Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ANZA ET AL. v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 04–433. Argued March 27, 2006—Decided June 5, 2006
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pro
hibits certain conduct involving a “pattern of racketeering activity,”
18 U. S. C. §1962, and makes a private right of action available to
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a viola
tion” of RICO’s substantive restrictions, §1964(c), provided that the
alleged violation was the proximate cause of the injury, Holmes v. Se
curities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268. Respon
dent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) has stores in Queens and
the Bronx. Petitioner National Steel Supply, Inc. (National), owned
by petitioners Joseph and Vincent Anza, has stores in the same loca
tions and is Ideal’s principal competitor. Ideal filed suit in the Dis
trict Court, claiming that National failed to charge New York’s sales
tax to cash-paying customers, allowing it to reduce its prices without
affecting its profit margin; and that it submitted fraudulent state tax
returns to conceal the conduct, which involved committing mail and
wire fraud, both forms of “racketeering activity” under RICO. Ideal
alleged that the Anzas violated §1962(c), which forbids conducting or
participating in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pat
tern of racketeering activity. It also claimed that all the petitioners
violated §1962(a)—which makes it unlawful for a person “to use or
invest” income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in an
enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce—
when they used funds generated by the fraudulent tax scheme to
open National’s Bronx location, causing Ideal to lose business and
market share. The District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dis
miss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that
Ideal had not shown reliance on petitioners’ misrepresentations, as
required in RICO mail and wire fraud claims. Vacating, the Second
2 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Syllabus

Circuit held, with regard to the §1962(c) claim, that a complaint al
leging a pattern of racketeering activity designed to give a defendant
a competitive advantage adequately pleaded probable cause even
where the scheme depended on fraudulent communications made to a
third party; and held that Ideal adequately pleaded its §1962(a) claim
by alleging injury resulting from petitioners’ use and investment of
racketeering proceeds.
Held:
1. Ideal cannot maintain its §1962(c) claim. Under Holmes, proxi
mate cause for §1964(c) purposes requires “some direct relation be
tween the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” 503
U. S., at 268. The direct victim of the alleged RICO violation is the
State of New York, not Ideal. Ideal’s claim is too attenuated to sat
isfy Holmes’ requirement of directness. This result is confirmed by
the directness requirement’s underlying premises, one of which is the
difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the dam
ages caused by some remote action. Ideal claims lost sales because of
National’s decreased prices, but National could have lowered prices
for reasons unrelated to the asserted tax fraud, and Ideal’s lost sales
could have resulted from other factors as well. The attenuated con
nection between Ideal’s injury and the Anzas’ injurious conduct thus
implicates fundamental concerns expressed in Holmes. Further illus
trating the absence of proximate cause is the speculative nature of
the proceedings that would follow if Ideal were permitted to maintain
its claim. A court would have to calculate the portion of National’s
price drop attributable to the pattern of racketeering activity and
then calculate the portion of lost sales attributable to the relevant
part of the price drop, but Holmes’ proximate causation element was
meant to prevent such intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrun
ning RICO litigation. A direct causal connection is especially war
ranted where the immediate victims can be expected to vindicate the
laws by pursuing their own claims. Contrary to the Second Circuit’s
rationale, a RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate-cause
requirement simply by claiming that the defendant’s aim was to in
crease market share at a competitor’s expense. Because Ideal has not
satisfied that requirement, this Court has no occasion to address the
substantial question whether a plaintiff asserting a RICO claim
predicated on mail or wire fraud must show that it relied on the de
fendant’s misrepresentations. Pp. 4–9.
2. The Second Circuit’s judgment with respect to Ideal’s §1962(a)
claim is vacated so that court can determine on remand whether peti
tioners’ alleged §1962(a) violation proximately caused Ideal’s asserted
injuries. Pp. 9–10.
373 F. 3d 251, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined,
and in which THOMAS, J., joined as to Part III. SCALIA, J., filed a con
curring opinion. THOMAS, J., and BREYER, J., filed opinions concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–433
_________________

JOSEPH ANZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IDEAL STEEL
SUPPLY CORP.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 5, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. §§1961–1968 (2000 ed. and Supp.
III), prohibits certain conduct involving a “pattern of
racketeering activity.” §1962 (2000 ed.). One of RICO’s
enforcement mechanisms is a private right of action,
available to “[a]ny person injured in his business or prop
erty by reason of a violation” of the Act’s substantive
restrictions. §1964(c).
In Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation,
503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992), this Court held that a plaintiff
may sue under §1964(c) only if the alleged RICO violation
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. The
instant case requires us to apply the principles discussed
in Holmes to a dispute between two competing businesses.
I
Because this case arises from a motion to dismiss, we
accept as true the factual allegations in the amended
complaint. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U. S. 163, 164
(1993).
2 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of the Court

Respondent Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (Ideal) sells
steel mill products along with related supplies and ser
vices. It operates two store locations in New York, one in
Queens and the other in the Bronx. Petitioner National
Steel Supply, Inc. (National), owned by petitioners Joseph
and Vincent Anza, is Ideal’s principal competitor. Na
tional offers a similar array of products and services, and
it, too, operates one store in Queens and one in the Bronx.
Ideal sued petitioners in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. It claimed
petitioners were engaged in an unlawful racketeering
scheme aimed at “gain[ing] sales and market share at
Ideal’s expense.” App. 7. According to Ideal, National
adopted a practice of failing to charge the requisite New
York sales tax to cash-paying customers, even when con
ducting transactions that were not exempt from sales tax
under state law. This practice allowed National to reduce
its prices without affecting its profit margin. Petitioners
allegedly submitted fraudulent tax returns to the New
York State Department of Taxation and Finance in an
effort to conceal their conduct.
Ideal’s amended complaint contains, as relevant here,
two RICO claims. The claims assert that petitioners, by
submitting the fraudulent tax returns, committed various
acts of mail fraud (when they sent the returns by mail)
and wire fraud (when they sent them electronically). See
18 U. S. C. §§1341, 1343 (2000 ed., Supp. III). Mail fraud
and wire fraud are forms of “racketeering activity” for
purposes of RICO. §1961(1)(B). Petitioners’ conduct
allegedly constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity,”
see §1961(5) (2000 ed.), because the fraudulent returns
were submitted on an ongoing and regular basis.
Ideal asserts in its first cause of action that Joseph and
Vincent Anza violated §1962(c), which makes it unlawful
for “any person employed by or associated with any enter
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, di
rectly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collec
tion of unlawful debt.” The complaint states that the
Anzas’ goal, which they achieved, was to give National a
competitive advantage over Ideal.
The second cause of action is asserted against all three
petitioners. It alleges a violation of §1962(a), which makes
it unlawful for any person who has received income de
rived from a pattern of racketeering activity “to use or
invest” that income “in acquisition of any interest in, or
the establishment or operation of,” an enterprise engaged
in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. As de
scribed in the complaint, petitioners used funds generated
by their fraudulent tax scheme to open National’s Bronx
location. The opening of this new facility caused Ideal to
lose “significant business and market share.” App. 18.
Petitioners moved to dismiss Ideal’s complaint under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The
District Court granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The court began from the proposition
that to assert a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud or
wire fraud, a plaintiff must have relied on the defendant’s
misrepresentations. Ideal not having alleged that it relied
on petitioners’ false tax returns, the court concluded Ideal
could not go forward with its RICO claims.
Ideal appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. 373 F. 3d
251 (2004). Addressing Ideal’s §1962(c) claim, the court
held that where a complaint alleges a pattern of racketeer
ing activity “that was intended to and did give the defen
dant a competitive advantage over the plaintiff, the com
plaint adequately pleads proximate cause, and the
plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim.” Id.,
at 263. This is the case, the court explained, “even where
4 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of the Court

