(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
JONES v. FLOWERS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No. 04–1477. Argued January 17, 2006—Decided April 26, 2006
Petitioner Jones continued to pay the mortgage on his Arkansas home
after separating from his wife and moving elsewhere in the same city.
Once the mortgage was paid off, the property taxes—which had been
paid by the mortgage company—went unpaid, and the property was
certified as delinquent. Respondent Commissioner of State Lands
mailed Jones a certified letter at the property’s address, stating that
unless he redeemed the property, it would be subject to public sale in
two years. Nobody was home to sign for the letter and nobody re
trieved it from the post office within 15 days, so it was returned to
the Commissioner, marked “unclaimed.” Two years later, the Com
missioner published a notice of public sale in a local newspaper. No
bids were submitted, so the State negotiated a private sale to respon
dent Flowers. Before selling the house, the Commissioner mailed an
other certified letter to Jones, which was also returned unclaimed.
Flowers purchased the house and had an unlawful detainer notice de
livered to the property. It was served on Jones’ daughter, who noti
fied him of the sale. He filed a state-court suit against respondents,
alleging that the Commissioner’s failure to provide adequate notice
resulted in the taking of his property without due process. Granting
respondents summary judgment, the trial court concluded that Ar
kansas’ tax sale statute, which sets out the notice procedure used
here, complied with due process. The State Supreme Court affirmed.
Held:
1. When mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, a State
must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to
the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to
do so. Pp. 4–12.
(a) This Court has deemed notice constitutionally sufficient if it
was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent,
2 JONES v. FLOWERS
Syllabus
see, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S.
306, 314, but has never addressed whether due process requires fur
ther efforts when the government becomes aware prior to the taking
that its notice attempt has failed. Most Courts of Appeals and State
Supreme Courts addressing this question have decided that the gov
ernment must do more in such a case, and many state statutes re
quire more than mailed notice in the first instance. Pp. 4–6.
(b) The means a State employs to provide notice “must be such as
one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.” Mullane, 399 U. S., at 315. The adequacy of
a particular form of notice is assessed by balancing the State’s inter
est against “the individual interest sought to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 314. Here, the evaluation concerns
the adequacy of notice prior to the State’s extinguishing a property
owner’s interest in a home. It is unlikely that a person who actually
desired to inform an owner about an impending tax sale of a house
would do nothing when a certified letter addressed to the owner is re
turned unclaimed. The sender would ordinarily attempt to resend
the letter, if that is practical, especially given that it concerns the
important and irreversible prospect of losing a house. The State may
have made a reasonable calculation of how to reach Jones, but it had
good reason to suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was
no better off than if no notice had been sent. The government must
consider unique information about an intended recipient regardless
of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to provide no
tice in the ordinary case. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S. 38, 40
(per curiam), and Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146–147.
It does not matter that the State in each of those cases was aware of
the information before it calculated the best way to send notice.
Knowledge that notice was ineffective was one of the “practicalities
and peculiarities of the case” taken into account, Mullane, supra, at
314–315, and it should similarly be taken into account in assessing
the adequacy of notice here. The Commissioner and Solicitor General
correctly note the constitutionality of that a particular notice proce
dure is assessed ex ante, not post hoc. But if a feature of the State’s
procedure is that it promptly provides additional information to the
government about the effectiveness of attempted notice, the ex ante
principle is not contravened by considering what the government
does with that information. None of the Commissioner’s additional
contentions—that notice was sent to an address that Jones provided
and had a legal obligation to keep updated, that a property owner
who fails to receive a property tax bill and pay taxes is on inquiry no
tice that his property is subject to governmental taking, and that
Jones was obliged to ensure that those in whose hands he left his
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Syllabus
property would alert him if it was in jeopardy—relieves the State of
its constitutional obligation to provide adequate notice. Pp. 7–12.
2. Because additional reasonable steps were available to the State,
given the circumstances here, the Commissioner’s effort to provide
notice to Jones was insufficient to satisfy due process. What is rea
sonable in response to new information depends on what that infor
mation reveals. The certified letter’s return “unclaimed” meant ei
ther that Jones was not home when the postman called and did not
retrieve the letter or that he no longer resided there. One reasonable
step addressed to the former possibility would be for the State to re-
send the notice by regular mail, which requires no signature. Certi
fied mail makes actual notice more likely only if someone is there to
sign for the letter or tell the mail carrier that the address is incorrect.
Regular mail can be left until the person returns home, and might in
crease the chances of actual notice. Other reasonable follow-up
measures would have been to post notice on the front door or address
otherwise undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Either approach would
increase the likelihood that any occupants would alert the owner, if
only because an ownership change could affect their own occupancy.
Contrary to Jones’ claim, the Commissioner was not required to
search the local phone book and other government records. Such an
open-ended search imposes burdens on the State significantly greater
than the several relatively easy options outlined here. The Commis
sioner’s complaint about the burden of even these additional steps is
belied by Arkansas’ requirement that notice to homestead owners be
accomplished by personal service if certified mail is returned and by
the fact that the State transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer or
tax sale purchaser. The Solicitor General’s additional arguments—
that posted notice could be removed by children or vandals, and that
the follow-up requirement will encourage States to favor modes of de
livery that will not generate additional information—are rejected.
This Court will not prescribe the form of service that Arkansas
should adopt. Arkansas can determine how best to proceed, and the
States have taken a variety of approaches. Pp. 12–17.
359 Ark. 443, ___ S. W. 3d ___, reversed and remanded.
ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS,
SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissent
ing opinion, in which SCALIA and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., took
no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–1477
_________________
GARY KENT JONES, PETITIONER v. LINDA K.
FLOWERS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ARKANSAS
[April 26, 2006]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid
taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment requires the government to provide the owner “no
tice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature
of the case.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We granted certiorari to deter
mine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the
owner and returned undelivered, the government must take
additional reasonable steps to provide notice before taking
the owner’s property.
I
In 1967, petitioner Gary Jones purchased a house at 717
North Bryan Street in Little Rock, Arkansas. He lived in
the house with his wife until they separated in 1993.
Jones then moved into an apartment in Little Rock, and
his wife continued to live in the North Bryan Street house.
