(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
No. 06–8120. Argued April 23, 2007—Decided June 18, 2007
After officers stopped a car to check its registration without reason to
believe it was being operated unlawfully, one of them recognized peti
tioner Brendlin, a passenger in the car. Upon verifying that Brendlin
was a parole violator, the officers formally arrested him and searched
him, the driver, and the car, finding, among other things, metham
phetamine paraphernalia. Charged with possession and manufac
ture of that substance, Brendlin moved to suppress the evidence ob
tained in searching his person and the car, arguing that the officers
lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to make the traffic
stop, which was an unconstitutional seizure of his person. The trial
court denied the motion, but the California Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that Brendlin was seized by the traffic stop, which was
unlawful. Reversing, the State Supreme Court held that suppression
was unwarranted because a passenger is not seized as a constitu
tional matter absent additional circumstances that would indicate to
a reasonable person that he was the subject of the officer’s investiga
tion or show of authority.
Held: When police make a traffic stop, a passenger in the car, like the
driver, is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and so may chal
lenge the stop’s constitutionality. Pp. 4–13.
(a) A person is seized and thus entitled to challenge the govern
ment’s action when officers, by physical force or a show of authority,
terminate or restrain the person’s freedom of movement through
means intentionally applied. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434;
Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 597. There is no seizure
without that person’s actual submission. See, e.g., California v. Ho
dari D., 499 U. S. 621, 626, n. 2. When police actions do not show an
unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual’s submission
takes the form of passive acquiescence, the test for telling when a
2 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
seizure occurs is whether, in light of all the surrounding circum
stances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave. E.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (princi
pal opinion). But when a person “has no desire to leave” for reasons
unrelated to the police presence, the “coercive effect of the encounter”
can be measured better by asking whether “a reasonable person
would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter.” Bostick, supra, at 435–436. Pp. 4–6.
(b) Brendlin was seized because no reasonable person in his posi
tion when the car was stopped would have believed himself free to
“terminate the encounter” between the police and himself. Bostick,
supra, at 436. Any reasonable passenger would have understood the
officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was
free to depart without police permission. A traffic stop necessarily
curtails a passenger’s travel just as much as it halts the driver, di
verting both from the stream of traffic to the side of the road, and the
police activity that normally amounts to intrusion on “privacy and
personal security” does not normally (and did not here) distinguish
between passenger and driver. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U. S. 543, 554. An officer who orders a particular car to pull over acts
with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and a sen
sible person would not expect the officer to allow people to come and
go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation into faulty
behavior or wrongdoing. If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving,
the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close
association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the
passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt
to leave would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the
officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place. It
is also reasonable for passengers to expect that an officer at the scene
of a crime, arrest, or investigation will not let people move around in
ways that could jeopardize his safety. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U. S. 408, 414–415. The Court’s conclusion comports with the
views of all nine Federal Courts of Appeals, and nearly every state
court, to have ruled on the question. Pp. 6–9.
(c) The State Supreme Court’s contrary conclusion reflects three
premises with which this Court respectfully disagrees. First, the
view that the police only intended to investigate the car’s driver and
did not direct a show of authority toward Brendlin impermissibly
shifts the issue from the intent of the police as objectively manifested
to the motive of the police for taking the intentional action to stop the
car. Applying the objective Mendenhall test resolves any ambiguity
by showing that a reasonable passenger would understand that he
was subject to the police display of authority. Second, the state
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Syllabus
court’s assumption that Brendlin, as the passenger, had no ability to
submit to the police show of authority because only the driver was in
control of the moving car is unavailing. Brendlin had no effective
way to signal submission while the car was moving, but once it came
to a stop he could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside.
Third, there is no basis for the state court’s fear that adopting the
rule this Court applies would encompass even those motorists whose
movement has been impeded due to the traffic stop of another car.
An occupant of a car who knows he is stuck in traffic because another
car has been pulled over by police would not perceive the show of au
thority as directed at him or his car. Pp. 9–13.
(d) The state courts are left to consider in the first instance
whether suppression turns on any other issue. P. 13.
38 Cal. 4th 1107, 136 P. 3d 845, vacated and remanded.
SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 06–8120
_________________
BRUCE EDWARD BRENDLIN, PETITIONER v.
