined, in
her expert opinion, that the wide distribution of stains
“front and back, top to bottom,” the fact that some blood
stains were mixed with mud, and the presence of blood
stains inside the pocket and inside the fly, showed that the
blood was spattered and wiped—not spilled—on House’s
jeans. Id., at 291–293, 295; id., at 293 (“[I]f a tube of blood
had spilled on these pants, the stain should have been in a
localized area”); id., at 294 (“The stains also . . . either
originate on the inside and don’t soak out or on the outside
and are not soaking to the inside. That, of course, would
be what you would see with a spill”).
It is also worth noting that the blood evidently spilled
inside the evidence container when the jeans were pro
tected inside a plastic zip lock bag, as shown by the pres
ence of a bloodstain on the outside of that bag. See Re
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
cord, Plt. Exh. 10–6. House’s expert tested the exterior
and interior of that plastic bag for bloodstains using an
“extremely sensitive” test, and only the exterior of the bag
tested positive for blood. Id., Doc. 274, at 95–96. The
evidence in the record indicates that the jeans were placed
in the plastic bag after they arrived at the FBI: FBI re
cords show that the jeans arrived there in a paper bag,
and the plastic bag has FBI markings on it. Id., Adden
dum 2, Trial Exh. 31, p. 36; id., Plt. Exh. 10–6. The blood
stain on the outside of the plastic bag therefore further
supports the District Court’s conclusion that the blood
spilled after the evidence was received and tested by the
FBI, and not en route when the jeans were in a paper bag.
I suppose it is theoretically possible that the jeans were
contaminated by spillage before arriving at the FBI, that
Agent Bigbee either failed to note or lied about such spill
age, and that the FBI then transferred the jeans into a
plastic bag and put them back inside the evidence con
tainer with the spilled blood still sloshing around suffi
ciently to contaminate the outside of the plastic bag as
extensively as it did. This sort of unbridled speculation
can theoretically defeat any inconvenient fact, but does
not suffice to convince me that the District Court’s factual
finding—that the blood spilled after FBI testing—was
clearly erroneous.
Moreover, the yellow “Tennessee Crime Lab” tape
placed around the container on all four sides does not line
up when the bloodstained corners of the container and its
lid are aligned, showing that the blood did not spill until
sometime after the container was received and opened at
its first destination—the FBI. See id., Respondent’s Exh.
24; id., Doc. 276, pp. 190–191 (testimony of Paulette Sut
ton). The majority points out that on one side of the con
tainer, the first of two layers of tape appears to begin
cleanly at the lid’s edge, and from this concludes that the
container must have been cut open and resealed by Ten
10 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
nessee authorities en route to the FBI. Ante, at 25; see
Record, Respondent’s Exh. 23d. Even if the majority’s
deduction from a photograph of the container were true, it
would show only that Tennessee authorities had reason to
open the container once it was sealed to take something
out or put something in, perhaps back at the crime lab in
Union County. But even if the container had been opened
before its arrival at the FBI, the majority recognizes that
it was resealed with “Tennessee Crime Lab” tape, and the
second layer of tape aligns only when the bloodstains on
the container and its lid do not. Ante, at 24–25. Of course,
the District Court—which concluded that the blood was
spilled after testing at the FBI laboratory—had before it
the box itself with the tape as the witnesses testified on
the point, and not—like this Court—simply a photograph.
See Bessemer City, 470 U. S., at 574 (district court’s find
ings about physical evidence are reviewed for clear error).
House’s theory that the blood on his jeans was trans
ferred there from the autopsy samples is based on Dr.
Blake’s reading of Agent Bigbee’s enzyme marker analysis
summary. After reading the summary, Dr. Blake con
cluded that the enzymes in the bloodstains on House’s
jeans and the enzymes in the autopsy samples had dete
riorated to the same extent. Record, Doc. 275, p. 110. In
particular, he noted that the GLO1 enzyme showed “in
complete penetration” on both the autopsy blood and the
jeans, and because enzymes are better preserved on cloth,
the enzyme should have been present on the jeans. Id., at
116. But Agent Bigbee disputed Dr. Blake’s reading of
what was, after all, Agent Bigbee’s own study. He testi
fied that “ ‘inc’ ” on his chart meant “inconclusive,” not
“incomplete penetration,” and that the term “inconclusive”
meant that the enzyme was present, but could not be
grouped into an ABO bloodtype. Id., Doc. 276, at 140.