Jones paid his mortgage each month for 30 years, and the
mortgage company paid Jones’ property taxes. After
Jones paid off his mortgage in 1997, the property taxes
2 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
went unpaid, and the property was certified as delinquent.
In April 2000, respondent Mark Wilcox, the Commis
sioner of State Lands (Commissioner), attempted to notify
Jones of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the
property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the
North Bryan Street address. See Ark. Code Ann. §26–37–
301 (1997). The packet of information stated that unless
Jones redeemed the property, it would be subject to public
sale two years later on April 17, 2002. See ibid. Nobody
was home to sign for the letter, and nobody appeared at
the post office to retrieve the letter within the next 15
days. The post office returned the unopened packet to the
Commissioner marked “ ‘unclaimed.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 3.
Two years later, and just a few weeks before the public
sale, the Commissioner published a notice of public sale in
the Arkansas Democrat Gazette. No bids were submitted,
which permitted the State to negotiate a private sale of
the property. See §26–37–202(b). Several months later,
respondent Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer.
The Commissioner mailed another certified letter to Jones
at the North Bryan Street address, attempting to notify
him that his house would be sold to Flowers if he did not
pay his taxes. Like the first letter, the second was also
returned to the Commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Ibid.
Flowers purchased the house, which the parties stipulated
in the trial court had a fair market value of $80,000, for
$21,042.15. Record 224. Immediately after the 30-day
period for postsale redemption passed, see §26–37–202(e),
Flowers had an unlawful detainer notice delivered to the
property. The notice was served on Jones’ daughter, who
contacted Jones and notified him of the tax sale. Id., at 11
(Exh. B).
Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the
Commissioner and Flowers, alleging that the Commis
sioner’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of
Jones’ right to redeem resulted in the taking of his prop
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
Opinion of the Court
erty without due process. The Commissioner and Flowers
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two
unclaimed letters sent by the Commissioner were a consti
tutionally adequate attempt at notice, and Jones filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner
and Flowers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a–13a. It concluded
that the Arkansas tax sale statute, which set forth the
notice procedure followed by the Commissioner, complied
with constitutional due process requirements.
Jones appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court af
firmed the trial court’s judgment. 359 Ark. 443, ___ S. W.
3d ___ (2004). The court noted our precedent stating that
due process does not require actual notice, see Dusenbery
v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002), and it held
that attempting to provide notice by certified mail satis
fied due process in the circumstances presented, 359 Ark.,
at ___, ___ S. W. 3d, at ___.
We granted certiorari, 545 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve a
conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts
concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the
government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a
property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned unde
livered. Compare, e.g., Akey v. Clinton County, 375 F. 3d
231, 236 (CA2 2004) (“In light of the notice’s return, the
County was required to use ‘reasonably diligent efforts’ to
ascertain Akey’s correct address”), and Kennedy v. Mos
safa, 100 N. Y. 2d 1, 9, 789 N. E. 2d 607, 611 (2003) (“[W]e
reject the view that the enforcing officer’s obligation is
always satisfied by sending the notice to the address listed
in the tax roll, even where the notice is returned as unde
liverable”), with Smith v. Cliffs on the Bay Condominium
Assn., 463 Mich. 420, 429, 617 N. W. 2d 536, 541 (2000)
(per curiam) (“The fact that one of the mailings was re
turned by the post office as undeliverable does not impose
on the state the obligation to undertake an investigation
4 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
to see if a new address . . . could be located”). We hold that
when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed,
the State must take additional reasonable steps to at
tempt to provide notice to the property owner before sell
ing his property, if it is practicable to do so. Under the
circumstances presented here, additional reasonable steps
were available to the State. We therefore reverse the
judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court.
II
A
Due process does not require that a property owner
receive actual notice before the government may take his
property. Dusenbery, supra, at 170. Rather, we have
stated that due process requires the government to pro
vide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. The Commis
sioner argues that once the State provided notice reasona
bly calculated to apprise Jones of the impending tax sale
by mailing him a certified letter, due process was satisfied.
The Arkansas statutory scheme is reasonably calculated to
provide notice, the Commissioner continues, because it
provides for notice by certified mail to an address that the
property owner is responsible for keeping up to date. See
Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). The Commissioner
notes this Court’s ample precedent condoning notice by
mail, see, e.g., Dusenbery, supra, at 169; Tulsa Profes
sional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490
(1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U. S. 791,
798 (1983); Mullane, supra, at 318–319, and adds that the
Arkansas scheme exceeds constitutional requirements by
requiring the Commissioner to use certified mail. Brief for
Respondent Commissioner 14–15.
It is true that this Court has deemed notice constitu
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
Opinion of the Court
tionally sufficient if it was reasonably calculated to reach
the intended recipient when sent. See, e.g., Dusenbery,
supra, at 168–169; Mullane, 339 U. S., at 314. In each of
these cases, the government attempted to provide notice
and heard nothing back indicating that anything had gone
awry, and we stated that “[t]he reasonableness and hence
the constitutional validity of [the] chosen method may be
defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably
certain to inform those affected.” Id., at 315; see also
Dusenbery, supra, at 170. But we have never addressed
whether due process entails further responsibility when
the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its
attempt at notice has failed. That is a new wrinkle, and
we have explained that the “notice required will vary with
circumstances and conditions.” Walker v. City of Hutchin
son, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956). The question presented
is whether such knowledge on the government’s part is
a “circumstance and condition” that varies the “notice
required.”