the scheme depended on fraudulent communications
directed to and relied on by a third party rather than the
plaintiff.” Ibid.
The court reached the same conclusion with respect to
Ideal’s §1962(a) claim. It reasoned that Ideal adequately
pleaded its claim because it alleged an injury by reason of
petitioners’ use and investment of racketeering proceeds,
“as distinct from injury traceable simply to the predicate
acts of racketeering alone or to the conduct of the business
of the enterprise.” Id., at 264.
We granted certiorari. 546 U. S. __ (2005).
II
Our analysis begins—and, as will become evident,
largely ends—with Holmes. That case arose from a com
plaint filed by the Securities Investor Protection Corpora
tion (SIPC), a private corporation with a duty to reimburse
the customers of registered broker-dealers who became
unable to meet their financial obligations. SIPC claimed
that the petitioner, Robert Holmes, conspired with others
to manipulate stock prices. When the market detected the
fraud, the share prices plummeted, and the “decline
caused [two] broker-dealers’ financial difficulties resulting
in their eventual liquidation and SIPC’s advance of nearly
$13 million to cover their customers’ claims.” 503 U. S., at
262–263. SIPC sued on several theories, including that
Holmes participated in the conduct of an enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity in viola
tion of §1962(c) and conspired to do so in violation of
§1962(d).
The Court held that SIPC could not maintain its RICO
claims against Holmes for his alleged role in the scheme.
The decision relied on a careful interpretation of §1964(c),
which provides a civil cause of action to persons injured
“by reason of” a defendant’s RICO violation. The Court
recognized the phrase “by reason of” could be read broadly
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

to require merely that the claimed violation was a “but
for” cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id., at 265–266. It
rejected this reading, however, noting the “unlikelihood
that Congress meant to allow all factually injured plain
tiffs to recover.” Id., at 266.
Proper interpretation of §1964(c) required consideration
of the statutory history, which revealed that “Congress
modeled §1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the fed
eral antitrust laws, §4 of the Clayton Act.” Id., at 267. In
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459
U. S. 519 (1983), the Court held that “a plaintiff’s right to
sue under §4 required a showing that the defendant’s
violation not only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but
was the proximate cause as well.” Holmes, supra, at 268
(citing Associated Gen. Contractors, supra, at 534). This
reasoning, the Court noted in Holmes, “applies just as
readily to §1964(c).” 503 U. S., at 268.
The Holmes Court turned to the common-law founda
tions of the proximate-cause requirement, and specifically
the “demand for some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Ibid. It
concluded that even if SIPC were subrogated to the rights
of certain aggrieved customers, the RICO claims could not
satisfy this requirement of directness. The deficiency, the
Court explained, was that “the link is too remote between
the stock manipulation alleged and the customers’ harm,
being purely contingent on the harm suffered by the bro
ker-dealers.” Id., at 271.
Applying the principles of Holmes to the present case,
we conclude Ideal cannot maintain its claim based on
§1962(c). Section 1962(c), as noted above, forbids conduct
ing or participating in the conduct of an enterprise’s af
fairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The Court
has indicated the compensable injury flowing from a viola
tion of that provision “necessarily is the harm caused by
predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern,
6 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of the Court

for the essence of the violation is the commission of those
acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.”
Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 (1985).
Ideal’s theory is that Joseph and Vincent Anza harmed
it by defrauding the New York tax authority and using the
proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to
attract more customers. The RICO violation alleged by
Ideal is that the Anzas conducted National’s affairs
through a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud. The direct
victim of this conduct was the State of New York, not
Ideal. It was the State that was being defrauded and the
State that lost tax revenue as a result.
The proper referent of the proximate-cause analysis is
an alleged practice of conducting National’s business
through a pattern of defrauding the State. To be sure,
Ideal asserts it suffered its own harms when the Anzas
failed to charge customers for the applicable sales tax.
The cause of Ideal’s asserted harms, however, is a set of
actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the
alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State). The at
tenuation between the plaintiff’s harms and the claimed
RICO violation arises from a different source in this case
than in Holmes, where the alleged violations were linked
to the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers’
inability to meet their financial obligations. Nevertheless,
the absence of proximate causation is equally clear in both
cases.
This conclusion is confirmed by considering the direct
ness requirement’s underlying premises. See 503 U. S., at
269–270. One motivating principle is the difficulty that
can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages
caused by some remote action. See id., at 269 (“[T]he less
direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascer
tain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to
the violation, as distinct from other, independent, fac
tors”). The instant case is illustrative. The injury Ideal
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

alleges is its own loss of sales resulting from National’s
decreased prices for cash-paying customers. National,
however, could have lowered its prices for any number of
reasons unconnected to the asserted pattern of fraud. It
may have received a cash inflow from some other source or
concluded that the additional sales would justify a smaller
profit margin. Its lowering of prices in no sense required
it to defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact
that a company commits tax fraud does not mean the
company will lower its prices; the additional cash could go
anywhere from asset acquisition to research and develop
ment to dividend payouts. Cf. id., at 271 (“The broker-
dealers simply cannot pay their bills, and only that inter
vening insolvency connects the conspirators’ acts to the
losses suffered by the nonpurchasing customers and gen
eral creditors”).
There is, in addition, a second discontinuity between the
RICO violation and the asserted injury. Ideal’s lost sales
could have resulted from factors other than petitioners’
alleged acts of fraud. Businesses lose and gain customers
for many reasons, and it would require a complex assess
ment to establish what portion of Ideal’s lost sales were
the product of National’s decreased prices. Cf. id., at 272–
273 (“If the nonpurchasing customers were allowed to sue,
the district court would first need to determine the extent
to which their inability to collect from the broker-dealers
was the result of the alleged conspiracy to manipulate, as
opposed to, say, the broker-dealers’ poor business practices
or their failures to anticipate developments in the finan
cial markets”).
The attenuated connection between Ideal’s injury and
the Anzas’ injurious conduct thus implicates fundamental
concerns expressed in Holmes. Notwithstanding the lack
of any appreciable risk of duplicative recoveries, which is
another consideration relevant to the proximate-cause
inquiry, see id., at 269, these concerns help to illustrate
8 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of the Court

why Ideal’s alleged injury was not the direct result of a
RICO violation. Further illustrating this point is the
speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if
Ideal were permitted to maintain its claim. A court con
sidering the claim would need to begin by calculating the
portion of National’s price drop attributable to the alleged
pattern of racketeering activity. It next would have to
calculate the portion of Ideal’s lost sales attributable to
the relevant part of the price drop. The element of proxi
mate causation recognized in Holmes is meant to prevent
these types of intricate, uncertain inquiries from overrun
ning RICO litigation. It has particular resonance when
applied to claims brought by economic competitors, which,
if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO and
the antitrust laws.
The requirement of a direct causal connection is espe
cially warranted where the immediate victims of an al
leged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws
by pursuing their own claims. See id., at 269–270
(“[D]irectly injured victims can generally be counted on to
vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without
any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs
injured more remotely”). Again, the instant case is in
structive. Ideal accuses the Anzas of defrauding the State
of New York out of a substantial amount of money. If the
allegations are true, the State can be expected to pursue
appropriate remedies. The adjudication of the State’s
claims, moreover, would be relatively straightforward;
while it may be difficult to determine facts such as the
number of sales Ideal lost due to National’s tax practices,
it is considerably easier to make the initial calculation of
how much tax revenue the Anzas withheld from the State.
There is no need to broaden the universe of actionable
harms to permit RICO suits by parties who have been
injured only indirectly.
The Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion,
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