While pointing out that his summary showed different
levels of enzymes in the two samples, Agent Bigbee also
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
noted that many different factors—such as heat, dirt, or
bacteria in a clothes hamper—could cause enzymes to
degrade on cloth. Id., at 139, 167–170. Considering how
House’s new blood spillage evidence fits within the record
as a whole, I can see no clear error in the District Court’s
express finding that the blood spilled in the evidence
container after the FBI found Mrs. Muncey’s blood on
House’s jeans.
The District Court attentively presided over a complex
evidentiary hearing, often questioning witnesses exten
sively during the presentation of critical evidence. See,
e.g., id., Doc. 275, at 110–115. The court concisely sum
marized the evidence presented, then dutifully made
findings about the reliability of the testimony it heard and
the evidence it observed. We are poorly equipped to sec
ond-guess the District Court’s reliability findings and
should defer to them, consistent with the guidance we
provided in Schlup.
II
With due regard to the District Court’s reliability find
ings, this case invites a straightforward application of the
legal standard adopted in Schlup. A petitioner does not
pass through the Schlup gateway if it is “more likely than
not that there is any juror who, acting reasonably, would
have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
513 U. S., at 333 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
The majority states that if House had presented just one
of his three key pieces of evidence—or even two of the
three—he would not pass through the Schlup gateway.
See ante, at 28 (“Were House’s challenge to the State’s
case limited to the questions he has raised about the blood
and semen, the other evidence favoring the prosecution
might well suffice to bar relief”); ante, at 33 (“If considered
in isolation, a reasonable jury might well disregard [the
12 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
evidence pointing to Mr. Muncey]. In combination, how
ever, with the challenges to the blood evidence and the
lack of motive with respect to House, the evidence pointing
to Mr. Muncey likely would reinforce other doubts as to
House’s guilt”). According to the majority, House has
picked the trifecta of evidence that places conviction out
side the realm of choices any juror, acting reasonably,
would make. Because the case against House remains
substantially unaltered from the case presented to the
jury, I disagree.
At trial, the State presented its story about what hap
pened on the night of Mrs. Muncey’s murder. The
Munceys’ daughter heard a deep-voiced perpetrator arrive
at the Muncey home late at night and tell Mrs. Muncey
that her husband had been in a wreck near the creek.
App. 19. Ms. Tharp relayed her testimony again at the
evidentiary hearing, and the District Court determined
that she was a “very credible witness.” Id., at 270, 323.
When police questioned House after witnesses reported
seeing him emerge from the embankment near Mrs.
Muncey’s body shortly before it was discovered, he told
two different officers that he never left Donna Turner’s
trailer the previous evening, even recounting the series of
television programs he watched before going to bed. 7 Tr.
963–965, 1031–1032. He had worked to concoct an alibi
we now know was a lie. On the day Mrs. Muncey’s body
was found, Bill Breeding, a criminal investigator at the
Union County Sheriff’s Office, observed House at the local
jail and noticed that he had abrasions “across his knuckles
and about his hands,” two or three bruises on his right
arm, scratches on his chest, and his right ring finger was
red and swollen. 6 id., at 801–802. The interviewing
officers noticed similar injuries. App. 78–80; 7 Tr. 974–
975. House told them that his finger was swollen because
he fell off a porch, and the scratches and bruises were
from tearing down a building, and from a cat. Ibid. Ms.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
Turner initially confirmed House’s alibi, but she changed
her story when police warned her that covering up a homi
cide was a serious offense. Id., at 1063. Ms. Turner then
told police that House had in fact left her house that night
between 10:30 and 10:45 p.m. Id., at 1062–1063. He came
back some time later panting and sweating, shirtless and
shoeless, and with various injuries. App. 88–91; 8 Tr.
1154–1155.
Also on the day the body was found, Sheriff Earl Loy
asked House if he was wearing the same clothes he wore
the night before. 6 id., at 845. House “hesitated,” then
stated that he had changed his shirt, but not his jeans.
Ibid. In other words, he specifically tried to conceal from
the police that he had worn other jeans the night before,
for reasons that were to become clear. Ms. Turner re
vealed that House’s statement that he had not changed his
jeans was a lie, and police retrieved House’s dirty jeans
from Ms. Turner’s hamper. Ibid. Of course, FBI testing
revealed that House’s jeans were stained with Mrs.