The Courts of Appeals and State Supreme Courts have
addressed this question on frequent occasions, and most
have decided that when the government learns its attempt
at notice has failed, due process requires the government
to do something more before real property may be sold in a
tax sale.1 See, e.g., Plemons v. Gale, 396 F. 3d 569, 576
——————
1 Most Courts of Appeals have also concluded that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the Federal Government to take
further reasonable steps in the property forfeiture context. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F. 3d 903, 911 (CA9 2003); Foehl v. United
States, 238 F. 3d 474, 480 (CA3 2001); Small v. United States, 136 F. 3d
1334, 1337–1338 (CADC 1998); Torres v. $36,256.80 U. S. Currency, 25
F. 3d 1154, 1161 (CA2 1994); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74
F. 3d 657, 660 (CA5 1996); United States v. Rodgers, 108 F. 3d 1247,
1252–1253 (CA10 1997); see also Garcia v. Meza, 235 F. 3d 287, 291 (CA7
2000) (declining to adopt a per se rule that only examines notice at the
time it is sent, but also declining to impose an affirmative duty to seek out
claimants in every case where notice is returned undelivered). But see
6 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
(CA4 2005); Akey, 375 F. 3d, at 236; Hamilton v. Renewed
Hope, Inc., 277 Ga. 465, 468, 589 S. E. 2d 81, 85 (2003);
Kennedy, 100 N. Y. 2d, at 9, 789 N. E. 2d, at 611; Malone
v. Robinson, 614 A. 2d 33, 38 (D. C. App. 1992); St. George
Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church v. Aggarwal, 326
Md. 90, 103, 603 A. 2d 484, 490 (1992); Wells Fargo Credit
Corp. v. Ziegler, 780 P. 2d 703, 705 (Okla. 1989);
Rosenberg v. Smidt, 727 P. 2d 778, 780–783 (Alaska 1986);
Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 297, 707 P. 2d 404, 408
(1985); Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507
Pa. 288, 296, 489 A. 2d 1334, 1338–1339 (1985). But see
Smith, 463 Mich., at 429, 617 N. W. 2d, at 541; Dahn v.
Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶23, 576 N. W. 2d 535, 541–542;
Elizondo v. Read, 588 N. E. 2d 501, 504 (Ind. 1992); Atlan
tic City v. Block C–11, Lot 11, 74 N. J. 34, 39–40, 376 A. 2d
926, 928 (1977). Many States already require in their
statutes that the government do more than simply mail
notice to delinquent owners, either at the outset or as a
followup measure if initial mailed notice is ineffective.2
——————
Madewell v. Downs, 68 F. 3d 1030, 1047 (CA8 1995); Sarit v. United
States Drug Enforcement Admin., 987 F. 2d 10, 14–15 (CA1 1993).
2 Many States require that notice be given to the occupants of the
property as a matter of course. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §3704.7
(West Supp. 2006); Ga. Code Ann. §48–4–45(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 2005); Ill.
Comp. Stat., ch. 35, §§200/21–75(a), 200/22–10, 200/22–15 (West 2004);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 36, §1073 (1990); Md. Tax-Prop. Code Ann.
§14–836(b)(4)(i)(2) (Lexis 2001); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §211.78i(3)
(West 2005); Minn. Stat. §281.23(6) (2004); Mont. Code Ann. §§15–18–
212(1)(a), (2)(A) (2005); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §57–28–04(3) (Lexis
2005); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68, §3118(A) (West Supp. 2006); S. D. Codified
Laws §10–25–5 (2004); Utah Code Ann. §59–2–1351(2)(a) (Lexis 2004);
Wis. Stat. §75.12(1) (2003–2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §39–13–108(e)(v)(B)
(2005). Some States require that notice be posted on the property or at
the property owner’s last known address either at the outset, see Del.
Code Ann., Tit. 9, §§8724, 8772 (1989 and Supp. 2004); Ga. Code Ann.
§48–4–78(d) (Supp. 2005); Haw. Rev. Stat. §246–56 (2003); Md. Tax-
Prop. Code Ann. §14–836(b)(6) (Lexis 2001); Okla. Stat., Tit. 68,
§3118(A) (West Supp. 2006), or as a followup measure when personal
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
Opinion of the Court
In Mullane, we stated that “when notice is a person’s
due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desir
ous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it,” 339 U. S., at 315, and that assess
ing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires
balancing the “interest of the State” against “the individ
ual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,” id., at 314. Our leading cases on notice
have evaluated the adequacy of notice given to beneficiar
ies of a common trust fund, Mullane, supra; a mortgagee,
Mennonite, 462 U. S. 791; owners of seized cash and auto
mobiles, Dusenbery, 534 U. S. 161; Robinson v. Hanrahan,
409 U. S. 38 (1972) (per curiam); creditors of an estate,
Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S. 478; and tenants living in
public housing, Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444 (1982). In
this case, we evaluate the adequacy of notice prior to the
State extinguishing a property owner’s interest in a home.
We do not think that a person who actually desired to
inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a
house he owns would do nothing when a certified letter
sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commis
sioner prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent
——————
service cannot be accomplished or certified mail is returned, see Fla.
Stat. §197.522(2)(a) (2003); Minn. Stat. §281.23(6) (2004); S. C. Code
Ann. §12–51–40(c) (Supp. 2005). And a few States require a diligent
inquiry to find a property owner’s correct address when mailed notice is
returned. See Miss. Code Ann. §27–43–3 (2002); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§361.595(3)(b) (2003); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 72, §5860.607a (Purdon
1990); R. I. Gen. Laws §44–9–25.1 (2005).
See also 26 U. S. C. §6335(a) (requiring the Internal Revenue Service to
make a reasonable attempt to personally serve notice on a delinquent
taxpayer before relying upon notice by certified mail); 28 U. S. C.
§3203(g)(1)(A)(i)(IV) (requiring written notice to tenants of real property
subject to sale under the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act); 12
U. S. C. §3758(2)(A)(iii) (requiring written notice to occupants before
foreclosure by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development);
§3758(2)(B)(ii) (requiring that notice be posted on the property if occu
pants are unknown).
8 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
taxpayers, handed them to the postman, and then watched
as the departing postman accidentally dropped the letters
down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Com
missioner’s office to prepare a new stack of letters and
send them again. No one “desirous of actually informing”
the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters
disappeared and say “I tried.” Failure to follow up would
be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were
reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients
when delivered to the postman.
By the same token, when a letter is returned by the post
office, the sender will ordinarily attempt to resend it, if it
is practicable to do so. See Small v. United States, 136
F. 3d 1334, 1337 (CADC 1998). This is especially true
when, as here, the subject matter of the letter concerns
such an important and irreversible prospect as the loss of
a house. Although the State may have made a reasonable
calculation of how to reach Jones, it had good reason to
suspect when the notice was returned that Jones was “no
better off than if the notice had never been sent.” Malone,
supra, at 37. Deciding to take no further action is not
what someone “desirous of actually informing” Jones
would do; such a person would take further reasonable
steps if any were available.