CALIFORNIA
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
[June 18, 2007]
JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of
the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The question in this case is whether the
same is true of a passenger. We hold that a passenger is
seized as well and so may challenge the constitutionality
of the stop.
I
Early in the morning of November 27, 2001, Deputy
Sheriff Robert Brokenbrough and his partner saw a
parked Buick with expired registration tags. In his ensu
ing conversation with the police dispatcher, Brokenbrough
learned that an application for renewal of registration was
being processed. The officers saw the car again on the
road, and this time Brokenbrough noticed its display of a
temporary operating permit with the number “11,” indicat
ing it was legal to drive the car through November. App.
115. The officers decided to pull the Buick over to verify
that the permit matched the vehicle, even though, as
Brokenbrough admitted later, there was nothing unusual
about the permit or the way it was affixed. Brokenbrough
2 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
asked the driver, Karen Simeroth, for her license and saw
a passenger in the front seat, petitioner Bruce Brendlin,
whom he recognized as “one of the Brendlin brothers.” Id.,
at 65. He recalled that either Scott or Bruce Brendlin had
dropped out of parole supervision and asked Brendlin to
identify himself.1 Brokenbrough returned to his cruiser,
called for backup, and verified that Brendlin was a parole
violator with an outstanding no-bail warrant for his ar
rest. While he was in the patrol car, Brokenbrough saw
Brendlin briefly open and then close the passenger door of
the Buick. Once reinforcements arrived, Brokenbrough
went to the passenger side of the Buick, ordered him out of
the car at gunpoint, and declared him under arrest. When
the police searched Brendlin incident to arrest, they found
an orange syringe cap on his person. A patdown search of
Simeroth revealed syringes and a plastic bag of a green
leafy substance, and she was also formally arrested.
Officers then searched the car and found tubing, a scale,
and other things used to produce methamphetamine.
Brendlin was charged with possession and manufacture
of methamphetamine, and he moved to suppress the evi
dence obtained in the searches of his person and the car as
fruits of an unconstitutional seizure, arguing that the
officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
make the traffic stop. He did not assert that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by the search of Si
meroth’s vehicle, cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978),
but claimed only that the traffic stop was an unlawful
seizure of his person. The trial court denied the suppres
sion motion after finding that the stop was lawful and
Brendlin was not seized until Brokenbrough ordered him
out of the car and formally arrested him. Brendlin
——————
1 The parties dispute the accuracy of the transcript of the suppression
hearing and disagree as to whether Brendlin gave his name or the false
name “Bruce Brown.” App. 115.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 3
Opinion of the Court
pleaded guilty, subject to appeal on the suppression issue,
and was sentenced to four years in prison.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the denial of
the suppression motion, holding that Brendlin was seized
by the traffic stop, which they held unlawful. 8 Cal. Rptr.
3d 882 (2004) (officially depublished). By a narrow major
ity, the Supreme Court of California reversed. The State
Supreme Court noted California’s concession that the
officers had no reasonable basis to suspect unlawful opera
tion of the car, 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1114, 136 P. 3d 845, 848
(2006),2 but still held suppression unwarranted because a
passenger “is not seized as a constitutional matter in the
absence of additional circumstances that would indicate to
a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the
peace officer’s investigation or show of authority,” id., at
1111, 136 P. 3d, at 846. The court reasoned that Brendlin
was not seized by the traffic stop because Simeroth was its
exclusive target, id., at 1118, 136 P. 3d, at 851, that a
passenger cannot submit to an officer’s show of authority
while the driver controls the car, id., at 1118–1119, 135
P. 3d, at 851–852, and that once a car has been pulled off
the road, a passenger “would feel free to depart or other
wise to conduct his or her affairs as though the police were
not present,” id., at 1119, 136 P. 3d, at 852. In dissent,
Justice Corrigan said that a traffic stop entails the seizure
of a passenger even when the driver is the sole target of
police investigation because a passenger is detained for
the purpose of ensuring an officer’s safety and would not
feel free to leave the car without the officer’s permission.
Id., at 1125, 136 P. 3d, at 856.