apparently reasoning that because the Anzas allegedly
sought to gain a competitive advantage over Ideal, it is
immaterial whether they took an indirect route to accom
plish their goal. See 373 F. 3d, at 263. This rationale does
not accord with Holmes. A RICO plaintiff cannot circum
vent the proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming
that the defendant’s aim was to increase market share at
a competitor’s expense. See Associated Gen. Contractors,
459 U. S., at 537 (“We are also satisfied that an allegation
of improper motive . . . is not a panacea that will enable
any complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss”). When a
court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the
central question it must ask is whether the alleged viola
tion led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries. In the instant
case, the answer is no. We hold that Ideal’s §1962(c) claim
does not satisfy the requirement of proximate causation.
Petitioners alternatively ask us to hold, in line with the
District Court’s decision granting petitioners’ motion to
dismiss, that a plaintiff may not assert a RICO claim
predicated on mail fraud or wire fraud unless it demon
strates it relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.
They argue that RICO’s private right of action must be
interpreted in light of common-law principles, and that at
common law a fraud action requires the plaintiff to prove
reliance. Because Ideal has not satisfied the proximate-
cause requirement articulated in Holmes, we have no
occasion to address the substantial question whether a
showing of reliance is required. Cf. 503 U. S., at 275–276.
III
The amended complaint also asserts a RICO claim
based on a violation of §1962(a). The claim alleges peti
tioners’ tax scheme provided them with funds to open a
new store in the Bronx, which attracted customers who
otherwise would have purchased from Ideal.
In this Court petitioners contend that the proximate
10 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of the Court

cause analysis should function identically for purposes of
Ideal’s §1962(c) claim and its §1962(a) claim. (Petitioners
also contend that “a civil RICO plaintiff does not plead an
injury proximately caused by a violation of §1962(a)
merely by alleging that a corporate defendant reinvested
profits back into itself,” Brief for Petitioners 20, n. 5, but
this argument has not been developed, and we decline to
address it.) It is true that private actions for violations of
§1962(a), like actions for violations of §1962(c), must be
asserted under §1964(c). It likewise is true that a claim is
cognizable under §1964(c) only if the defendant’s alleged
violation proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. The
proximate-cause inquiry, however, requires careful con
sideration of the “relation between the injury asserted and
the injurious conduct alleged.” Holmes, supra, at 268.
Because §1962(c) and §1962(a) set forth distinct prohibi
tions, it is at least debatable whether Ideal’s two claims
should be analyzed in an identical fashion for proximate-
cause purposes.
The Court of Appeals held that Ideal adequately pleaded
its §1962(a) claim, see 373 F. 3d, at 264, but the court did
not address proximate causation. We decline to consider
Ideal’s §1962(a) claim without the benefit of the Court of
Appeals’ analysis, particularly given that the parties have
devoted nearly all their attention in this Court to the
§1962(c) claim. We therefore vacate the Court of Appeals’
judgment with respect to Ideal’s §1962(a) claim. On re
mand, the court should determine whether petitioners’
alleged violation of §1962(a) proximately caused the inju
ries Ideal asserts.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part
and vacated in part. The case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

SCALIA, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–433
_________________

JOSEPH ANZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IDEAL STEEL
SUPPLY CORP.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 5, 2006]

JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. I also note that it is
inconceivable that the injury alleged in the 18 U. S. C.
§1962(c) claim at issue here is within the zone of interests
protected by the RICO cause of action for fraud perpe
trated upon New York State. See Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 286–290
(1992) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–433
_________________

JOSEPH ANZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IDEAL STEEL
SUPPLY CORP.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 5, 2006]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
The Court today limits the lawsuits that may be brought
under the civil enforcement provision of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO or Act),
18 U. S. C. §1961 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III), by adopt
ing a theory of proximate causation that is supported
neither by the Act nor by our decision in Holmes v. Securi
ties Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268
(1992), on which the Court principally relies. The Court’s
stringent proximate-causation requirement succeeds in
precluding recovery in cases alleging a violation of
§1962(c) that, like the present one, have nothing to do
with organized crime, the target of the RICO statute.
However, the Court’s approach also eliminates recovery
for plaintiffs whose injuries are precisely those that Con
gress aimed to remedy through the authorization of civil
RICO suits. Because this frustration of congressional
intent is directly contrary to the broad language Congress
employed to confer a RICO cause of action, I respectfully
dissent from Part II of the Court’s opinion.
I
The language of the civil RICO provision, which broadly
permits recovery by “[a]ny person injured in his business
2 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

or property by reason of a violation” of the Act’s substan
tive restrictions, §1964(c) (2000 ed.), plainly covers the
lawsuit brought by respondent. Respondent alleges that
he was injured in his business, and that this injury was
the direct result of petitioners’ violation of §1962(c).1 App.
12–17. In Holmes, however, we held that a RICO plaintiff
is required to show that the RICO violation “not only was
a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause
as well.” 503 U. S., at 268. We employed the term “ ‘proxi
mate cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to
limit a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that
person’s own acts.” Ibid. These tools reflect “ ‘ideas of
what justice demands, or of what is administratively
possible and convenient.’ ” Ibid. (quoting W. Keeton, D.
Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law
of Torts §41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser &
Keeton)).
Invoking one of the common-law proximate-cause con
siderations, we held that a RICO plaintiff must prove
“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged.” 503 U. S., at 268. Today the
Court applies this formulation of proximate causation to
conclude that the “attenuated and uncertain relationship”
between the violation of §1962(c) and Ideal’s injury “can
not, consistent with Holmes’ demand for directness, sus
tain Ideal’s claim.” Ante, at 6. But the Court’s determina
tion relies on a theory of “directness” distinct from that
adopted by Holmes.
In Holmes, the Court explained that “a plaintiff who
——————
1 Respondent also alleges that petitioners injured his business

through a violation of §1962(a), although the parties dedicate little
attention to this issue. In light of the Court’s disposition of the §1962(c)
claim and the limited discussion of §1962(a) by the parties, I agree with
the Court that we should give the Court of Appeals the first opportu
nity to reconsider the §1962(a) claim. Accordingly, I join Part III of the
Court’s opinion.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes
visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was
generally said to stand at too remote a distance to re
cover.” 503 U. S., at 268–269. The plaintiff in Holmes was
indirect in precisely this sense. The defendant was alleged
to have participated in a stock manipulation scheme that
disabled two broker-dealers from meeting their obligations
to customers. Accordingly, the plaintiff, Securities Inves
tor Protection Corporation (SIPC), had to advance nearly
$13 million to cover the claims of customers of those bro
ker-dealers. SIPC attempted to sue based on the claim
that it was subrogated to the rights of those customers of
the broker-dealers who did not purchase manipulated
securities. We held that the nonpurchasing customers’
injury was not proximately caused by the defendant’s
conduct, because “the conspirators have allegedly injured
these customers only insofar as the stock manipulation
first injured the broker-dealers and left them without the
wherewithal to pay customers’ claims.” Id., at 271.2
Here, in contrast, it was not New York’s injury that
caused respondent’s damages; rather, it was petitioners’
own conduct—namely, their underpayment of tax—that
permitted them to undercut respondent’s prices and
thereby take away its business. Indeed, the Court’s ac
knowledgment that there is no appreciable risk of duplica
tive recovery here, in contrast to Holmes, ante, at 7, is
effectively a concession that petitioners’ damages are not
indirect, as that term is used in Holmes. See 503 U. S., at
——————
2 Sutherland’s treatise on damages, on which the Court relied in
Holmes, labels the same type of claims indirect: those where one party
is injured, and it is that very injury—and not the wrongful behavior by
the tortfeasor—that causes the injury to the plaintiff. See 1 J. Suther
land, Law of Damages 55 (1882) (hereinafter Sutherland). Indeed,
every example cited in Sutherland in illustration of this principle
parallels Holmes; the plaintiff would not be injured absent the injury to
another victim. See Sutherland 55–56.
4 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