In prior cases, we have required the government to
consider unique information about an intended recipient
regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably
calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case. In Rob
inson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice of forfeiture pro
ceedings sent to a vehicle owner’s home address was in
adequate when the State knew that the property owner
was in prison. 409 U. S., at 40. In Covey v. Town of So
mers, 351 U. S. 141 (1956), we held that notice of foreclo
sure by mailing, posting, and publication was inadequate
when town officials knew that the property owner was
incompetent and without a guardian’s protection. Id., at
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
Opinion of the Court
146–147.
The Commissioner points out that in these cases, the
State was aware of such information before it calculated
how best to provide notice. But it is difficult to explain
why due process would have settled for something less if
the government had learned after notice was sent, but
before the taking occurred, that the property owner was in
prison or was incompetent. Under Robinson and Covey,
the government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the
normal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation
on the government’s part to take additional steps to effect
notice. That knowledge was one of the “practicalities and
peculiarities of the case,” Mullane, supra, at 314–315, that
the Court took into account in determining whether con
stitutional requirements were met. It should similarly be
taken into account in assessing the adequacy of notice in
this case. The dissent dismisses the State’s knowledge
that its notice was ineffective as “learned long after the
fact,” post, at 7, n. 5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.), but the notice
letter was promptly returned to the State two to three
weeks after it was sent, and the Arkansas statutory re
gime precludes the State from taking the property for two
years while the property owner may exercise his right to
redeem, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–37–301 (Supp. 2005).
It is certainly true, as the Commissioner and Solicitor
General contend, that the failure of notice in a specific
case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted
notice; in that sense, the constitutionality of a particular
procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post
hoc. But if a feature of the State’s chosen procedure is
that it promptly provides additional information to the
government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not
contravene the ex ante principle to consider what the
government does with that information in assessing the
adequacy of the chosen procedure. After all, the State
knew ex ante that it would promptly learn whether its
10 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
effort to effect notice through certified mail had succeeded.
It would not be inconsistent with the approach the Court
has taken in notice cases to ask, with respect to a proce
dure under which telephone calls were placed to owners,
what the State did when no one answered. Asking what
the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed
is not substantively different.
The Commissioner has three further arguments for why
reasonable followup measures were not required in this
case. First, notice was sent to an address that Jones
provided and had a legal obligation to keep updated. See
Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997). Second, “after failing
to receive a property tax bill and pay property taxes, a
property holder is on inquiry-notice that his property is
subject to governmental taking.” Brief for Respondent
Commissioner 18–19. Third, Jones was obliged to ensure
that those in whose hands he left his property would alert
him if it was in jeopardy. None of these contentions re
lieves the State of its constitutional obligation to provide
adequate notice.
The Commissioner does not argue that Jones’ failure to
comply with a statutory obligation to keep his address
updated forfeits his right to constitutionally sufficient
notice, and we agree. Id., at 19; see also Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 16, n. 5 (quoting Mennonite, 462
U. S., at 799 (“ ‘[A] party’s ability to take steps to safe
guard its own interests does not relieve the State of its
constitutional obligation’ ”)). In Robinson, we noted that
Illinois law required each vehicle owner to register his
address with the secretary of state, and that the State’s
vehicle forfeiture scheme provided for notice by mail to the
address listed in the secretary’s records. See 409 U. S., at
38, n. 1 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 951⁄2, §3–405 (1971), and
ch. 38, §36–1 (1969)). But we found that the State had not
provided constitutionally sufficient notice, despite having
followed its reasonably calculated scheme, because it knew
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 11
Opinion of the Court
that Robinson could not be reached at his address of re
cord. 409 U. S., at 31–32. Although Ark. Code Ann. §26–
35–705 provides strong support for the Commissioner’s
argument that mailing a certified letter to Jones at 717
North Bryan Street was reasonably calculated to reach
him, it does not alter the reasonableness of the Commis
sioner’s position that he must do nothing more when the
notice is promptly returned “unclaimed.”
As for the Commissioner’s inquiry notice argument, the
common knowledge that property may become subject to
government taking when taxes are not paid does not
excuse the government from complying with its constitu
tional obligation of notice before taking private property.
We have previously stated the opposite: An interested
party’s “knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes
is not equivalent to notice that a tax sale is pending.”
Mennonite, supra, at 800. It is at least as widely known
that arrestees have the right to remain silent, and that
anything they say may be used against them, see
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000)
(“Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966),] has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture”), but
that knowledge does not excuse a police failure to provide
Miranda warnings. Arkansas affords even a delinquent
taxpayer the right to settle accounts with the State and
redeem his property, so Jones’ failure to pay his taxes in a
timely manner cannot by itself excuse inadequate notice.
Finally, the Commissioner reminds us of a statement
from Mullane that the State can assume an owner leaves
his property in the hands of one who will inform him if his
interest is in jeopardy. 339 U. S., at 316. But in this
passage, Justice Jackson writes of “libel of a ship, attach
ment of a chattel[,] or entry upon real estate in the name
of law”—such “seiz[ures]” of property, he concluded, “may
reasonably be expected to come promptly to the owner’s
12 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
attention.” Ibid. An occupant, however, is not charged
with acting as the owner’s agent in all respects, and it is
quite a leap from Justice Jackson’s examples to conclude
that it is an obligation of tenancy to follow up with certi
fied mail of unknown content addressed to the owner. In
fact, the State makes it impossible for the occupant to
learn why the Commissioner is writing the owner, because
an occupant cannot call for a certified letter without first
obtaining the owner’s signature. For all the occupant
knows, the Commissioner of State Lands might write to
certain residents about a variety of matters he finds im
portant, such as state parks or highway construction; it
would by no means be obvious to an occupant observing a
certified mail slip from the Commissioner that the owner
is in danger of losing his property. In any event, there is
no record evidence that notices of attempted delivery were
left at 717 North Bryan Street.
Mr. Jones should have been more diligent with respect
to his property, no question. People must pay their taxes,
and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax
delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a
citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due
process requires the government to provide adequate
notice of the impending taking. U. S. Const., Amdt. 14;
Mennonite, supra, at 799.
B
In response to the returned form suggesting that Jones
had not received notice that he was about to lose his prop
erty, the State did—nothing. For the reasons stated, we
conclude the State should have taken additional reason
able steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so. The
question remains whether there were any such available
steps. While “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the
form of service that the [government] should adopt,” Gree
ne, 456 U. S., at 455, n. 9, if there were no reasonable addi
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 13
Opinion of the Court
tional steps the government could have taken upon return of
the unclaimed notice letter, it cannot be faulted for doing
nothing.