Muncey’s blood, and the District Court determined that
House’s new evidence of blood spillage did not undermine
those test results. App. 348. If in fact Mrs. Muncey’s
blood only got on House’s jeans from later evidentiary
spillage, House would have had no reason to lie to try to
keep the existence of the concealed jeans from the police.
Through Ms. Turner’s testimony at trial, the jury also
heard House’s story about what happened that night. He
left Ms. Turner’s trailer late at night to go for a walk. Id.,
at 86. When he returned some time later—panting,
sweating, and missing his shirt and shoes—he told her
that some men in a truck tried to kill him. Id., at 88–91.
When Ms. Turner asked House about his injuries, he
attributed them to fighting with his assailants. Id., at 90;
8 Tr. 1154–1155. House retold this story to the District
Court, saying that he initially lied to police because he
was on parole and did not want to draw attention to him
14 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
self. Record, Doc. 276, at 99, 108–109. In other words,
having nothing to hide and facing a murder charge, House
lied—and when he was caught in the lie, he said he lied
not to escape the murder charge, but solely to avoid unex
plained difficulties with his parole officer. The jury re
jected House’s story about the night’s events, and the
District Court “considered Mr. House’s demeanor and
found that he was not a credible witness.” App. 329.
The jury also heard House’s attempt to implicate Mr.
Muncey in his wife’s murder by calling Mrs. Muncey’s
brother, Ricky Green, as a witness. Mr. Green testified
that two weeks before the murder, his sister called him to
say that she and Mr. Muncey had been fighting, that she
wanted to leave him, and that she was scared. 7 Tr. 1088.
Mr. Green also testified that the Munceys had marital
problems, and that he had previously seen Mr. Muncey hit
his wife. Id., at 1087. The jury rejected House’s attempt
to implicate Mr. Muncey, and the District Court was not
persuaded by House’s attempt to supplement this evidence
at the evidentiary hearing, finding that his new witnesses
were not credible. App. 348.
Noticeably absent from the State’s story about what
happened to Mrs. Muncey on the night of her death was
much mention of the semen found on Mrs. Muncey’s cloth
ing. House’s single victory at the evidentiary hearing was
new DNA evidence proving that the semen was deposited
by Mr. Muncey. The majority identifies the semen evi
dence as “[c]entral to the State’s case” against House, ante,
at 8, but House’s jury would probably be quite surprised
by this characterization. At trial, Agent Bigbee testified
that from the semen stains on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing, he
could determine that the man who deposited the semen
had type A blood, and was a secretor. App. 54–56. Agent
Bigbee also testified that House and Mr. Muncey both
have type A blood, that House is a secretor, and that
“[t]here is an eighty (80%) percent chance that [Mr.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
Muncey] is a secretor.” Id., at 55–56; 6 Tr. 952 (emphasis
added). Moreover, Agent Bigbee informed the jury that
because 40 percent of people have type A blood, and 80
percent of those people are secretors, the semen on Mrs.
Muncey’s clothing could have been deposited by roughly
one out of every three males. Id., at 957. The jury was
also informed several times by the defense that Mrs.
Muncey’s body was found fully clothed. See, e.g., 4 id., at
628; 9 id., at 1274.
The majority describes House’s sexual motive as “a
central theme in the State’s narrative linking House to the
crime,” and states that without the semen evidence, “a
jury . . . would have found it necessary to establish some
different motive, or, if the same motive, an intent far more
speculative.” Ante, at 21. The State, however, consis
tently directed the jury’s attention away from motive, and
sexual motive was far from a “central theme” of the State’s
case—presumably because of the highly ambiguous nature
of the semen evidence recounted above. The Tennessee
Supreme Court did not mention that evidence in catalog
ing the “[p]articularly incriminating” or “[d]amaging”
evidence against House. App. 135. The State did not
mention the semen evidence in its opening statement to
the jury, instead focusing on premeditation. 4 Tr. 613–
615. The defense used its opening statement to expose
lack of motive as a weakness in the State’s case. Id., at
628. After the State’s equivocal presentation of the semen
evidence through Agent Bigbee’s testimony at trial, the
State again made no reference to the semen evidence or to
a motive in its closing argument, prompting the defense to
again highlight this omission. 9 id., at 1274 (“[W]hy was
Carolyn Muncey killed? We don’t know. Is it important to
have some motive? In your minds? What motive did Paul
Gregory House have to go over and kill a woman that he
barely knew? Who was still dressed, still clad in her
clothes”).