269 (“[R]ecognizing claims of the indirectly injured would
force courts to adopt complicated rules apportioning dam
ages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury
from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries”). The mere fact that New York is a direct
victim of petitioners’ RICO violation does not preclude
Ideal’s claim that it too is a direct victim. Because the
petitioners’ tax underpayment directly caused respon
dent’s injury, Holmes does not bar respondent’s recovery.
The Court nonetheless contends that respondent has
failed to demonstrate proximate cause. It does so by
relying on our observation in Holmes that the directness
requirement is appropriate because “ ‘[t]he less direct an
injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the
amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the viola
tion, as distinct from other, independent, factors.’ ” Ante,
at 6 (quoting Holmes, supra, at 269, in turn, citing Associ
ated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S.
519 (1983)). In Holmes, we noted that it would be hard for
the District Court to determine how much of the broker-
dealers’ failure to pay their customers was due to the
fraud and how much was due to other factors affecting the
broker-dealers’ business success. 503 U. S., at 273–274.
The Court contends that here, as in Holmes, it is difficult
to “ascertain the damages caused by some remote action.”
Ante, at 6.
The Court’s reliance on the difficulty of ascertaining the
amount of Ideal’s damages caused by petitioners’ unlawful
acts to label those damages indirect is misguided. Holmes
and Associated General Contractors simply held that one
reason that indirect injuries should not be compensable is
that such injuries are difficult to ascertain. Holmes, su
pra, at 269; Associated General Contractors, supra, at 542.
We did not adopt the converse proposition that any inju
ries that are difficult to ascertain must be classified as
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

indirect for purposes of determining proximate causation.3
Proximate cause and certainty of damages, while both
related to the plaintiff’s responsibility to prove that the
amount of damages he seeks is fairly attributable to the
defendant, are distinct requirements for recovery in tort.4
See 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts §912 (1977) (certainty
of damages); 2 id., §§430–431 (1963–1964) (proximate
causation). That is, to recover, a plaintiff must show both
that his injury is sufficiently connected to the tort that
“the moral judgment and practical sense of mankind [will]
recognize responsibility in the domain of morals,” Suther
land 18, and that the specific pecuniary advantages, the
loss of which is alleged as damages, “would have resulted,
and, therefore, that the act complained of prevented
them,” id., at 106–107. Holmes and Associated General
Contractors dealt primarily with the former showing. The
Court’s discussion of the Union’s “highly speculative”
damages in Associated General Contractors focused not on
the difficulty of proving the precise amount of damages,
but with “the tenuous and speculative character of the
relationship between the alleged antitrust violation and
the Union’s alleged injury.” 459 U. S., at 545. Here, the
relationship between the alleged RICO violation and the
——————
3 Indeed, in Associated General Contractors, we did not even squarely
hold that the reason that indirect damages are not compensable was
that the damages were not easily ascertainable; instead, we merely
recognized the empirical fact that “[p]artly because it is indirect, and
partly because the alleged effects on the Union may have been pro
duced by independent factors, the Union’s damages claim is also highly
speculative.” 459 U. S., at 542.
4 Sutherland described the interrelation between the two concepts:

“A fatal uncertainty may infect a case where an injury is easily prov
able, but the alleged responsible cause cannot be sufficiently estab
lished as to the whole or some part of that injury. So it may exist
where a known and provable wrong or violation of contract appears, but
the alleged loss or injury as a result of it cannot be certainly shown.”
Sutherland 94.
6 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

alleged injury is clear: Petitioners underpaid sales tax,
permitting them to undercharge sales tax, inflicting com
petitive injury on respondent. The question with which
the Court expresses concern—whether Ideal can prove the
amount of its actual damages “with sufficient certainty,”
Sutherland 106, to permit recovery—is simply not before
the Court.
It is nonetheless worth noting that the Court overstates
the difficulties of proof faced by respondent in this case.
Certainly the plaintiff in this case, as in all tort cases
involving damage to business, must demonstrate that he
suffered a harm caused by the tort, and not merely by
external market conditions. See generally Prosser &
Keeton §130, at 1014–1015, and nn. 92–99 (gathering
cases authorizing liability for torts that “depriv[e] the
plaintiff of customers or other prospects”); cf. Dura Phar
maceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 342 (2005) (“[A]n
inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proxi
mately cause the relevant economic loss,” absent evidence
that it was the inflated price that actually caused harm).
But under the facts as alleged by Ideal, National did not
generally lower its prices, so the Court need not inquire
into “any number of reasons,” ante, at 7, that it might
have done so.5 Instead, it simply ceased charging tax on
cash sales, allegedly, and logically, because it had ceased
reporting those sales and accordingly was not itself paying
sales tax on them. App. 11–13. Nor is it fatal to Ideal’s
proof of damages that National could have continued to
——————
5 Nor
is it fair to require a plaintiff to prove that the tort caused the
lowering of prices at the motion to dismiss stage. Ideal’s complaint
alleges that petitioners “pass on to National’s customers the sales tax
‘savings’ that National realizes as a result of its false returns.” App. 16.
This allegation that, as a factual matter, National was able to charge a
lower price after tax because of its fraud suffices to permit Ideal to
survive a motion to dismiss on the question whether the prices were
lowered due to the fraud, as opposed to other factors.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

charge taxes to its customers and invested the additional
money elsewhere. Ante, at 7. Had National actually done
so, it might be difficult to ascertain the damages suffered
by Ideal as a result of that investment. But the mere fact
that National could have committed tax fraud without
readily ascertainable injury to Ideal does not mean that its
tax fraud necessarily caused no readily ascertainable
injury in this case. Likewise, the Court is undoubtedly
correct that “Ideal’s lost sales could have resulted from
factors other than petitioners’ alleged tax frauds.” Ibid.
However, the means through which the fraudulent scheme
was carried out—with sales tax charged on noncash sales,
but no tax charged on cash sales—renders the damages
more ascertainable than in the typical case of lost busi
ness. In any event, it is well within the expertise of a
district court to evaluate testimony and evidence and
determine what portion of Ideal’s lost sales are attribut
able to National’s lower prices and what portion to other
factors.
The Court also relies on an additional reason Holmes
gave for limiting recovery to direct victims—namely, that
“[t]he requirement of a direct causal connection is espe
cially warranted where the immediate victims of an al
leged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws
by pursuing their own claims.” Ante, at 8 (citing Holmes,
503 U. S., at 269–270). Certainly, New York can sue here
and vindicate the law, rendering respondent’s enforcement
of the law less necessary than it would be if respondent
were the only direct victim of the illegal activity. But our
recognition in Holmes that limiting recovery to direct
victims would not undermine deterrence does not support
the conclusion that any victim whose lawsuit is unneces
sary for deterrence is an indirect victim. Indeed, in any
tort case with multiple possible plaintiffs, a single plain
tiff’s lawsuit could suffice to vindicate the law. If multiple
plaintiffs are direct victims of a tort, it would be unjust to
8 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