We think there were several reasonable steps the State
could have taken. What steps are reasonable in response
to new information depends upon what the new informa
tion reveals. The return of the certified letter marked
“unclaimed” meant either that Jones still lived at 717
North Bryan Street, but was not home when the postman
called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or
that Jones no longer resided at that address. One reason
able step primarily addressed to the former possibility
would be for the State to resend the notice by regular mail,
so that a signature was not required. The Commissioner
says that use of certified mail makes actual notice more
likely, because requiring the recipient’s signature protects
against misdelivery. But that is only true, of course, when
someone is home to sign for the letter, or to inform the
mail carrier that he has arrived at the wrong address.
Otherwise, “[c]ertified mail is dispatched and handled in
transit as ordinary mail,” United States Postal Service,
Domestic Mail Manual §503.3.2.1 (Mar. 16, 2006), and the
use of certified mail might make actual notice less likely in
some cases—the letter cannot be left like regular mail to
be examined at the end of the day, and it can only be
retrieved from the post office for a specified period of time.
Following up with regular mail might also increase the
chances of actual notice to Jones if—as it turned out—he
had moved. Even occupants who ignored certified mail
notice slips addressed to the owner (if any had been left)
might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice packet
and leave it for the postman to retrieve, or notify Jones
directly.
Other reasonable followup measures, directed at the
possibility that Jones had moved as well as that he had
simply not retrieved the certified letter, would have been
14 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
to post notice on the front door, or to address otherwise
undeliverable mail to “occupant.” Most States that explic
itly outline additional procedures in their tax sale statutes
require just such steps. See n. 2, supra. Either approach
would increase the likelihood that the owner would be
notified that he was about to lose his property, given the
failure of a letter deliverable only to the owner in person.
That is clear in the case of an owner who still resided at
the premises. It is also true in the case of an owner who
has moved: Occupants who might disregard a certified
mail slip not addressed to them are less likely to ignore
posted notice, and a letter addressed to them (even as
“occupant”) might be opened and read. In either case,
there is a significant chance the occupants will alert the
owner, if only because a change in ownership could well
affect their own occupancy. In fact, Jones first learned of
the State’s effort to sell his house when he was alerted by
one of the occupants—his daughter—after she was served
with an unlawful detainer notice.
Jones believes that the Commissioner should have
searched for his new address in the Little Rock phonebook
and other government records such as income tax rolls.
We do not believe the government was required to go this
far. As the Commissioner points out, the return of Jones’
mail marked “unclaimed” did not necessarily mean that
717 North Bryan Street was an incorrect address; it
merely informed the Commissioner that no one appeared
to sign for the mail before the designated date on which it
would be returned to the sender. An open-ended search
for a new address—especially when the State obligates the
taxpayer to keep his address updated with the tax collec
tor, see Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997)—imposes
burdens on the State significantly greater than the several
relatively easy options outlined above.
The Commissioner complains about the burden of even
those additional steps, but his argument is belied by Ar
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 15
Opinion of the Court
kansas’ current requirement that notice to homestead
owners be accomplished by personal service if certified
mail is returned, §26–37–301(e) (Supp. 2005), and the fact
that Arkansas transfers the cost of notice to the taxpayer
or the tax sale purchaser, §26–37–104(a). The Commis
sioner has offered no estimate of how many notice letters
are returned, and no facts to support the dissent’s asser
tion that the Commissioner must now physically locate
“tens of thousands of properties every year.” Post, at 10.
Citing our decision in Greene v. Lindsey, the Solicitor
General adds that posted notice could be taken down by
children or vandals. But in Greene, we noted that outside
the specific facts of that case, posting notice on real prop
erty is “a singularly appropriate and effective way of
ensuring that a person . . . is actually apprised of proceed
ings against him.” 456 U. S., at 452–453. Successfully
providing notice is often the most efficient way to collect
unpaid taxes, see Mennonite, 462 U. S., at 800, n. 5 (more
effective notice may ease burden on State if recipient
arranges to pay delinquent taxes prior to tax sale); Tr. of
Oral Arg. 24 (85 percent of tax delinquent properties in
Arkansas are redeemed upon notice of delinquency), but
rather than taking relatively easy additional steps to
effect notice, the State undertook the burden and expense
of purchasing a newspaper advertisement, conducting an
auction, and then negotiating a private sale of the prop
erty to Flowers.
The Solicitor General argues that requiring further
effort when the government learns that notice was not
delivered will cause the government to favor modes of
providing notice that do not generate additional informa
tion—for example, starting (and stopping) with regular
mail instead of certified mail. We find this unlikely, as we
have no doubt that the government repeatedly finds itself
being asked to prove that notice was sent and received.
Using certified mail provides the State with documenta
16 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
tion of personal delivery and protection against false
claims that notice was never received. That added secu
rity, however, comes at a price—the State also learns
when notice has not been received. We conclude that,
under the circumstances presented, the State cannot
simply ignore that information in proceeding to take and
sell the owner’s property—any more than it could ignore
the information that the owner in Robinson was in jail, or
that the owner in Covey was incompetent.
Though the Commissioner argues that followup meas
ures are not constitutionally required, he reminds us that
the State did make some attempt to follow up with Jones
by publishing notice in the newspaper a few weeks before
the public sale. Several decades ago, this Court observed
that “[c]hance alone” brings a person’s attention to “an
advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of
a newspaper,” Mullane, 339 U. S., at 315, and that notice
by publication is adequate only where “it is not reasonably
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,”
id., at 317. Following up by publication was not constitu
tionally adequate under the circumstances presented here
because, as we have explained, it was possible and practi
cable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impend
ing tax sale.
The dissent forcefully articulates some basic principles
about constitutionally required notice, principles from
which we have no intention to depart. In particular, we
disclaim any “new rule” that is “contrary to Dusenbery and
a significant departure from Mullane.” Post, at 6. In
Dusenbery, the Government was aware that someone at
the prison had signed for the prisoner’s notice letter, and
we determined that this attempt at notice was adequate,
despite the fact that the State could have made notice
more likely by requiring the prisoner to sign for the letter
himself. 534 U. S., at 171. In this case, of course, the
notice letter was returned to the Commissioner, informing
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 17
Opinion of the Court
him that his attempt at notice had failed.