16 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
In rebuttal, the State disclaimed any responsibility
to prove motive, again shifting the jury’s focus to
premeditation:
“The law says that if you take another person’s life,
you beat them, you strangle them, and then you don’t
succeed, and then you kill them by giving them multi
ple blows to the head, and one massive blow to the
head, and that that causes their brains to crash
against the other side of their skull, and caused such
severe bleeding inside the skull itself, that you die—
that it does not make any difference under God’s
heaven, what the motive was. That is what the law
is. The law is that if motive is shown, it can be con
sidered by the jury as evidence of guilt. But the law is
that if you prove that a killing was done, beyond a
reasonable doubt, by a person, and that he premedi
tated it, he planned it, it is not necessary for the jury
to conclude why he did it.” App. 106.
As a follow-up to this explanation, when the trial was
almost over and only in response to the defense’s consis
tent prodding, the State made its first and only reference
to a possible motive, followed immediately by another
disclaimer:
“Now, you may have an idea why he did it. The evi
dence at the scene which seemed to suggest that he
was subjecting this lady to some kind of indignity,
why would you get a lady out of her house, late at
night, in her night clothes, under the trick that her
husband has had a wreck down by the creek? . . . Why
is it that you choke her? Why is it that you repeatedly
beat her? Why is it that she has scrapes all over her
body? Well, it is because either you don’t want her to
tell what indignities you have subjected her to, or she
is unwilling and fights against you, against being sub
jected to those indignities. . . . That is what the evi
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
dence at the scene suggests about motive. But motive
is not an element of the crime. It is something that
you can consider, or ignore. Whatever you prefer.
The issue is not motive. The issue is premeditation.”
Id., at 106–107.
It is on this “obliqu[e]” reference to the semen evidence
during the State’s closing argument that the majority
bases its assertion that House’s sexual motive was a “cen
tral theme in the State’s narrative.” Ante, at 11, 21.
Although it is possible that one or even some jurors might
have entertained doubt about House’s guilt absent the
clearest evidence of motive, I do not find it more likely
than not that every juror would have done so, and that is
the legal standard under Schlup. The majority aphoristi
cally states that “[w]hen identity is in question, motive is
key.” Ante, at 21. Not at all. Sometimes, when identity is
in question, alibi is key. Here, House came up with one—
and it fell apart, later admitted to be fabricated when his
girlfriend would not lie to protect him. Scratches from a
cat, indeed. Surely a reasonable juror would give the fact
that an alibi had been made up and discredited significant
weight. People facing a murder charge, who are innocent,
do not make up a story out of concern that the truth might
somehow disturb their parole officer. And people do not
lie to the police about which jeans they were wearing the
night of a murder, if they have no reason to believe the
jeans would be stained with the blood shed by the victim
in her last desperate struggle to live.
In Schlup, we made clear that the standard we adopted
requires a “stronger showing than that needed to establish
prejudice.” 513 U. S., at 327. In other words, House must
show more than just a “reasonable probability that . . . the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting
guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695 (1984).
House must present such compelling evidence of innocence
18 HOUSE v. BELL
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.
that it becomes more likely than not that no single juror,
acting reasonably, would vote to convict him. Schlup,
supra, at 329. The majority’s conclusion is that given the
sisters’ testimony (if believed), and Dr. Blake’s rebutted
testimony about how to interpret Agent Bigbee’s enzyme
marker analysis summary (if accepted), combined with the
revelation that the semen on Mrs. Muncey’s clothing was
deposited by her husband (which the jurors knew was just
as likely as the semen having been deposited by House),
no reasonable juror would vote to convict House. Ante, at
34. Given the District Court’s reliability findings about
the first two pieces of evidence, the evidence before us now
is not substantially different from that considered by
House’s jury. I therefore find it more likely than not that
in light of this new evidence, at least one juror, acting
reasonably, would vote to convict House. The evidence as
a whole certainly does not establish that House is actually
innocent of the crime of murdering Carolyn Muncey, and
accordingly I dissent.