We granted certiorari to decide whether a traffic stop
——————
2 California conceded that the police officers lacked reasonable suspi
cion to justify the traffic stop because a “ ‘vehicle with an application for
renewal of expired registration would be expected to have a temporary
operating permit.’ ” 38 Cal. 4th, at 1114, 136 P. 3d, at 848 (quoting
Brief for Respondent California in No. S123133 (Sup. Ct. Cal.), p. 24).
4 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
subjects a passenger, as well as the driver, to Fourth
Amendment seizure, 549 U. S. __ (2007). We now vacate.
II
A
A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to
challenge the government’s action under the Fourth
Amendment when the officer, “ ‘by means of physical force
or show of authority,’ ” terminates or restrains his freedom
of movement, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U. S. 429, 434 (1991)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968)),
“through means intentionally applied,” Brower v. County
of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original).
Thus, an “unintended person . . . [may be] the object of the
detention,” so long as the detention is “willful” and not
merely the consequence of “an unknowing act.” Id., at
596; cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 844
(1998) (no seizure where a police officer accidentally
struck and killed a motorcycle passenger during a high-
speed pursuit). A police officer may make a seizure by a
show of authority and without the use of physical force,
but there is no seizure without actual submission; other
wise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned. See California v. Ho
dari D., 499 U. S. 621, 626, n. 2 (1991); Lewis, supra, at
844, 845, n. 7.
When the actions of the police do not show an unambi
guous intent to restrain or when an individual’s submis
sion to a show of governmental authority takes the form of
passive acquiescence, there needs to be some test for
telling when a seizure occurs in response to authority, and
when it does not. The test was devised by Justice Stewart
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 (1980), who
wrote that a seizure occurs if “in view of all of the circum
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave,” id., at
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 5
Opinion of the Court
554 (principal opinion). Later on, the Court adopted Jus
tice Stewart’s touchstone, see, e.g., Hodari D., supra, at
627; Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U. S. 567, 573 (1988);
INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 215 (1984), but added that
when a person “has no desire to leave” for reasons unre
lated to the police presence, the “coercive effect of the
encounter” can be measured better by asking whether “a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,” Bostick,
supra, at 435–436; see also United States v. Drayton, 536
U. S. 194, 202 (2002).
The law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a
traffic stop entails a seizure of the driver “even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653
(1979); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806,
809–810 (1996). And although we have not, until today,
squarely answered the question whether a passenger is
also seized, we have said over and over in dicta that dur
ing a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the vehicle,
not just the driver. See, e.g., Prouse, supra, at 653
(“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the Fourth
and Fourteenth] Amendments”); Colorado v. Bannister,
449 U. S. 1, 4, n. 3 (1980) (per curiam) (“There can be no
question that the stopping of a vehicle and the detention of
its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S.
420, 436–437 (1984) (“[W]e have long acknowledged that
stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants consti
tute a seizure” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 226 (1985) (“[S]topping a
car and detaining its occupants constitute a seizure”);
Whren, supra, at 809–810 (“Temporary detention of indi
viduals during the stop of an automobile by the police,
even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,
6 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning of
[the Fourth Amendment]”).
We have come closest to the question here in two cases
dealing with unlawful seizure of a passenger, and neither
time did we indicate any distinction between driver and
passenger that would affect the Fourth Amendment
analysis. Delaware v. Prouse considered grounds for
stopping a car on the road and held that Prouse’s suppres
sion motion was properly granted. We spoke of the arrest
ing officer’s testimony that Prouse was in the back seat
when the car was pulled over, see 440 U. S., at 650, n. 1,
described Prouse as an occupant, not as the driver, and
referred to the car’s “occupants” as being seized, id., at
653. Justification for stopping a car was the issue again in
Whren v. United States, where we passed upon a Fourth
Amendment challenge by two petitioners who moved to
suppress drug evidence found during the course of a traffic
stop. See 517 U. S., at 809. Both driver and passenger
claimed to have been seized illegally when the police
stopped the car; we agreed and held suppression unwar
ranted only because the stop rested on probable cause.
Id., at 809–810, 819.