As for Mullane, it directs that “when notice is a person’s
due . . . [t]he means employed must be such as one desir
ous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably
adopt to accomplish it.” 339 U. S., at 315. Mindful of the
dissent’s concerns, we conclude, at the end of the day, that
someone who actually wanted to alert Jones that he was
in danger of losing his house would do more when the
attempted notice letter was returned unclaimed, and there
was more that reasonably could be done.
As noted, “[i]t is not our responsibility to prescribe the
form of service that the [government] should adopt.”
Greene, supra, at 455, n. 9. In prior cases finding notice
inadequate, we have not attempted to redraft the State’s
notice statute. See, e.g., Tulsa Professional, 485 U. S., at
490–491; Robinson, 409 U. S., at 40; Schroeder v. City of
New York, 371 U. S. 208, 213–214 (1962); Walker, 352 U. S.,
at 116; Covey, 351 U. S., at 146–147. The State can de
termine how to proceed in response to our conclusion that
notice was inadequate here, and the States have taken a
variety of approaches to the present question. See n. 2,
supra. It suffices for present purposes that we are confi
dent that additional reasonable steps were available for
Arkansas to employ before taking Jones’ property.
* * *
There is no reason to suppose that the State will ever be
less than fully zealous in its efforts to secure the tax reve
nue it needs. The same cannot be said for the State’s
efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice
before the State takes action against them. In this case,
the State is exerting extraordinary power against a prop
erty owner—taking and selling a house he owns. It is not
too much to insist that the State do a bit more to attempt
to let him know about it when the notice letter addressed
to him is returned unclaimed.
18 JONES v. FLOWERS
Opinion of the Court
The Commissioner’s effort to provide notice to Jones of
an impending tax sale of his house was insufficient to
satisfy due process given the circumstances of this case.
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is reversed,
and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 04–1477
_________________
GARY KENT JONES, PETITIONER v. LINDA K.
FLOWERS ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
ARKANSAS
[April 26, 2006]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA and
JUSTICE KENNEDY join, dissenting.
When petitioner failed to pay his property taxes for
several consecutive years, respondent Commissioner of
State Lands in Arkansas, using the record address that
petitioner provided to the State, sent petitioner a letter by
certified mail, noting his tax delinquency and explaining
that his property would be subject to public sale if the
delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid. After peti
tioner failed to respond, the State also published notice of
the delinquency and public sale in an Arkansas newspaper.
Soon after respondent Linda K. Flowers submitted a pur
chase offer to the State, it sent petitioner a second letter by
certified mail explaining that the sale would proceed if the
delinquent taxes and penalties were not paid.
Petitioner argues that the State violated his rights
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment because, in his view, the State failed to take suffi
cient steps to contact him before selling his property to
Flowers. Petitioner contends that once the State became
aware that he had not claimed the certified mail, it was
constitutionally obligated to employ additional methods to
locate him.
Adopting petitioner’s arguments, the Court holds today
that “when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned un
2 JONES v. FLOWERS
THOMAS, J., dissenting
claimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps
to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before
selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.” Ante, at
4. The Court concludes that it was practicable for Arkan
sas to take additional steps here—namely, notice by regu
lar mail, posting notice on petitioner’s door, and address
ing mail to “occupant.” Ante, at 13. Because, under this
Court’s precedents, the State’s notice methods clearly
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, I
respectfully dissent.
I
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from
“depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” This Court has held that a State must
provide an individual with notice and opportunity to be
heard before the State may deprive him of his property.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S.
306, 313 (1950). Balancing a State’s interest in efficiently
managing its administrative system and an individual’s
interest in adequate notice, this Court has held that a State
must provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action.” Id., at 313–314. As this Court has explained,
“when notice is a person’s due . . . [t]he means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id., at
315. “[H]eroic efforts,” however, are not required. Dusen
bery v. United States, 534 U. S. 161, 170 (2002). To the
contrary, we have expressly rejected “[a] construction of the
Due Process Clause which would place impossible or im
practical obstacles in the way [of the State].” Mullane,
supra, at 313–314. Thus, “none of our cases . . . has re
quired actual notice”; instead, “we have allowed the Gov
ernment to defend the ‘reasonableness and hence the consti
tutional validity of any chosen method . . . on the ground
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 3
THOMAS, J., dissenting
that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those af
fected.’” Dusenbery, supra, at 169–170 (quoting Mullane,
supra, at 315).
The methods of notice employed by Arkansas were rea
sonably calculated to inform petitioner of proceedings
affecting his property interest and thus satisfy the re
quirements of the Due Process Clause. The State mailed a
notice by certified letter to the address provided by peti
tioner. The certified letter was returned to the State
marked “unclaimed” after three attempts to deliver it. The
State then published a notice of public sale containing
redemption information in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette
newspaper. After Flowers submitted a purchase offer, the
State sent yet another certified letter to petitioner at his
record address. That letter, too, was returned to the State
marked “unclaimed” after three delivery attempts.1
Arkansas’ attempts to contact petitioner by certified
mail at his “record address,” without more, satisfy due
process. Dusenbery, supra, at 169. See also Mullane,
supra, at 318; Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc.
v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 490 (1988) (“We have repeatedly
recognized that mail service is an inexpensive and effi
cient mechanism that is reasonably calculated to provide
actual notice”); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462
U. S. 791, 792, 798 (1983) (holding that “notice mailed to
[the affected party’s] last known available address” is
sufficient where a State seeks to sell “real property on
——————
1 Though the Court posits that “there is no record evidence that no
tices of attempted delivery were left at 717 North Bryan Street,” ante,
at 12, the postal carrier was required to leave notice at the address at
each delivery attempt indicating that delivery of certified mail had been
attempted and that the mail could be retrieved at the local post office.
See United States Postal Operations Manual §813.25 (July 2005),
http://www.nalc.org/depart/can/pdf/manuals/pom/pomc8.pdf (all Inter
net materials as visited Apr. 21, 2006, and available in Clerk of Court’s
case file) (“The carrier must leave a notice of arrival on Form 3849 if
the carrier cannot deliver the certifiable article for any reason”).