declare some of their lawsuits unnecessary for deterrence,
absent any basis for doing so in the relevant statute.
Because respondent’s injuries result from petitioners’
fraud, and not from New York’s injuries, respondent has a
right to recover equal to that of New York.
Application of common-law principles of proximate
causation beyond the directness requirement likewise
supports a finding that causation was sufficiently pleaded
in this case. Though the Holmes Court noted that direct
ness was “one of [the] central elements” it had considered
in evaluating causation, it recognized that proximate
causation took “many shapes” at common law. Id., at 268.
Cf. Prosser & Keeton §42, at 273 (noting “two contrasting
theories of legal cause,” one extending liability to, but not
beyond, “the scope of the ‘foreseeable risks,’ ” and the other
extending liability to, but not beyond, all “ ‘directly trace
able’ ” consequences and those indirect consequences that
are foreseeable).6 The proximate-cause limitation serves
to ensure that “a defendant is not answerable for anything
beyond the natural, ordinary and reasonable consequences
of his conduct.” Sutherland 57. “If one’s fault happens to
concur with something extraordinary, and therefore not
likely to be foreseen, he will not be answerable for such
unexpected result.” Ibid. Based on this principle, courts
have historically found proximate causation for injuries
from natural causes, if a wrongful act “rendered it prob
able that such an injury will occur,” id., at 62; for injuries
where the plaintiff’s reliance is the immediate cause, such
as in an action for fraud, so long as the reliance was “rea
sonably induced by the prior misconduct of the defendant,”
id., at 62–63; and for injuries where an innocent third
party intervenes between the tortfeasor and the victim,
——————
6 Prosser and Keeton appear to use “direct” in a broader sense than

that adopted by the Court in Holmes. See Prosser & Keeton §43, at
273, 293–297.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

such that the innocent third party is the immediate cause
of the injury, so long as the tortfeasor “contributed so
effectually to [the injury] as to be regarded as the efficient
or at least concurrent and responsible cause,” id., at 64–65
(emphasis deleted).
The Court of Appeals, by limiting RICO plaintiffs to
those who are “ ‘the targets, competitors and intended
victims of the racketeering enterprise,’ ” 373 F. 3d 251, 260
(CA2 2004) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N. A., 318 F. 3d
113, 124 (CA2 2003)), outlined a proximate-causation
standard that falls well in line both with the reasoning
behind having a proximate-cause requirement at all, and
with the traditional applications of this standard to tort
feasors who caused injury only through a two-step process.
The Court, in contrast, permits a defendant to evade
liability for harms that are not only foreseeable, but the
intended consequences of the defendant’s unlawful behav
ior. A defendant may do so simply by concocting a scheme
under which a further, lawful and intentional step by the
defendant is required to inflict the injury. Such a rule
precludes recovery for injuries for which the defendant is
plainly morally responsible and which are suffered by
easily identifiable plaintiffs. There is no basis in the
RICO statute, in common-law tort, or in Holmes for reach
ing this result.
II
Because neither the plain language of the civil RICO
provision nor our precedent supports the Court’s holding,
it must be rejected. It is worth noting, however, that
while the Court’s holding in the present case may prevent
litigation in an area far removed from the concerns about
organized crime that led to RICO’s enactment, that hold
ing also precludes civil recovery for losses sustained by
business competitors as a result of quintessential organ
ized criminal activity, cases Congress indisputably in
10 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

tended its broad language to reach.
Congress plainly enacted RICO to address the problem
of organized crime, and not to remedy general state-law
criminal violations. See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 245 (1989). There is some
evidence, to be sure, that the drafters knew that RICO
would have the potential to sweep more broadly than
organized crime and did not find that problematic. Id., at
246–248. Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that “in
its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enac
tors.” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 500
(1985).
Judicial sentiment that civil RICO’s evolution is unde
sirable is widespread.7 Numerous justices have expressed
dissatisfaction with either the breadth of RICO’s applica
tion, id., at 501 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, Black
mun, and Powell, JJ., dissenting) (“The Court’s interpreta
tion of the civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes
private litigation; it validates the federalization of broad
areas of state common law of frauds, and it approves the
displacement of well-established federal remedial provi
sions. . . . [T]here is no indication that Congress even
considered, much less approved, the scheme that the
Court today defines”), or its general vagueness at outlin
ing the conduct it is intended to prohibit, H. J. Inc., supra,
——————
7 See Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 St. Mary’s L. J. 5,
13 (1989) (“I think that the time has arrived for Congress to enact
amendments to civil RICO to limit its scope to the sort of wrongs that
are connected to organized crime, or have some other reason for being
in federal court”); Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges’ Perspective, and
Some Notes on Practice for North Carolina Lawyers, 12 Campbell
L. Rev. 145, 148 (1990) (“[E]very single district judge with whom I have
discussed the subject (and I’m talking in the dozens of district judges
from across the country) echoes the entreaty expressed in the Chief
Justice’s title in The Wall Street Journal [,Get RICO Cases Out of My
Courtroom, May 19, 1983, p. A14, col. 4]”).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

at 255–256 (SCALIA, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and
O’Connor and KENNEDY, JJ., concurring in judgment) (“No
constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the
present case . . . . That the highest Court in the land has
been unable to derive from this statute anything more
than today’s meager guidance bodes ill for the day when
that challenge is presented”). Indeed, proposals for cur
tailing civil RICO have been introduced in Congress; for
example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
enacted in 1995, removed securities fraud as a predicate
act under RICO. Pub. L. 104–67, §107, 109 Stat. 758,
amending 18 U. S. C. §1964(c); see also Abrams, Crime
Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons from Civil
RICO, 50 SMU L. Rev. 33, 34 (1996).
This case, like the majority of civil RICO cases, has no
apparent connection to organized crime. See Sedima, 473
U. S., at 499, n. 16 (quoting an ABA Task Force determi
nation that, over the period reviewed, only 9% of civil
RICO cases at the trial court level involved “ ‘allegations of
criminal activity of a type generally associated with pro
fessional criminals’ ”). Given the distance the facts of this
case lie from the prototypical organized criminal activity
that led to RICO’s enactment, it is tempting to find in the
Act a limitation that will keep at least this and similar
cases out of court.
The Court’s attempt to exclude this case from the reach
of civil RICO, however, succeeds in eliminating not only
cases that lie far outside the harm RICO was intended to
correct, but also those that were at the core of Congress’
concern in enacting the statute. The Court unanimously
recognized in Sedima that one reason—and, for the dis
sent, the principal reason—Congress enacted RICO was to
protect businesses against competitive injury from organ
ized crime. See id., at 500–523 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the provision conferring a right of action
on individual plaintiffs had as its “principal target . . . the
12 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

economic power of racketeers, and its toll on legitimate
businessmen”); id., at 494–500.
The unanimous view of the Sedima Court is correct.
The sponsor of a Senate precursor to RICO noted that
“ ‘the evil to be curbed is the unfair competitive advantage
inherent in the large amount of illicit income available to
organized crime.’ ” Id., at 514 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 17999 (1967) (remarks of Senator
Hruska); some emphasis deleted); see also 473 U. S., at
515 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“ ‘When organized crime
moves into a business, it brings all the techniques of vio
lence and intimidation which it used in its illegal busi
nesses. Competitors are eliminated and customers con
fined to sponsored suppliers’ ”). Upon adding a provision
for a civil remedy in a subsequently proposed bill, Senator
Hruska noted:
“ ‘[This] bill also creates civil remedies for the honest
businessman who has been damaged by unfair compe
tition from the racketeer businessman. Despite the
willingness of the courts to apply the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act to organized crime activities, as a practical
matter the legitimate businessman does not have
adequate civil remedies available under that act. This
bill fills that gap.’ ” Id., at 516 (Marshall, J., dissent
ing) (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 6993 (1969); emphasis
deleted).
A portion of these bills was ultimately included in RICO,
which was attached as Title IX to the Organized Crime
Control Act. The Committee Report noted that the Title
“has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organi
zations operating in interstate commerce.” S. Rep. No.
91–617, p. 76 (1969).
The observations of the President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the source of
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