B
The State concedes that the police had no adequate
justification to pull the car over, see n. 2, supra, but ar
gues that the passenger was not seized and thus cannot
claim that the evidence was tainted by an unconstitutional
stop. We resolve this question by asking whether a rea
sonable person in Brendlin’s position when the car stopped
would have believed himself free to “terminate the en
counter” between the police and himself. Bostick, supra,
at 436. We think that in these circumstances any reason
able passenger would have understood the police officers
to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car
was free to depart without police permission.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 7
Opinion of the Court
A traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger
has chosen just as much as it halts the driver, diverting
both from the stream of traffic to the side of the road, and
the police activity that normally amounts to intrusion on
“privacy and personal security” does not normally (and did
not here) distinguish between passenger and driver.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 554
(1976). An officer who orders one particular car to pull
over acts with an implicit claim of right based on fault of
some sort, and a sensible person would not expect a police
officer to allow people to come and go freely from the
physical focal point of an investigation into faulty behavior
or wrongdoing. If the likely wrongdoing is not the driving,
the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion
owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing
is only bad driving, the passenger will expect to be subject
to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would
be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the
officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the
first place. Cf. Drayton, supra, at 197–199, 203–204 (find
ing no seizure when police officers boarded a stationary
bus and asked passengers for permission to search for
drugs).3
It is also reasonable for passengers to expect that a
police officer at the scene of a crime, arrest, or investiga
tion will not let people move around in ways that could
jeopardize his safety. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S.
408 (1997), we held that during a lawful traffic stop an
officer may order a passenger out of the car as a precau
——————
3 Of course, police may also stop a car solely to investigate a passen
ger’s conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp.
2d 627, 629, n. 1 (Md. 2001) (passenger’s violation of local seatbelt law);
People v. Roth, 85 P. 3d 571, 573 (Colo. App. 2003) (passenger’s viola
tion of littering ordinance). Accordingly, a passenger cannot assume,
merely from the fact of a traffic stop, that the driver’s conduct is the
cause of the stop.
8 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
tionary measure, without reasonable suspicion that the
passenger poses a safety risk. Id., at 414–415; cf. Pennsyl
vania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106 (1977) (per curiam) (driver
may be ordered out of the car as a matter of course). In
fashioning this rule, we invoked our earlier statement that
“ ‘[t]he risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is
minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned
command of the situation.’ ” Wilson, supra, at 414 (quot
ing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 702–703 (1981)).
What we have said in these opinions probably reflects a
societal expectation of “ ‘unquestioned [police] command’ ”
at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to
leave, or to terminate the personal encounter any other
way, without advance permission. Wilson, supra, at 414.4
Our conclusion comports with the views of all nine
Federal Courts of Appeals, and nearly every state court, to
have ruled on the question. See United States v. Kimball,
25 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 1994); United States v. Mosley, 454
F. 3d 249, 253 (CA3 2006); United States v. Rusher, 966
F. 2d 868, 874, n. 4 (CA4 1992); United States v. Grant,
349 F. 3d 192, 196 (CA5 2003); United States v. Perez, 440
F. 3d 363, 369 (CA6 2006); United States v. Powell, 929
F. 2d 1190, 1195 (CA7 1991); United States v. Ameling,
328 F. 3d 443, 446–447, n. 3 (CA8 2003); United States v.
Twilley, 222 F. 3d 1092, 1095 (CA9 2000); United States v.
Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F. 3d 1158, 1163–1164 (CA10 1995);
State v. Bowers, 334 Ark. 447, 451–452, 976 S. W. 2d 379,
381–382 (1998); State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 405–
406, 679 P. 2d 1123, 1123–1124 (1984); People v. Bunch,
——————
4 Although the State Supreme Court inferred from Brendlin’s decision
to open and close the passenger door during the traffic stop that he was
“awar[e] of the available options,” 38 Cal. 4th 1107, 1120, 136 P. 3d
845, 852 (2006), this conduct could equally be taken to indicate that
Brendlin felt compelled to remain inside the car. In any event, the test
is not what Brendlin felt but what a reasonable passenger would have
understood.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 9
Opinion of the Court
207 Ill. 2d 7, 13, 796 N. E. 2d 1024, 1029 (2003); State v.
Eis, 348 N. W. 2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hodges,
252 Kan. 989, 1002–1005, 851 P. 2d 352, 361–362 (1993);
State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St. 3d 57, 63, 630 N. E. 2d 355,
360 (1994) (per curiam); State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243,
253–258, 557 N. W. 2d 245, 249–251 (1996). And the
treatise writers share this prevailing judicial view that a
passenger may bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to
the legality of a traffic stop. See, e.g., 6 W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure §11.3(e), pp. 194, 195, and n. 277 (4th ed.