4 JONES v. FLOWERS
THOMAS, J., dissenting
which payments of property taxes have been delinquent”
(emphasis added)). Because the notices were sent to the
address provided by petitioner himself, the State had an
especially sound basis for determining that notice would
reach him. Moreover, Arkansas exceeded the constitu
tional minimum by additionally publishing notice in a
local newspaper.2 See Mullane, supra, at 318. Due proc
ess requires nothing more—and certainly not here, where
petitioner had a statutory duty to pay his taxes and to
report any change of address to the state taxing authority.
See Ark. Code Ann. §26–35–705 (1997).
My conclusion that Arkansas’ notice methods satisfy due
process is reinforced by the well-established presumption
that individuals, especially those owning property, act in
their own interest. Recognizing that “ ‘[i]t is the part of
common prudence for all those who have any interest in [a
thing], to guard that interest by persons who are in a
situation to protect it,’ ” Mullane, supra, at 316 (quoting
The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144 (1815)), this Court has con
cluded that “[t]he ways of an owner with tangible property
are such that he usually arranges means to learn of any
direct attack upon his possessory or proprietary rights.”
Mullane, 339 U. S., at 316. Consistent with this observa
tion, Arkansas was free to “indulge the assumption” that
petitioner had either provided the State taxing authority
with a correct and up-to-date mailing address—as re
quired by state law—“or that he . . . left some caretaker
under a duty to let him know that [his property was] being
jeopardized.”3 Ibid.
——————
2 The
Court found inadequate the State’s attempt at notice by publi
cation, as if that were the State’s sole method for effectuating notice,
see ante, at 16. But the State plainly used it here as a secondary
method of notice.
3 The issue is not, as the Court maintains, whether the current occu
pant is “charged with acting as the owner’s agent.” Ante, at 12.
Rather, the issue is whether petitioner discharged his own duty to
guard his interests.
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 5
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The Court does not conclude that certified mail is inher
ently insufficient as a means of notice, but rather that “the
government’s knowledge that notice pursuant to the nor
mal procedure was ineffective triggered an obligation on
the government’s part to take additional steps to effect
notice.” Ante, at 9. I disagree.
First, whether a method of notice is reasonably calcu
lated to notify the interested party is determined ex ante,
i.e., from the viewpoint of the government agency at the
time its notice is sent. This follows from Mullane, where
this Court rested its analysis on the information the
sender had “at hand” when its notice was sent. 339 U. S.,
at 318. Relatedly, we have refused to evaluate the rea
sonableness of a particular method of notice by comparing
it to alternative methods that are identified after the fact.
See Dusenbery, 534 U. S., at 171–172. Today the Court
appears to abandon both of these practices. Its rejection of
Arkansas’ selected method of notice—a method this Court
has repeatedly concluded is constitutionally sufficient—is
based upon information that was unavailable when notice
was sent. Indeed, the Court’s proposed notice methods—
regular mail, posting and addressing mail to “occupant,”
ante, at 12–14—are entirely the product of post hoc con
siderations, including the discovery that members of
petitioner’s family continued to live in the house. Simi
larly, the Court’s observation that “[t]he Commissioner[’s]
complain[t] about the burden of . . . additional steps . . . is
belied by Arkansas’ current requirement that notice to
homestead-owners be accomplished by personal service if
certified mail is returned,” ante, at 14–15, is contrary to
Dusenbery’s “conclusion that the Government ought not be
penalized and told to ‘try harder’ . . . simply because [it]
has since upgraded its policies,” 534 U. S., at 172 (citation
omitted).
Second, implicit in our holding that due process does not
require “actual notice,” see id., at 169–170, is that when
6 JONES v. FLOWERS
THOMAS, J., dissenting
the “government becomes aware . . . that its attempt at
notice has failed,” ante, at 5, it is not required to take
additional steps to ensure that notice has been received.
Petitioner’s challenge to Arkansas’ notice methods, and
the Court’s acceptance of it, is little more than a thinly
veiled attack on Dusenbery. Under the majority’s logic,
each time a doubt is raised with respect to whether notice
has reached an interested party, the State will have to
consider additional means better calculated to achieve
notice. Because this rule turns on speculative, newly
acquired information, it has no natural end point, and, in
effect, requires the States to achieve something close to
actual notice. The majority’s new rule is contrary to
Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane.
The only circumstances in which this Court has found
notice by mail and publication inadequate under the Due
Process Clause involve situations where the state or local
government knew at the outset that its notice efforts were
destined to fail and knew how to rectify the problem prior
to sending notice. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U. S.
38, 39 (1972) (per curiam) (intended recipient known to be
in jail); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 145 (1956)
(intended recipient known to be incompetent and without
a guardian).
In Robinson, the State, having arrested petitioner and
detained him in county jail, immediately instituted forfei
ture proceedings against his automobile and mailed notice
of those proceedings to his residential address. 409 U. S.,
at 38. Robinson, who was incarcerated in the county jail
during the entirety of the forfeiture proceedings, did not
receive notice of the proceedings until after he was re
leased and the forfeiture order had been entered. Id., at
38–39. Because the State knew beforehand that Robinson
was not at, and had no access to, the address to which it
sent the notice, this Court held that the State’s efforts
were not “reasonably calculated” to notify him of the pend
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 7
THOMAS, J., dissenting
ing proceedings. Id., at 40. Similarly, in Covey, the Court
concluded that the methods of notice used by the town—
mailing, posting, and publishing—were not reasonably
calculated to inform Covey of proceedings adverse to her
property interests because local officials knew prior to
sending notice that she was “without mental capacity to
handle her affairs” and unable to comprehend the mean
ing of the notices. 351 U. S., at 144, 146.