much of the congressional concern over organized crime,
are consistent with these statements. Its chapter on
Organized Crime noted that “organized crime is also
extensively and deeply involved in legitimate business. . . .
[I]t employs illegitimate methods—monopolization, terror
ism, extortion, tax evasion—to drive out or control lawful
ownership and leadership and to exact illegal profits from
the public.” The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
p. 187 (1967). The report noted that “[t]he millions of
dollars [organized crime] can throw into the legitimate
economic system gives it power to manipulate the price of
shares on the stock market, to raise or lower the price of
retail merchandise, to determine whether entire indus
tries are union or nonunion, to make it easier or harder for
businessmen to continue in business.” Ibid.
It is not difficult to imagine a competitive injury to a
business that would result from the kind of organized
crime that Sedima, Congress, and the Commission all
recognized as the principal concern of RICO, yet that
would fail the Court’s restrictive proximate-cause test.
For example, an organized crime group, running a legiti
mate business, could, through threats of violence, per
suade its supplier to sell goods to it at cost, so that it could
resell those goods at a lower price to drive its competitor
out of the business. Honest businessmen would be unable
to compete, as they do not engage in threats of violence to
lower their costs. Civil RICO, if it was intended to do
anything at all, was intended to give those businessmen a
cause of action. Cf. Sedima, 473 U. S., at 521–522 (Mar
shall, J., dissenting). Yet just like respondent, those
businessmen would not themselves be the immediate
target of the threats; the target would be the supplier.
Like respondent’s injury, their injury would be most im
mediately caused by the lawful activity of price competi
tion, not the unlawful activity of threatening the supplier.
Accordingly, under the Court’s view, the honest business
14 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

man competitor would be just an “indirect” victim, whose
injury was not proximately caused by the RICO violation.8
Civil RICO would thus confer no right to sue on the indi
vidual who did not himself suffer the threats of violence,
even if the threats caused him harm.
As a result, after today, civil RICO plaintiffs that suffer
precisely the kind of injury that motivated the adoption of
the civil RICO provision will be unable to obtain relief. If
this result was compelled by the text of the statute, the
interference with congressional intent would be unavoid
able. Given that the language is not even fairly suscepti
ble of such a reading, however, I cannot agree with this
frustration of congressional intent.
III
Because I conclude that Ideal has sufficiently pleaded
proximate cause, I must proceed to the question which the
Court does not reach: whether reliance is a required ele
ment of a RICO claim predicated on mail or wire fraud
and, if it is, whether that reliance must be by the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals held that reliance is required, but
that “a RICO claim based on mail fraud may be proven
where the misrepresentations were relied on by a third
person, rather than by the plaintiff.” 373 F. 3d, at 262–
263. I disagree with the conclusion that reliance is re
quired at all. In my view, the mere fact that the predicate
acts underlying a particular RICO violation happen to be
fraud offenses does not mean that reliance, an element of
common-law fraud, is also incorporated as an element of a
civil RICO claim.
Petitioners are correct that the common law generally
required a showing of justifiable reliance before a plaintiff
——————
8 The honest businessman would likewise fail JUSTICE SCALIA’s theory
of proximate causation, because laws against threats of violence are
intended to protect those who are so threatened, not other parties that
might suffer as a consequence. Ante, at 1 (concurring opinion).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

could recover for damages caused by fraud. See Neder v.
United States, 527 U. S. 1, 24–25 (1999); Prosser & Keeton
§105, at 728. But RICO does not confer on private plain
tiffs a right to sue defendants who engage in any act of
common-law fraud; instead, racketeering activity includes,
as relevant to this case, “any act which is indictable under
[18 U. S. C. §]1341 (relating to mail fraud) [and §]1343
(relating to wire fraud).” §1961(1) (2000 ed., Supp. III).
And we have recognized that these criminal fraud statutes
“did not incorporate all the elements of common-law
fraud.” Neder, 527 U. S., at 24. Instead, the criminal mail
fraud statute applies to anyone who “having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud . . .
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or
attempting so to do, places in any post office . . . any mat
ter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service . . . .” §1341. See §1343 (similar language for wire
fraud). We have specifically noted that “[b]y prohibiting
the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,
the element of reliance . . . would clearly be inconsistent
with the statutes Congress enacted.” Id., at 25.
Because an individual can commit an indictable act of
mail or wire fraud even if no one relies on his fraud, he
can engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in viola
tion of §1962, without proof of reliance. Accordingly, it
cannot be disputed that the Government could prosecute a
person for such behavior. The terms of §1964(c) (2000 ed.),
which broadly authorize suit by “[a]ny person injured in
his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962,” permit no different conclusion when an individual
brings a civil action against such a RICO violator.
It is true that our decision in Holmes to apply the com
mon-law proximate cause requirement was likewise not
compelled by the broad language of the statute. But our
decision in that case was justified by the “very unlikeli
hood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured
16 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

plaintiffs to recover.” 503 U. S., at 266. This unlikelihood
stems, in part, from the nature of proximate cause, which
is “not only a general condition of civil liability at common
law but is almost essential to shape and delimit a rational
remedy.” Systems Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, 303 F. 3d
100, 104 (CA1 2002). We also decided Holmes in light of
Congress’ decision to use the same words to impose civil
liability under RICO as it had in §7 of the Sherman Act,
26 Stat. 210, into which federal courts had implied a
proximate-cause limitation. 503 U. S., at 268. Accord
ingly, it was fair to interpret the broad language “by rea
son of” as meaning, in all civil RICO cases, that the viola
tion must be both the cause-in-fact and the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
Here, by contrast, the civil action provision cannot be
read to always require that the plaintiff have relied on the
defendant’s action. Reliance is not a general limitation on
civil recovery in tort; it “is a specialized condition that
happens to have grown up with common law fraud.”
Loiselle, supra, at 104. For most of the predicate acts
underlying RICO violations, it cannot be argued that the
common law, if it even recognized such acts as civilly
actionable, required proof of reliance. See §1961 (2000 ed.,
Supp. III). In other words, there is no language in
§1964(c) that could fairly be read to add a reliance re
quirement in fraud cases only. Nor is there any reason to
believe that Congress would have defined “racketeering
activity” to include acts indictable under the mail and wire
fraud statutes, if it intended fraud-related acts to be predi
cate acts under RICO only when those acts would have
been actionable under the common law.
Because reliance cannot be read into §§1341 and 1343,
nor into RICO itself, it is not an element of a civil RICO
claim. This is not to say that, in the general case, a plain
tiff will not have to prove that someone relied on the
predicate act of fraud as part of his case. If, for example,
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Opinion of THOMAS, J.