2004 and Supp. 2007) (“If either the stopping of the car,
the length of the passenger’s detention thereafter, or the
passenger’s removal from it are unreasonable in a Fourth
Amendment sense, then surely the passenger has stand
ing to object to those constitutional violations and to have
suppressed any evidence found in the car which is their
fruit” (footnote omitted)); 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Sei
zures, Arrests and Confessions §11:20, p. 11–98 (2d ed.
2007) (“[A] law enforcement officer’s stop of an automobile
results in a seizure of both the driver and the passenger”).5
C
The contrary conclusion drawn by the Supreme Court of
California, that seizure came only with formal arrest,
reflects three premises as to which we respectfully dis
agree. First, the State Supreme Court reasoned that
Brendlin was not seized by the stop because Deputy Sher
iff Brokenbrough only intended to investigate Simeroth
and did not direct a show of authority toward Brendlin.
The court saw Brokenbrough’s “flashing lights [as] di
rected at the driver,” and pointed to the lack of record
evidence that Brokenbrough “was even aware [Brendlin]
——————
5 Only two State Supreme Courts, other than California’s, have stood
against this tide of authority. See People v. Jackson, 39 P. 3d 1174,
1184–1186 (Colo. 2002) (en banc); State v. Mendez, 137 Wash. 2d 208,
222–223, 970 P. 2d 722, 729 (1999) (en banc).
10 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
was in the car prior to the vehicle stop.” 38 Cal. 4th, at
1118, 136 P. 3d, at 851. But that view of the facts ignores
the objective Mendenhall test of what a reasonable pas
senger would understand. To the extent that there is
anything ambiguous in the show of force (was it fairly seen
as directed only at the driver or at the car and its occu
pants?), the test resolves the ambiguity, and here it leads
to the intuitive conclusion that all the occupants were
subject to like control by the successful display of author
ity. The State Supreme Court’s approach, on the contrary,
shifts the issue from the intent of the police as objectively
manifested to the motive of the police for taking the inten
tional action to stop the car, and we have repeatedly re
jected attempts to introduce this kind of subjectivity into
Fourth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U. S.,
at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”); Chesternut,
486 U. S., at 575, n. 7 (“[T]he subjective intent of the
officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth
Amendment implications of police conduct only to the
extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person
confronted”); Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 554, n. 6 (principal
opinion) (disregarding a Government agent’s subjective
intent to detain Mendenhall); cf. Rakas, 439 U. S., at 132–
135 (rejecting the “target theory” of Fourth Amendment
standing, which would have allowed “any criminal defen
dant at whom a search was directed” to challenge the
legality of the search (internal quotation marks omitted)).
California defends the State Supreme Court’s ruling on
this point by citing our cases holding that seizure requires
a purposeful, deliberate act of detention. See Brief for
Respondent 9–14. But Chesternut, supra, answers that
argument. The intent that counts under the Fourth
Amendment is the “intent [that] has been conveyed to the
person confronted,” id., at 575, n. 7, and the criterion of
willful restriction on freedom of movement is no invitation
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 11
Opinion of the Court
to look to subjective intent when determining who is
seized. Our most recent cases are in accord on this point.
In Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, we considered whether a seizure
occurred when an officer accidentally ran over a passenger
who had fallen off a motorcycle during a high-speed chase,
and in holding that no seizure took place, we stressed that
the officer stopped Lewis’s movement by accidentally
crashing into him, not “through means intentionally ap
plied.” Id., at 844 (emphasis deleted). We did not even
consider, let alone emphasize, the possibility that the
officer had meant to detain the driver only and not the
passenger. Nor is Brower, 489 U. S. 593, to the contrary,
where it was dispositive that “Brower was meant to be
stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock—and
that he was so stopped.” Id., at 599. California reads this
language to suggest that for a specific occupant of the car
to be seized he must be the motivating target of an offi
cer’s show of authority, see Brief for Respondent 12, as if
the thrust of our observation were that Brower, and not
someone else, was “meant to be stopped.” But our point
was not that Brower alone was the target but that officers
detained him “through means intentionally applied”; if the
car had had another occupant, it would have made sense
to hold that he too had been seized when the car collided
with the roadblock. Neither case, then, is at odds with our
holding that the issue is whether a reasonable passenger
would have perceived that the show of authority was at
least partly directed at him, and that he was thus not free
to ignore the police presence and go about his business.
Second, the Supreme Court of California assumed that
Brendlin, “as the passenger, had no ability to submit to
the deputy’s show of authority” because only the driver
was in control of the moving vehicle. 38 Cal. 4th, at 1118,
1119, 136 P. 3d, at 852. But what may amount to submis
sion depends on what a person was doing before the show
of authority: a fleeing man is not seized until he is physi
12 BRENDLIN v. CALIFORNIA
Opinion of the Court
cally overpowered, but one sitting in a chair may submit to
authority by not getting up to run away. Here, Brendlin
had no effective way to signal submission while the car
was still moving on the roadway, but once it came to a stop
he could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside.
Third, the State Supreme Court shied away from the
rule we apply today for fear that it “would encompass even
those motorists following the vehicle subject to the traffic
stop who, by virtue of the original detention, are forced to
slow down and perhaps even come to a halt in order to
accommodate that vehicle’s submission to police author
ity.” Id., at 1120, 136 P. 3d, at 853. But an occupant of a
car who knows that he is stuck in traffic because another
car has been pulled over (like the motorist who can’t even
make out why the road is suddenly clogged) would not
perceive a show of authority as directed at him or his car.
Such incidental restrictions on freedom of movement
would not tend to affect an individual’s “sense of security
and privacy in traveling in an automobile.” Prouse, 440
U. S., at 662. Nor would the consequential blockage call
for a precautionary rule to avoid the kind of “arbitrary and
oppressive interference by [law] enforcement officials with
the privacy and personal security of individuals” that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to limit. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U. S., at 554.6
Indeed, the consequence to worry about would not flow
from our conclusion, but from the rule that almost all
courts have rejected. Holding that the passenger in a
——————
6 California claims that, under today’s rule, “all taxi cab and bus pas
sengers would be ‘seized’ under the Fourth Amendment when the cab
or bus driver is pulled over by the police for running a red light.” Brief
for Respondent 23. But the relationship between driver and passenger
is not the same in a common carrier as it is in a private vehicle, and the
expectations of police officers and passengers differ accordingly. In
those cases, as here, the crucial question would be whether a reason
able person in the passenger’s position would feel free to take steps to
terminate the encounter.
Cite as: 551 U. S. ____ (2007) 13
Opinion of the Court
private car is not (without more) seized in a traffic stop
would invite police officers to stop cars with passengers
regardless of probable cause or reasonable suspicion of
anything illegal.7 The fact that evidence uncovered as a
result of an arbitrary traffic stop would still be admissible
against any passengers would be a powerful incentive to
run the kind of “roving patrols” that would still violate the
driver’s Fourth Amendment right. See, e.g., Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 273 (1973) (stop
and search by Border Patrol agents without a warrant or
probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment); Prouse,
supra, at 663 (police spot check of driver’s license and
registration without reasonable suspicion violated the
Fourth Amendment).
* * *
Brendlin was seized from the moment Simeroth’s car
came to a halt on the side of the road, and it was error to
deny his suppression motion on the ground that seizure
occurred only at the formal arrest. It will be for the state
courts to consider in the first instance whether suppres
sion turns on any other issue. The judgment of the Su
preme Court of California is vacated, and the case is re
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
——————
7 Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 663 (1979) (requiring
“at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” to support random,
investigative traffic stops), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 880–884 (1975) (same), with Whren v. United States, 517
U. S. 806, 810 (1996) (“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reason
able where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred”), and Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U. S. 318, 354
(2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual
has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he
may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”).