By contrast, Arkansas did not know at the time it sent
notice to petitioner that its method would fail; and Ar
kansas did not know that petitioner no longer lived at the
record address simply because letters were returned
“unclaimed.” Pet. for Cert. 3. “[U]nclaimed” does not
necessarily mean that an address is no longer correct; it
may indicate that an intended recipient has simply failed
or refused to claim mail. See United States Postal Ser
vice, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), §507, Exh. 1.4.1,
http://pe.usps.gov/text/dmm300/507.htm.4 Given that the
State had been using the address provided by petitioner
and that petitioner had a legal duty to maintain a cur
rent mailing address with the state taxing authority,
return of the mail as “unclaimed” did not arm Arkansas
with the type of specific knowledge that the governments
had at hand in Robinson and Covey. Cf. ante, at 13. The
State cannot be charged to correct a problem of peti
tioner’s own creation and of which it was not aware.5
——————
4 The Postal Service uses “Moved, Left No Address” to indicate that
the “[A]ddressee moved and filed no change-of-address order,” and “Not
Deliverable as Addressed—Unable to Forward” to indicate that the
mail is “undeliverable at address given; no change-of-address order on
file; forwarding order expired.” DMM §507, Exh. 1.4.1.
5 The Court’s “storm drain” hypothetical, ante, at 7–8, presents the
harder question of when notice is sent—at the precise moment the
Commissioner places the mail in the postal carrier’s hand or the split
second later when he observes the departing carrier drop the mail down
the storm drain. That more difficult question is not before us in this
case because Arkansas learned long after the fact that its attempts had
been unsuccessful.
8 JONES v. FLOWERS
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Even if the State had divined that petitioner was no
longer at the record address, its publication of notice in a
local newspaper would have sufficed because Mullane
authorizes the use of publication when the record address
is unknown. See 339 U. S., at 316 (“[P]ublication tradi
tionally has been acceptable as notification supplemental
to other action which in itself may reasonably be ex
pected to convey a warning”).
II
The Court’s proposed methods, aside from being consti
tutionally unnecessary, are also burdensome, impractical,
and no more likely to effect notice than the methods actu
ally employed by the State.
In Arkansas, approximately 18,000 parcels of delinquent
real estate are certified annually. Tsann Kuen Enterprises
Co. v. Campbell, 335 Ark. 110, 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d 822,
828 (2003). Under the Court’s rule, the State will bear the
burden of locating thousands of delinquent property own
ers. These administrative burdens are not compelled by
the Due Process Clause. See Mullane, supra, at 313–314;
Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc., 485 U. S., at
489–490 (stating that constitutionally sufficient notice
“need not be inefficient or burdensome”). Here, Arkansas
has determined that its law requiring property owners to
maintain a current address with the state taxing author
ity, in conjunction with its authorization to send property
notices to the record address, is an efficient and fair way
to administer its tax collection system. The Court’s deci
sion today forecloses such a reasonable system and bur
dens the State with inefficiencies caused by delinquent
taxpayers.
Moreover, the Court’s proposed methods are no more
reasonably calculated to achieve notice than the methods
employed by the State here. Regular mail is hardly fool
proof; indeed, it is arguably less effective than certified
mail. Certified mail is tracked, delivery attempts are
Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 9
THOMAS, J., dissenting
recorded, actual delivery is logged, and notices are posted
to alert someone at the residence that certified mail is
being held at a local post office. By creating a record,
these features give parties grounds for defending or chal
lenging notice. By contrast, regular mail is untraceable;
there is no record of either delivery or receipt. Had the
State used regular mail, petitioner would presumably
argue that it should have sent notice by certified mail
because it creates a paper trail.6
The Court itself recognizes the deficiencies of its pro
posed methods. It acknowledges that “[f]ollowing up with
regular mail might . . . increase the chances of actual
notice”; “occupants who ignored certified mail notice slips
. . . might scrawl the owner’s new address on the notice
packet,” ante, at 12; and “a letter addressed to [occupant]
might be opened and read,” ante, at 14 (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, the Court justifies its redrafting of Arkansas’
notice statute on the ground that “[its] approach[es] would
increase the likelihood that the owner would be notified
that he was about to lose his property . . . .” Ibid. That,
however, is not the test; indeed, we rejected such reasoning
in Dusenbery. See 534 U. S., at 171 (rejecting the argu
ment that “the FBI’s notice was constitutionally flawed
——————
6 Interestingly, the Court stops short of saddling the State with the
other steps that petitioner argues a State should take any time the
interested party fails to claim letters mailed to his record address, see
ante, at 14, namely searching state tax records, the phone-book, the
Internet, department of motor vehicle records, or voting rolls, contacting
his employer, or employing debt collectors. Here, the Court reasons that
because of the context—the fact that the letter was returned merely
“unclaimed” and petitioner had a duty to maintain a current address—the
State is not required to go as far as petitioner urges. Ibid. Though the
methods proposed by petitioner are severely flawed (for instance, the
commonality of his surname “Jones” calls into question the fruitfulness of
Internet and phone-book searches), there is no principled basis for the
Court’s conclusion that petitioner’s other proposed methods would “im
pos[e] burdens on the State significantly greater than the several rela
tively easy options outlined [by the Court].” Ibid.
10 JONES v. FLOWERS
THOMAS, J., dissenting
because it was ‘substantially less likely to bring home
notice’ than a feasible substitute” (citations omitted)).
The Court’s suggestion that Arkansas post notice is
similarly unavailing. The State’s records are organized by
legal description, not address, which makes the prospect of
physically locating tens of thousands of properties every
year, and posting notice on each, impractical. See Tsann
Kuen Enterprises Co., supra, at 119–120, 129 S. W. 3d, at
828. Also, this Court has previously concluded that post
ing is an inherently unreliable method of notice. See
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U. S. 444, 453–454 (1982).
Similarly, addressing the mail to “occupant,” see ante, at
13, is no more reasonably calculated to reach petitioner. It
is sheer speculation to assume, as the Court does, that
although “[o]ccupants . . . might disregard a certified mail
slip . . . , a letter addressed to them (even as ‘occupant’)
might be opened and read.” Ante, at 14. It is at least as
likely that an occupant who receives generically addressed
mail will discard it as junk mail.
III
If “title to property should not depend on [factual] vaga
ries,” Dusenberry, supra, at 171, then certainly it cannot
turn on “wrinkle[s],” ante, at 5, caused by a property
owner’s own failure to be a prudent ward of his interests.
The meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the
antics of tax evaders and scofflaws. Nor is the self-created
conundrum in which petitioner finds himself a legitimate
ground for imposing additional constitutional obligations on
the State. The State’s attempts to notify petitioner by
certified mail at the address that he provided and, addi
tionally, by publishing notice in a local newspaper satisfy
due process. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of
the Arkansas Supreme Court.