New York had not believed petitioners’ misrepresentation
with respect to their sales, Ideal may well not have been
injured by petitioners’ scheme, which would have faltered
at the first step. Indeed, the petitioners recognize that “in
the ordinary misrepresentation case, the reliance re
quirement simply functions as a necessary prerequisite to
establishing the causation required by the language of
§1964(c).” Brief for Petitioners 29. But the fact that proof
of reliance is often used to prove an element of the plain
tiff’s cause of action, such as the element of causation,
does not transform reliance itself into an element of the
cause of action. See Loiselle, supra, at 104 (“Reliance is
doubtless the most obvious way in which fraud can cause
harm, but it is not the only way”). Because respondent
need not allege reliance at all, its complaint, which alleges
that New York relied on petitioners’ misrepresentations,
App. 16, is more than sufficient.
* * *
The Congress that enacted RICO may never have in
tended to reach cases like the one before us, and may have
“federalize[d] a great deal of state common law” without
any intention of “produc[ing] these far-reaching results.”
Sedima, 473 U. S., at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But
this Court has always refused to ignore the language of
the statute to limit it to “the archetypal, intimidating
mobster,” and has instead recognized that “[i]t is not for
the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations
where Congress has provided it simply because plaintiffs
are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applica
tions.” Id., at 499–500. Today, however, the Court not
only eliminates private RICO actions in some situations
Congress may have inadvertently regulated, but it sub
stantially limits the ability of civil RICO to reach even
those cases that motivated Congress’ enactment of this
provision in the first place. I respectfully dissent.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of BREYER, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________

No. 04–433
_________________

JOSEPH ANZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IDEAL STEEL
SUPPLY CORP.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[June 5, 2006]

JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In my view, the civil damages remedy in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U. S. C. §§1961–1968 (2000 ed. and Supp. III), does not
cover claims of injury by one competitor where the legiti
mate pro-competitive activity of another competitor im
mediately causes that injury. I believe that this is such a
case and would consequently hold that RICO does not
authorize the private action here at issue.
I

A

RICO essentially seeks to prevent organized criminals
from taking over or operating legitimate businesses. Its
language, however, extends its scope well beyond those
central purposes. RICO begins by listing certain predicate
acts, called “ ‘racketeering activity,’ ” which consist of other
crimes, ranging from criminal copyright activities, the
facilitation of gambling, and mail fraud to arson, kidnap
ping and murder. §1961(1). It then defines a “ ‘pattern of
racketeering activity’ ” to include engaging in “at least
two” predicate acts in a 10-year period. §1961(5) (2000
ed.). And it forbids certain business-related activities
involving such a “pattern” and an “enterprise.” The for
2 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of BREYER, J.

bidden activities include using funds derived from a “pat
tern of racketeering activity” in acquiring, establishing, or
operating any enterprise, and conducting the affairs of any
enterprise through such “a pattern.” §§1962(a), (c).
RICO, a federal criminal statute, foresees criminal law
enforcement by the Federal Government. §1963 (2000 ed.,
Supp. III). It also sets forth civil remedies. §1964 (2000
ed.). District courts “have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain [RICO] violations.” §1964(a). And a person “in
jured in his business or property by reason of a [RICO]
violation” may seek treble damages and attorney’s fees.
§1964(c).
B
The present case is a private RICO treble-damages
action. A steel supply company, Ideal Steel, has sued a
competing steel supply company, National Steel, and its
owners, Joseph and Vincent Anza (to whom I shall refer
collectively as “National”). Ideal says that National com
mitted mail fraud by regularly filing false New York state
sales tax returns in order to avoid paying sales tax that it
owed—activity that amounts to a “pattern of racketeering
activity.” This activity enabled National to charge lower
prices without reducing its profit margins. Ideal says
National used some of these excess profits to fund the
building of a new store. Both the lower prices and the new
outlet attracted Ideal customers, thereby injuring Ideal.
Hence, says Ideal, it was injured “in [its] business . . . by
reason of” violations of two RICO provisions, the provision
that forbids conducting an “enterprise’s affairs” through a
“pattern of racketeering activity” and the provision that
forbids investing funds derived from such a “pattern” in an
“enterprise.” §§1962(c), (a). The question before us is
whether RICO permits Ideal to bring this private treble-
damages claim.
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Opinion of BREYER, J.

II
This Court, in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268 (1992), held that RICO’s
private treble-damages provision “demand[ed] . . . some
direct relation between the injury asserted and the injuri
ous conduct alleged.” The Court then determined that the
injury alleged by the plaintiff in that case was too remote
from the injurious conduct to satisfy this requirement.
I do not agree with the majority insofar as it believes
that Holmes’ holding in respect to the fact pattern there at
issue virtually dictates the answer to the question here.
In my view, the “causal connection” between the forbidden
conduct and plaintiff’s harm is, in certain key ways, more
direct here than it was in Holmes. In Holmes, the RICO
plaintiff was a surrogate for creditors of broker-dealers
that went bankrupt after losing money in stocks that had
been overvalued due to fraudulent statements made by
the RICO defendant and others. Put in terms of “proxi
mate cause,” the plaintiff’s harm (an ordinary creditor
loss) differed in kind from the harm that the “predicate
acts” (securities fraud) would ordinarily cause (stock
related monetary losses). The harm was “indirect” in the
sense that it was entirely derivative of the more direct
harm the defendant’s actions had caused the broker-
dealers; and, there were several steps between the viola
tion and the harm (misrepresentation—broker-dealer
losses—broker-dealer business failure—ordinary creditor
loss). Here, however, the plaintiff alleges a harm (lost
customers) that flows directly from the lower prices and
the opening of a new outlet—actions that were themselves
allegedly caused by activity that Congress designed RICO
to forbid (conducting a business through a “pattern” of
“predicate acts” and investing in a business funds derived
from such a “pattern”). In this sense, the causal links
before us are more “direct” than those in Holmes. See
ante, at 2–4 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissent
4 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of BREYER, J.

ing in part).
Nonetheless, I agree with the majority that Holmes
points the way. That case makes clear that RICO contains
important limitations on the scope of private rights of
action. It specifies that RICO does not provide a private
right of action “simply on showing that the defendant
violated §1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defen
dant’s violation was a ‘but for’ cause of the plaintiff’s
injury.” 503 U. S., at 265–266 (footnote omitted). Pointing
out “the very unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow
all factually injured plaintiffs to recover,” id., at 266 (em
phasis added), Holmes concludes that RICO imposes a
requirement of “proximate cause,” a phrase that “label[s]
generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s re
sponsibility for the consequences of that person’s own
acts.” Id., at 268. It recognizes that these tools seek to
discern “ ‘what justice demands, or . . . what is administra
tively possible and convenient.’ ” Ibid. (quoting W. Keeton,
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
Law of Torts §41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984)). It also explains
that “proximate cause” demands “directness,” while speci
fying that “directness” is only one of “the many shapes this
concept took at common law.” 503 U. S., at 268–269. And
it points to antitrust law, both as a source of RICO’s
treble-damages provisions and as an aid to their interpre
tation. Ibid.
In my view, the “antitrust” nature of the treble-damage
provision’s source, taken together with both RICO’s basic
objectives and important administrative concerns, implies
that a cause is “indirect,” i.e., it is not a “proximate cause,”
if the causal chain from forbidden act to the injury caused
a competitor proceeds through a legitimate business’s
ordinary competitive activity. To use a physical metaphor,
ordinary competitive actions undertaken by the defendant
competitor cut the direct causal link between the plaintiff
competitor’s injuries and the forbidden acts.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of BREYER, J.

The basic objective of antitrust law is to encourage the
competitive process. In particular, that law encourages
businesses to compete by offering lower prices, better
products, better methods of production, and better systems
of distribution. See, e.g., 1 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and
Their Application ¶100a, pp. 3–4 (2d ed. 2000). As I shall
explain, these principles suggest that RICO does not
permit private action based solely upon this competitive
type of harm, i.e., harm a plaintiff suffers only because the
defendant was able to attract customers through normal
competitive methods, such as lower prices, better prod
ucts, better methods of production, or better systems of
distribution. In such cases, the harm falls outside the
limits that RICO’s private treble-damages provision’s
“proximate-cause” requirement imposes. In such cases the
distance between the harm and the predicate acts that
funded (or otherwise enabled) such ordinary competitive
activity is too distant. The harm is not “direct.”
At the same time, those principles suggest that other
types of competitive injuries not within their protective
ambit could lie within, not outside, “proximate-cause”
limits. Where, for example, a RICO defendant attracts
customers in ways that involve illegitimate competitive
means, e.g., by threatening violence, a claim may still lie.
Claims involving RICO violations that objectively target a
particular competitor, e.g., bribing an official to harass a
competitor, could also be actionable.
Several considerations lead to this conclusion. First, I
have found no case (outside the Second Circuit, from
which this case arose) in which a court has authorized a
private treble-damages suit based upon no more than a
legitimate business’s ordinary pro-competitive activity
(even where financed by the proceeds of a RICO predicate
act).
Second, an effort to bring harm caused by ordinary
6 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of BREYER, J.

competitive activity within the scope of RICO’s private
treble-damages action provision will raise serious prob
lems of administrability. Ante, at 6–8 (majority opinion);
see also Holmes, supra, at 269. To demonstrate that a
defendant’s lower price caused a plaintiff to lose customers
(or profits) requires the plaintiff to show what would have
happened in its absence. Would customers have changed
suppliers irrespective of the price change because of other
differences in the suppliers? Would other competing firms
have lowered their prices? Would higher prices have
attracted new entry? Would demand for the industry’s
product, or the geographic scope of the relevant market,
have changed? If so, how? To answer such questions
based upon actual market circumstances and to apportion
damages among the various competitors harmed is diffi
cult even for plaintiffs trying to trace harm caused by a
defendants’ anti-competitive behavior. Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519, 542,
544 (1983) (the possibility that harm “may have been
produced by independent factors” and “the danger of com
plex apportionment of damages” weigh against finding the
requisite causal connection in an antitrust case). To an
swer such questions in the context of better functioning
markets, where prices typically reflect competitive condi
tions, would likely prove yet more difficult.
Third, where other victims, say victims of the underly
ing RICO “predicate acts” are present, there is no pressing
need to provide such an action. Those alternative victims
(here the State of New York) typically “could be counted
on to bring suit for the law’s vindication.” Holmes, supra,
at 273. They could thus fulfill Congress’ aim in adopting
the civil remedy of “turn[ing victims] into prosecutors,
‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racket
eering activity.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 557 (2000)
(quoting Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp., 521 U. S. 179, 187
(1997)).
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of BREYER, J.

Fourth, this approach to proximate cause would retain
private actions aimed at the heart of Congress’ relevant
RICO concerns. RICO’s sponsors, in reporting their under
lying reasons for supporting RICO, emphasized, not the fair,
ordinary competition that an infiltrated business might offer
its competitors, but the risk that such a business would act
corruptly, exercising unfair methods of competition. S. Rep.
No. 91–617, pp. 76–78 (1969); see also Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 165 (2001). RICO
focuses upon the “infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime,” in significant part because, when “ ‘or
ganized crime moves into a business, it brings all the
techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in
its illegal businesses.’ ” Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U. S. 479, 517, 515 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting 113 Cong. Rec. 17999 (1967)).
My approach would not rule out private actions in such
cases. Nor would it rule out three of the four suits men
tioned by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Sedima, when he
describes RICO’s objectives. It would not rule out lawsuits
by injured competitors or legitimate investors if a racket
eer, “uses ‘[t]hreats, arson and assault . . . to force com
petitors out of business’ ”; “uses arson and threats to in
duce honest businessmen to pay protection money, or to
purchase certain goods, or to hire certain workers”; or
“displace[s]” an “honest investor” when he “infiltrates and
obtains control of a legitimate business . . . through fraud”
or the like. 473 U. S., at 521–522.
I concede that the approach would rule out a competi
tor’s lawsuit based on no more than an “infiltrated enter
prise” operating a legitimate business to a businessman’s
competitive disadvantage because unlawful predicate acts
helped that legitimate business build “a strong economic
base.” And I recognize that this latter kind of suit at least
arguably would have provided helpful deterrence had the
view of Sedima’s dissenting Justices prevailed. Id., at
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Opinion of BREYER, J.

500–523 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that RICO’s
private action provision did not authorize suits based on
harm flowing directly from predicate acts); id., at 523–530
(Powell, J., dissenting) (same). But the dissent did not
prevail, and the need for deterrence consequently offers
only weakened support for a reading of RICO that author
izes private suits in this category.
Fifth, without this limitation, RICO enforcement and
basic antitrust policy could well collide. Firms losing the
competitive battle might find bases for a RICO attack on
their more successful competitors in claimed misrepresen
tations or even comparatively minor misdeeds by that
competitor. Firms that fear such treble-damages suits
might hesitate to compete vigorously, particularly in
concentrated industries where harm to a competitor is
more easily traced but where the consumer’s need for
vigorous competition is particularly strong. The ultimate
victim of any such tendency to pull ordinary competitive
punches of course would be not the competing business,
but the consumer. Although Congress did not intend its
RICO treble-damages provision as a simple copy of the
antitrust laws’ similar remedies, see, e.g., Sedima, supra,
at 498–499, there is no sound reason to interpret RICO’s
treble-damages provision as if Congress intended to set it
and its antitrust counterpart at cross-purposes.
For these reasons, I would read into the private treble-
damages provision a “proximate-cause” limitation that
places outside the provision harms that are traceable to an
unlawful act only through a form of legitimate competitive
activity.
III
Applying this approach to the present case, I would hold
that neither of Ideal’s counts states a RICO private treble-
damages claim. National is a legitimate business. An
other private plaintiff (the State of New York) is available.
 Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of BREYER, J.

The question is whether Ideal asserts a harm caused
directly by something other than ordinary competitive
activity, i.e., lower prices, a better product, a better distri
bution system, or a better production method.
Ideal’s second count claims injury caused by National’s
(1) having taken customers (2) attracted by its new store
(3) that it financed in part through profits generated by
the tax fraud scheme, and the financing is the relevant
violation. §1962(a). The opening of a distribution outlet is
a legitimate competitive activity. It benefits the firm that
opens it by making it more convenient for customers to
purchase from that supplier. That ordinary competitive
process is all the complaint describes. And for the reasons
I have given in Part II, supra, I believe that the financing
of a new store—even with funds generated by unlawful
activities—is not sufficient to create a private cause of
action as long as the activity funded amounts to legitimate
competitive activity. Ideal must look for other remedies,
e.g., bringing the facts to the attention of the United
States Attorney or the State of New York.
Ideal’s first count presents a more difficult question. It
alleges that National filed false sales tax returns to the
State of New York. As an action indictable under the
federal mail fraud statute, that action is a predicate act
under RICO. See §1961(1) (2000 ed., Supp. III). National
passed these savings on to its cash customers by not
charging them sales tax, thereby attracting more cash
customers than it would have without the scheme. Is this
a form of injury caused, not by ordinary competitive activ
ity, but simply by the predicate act itself?
In my view, the answer to this question is “no.” The
complaint alleges predicate acts that amount simply to the
facts that National did not “charge” or “pay” sales taxes or
accurately “report” sales figures to the State. National did
not tell its customers, “We shall not pay sales taxes.”
Rather, it simply charged the customer a lower price, say,
10 ANZA v. IDEAL STEEL SUPPLY CORP.

Opinion of BREYER, J.

$100 rather than $100 plus $8 tax. Consider a retailer
who advertises to the customer a $100 table and adds, “We
pay all sales taxes.” Such a retailer is telling the customer
that he will charge the customer a lower price by the
amount of the tax, i.e., about $92. The retailer implies
that he, the retailer, will pay the tax to the State, taking
the requisite amount owed to the State from the $100 the
customer paid for the item.
The defendants here have done no more. They have in
effect cut the price of the item by the amount of the sales
tax and then kept the money instead of passing it on to the
State. They funded the price cut from the savings, but the
source of the savings is, in my view, beside the point as
long as the price cut itself is legitimate. I can find nothing
in the complaint that suggests it is not.
For these reasons, I would reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals on both counts.